A 


yyr 


■'A 


THE  LIBRARY 

OF 

THE  UNIVERSITY 

OF  CALIFORNIA 

LOS  ANGELES 


1 


i    a  3 


GIFT  OF 

.  E.  F.   Ducok 


Digitized  by  the  Internet  Archive 

in  2008  with  funding  from 

Microsoft  Corporation 


http://www.archive.org/details/dataofethicsOOspen 


THE 

DATA  OF  ETHICS 


BY 

HERBERT  SPENCER 


DONOHUE   BROTHERS 

CHICAGO — NEW  YORK 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER  I. 

PAGE 

Conduct  in  General 1 1 

CHAPTER  II. 

The  Evolution  of  Conduct 17 

CHAPTER  III. 

Good  and  Bad  Conduct 32 

CHAPTER  IV. 
Ways  of  Judging  Conduct 62 

CHAPTER  V. 
The  Physical  View 82 

CHAPTER  VI. 

The  Biological  View 95 

CHAPTER  VH. 

The  Psychological  View 127 

CHAPTER  VIII. 
The  Sociological  View 162 

CHAPTER  IX. 
Criticisms  and  Explanations 183 

CHAPTER  X. 
The  Relativity  of  Pains  and  Pleasures 210 

CHAPTER  XI. 
Egoism  versus  Altruism •?•••« 223 

1004813 


vi  CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER  XII. 

PAGH 

Altruism  versus  Egoism 241 

CHAPTER  XIII. 
Trial  and  Compromise 261 

CHAPTER  XIV. 
Conciliatiou 287 

CHAPTER  XV. 
Absolute  and  Relative  Ethics 306 

CHAPTER  XVI. 
The  Scope  of  Ethics , 33g 


AUTHOR'S   PREFACE. 


A  reference  to  the  programme  of  the  "  System  of 
Synthetic  Philosophy "  will  show  that  the  chapters 
herewith  issued  constitute  the  first  division  of  the  work 
on  the  Principles  of  Morality,  with  which  the  System 
ends.  As  the  second  and  third  volumes  of  the  Prin- 
ciples of  Sociology  are  as  yet  unpublished,  this  install- 
ment of  the  succeeding  work  appears  out  of  its  place. 

I  have  been  led  thus  to  deviate  from  the  order  origi- 
nally set  down  by  the  fear  that  persistence  in  conform- 
ing to  it  might  result  in  leaving  the  final  work  of  the 
series  unexecuted.  Hints,  repeated  of  late  years  with 
increasing  frequency  and  distinctness,  have  shown  me 
that  health  may  permanently  fail,  even  if  life  does  not 
end,  before  I  reach  the  last  part  of  the  task  I  have 
marked  out  for  myself.  This  last  part  of  the  task  it 
is  to  which  I  regard  all  the  preceding  parts  as  sub- 
sidiary. Written  as  far  back  as  1842,  my  first  essay, 
consisting  of  letters  on  TJie  Proper  Sphere  of  G-overn- 
ment,  vaguely  indicated  what  I  conceived  to  be  certain 
general  principles  of  right  and  wrong  in  political  con- 
duct, and  from  that  time  onward  my  ultimate  purpose, 
lying  behind  all  proximate  purposes,  has  been  that  of 
finding  for  the  principles  of  right  and  wrong,  in  con- 
duct at  large,  a  scientific  basis.     To  leave  this  purpose 


6  A  UTIWR  S  PREFA  CE. 

unfulfilled,  after  making  so  extensive  a  preparation  for 
fulfilling  it,  would  be  a  failure  the  probability  of  which 
I  do  not  like  to  contemplate,  and  I  am  anxious  to  pre- 
clude it,  if  not  wholly,  still  partially.  Hence  the  step 
I  now  take.  Though  this  first  division  of  the  work 
terminating  the  Synthetic  Philosophy,  cannot,  of  course, 
contain  the  specific  conclusions  to  be  set  forth  in  the 
entire  work,  yet  it  implies  them  in  such  wise  that* 
definitely  to  formulate  them  requires  nothing  beyond 
logical  deduction. 

I  am  the  more  anxious  to  indicate  in  outline,  if  I 
cannot  complete,  this  final  work,  because  the  establish- 
ment of  rules  of  right  conduct  on  a  scientific  basis  is 
a  pressing  need.  Now,  that  moral  injunctions  are  los- 
ing the  authority  given  by  their  supposed  sacred  origin, 
the  secularization  of  morals  is  becoming  imperative. 
Few  things  can  happen  more  disastrous  than  the  decay 
and  death  of  a  regulative  system  no  longer  fit,  before 
another  and  fitter  regulative  system  has  grown  up  to 
replace  it.  Most  of  those  who  reject  the  current  creed 
appear  to  assume  that  the  controlling  agency  furnished 
by  it  may  safely  be  thrown  aside,  and  the  vacancy  left 
unfilled  by  any  other  controlling  agency.  Meanwhile, 
those  who  defend  the  current  creed  allege  that  in  the 
absence  of  the  guidance  it  yields,  no  guidance  can 
exist:  divine  commandments  they  think  the  only  pos- 
sible guides.  Thus,  between  these  extreme  opponents, 
there  is  a  certain  community.  The  one  holds  that  the 
gap  left  by  disappearance  of  the  code  of  supernatural 
ethics  need  not  he  filled  by  a  code  of  natural  ethics, 
and  the  other  holds  thai  it  cannol  be  so  filled.  Both 
contemplate  a  vacuum,  which  the  one  wishes  and  the 
other  fears.     As  the  change  which  promises  or  threat- 


AUTnORS  PREFACE.  7 

ens  to  bring  about  this  state,  desired  or  dreaded,  is 
rapidly  progressing,  those  who  believe  that  the  vacuum 
can  be  filled,  and  that  it  must  be  filled,  are  called  on  to 
do  something  in  pursuance  of  their  belief. 

To  this  more  special  reason  I  may  add  a  more  general 
reason.  Great  mischief  has  been  done  by  the  repellent 
aspect  habitually  given  to  moral  rule  by  its  expositors, 
and  immense  benefits  are  to  be  anticipated  from  present- 
ing moral  rule  under  that  attractive  aspect  which  it  has 
when  undistorted  by  superstition  and  asceticism.  If  a 
father,  sternly  enforcing  numerous  commands,  some 
needful  and  some  needless,  adds  to  his  severe  control  a 
behavior  wholly  unsympathetic ;  if  his  children  have  to 
take  their  pleasures  by  stealth,  or,  when  timidly  looking 
up  from  their  play,  ever  meet  a  cold  glance  or  more  fre- 
quently a  frown,  his  government  will  inevitably  be  dis- 
liked, if  not  hated,  and  the  aim  will  be  to  evade  it  as 
much  as  possible.  Contrariwise,  a  father  who,  equally 
firm  in  maintaining  restraints  needful  for  the  well-being 
of  his  children  or  the  well-being  of  other  persons,  not 
only  avoids  needless  restraints,  but,  giving  his  sanction 
to  all  legitimate  gratifications  and  providing  the  means 
for  them,  looks  on  at  their  gambols  with  an  approving 
smile,  can  scarcely  fail  to  gain  an  influence  which,  no 
less  efficient  for  the  time  being,  will  also  be  permanent- 
ly efficient.  The  controls  of  such  two  fathers  symbolize 
the  controls  of  Morality  as  it  is  and  Morality  as  it 
should  be. 

Nor  does  mischief  result  only  from  this  undue  severity 
of  the  ethical  doctrine  bequeathed  us  by  the  harsh  past. 
Further  mischief  results  from  the  impracticability  of  its 
ideal.  In  violent  reaction  against  the  utter  selfishness 
of  life  as  carried  on  in  barbarous  societies,  it  has  insisted 


8  A  UTUOR'  S  PHEFA  CE. 

on  a  life  utterly  unselfish.  But  just  as  the  rampant 
egoism  of  a  brutal  militancy  was  not  to  be  remedied  by 
attempts  at  the  absolute  subjection  of  the  ego  in  con- 
vents and  monasteries,  so  neither  is  the  misconduct 
of  ordinary  humanity,  as  now  existing,  to  be  remedied 
by  upholding  a  standard  of  abnegation  beyond  human 
achievement.  Rather  the  effect  is  to  produce  a  despair- 
ing abandonment  of  all  attempts  at  a  higher  life.  And 
not  only  does  an  effort  to  achieve  the  impossible  end  in 
this  way,  but  it  simultaneously  discredits  the  possible. 
By  association  with  rules  that  cannot  be  obeyed,  rules 
that  can  be  obeyed  lose  their  authority. 

Much  adverse  comment  will,  I  doubt  not,  be  passed 
on  the  theory  of  right  conduct  which  the  following 
pages  shadow  forth.  Critics  of  a  certain  class,  far  from 
rejoicing  that  ethical  principles  otherwise  derived  by 
them,  coincide  with  ethical  principles  scientifically  de- 
rived, are  offended  by  the  coincidence.  Instead  of  rec- 
ognizing essential  likeness  they  enlarge  on  superficial 
difference.  Since  the  days  of  persecution,  a  curious 
change  has  taken  place  in  the  behavior  of  so-called 
orthodoxy  toward  so-called  heterodoxy.  The  time  was 
when  a  heretic,  forced  by  torture  to  recant,  satisfied 
authority  by  external  conformity:  apparent  agreement 
sufficed,  however  profound  continued  to  be  the  real 
reement!  But  now  that  the  heretic  can  no  longer 
be  coerced  into  professing  the  ordinary  belief,  his  belief 
is  made  to  appear  as  much  opposed  to  the  ordinary  as 
ble.  Docs  he  diverge  from  established  theological 
dogma?  Then  he  shall  be  an  atheist;  however  inad- 
missible he  considers  the  term.  Does  he  think  spirit, 
ualistio  interpretations  of  phenomena  not  valid?  Then 
he  shall  be  classed  as  a  materialist ;  indignantly  though 


AUTHORS  PREFACE.  D 

he  repudiates  the  name.  And  in  like  manner,  whal  dif- 
ferences exist  between  natural  molality  and  super- 
natural morality,  it  has  become  the  policy  to  exaggerate 
into  fundamental  antagonisms.  In  pursuance  of  this 
policy,  there  will  probably  be  singled  out  for  reprobation 
from  this  volume,  doctrines  which,  taken  by  themselves, 
may  readily  be  made  to  seem  utterly  wrong.  With  a 
view  to  clearness,  I  have  treated  separately  sonic  correl- 
ative aspects  of  conduct,  drawing  conclusions  either  of 
which  becomes  untrue  if  divorced  from  the  other ;  and 
have  thus  given  abundant  opportunity  for  misrepresent 
ation. 

The  relations  of  this  work  to  works  preceding  it  in 
the  series  are  such  as  to  involve  frequent  reference. 
Containing,  as  it  does,  the  outcome  of  principles  set 
forth  in  each  of  them,  I  have  found  it  impracticable  to 
dispense  with  re-statements  of  those  principles.  Fur- 
ther, the  presentation  of  them  in  their  relations  to  dif- 
ferent ethical  theories,  has  made  it  needful,  in  every 
case,  briefly  to  remind  the  reader  what  they  are,  and 
how  they  are  derived.  Hence  an  amount  of  repetition 
which  to  some  will  probably  appear  tedious.  I  do  not, 
however,  much  regret  this  almost  unavoidable  result ; 
for  only  by  varied  iteration  can  alien  conceptions  be 
forced  on  reluctant  minds. 

June.  187  (J. 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


CHAPTER  I. 

CONDUCT  IN   GENERAL. 

§  1.  The  doctrine  that  correlatives  imply  one  an- 
other— that  a  father  cannot  be  thought  of  without 
thinking  of  a  child,  and  that  there  can  be  no  conscious- 
ness of  superior  without  a  consciousness  of  inferior — 
has  for  one  of  its  common  examples  the  necessary  con- 
nection between  the  conceptions  of  whole  and  part. 
Beyond  the  primaiy  truth  that  no  idea  of  a  whole  can 
be  framed  without  a  nascent  idea  of  parts  constituting 
it,  and  that  no  idea  of  a  part  can  be  framed  without  a 
nascent  idea  of  some  whole  to  which  it  belongs,  there 
is  the  secondary  truth  that  there  can  be  no  correct  idea 
of  a  part  without  a  correct  idea  of  the  correlative  whole. 
There  are  several  ways  in  which  inadequate  knowledge 
of  the  one  involves  inadequate  knowledge  of  the  other. 

If  the  part  is  conceived  without  any  reference  to  the 
whole,  it  becomes  itself  a  whole — an  independent 
entity ;  and  its  relations  to  existence  in  general  are 
misapprehended.  Further,  the  size  of  the  part  as  com- 
pared with  the  size  of  the  whole  must  be  misappre- 
hended unless  the  whole  is  not  only  recognized  as  in- 
cluding  it,  but  is   figured  in  its    total  extent.      And 

11 


1  '2  TTTE  T)A  TA   OF  ETUICS. 

again,  the  position  which  the  part  occupies  in  relation 
to  other  parts  cannot  be  rightly  conceived  unless  there 
is  some  conception  of  the  whole  in  its  distribution  as 
well  as  in  its  amount. 

Still  more  when  part  and  whole,  instead  of  being 
statically  related  only,  are  dynamically  related,  must 
there  be  a  general  understanding1  of  the  whole  before 
the  part  can  be  understood.  By  a  savage  who  has 
never  seen  a  vehicle,  no  idea  can  be  formed  of  the  use 
and  action  of  a  wheel.  To  the  unsymmetrically- 
pierced  disk  of  an  eccentric,  no  place  or  purpose  can  be 
ascribed  by  a  rustic  unacquainted  with  machinery. 
Even  a  mechanician,  if  he  has  never  looked  into  a 
piano,  will,  if  shown  a  damper,  be  unable  to  conceive 
its  function  or  relative  value. 

.Must  of  all,  however,  where  the  whole  is  organic, 
does  complete  comprehension  of  a  part  imply  extensive 
comprehension  of  the  whole.  Suppose  a  being  igno- 
rant of  the  human  body  to  find  a  detached  arm.  If  not 
misconceived  by  him  as  a  supposed  whole,  instead  of 
being  conceived  as  a  part,  still  its  relations  to  other 
parts,  and  its  structure,  would  be  wholly  inexplicable. 
Admitting  that  the  co-operation  of  its  bones  and  mus- 
cles tni'jlit  be  divined,  yet  no  thought  could  be  framed 
of  the  Bhare  taken  by  the  arm  in  the  actions  of  the  un- 
known whole  it  belonged  to ;  nor  could  any  interpreta- 
tion be  put  upon  the  nerves  and  vessels  ramifying 
through  it,  which  severally  refer  to  certain  central 
organs.  A  theory  of  the  structure  of  the  arm  implies 
a  theory  of  the  structure  of  the  body  at  large. 

And  this  truth  holds  not  of  material  aggregates  only, 

but    of    immaterial    aggregates — aggregated    motions, 

.  thoughts,  words.     The  moon's   movements  can- 


CONDUCT  IN  GENERAL.  13 

not  be  fully  interpreted  without  taking  into  account 
the  movements  of  the  Solar  System  at  large.  The 
process  of  loading  a  gun  is  meaningless  until  tin'  sub- 
sequent  actions  performed  with  the  gun  an;  known. 
A  fragment  of  a  sentence,  if  not  unintelligible,  is 
wrongly  interpreted  in  the  absence  of  the  remainder. 
Cut  off  its  beginning  and  end,  and  the  rest  of  a  demon- 
stration proves  nothing.  Evidence  given  by  a  plaintiff 
often  misleads  until  the  evidence  which  the  defendant 
produces  is  joined  with  it. 

§  2.  Conduct  is  a  whole ;  and,  in  a  sense,  it  is  an 
organic  whole — an  aggregate  of  inter-dependent  actions 
performed  by  an  organism.  That  division  or  aspect  of 
conduct  with  which  Ethics  deals,  is  a  part  of  this 
organic  whole — a  part  having  its  components  inextri- 
cably bound  up  with  the  rest.  As  currently  conceived, 
stirring  the  fire,  or  reading  a  newspaper,  or  eating  a 
meal,  are  acts  with  which  Morality  has  no  concern. 
Opening  the  window  to  air  the  room,  putting  on  an 
overcoat  when  the  weather  is  cold,  are  thought  of  as 
having  no  ethical  significance.  These,  however,  are 
all  portions  of  conduct.  The  behavior  we  call  good 
and  the  behavior  we  call  bad,  are  included,  along  with 
the  behavior  we  call  indifferent,  under  the  conception 
of  behavior  at  largfe.  The  whole  of  which  Ethics 
forms  a  part,  is  the  whole  constituted  by  the  theory 
of  conduct  in  general ;  and  this  whole  must  be  tinder- 
stood  before  the  part  can  be  understood.  Let  us  con- 
sider this  proposition  more  closely. 

And  first,  how  shall  we  define  conduct?  It  is  not 
co-extensive  with  the  aggregate  of  actions,  though  it  is 
nearly  so.    Such  actions  as  those  of  an  epileptic  in  a 


14  THE  DATA  OF  ETniCS. 

fit  are  not  included  in  our  conception  of  conduct :  the 
conception  excludes  purposeless  actions.  And  in  recog_ 
nizing  this  exclusion,  we  simultaneously  recognize  all 
that  is  included.  The  definition  of  conduct  which 
emerges  is  either  acts  adjusted  to  ends,  or  else  the 
adjustment  of  acts  to  ends,  according  as  we  contem- 
plate the  formed  body  of  acts,  or  think  of  the  form 
alone.  And  conduct  in  its  full  acceptation  must  be 
taken  as  comprehending  all  adjustments  of  acts  to  ends, 
from  the  simplest  to  the  most  complex,  whatever  their 
special  natures  and  whether  considered  separately  or  in 
their  totality. 

Conduct  in  general  being  thus  distinguished  from  the 
somewhat  larger  whole  constituted  by  actions  in  gen- 
eral, let  us  next  ask  what  distinction  is  habitually  made 
between  the  conduct  on  which  ethical  judgments  are 
passed  and  the  remainder  of  conduct.  As  already  said, 
a  large  part  of  ordinary  conduct  is  indifferent.  Shall  I 
walk  to  the  waterfall  to-day  ?  or  shall  I  ramble  along 
the  sea-shore  ?  Here  the  ends  are  ethically  indifferent, 
If  I  go  to  the  waterfall,  shall  I  go  over  the  moor  or  take 
the  path  through  the  wood?  Here  the  means  are 
ethically  indifferent.  And  from  hour  to  hour  most  of 
the  tilings  we  do  are  not  to  be  judged  as  either  good  or 
bad  in  respect  of  either  ends  or  means. 

No  less  clear  is  it  that  the  transition  from  indifferent 
acts  to  acts  which  are  good  or  bad  is  gradual.  If  a 
friend  who  is  with  me  has  explored  the  sea-shore,  but 
ttot  seen  the  waterfall,  the  choice  of  one  or  other 
end  is  no  longer  ethically  indifferent.  And  if,  the 
waterfall  being  fixed  on  as  our  goal,  the  way  over  the 
moor  is  too  long  for  his  strength,  while  the  shorter 
way  through  the  wood  is  not,  the  choice  of  means  is 


CONDUCT  IN  GEN Ell AL.  15 

no  longer  ethically  indifferent.  Again,  if  a  probable 
result  of  making  the  one  excursion  rather  than  the 
other,  is  that  I  shall  not  be  back  in  time  to  keep  an 
appointment,  or  if  taking  the  longer  route  entails  this 
risk  while  taking  the  shorter  does  not,  the  decision  in 
favor  of  one  or  other  end  or  means  acquires  in  another 
way  an  ethical  character ;  and  if  the  appointment  is 
one  of  some  importance,  or  one  of  great  importance,  or 
one  of  life-and-death  importance,  to  self  or  others,  the 
ethical  character  becomes  pronounced.  These  instances 
will  sufficiently  suggest  the  truth  that  conduct  with 
which  Morality  is  not  concerned,  passes  into  conduct 
which  is  moral  or  immoral,  by  small  degrees  and  in 
countless  ways. 

But  the  conduct  that  has  to  be  conceived  scientific- 
ally before  we  can  scientifically  conceive  those  modes 
of  conduct  which  are  the  objects  of  ethical  judgments, 
is  a  conduct  immensely  wider  in  range  than  that  just 
indicated.  Complete  comprehension  of  conduct  is  not 
to  be  obtained  by  contemplating  the  conduct  of  human 
beings  only ;  we  have  to  regard  this  as  a  part  of  uni- 
versal conduct — conduct  as  exhibited  by  all  living 
creatures.  For  evidently  this  comes  within  our  defini- 
tion— acts  adjusted  to  ends.  The  conduct  of  the  higher 
animals  as  compared  witli  that  of  man,  and  the  conduct 
of  the  lower  animals  as  compared  with  that  of  the 
higher,  mainly  differ  in  this,  that  the  adjustments  of 
acts  to  ends  are  relatively  simple  and  relatively  incom- 
plete. And  as  in  other  cases,  so  in  this  case,  we  must 
interpret  the  more  developed  by  the  less  developed. 
Just  as,  fully  to  understand  the  part  of  conduct  which 
Ethics  deals  with,  we  must  study  human  conduct  as  a 
whole ;  so,  fully  to   understand  human   conduct   as   a 


16  THE  DATA   OF  ETHICS. 

whole,  we  must  study  it  as  a  part  of  that  larger  whole 
constituted  by  the  conduct  of  animate  beings  in  gen- 
eral. 

Nor  is  even  this  whole  conceived  with  the  needful 
fullness,  so  long  as  we  think  only  of  the  conduct  at 
present  displayed  around  us.  We  have  to  include  in 
our  conception  the  less-developed  conduct  out  of  which 
this  has  arisen  in  course  of  time.  We  have  to  regard 
the  conduct  now  shown  us  by  creatures  of  all  orders, 
as  an  outcome  of  the  conduct  which  has  brought  life  of 
every  kind  to  its  present  height.  And  this  is  tanta- 
mount to  saving  that  our  preparatory  step  must  be  to 
study  the  evolution  of  conduct. 


THE  EVOLUTION  OF  CONDUCT. 


CHAPTER  II. 

THE  EVOLUTION   OF   CONDUCT. 

§  3.  We  have  become  quite  familiar  with  the  idea  of 
an  evolution  of  structures  throughout  the  ascending 
types  of  animals.  To  a  considerable  degree  Ave  have 
become  familiar  with  the  thought  that  an  evolution  of 
functions  has  gone  on  pari  passu  with  the  evolution 
of  structures.  Now,  advancing  a  step,  we  have  to 
frame  a  conception  of  the  evolution  of  conduct,  as 
correlated  with  this  evolution  of  structures  and 
functions. 

These  three  subjects  are  to  be  definitely  distinguished. 
Obviously  the  facts  comparative  morphology  sets  forth, 
form  a  whole  which,  though  it  cannot  be  treated  in 
general  or  in  detail  without  taking  into  account  tacts 
belonging  to  comparative  physiology,  is  essentially  in- 
dependent. No  less  clear  is  it  that  we  may  devote  our 
attention  exclusively  to  that  progressive  differentiation 
of  functions,  and  combination  of  functions,  which  ac- 
companies  the  development  of  structures — may  say  no 
more  about  the  characters  and  connections  of  organs 
than  is  implied  in  describing  their  separate  and  joint 
actions.  And  the  subject  of  conduct  lies  outside  the 
subject  of  functions,  if  not  as  far  as  this  lies  outside  the 
subject  of  structures,  still,  far  enough  to  make  it  sub- 
stantially separate.  For  those  functions  which  are 
already  variously  compounded  to  achieve  what  wo 
2 


1  -  TITE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 

regard  as  single  bodily  acts,  are  endlessly  recompounded 
to  achieve  that  coordination  of  bodily  acts  which  is 
known  as  conduct. 

We  arc  concerned  with  functions  in  the  true  sense, 
while  we  think  of  them  as  processes  carried  on  within 
the  body;  and,  without  exceeding  the  limits  of  physi- 
ology,  we  may  treat  of  their  adjusted  combinations, 
BO  long  as  these  are  regarded  as  parts  of  the  vital 
consensus.  If  we  observe  how  the  lungs  aerate  the 
blood  which  the  heart  sends  to  them;  how  heart  and 
lungs  together  supply  aerated  blood  to  the  stomach, 
and  so  enable  it  to  do  its  work  ;  how  these  co-operate 
with  sundry  secreting  and  excreting  glands  to  further 
digestion  and  to  remove  waste  matter  ,•  and  how  all  of 
them  join  to  keep  the  brain  in  a  fit  condition  for  carry- 
ing on  those  actions  which  indirectly  conduce  to  main- 
tenance of  the  life  at  large  ;  we  are  dealing  with  func- 
tions. Even  when  considering  how  parts  that  act 
directly  on  the  environment — legs,  arms,  wings — per- 
forin their  duties,  we  are  still  concerned  with  functions 
in  that  aspect  of  them  constituting  physiology,  so  long 
as  we  restrict  our  attention  to  internal  processes,  and 
to  internal  combinations  of  them. 

But   we  enter  on   the  subject  of  conduct  when  we 

i  to  study  such  combinations  among  the  actions 
of  sensory  and  motor  organs  as  are  externally  niaiii- 

d.  Suppose  that  instead  of  observing  those  con- 
traction- of  muscles  by  which  the  optic  axes  are  con- 
verged  and  the  foci  of  the  eyes  adjusted  (which  is  a 
portion  of  physiology),  and  that  instead  of  observing 

co-operation  of  other  nerves,  muscles  and  bones, 
by  which  a  hand  is  moved  to  a  particular  place  and  the 
fingers  closed  (which  is  also  a  portion  of  physiology), 


TUE  EVOLUTION  OF  CONDUCT.  19 

We  observe  a  weapon  being  seized  by  a  hand  under 
guidance  of  the  eyes.  We  now  pass  from  the  thought 
of  combined  internal  functions  to  the  thought  of  com- 
bined external  motions.  Doubtless,  if  we  could  trace 
the  cerebral  processes  which  accompany  these,  we 
should  find  an  inner  physiological  co-ordination  cor- 
responding with  the  outer  co-ordination  of  actions. 
But  this  admission  is  consistent  with  the  assertion, 
that  when  we  ignore  the  internal  combination  and 
attend  only  to  the  external  combination,  we  pass  from 
a  portion  of  physiology  to  a  portion  of  conduct.  For 
though  it  may  be  objected  that  the  external  combina- 
tion instanced  is  too  simple  to  be  rightly  included 
under  the  name  conduct,  yet  a  moment's  thought  shows 
that  it  is  joined  with  what  we  call  conduct  by  insensible 
gradations.  Suppose  the  weapon  seized  is  used  to  ward 
off  a  blow.  Suppose  a  counter-blow  is  given.  Suppose 
the  aggressor  runs  and  is  chased.  Suppose  there  comes 
a  struggle  and  a  handing  him  over  to  the  police. 
Suppose  there  follow  the  many  and  varied  acts  consti- 
tuting a  prosecution.  Obviously  the  initial  adjustment 
of  an  act  to  an  end,  inseparable  from  the  rest,  must  be 
included  with  them  under  the  same  general  head  ;  and 
obviously  from  this  initial  simple  adjustment,  having 
intrinsically  no  moral  character,  we  pass  by  degrees  to 
the  most  complex  adjustments  and  to  those  on  which 
moral  judgments  are  passed. 

Hence,  excluding  all  internal  co-ordinations,  our 
subject  here  is  the  aggregate  of  all  external  co-ordina- 
tions ;  and  this  aggregate  includes  not  only  the  sim- 
plest as  well  as  the  most  complex  performed  by  human 
beings,  but  also  those  performed  by  all  inferior  beings 
considered  as  less  or  more  evolved. 


THE  DATA  OF  ETIIICS. 

v?  4.  Already  the  question:  What  constitutes  ad- 
vance in  the  evolution  of  conduct,  as  we  trace  it  up 
from  the  lowest  types  of  living  creatures  to  the 
highest  ?  has  been  answered  hy  implication.  A  few 
examples  will  now  bring  the  answer  into  conspicuous 
relief. 

We  saw  that  conduct  is  distinguished  from  the 
totality  of  actions  by  excluding  purposeless  actions ; 
but  during  evolution  this  distinction  arises  by  degrees. 
In  the  very  lowest  creatures  most  of  the  movements 
from  moment  to  moment  made,  have  not  more  recogniz- 
able aims  than  have  the  struggles  of  an  epileptic.  An 
infusorium  swims  randomly  about,  determined  in  its 
course  not  by  a  perceived  object  to  be  pursued  or 
escaped,  but,  apparently,  by  varying  stimuli  in  its 
medium  ;  and  its  acts,  unadjusted  in  any  appreciable 
way  to  ends,  lead  it  now  into  contact  with  some  nutri- 
tive substance  which  it  absorbs,  and  now  into  the  neigh- 
borhood of  some  creature  by  which  it  is  swallowed  and 

ted.     Lacking  those  developed  senses  and  motor 

;s  which  higher  animals  possess,  ninety-nine  in  the 
hundred  of  these  minute  animals,  severally  living  for 
but  a  few  hours,  disappear  either  by  innutrition  or  by 

iiction.  The  conduct  is  constituted  of  actions  so 
little  adjusted  to  ends,  that  life  continues  only  as  long 
ae  the  accidents  of  the  environment  are  favorable'.  But 
when,  among  aquatic  creatures,  we  observe  one  which, 

rh  still  low  in  type,  is  much  higher  than  the  in- 
fusorium— say  a  rotifer — we  see  how,  along  with  larger 
size,  more  developed  structures,  and  greater  power  of 
combining  functions,  there  goes  an  advance  in  conduct. 
We  Bee  how  by  its  whirling  cilia  it  sucks  in  as  food 
these  small  animals  moving  around ;  how  by  its  prehen- 


THE  EVOLUTION  OF  CONDUCT.  21 

sile  tail  it  fixes  itself  to  some  fit  object;  how  by  with- 
drawing its  outer  organs  and  contracting  its  body,  it 
preserves  itself  from  this  or  that  injury  from  time  to 
time  threatened;  and  how  thus,  by  better  adjusting  its 
own  actions,  it  becomes  less  dependent  on  the  actions 
going  on  around,  and  so  preserves  itself  for  a  longer 
period. 

A  superior  sub-kingdom,  as  the  Mollusca,  still  better 
exemplifies  this  contrast.  When  we  compare  a  low 
mollusc,  such  as  a  floating  ascidian,  with  a  high  mol- 
lusc, such  as  a  cephalopod,  we  are  again  shown  that 
greater  organic  evolution  is  accompanied  by  more 
evolved  conduct.  At  the  mercy  of  everymarine  creat- 
ure large  enough  to  swallow  it,  and  drifted  about  by 
currents  which  may  chance  to  keep  it  at  sea,  or  may 
chance  to  leave  it  fatally  stranded,  the  ascidian  dis- 
plays but  little  adjustment  of  acts  to  ends  in  compari- 
son with  the  cephalopod  ;  which,  now  crawling  over  the 
beach,  now  exploring  the  rocky  crevices,  now  swim- 
ming through  the  open  water,  now  darting  after  a  fish, 
now  hiding  itself  from  some  larger  animal  in  a  cloud  of 
ink,  and  using  its  suckered  arms  at  one  time  for  anchor- 
ing itself  and  at  another  for  holding  fast  its  prey;  se- 
lects and  combines  and  proportions  its  movements  from 
minute  to  minute,  so  as  to  evade  dangers  which  threaten, 
while  utilizing1  chances  of  food  which  offer :  so  showing 
da  varied  activities  which,  in  achieving  special  ends, 
achieve  the  general  end  of  securing  continuance  of  the 
activities. 

Among  vertebrate  animals  we  similarly  trace  up, 
along  with  advance  in  structures  and  functions,  this 
advance  in  conduct.  A  fish  roaming  about  at  hazard 
in  search  of  something  to  eat,  able  to  detect  it  by  smell 


■2-2  TUE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 

or  sight  only  within  short  distances,  and  now  and  again 
rushing  away  in  alarm  on  the  approach  of  a  bigger  fish, 
makes  adjustments  of  acts  to  ends  that  are  relatively 
few  and  simple  in  their  kinds  :  and  shows  us,  as  a  con- 
sequence, how  small  is  the  average  duration  of  life.  So 
few  survive  to  maturity  that,  to  make  up  for  destruc- 
tion of  unhatched  young  and  small  fry  and  half-grown 
individuals,  a  million  ova  have  to  be  spawned  by  a  cod- 
fish that  two  may  reach  the  spawning  age.  Conversely, 
by  a  highly-evolved  mammal,  such  as  an  elephant,  those 
general  actions  performed  in  common  with  the  fish  are 
far  better  adjusted  to  their  ends.  By  sight  as  well,  prob- 
ably, as  by  odor,  it  detects  food  at  relatively  great  dis- 
tances :  and  when,  at  intervals,  there  arises  a  need  for 
e,  relatively  great  speed  is  attained.  But  the  chief 
difference  arises  from  the  addition  of  new  sets  of  adjust- 
ments. We  Lav<-  combined  actions  which  facilitate  nu- 
trition— the  breaking  off  of  succulent  and  fruit-bearing 
branches,  the  selecting  of  edible  growths  throughout  a 
comparatively  wide  reach;  and.  in  case  of  danger, safety 
can  l»e  achieved  not  by  flight  only,  but,  if  necessary,  by 

:  attack:  bringing  into  combined  use  tusks, 
trunk  and  ponderous  feet.  Further,  we  see  various 
subsidiary  acta  adjusted  to  subsidiary  ends — now  the 
going  into  a  river  for  coolness,  and  using  the   trunk  as 

■  if  projecting  water  over  the  body;   now   the 

employment  of  a  bough  for  sweeping  away  flies  from 

the  back  ;  now  the  making  of  signal  sounds  to  alarm 

the  herd,  and  adapting  the  actions  to  such  sounds  when 

Evidently,  the   effect   of   this   more 

highly-evolved  conduct  is  to  secure  the  balance  of  the 

:iic  actions  throughout  far  longer  periods. 

And  now,  on  studying  the  doings  of  the  highest  of 


THE  EVOL  UTION  OF  COX  I)  Ui  T.  23 

mammals,  mankind,  we  not  only  find  that  the  adjust- 
ments of  acts  to  ends  are  both  more  numerous  and  bet- 
ter than  among  lower  mammals,  but  we  find  the  same 
thing  on  comparing  the  doings  of  higher  races  of  men 
with  those  of  lower  races.  If  we  take  any  one  of  the 
major  ends  achieved,  we  see  greater  completene- 
achievement  by  civilized  than  by  savage ;  and  we  also 
see  an  achievement  of  relatively  numerous  minor  ends 
subserving  major  ends.  Is  it  in  nutrition  ?  The  food 
is  obtained  more  regularly  in  response  to  appetite  ;  it  is 
far  higher  in  quality  ;  it  is  free  from  dirt  ;  it  is  greater 
in  variety ;  it  is  better  prepared.  Is  it  in  warmth  ? 
The  characters  of  the  fabrics  and  forms  of  the  articles 
used  for  clothing,  and  the  adaptations  of  them  to  re- 
quirements from  day  to  day  and  hour  to  hour,  are  much 
superior.  Is  it  in  dwellings  ?  Between  the  shelter  of 
boughs  and  grass  which  the  lowest  savage  builds,  and 
the  mansion  of  the  civilized  man,  the  contrast  in  aspect 
is  not  more  extreme  than  is  the  contrast  in  number  and 
efficiency  of  the  adjustments  of  acts  to  ends  betrayed  in 
their  respective  constructions.  And  when  with  the 
ordinary  activities  of  the  savage  we  compare  the  ordi- 
nary civilized  activities — as  the  business  of  the  trader, 
which  involves  multiplied  and  complex  transactions  ex- 
tending over  long  periods,  or  as  professional  avocations, 
prepared  for  by  elaborate  studies,  and  daily  carried  on 
in  endlessly  varied  forms,  or  as  political  discussions  and 
agitations,  directed  now  to  the  carrying  of  this  measure 
and  now  to  the  defeating  of  that — we  see  sets  of  adjust- 
ments of  acts  to  ends,  not  only  immensely  exceeding 
those  seen  among  lower  races  of  men  in  variety  and 
intricacy,  but  sets  to  which  lower  races  of  men  present 
nothing  analogous.     And  along  with  this  greater  elab- 


•1 4  THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 

oration  of  life  produced  by  the  pursuit  of  more  numer- 
ous ends,  there  goes  that  increased  duration  of  life 
which  constitutes  the  supreme  end. 

And  here  is  suggested  the  need  for  supplementing 
this  conception  of  evolving  conduct.  For  besides  being 
an  improving  adjustment  of  acts  to  ends,  such  as  fur- 
thers prolongation  of  life,  it  is  such  as  furthers  in- 
creased amount  of  life.  Reconsideration  of  the  ex- 
amples above  given  will  show  that  length  of  life  is  not 
by  itself  a  measure  of  evolution  of  conduct;  but  that 
quantity  of  life  must  be  taken  into  account.  An.  oys- 
ter,  adapted  by  its  structure  to  the  diffused  food  con- 
tained in  the  water  it  draws  in,  and  shielded  by  its  shell 
from  nearly  all  dangers,  may  live  longer  than  a  cuttle- 
fish, which  has  such  superior  powers  of  dealing  with 
numerous  contingencies;  but  then,  the  sum  of  vital 
activities  during  any  given  interval  is  far  less  in  (he 
:  than  in  the  cuttle-fish.  So  a  worm,  ordinarily 
sheltered  from  mosl  enemies  by  the  earth  it  burrows 
through,  which  also  supplies  a  sufficiency  of  its  poor 
food,  may  have  greater  longevity  than  many  of  its  an- 
nulose  relatives,  the  insects ;  but  one  of  these,  during 
sxistence  as  larva  and  imago,  may  experience  a 
greater  quantity  of  the  changes  which  constitute  life. 
Nor  is  it  otherwise  when  we  compare  the  more  evolved 

with  the  less  evolved  among  mankind.      The   difference 

between  ihe  average  Lengths  of  the  lives  of  savage  and 
civilized  La  no  true  measure  of  the  difference  between 
the  totalities  of  their  two  Lives,  considered  as  aggregates 
of  thought,  feeling  and  action.     Hence,  estimating  life 

by  multiplying  its  length  into  its   breadth,  we  must  say 

lie  augmentation  of  it.  which  accompanies  evolu- 
tion of  conduct,  results   from  increase  of  both  factors. 


THE  EVOLUTION  OF  CONDUCT.  25 

The  more  multiplied  and  varied  adjustments  of  acts  to 
ends,  by  which  the  more  developed  creature  from  hour 
to  hour  fulfills  more  numerous  requirements,  severally 
add  to  the  activities  that  are  carried  on  abreast,  and 
Beyerally help  to  make  greater  tin'  period  through  which 
such  simultaneous  activities  endure.  Each  further 
evolution  of  conduct  widens  the  aggregate  of  actions 
while  conducing  to  elongation  of  it. 

§  5.  Turn  we  now  to  a  further  aspect  of  the  phenom- 
ena, separate  from,  but  necessarily  associated  with,  the 
last.  Thus  far  we  have  considered  only  those  adjust- 
ments of  acts  to  ends  which  have  for  their  final  purpose 
complete  individual  life.  Now  we  have  to  consider 
those  adjustments  which  have  to  their  final  purpose  the 
life  of  the  species. 

Self-preservation  in  each  generation  has  all  along  de- 
pended on  the  preservation  of  offspring  by  preceding 
generations.  And  in  proportion  as  evolution  of  the  con- 
duet  subserving  individual  life  is  high,  implying  high 
organization,  there  must  previously  have  been  a  highly- 
evolved  conduct  subserving  nurture  of  the  young. 
Throughout  the  ascending  grades  of  the  animal  king- 
dom, this  second  kind  of  conduct  presents  stages  of  ad- 
vance like  those  which  we  have  observed  in  the  first. 
Low  down,  where  structures  and  functions  are  little  de- 
veloped, and  the  power  of  adjusting  acts  to  ends  but. 
slight,  there  is  no  conduct,  properly  so  named,  furthering 
salvation  of  the  species.  Race-maintaining  conduct, 
like  self-maintaining  conduct,  arises  gradually  out  iA' 
that  which  cannot  be  called  conduct :  adjusted  actions 
are  preceded  by  unadjusted  ones. 

Protozoa  spontaneously  divide  and  sub-divide,  in  con- 


26  TUE  DATA  OF  ETIIICS. 

sequence  of  physical  changes  over  which  they  have  no 
control ;  or,  at  other  times,  after  a  period  of  quiescence, 
break  up  into  minute  portions  which  severally  grow  into 
new  individuals.  In  neither  case  can  conduct  be  al- 
leged. Higher  up,  the  process  is  that  of  ripening,  at 
intervals,  germ-cells  and  sperm-cells,  which,  on  occasion, 
are  sent  forth  into  the  surrounding  water  and  left  to 
their  fate :  perhaps  one  in  ten  thousand  surviving  to 
maturity.  Here,  again,  we  see  only  development  and 
dispersion  going  on  apart  from  parental  care.  Types 
above  these,  as  fish  which  choose  fit  places  in  which  to 
deposit  their  ova,  or  as  the  higher  crustaceans  which 
carry  masses  of  ova  about  until  they  are  hatched,  ex- 
hibit adjustments  of  acts  to  ends  which  we  may  properly 
call  conduct,  though  it  is  of  the  simplest  kind.  Where, 
as  ;unong  certain  fish,  the  male  keeps  guard  over  the 
eggs,  driving  away  intruders,  there  is  an  additional  ad- 
justment of  acts  to  ends;  and  the  applicability  of  the 
name  conduct  is  more  decided. 

Passing  at  once  to  creatures  far  superior,  such  as  birds, 
which,  building  nests  and  sitting  on  their  eggs,  feed 
their  broods  for  considerable  periods,  and  give  them  aid 
after  they  can  fly  ;  or  such  as  mammals  which,  suckling 
their  young  for  a  time,  continue  afterward  to  bring  them 
fund  or  protect  them  while  they  feed,  until  they  reach 
at  which  they  can  provide  for  themselves;  we  are 
shown  how  this  conduct  which  furthers  race-mainte- 
nance evolves  hand-in-hand  with  the  conduct  which 
furthers  self-maintenance.  That  better  organization 
which  makes  possible  the  last,  makes  possible  the  first 
also. 

Mankind  exhibit  a  great  progress  of  like  nature. 
Compared  with  brutes,  the  savage,  higher  in  his  self- 


THE  EVOLUTION  OF  CONDUCT.  27 

maintaining  conduct,  is  higher  too  in  his  race-maintain- 
ing conduct.  A  larger  number  of  the  wants  of  off- 
spring are  provided  for:  and  parental  care,  enduring 
longer,  extends  to  the  disciplining  of  offspring  in  arts 
and  habits  which  fit  them  for  their  conditions  of  exist- 
ence.' Conduct  of  this  order,  equally  with  conduct  of 
the  first  order,  we  see  becoming  evolved  in  a  still 
greater  degree  as  we  ascend  from  savage  to  civilized. 
The  adjustments  of  acts  to  ends  in  the  rearing  of  chil- 
dren become  far  more  elaborate,  alike  in  number  of  ends 
met,  variety  of  means  used,  and  efficiency  of  their  adap- 
tations ;  and  the  aid  and  oversight  are  continued 
throughout  a  much  greater  part  of  early  life. 

In  tracing  up  the  evolution  of  conduct,  so  that  we 
may  frame  a  true  conception  of  conduct  in  general,  we 
have  thus  to  recognize  these  two  kinds  as  mutually  de- 
pendent. Speaking  generally,  neither  can  evolve  with- 
out evolution  of  the  other ;  and  the  highest  evolutions 
of  the  two  must  be  reached  simultaneously. 

§  6.  To  conclude,  however,  that  on  reaching  a  per- 
fect adjustment  of  acts  to  ends  subserving  individual 
life  and  the  rearing  of  offspring,  the  evolution  of  con- 
duct becomes  complete,  is  to  conclude  erroneously.  Or 
rather,  I  should  say,  it  is  an  error  to  suppose  that  either 
of  these  kinds  of  conduct  can  assume  its  highest  form, 
without  its  highest  form  being  assumed  by  a  third  kind 
of  conduct  yet  to  be  named. 

The  multitudinous  creatures  of  all  kinds  which  fill 
the  earth,  cannot  live  wholly  apart  from  one  another, 
but  are  more  or  less  in  presence  of  one  another — are 
interfered  with  by  one  another.  In  large  measure  the 
adjustments  of  acts  to  ends  which  we  have  been  con- 


•N  TllK  DATA    OF  ETHICS. 

sidering,  are  components  of  that  "struggle  for  exist- 
ence" carried  on  both  between  members  of  the  same 
species  and  between  members  of  different  species;  and, 
very  generally,  a  successful  adjustment  made  by  one 
creature  involves  an  unsuccessful  adjustment  made  by 
another  creature,  either  of  the  same  kind  or  of  a  differ- 
ent kind.  That  the  carnivore  may  live  herbivores  must 
die  :  and  that  Its  young  may  be  reared  the  young  of 
weaker  creatures  must  be  orphaned.  Maintenance  of 
the  hawk  and  its  broods  involves  the  deaths  of  many 
small  birds:  and  that  small  birds  may  multiply,  their 
progeny  must  be  fed  with  innumerable  sacrificed  worms 
ami  larva1.  Competition  among  member's  of  the  same 
species  has  allied,  though  less  conspicuous,  results. 
The  stronger  of  ten  carries  off  by  force  the  prey  which 
the  vveaker  h;is  caught.  Monopolizing  certain  hunting 
grounds,  the  more  ferocious  drive  others  of  their  kind 
into  less  favorable  places.  With  plant-eating  animals, 
too,  the  like  holds:  the  better  food  is  secured  by  the 
more  vigorous  individuals,  while  the  less  vigorous  and 
[i'i\,  succumb  either  directly  from  innutrition  or 
indirectly  from  resulting  inability  to  escape  enemies. 
That  is  to  say.  among  creatures  whose  lives  are  carried 
on  antagonistically,  each  of  the  two  kinds  of  conduct 
delineated    above,   must    remain    imperfectly    evolved. 

in  such  few  kinds    of  them    as    have    little   to    fear 

from  enemies  or  competitors,  as  lions  or  tigers,  there  is 
still  inevitable  failure  in  the  adjustments  of  acts  to  ends 
toward    tin  of    Life.     Death   by  starvation   from 

inability  to  catch  prey,  shows  a  falling  short  of  conduct 
from  il  a  idi  al. 

This  imperfectly-evolved   conduct   introduces    us  by 
Lduct  that  is  perfectly  evolved.     Con- 


Til  K  E \ 'OL UTION  OF  COND UCT.  29 

femplating  these  adjustments  of  acts  to  ends  which  miss 
completeness  because  they  cannot  be  made  by  one  creat- 
ure without  other  creatures  being  prevented  from  mak- 
ing them,  raises  the  thought  of  adjustments  such  that 
each  creature  may  make  them  without  preventing  them 
from  being  made  by  other  creatures.  That  the  highest 
form  of  conduct  must  be  so  distinguished,  is  an  inevi- 
table implication  ;  for,  while  the  form  of  conduct  is  such 
that  adjustments  of  acts  to  ends  by  some  necessitate 
non-adjustments  by  others,  there  remains  room  for  modi- 
fications which  bring  cqnduct  into  a  form  avoiding  this, 
and  so  making  the  totality  of  life  greater. 

From  the  abstract  let  us  pass  to  the  concrete.  Rec- 
ognizing men  as  the  beings  whose  conduct  is  most 
evolved,  let  us  ask  under  what  conditions  their  conduct, 
in  all  three  aspects  of  its  evolution,  reaches  its  limit, 
Clearly  while  the  lives  led  are  entirely  predatory,  as 
those  of  savages,  the  adjustments  of  acts  to  ends  fall 
short  of  this  highest  form  of  conduct  in  every  way. 
Individual  life,  ill  carried  on  from  hour  to  hour,  is  pre- 
maturely cut  short  ;  the  fostering  of  offspring  often 
fails,  and  is  incomplete  when  it  docs  not  fail  ;  and  in 
so  far  as  the  ends  of  self-maintenance  and  race-main- 
tenance are  met,  they  are  met  by  destruction  of  other 
beings  of  different  kind  or  of  Like  kind.  In  social 
groups  formed  by  compounding  and  re-compounding 
primitive  hordes,  conduct  remains  imperfectly  evolved 
in  proportion  as  then  continue  antagonisms  between 
the  groups  and  antagonisms  between  members  of  the 
same  group — two  traits  necessarily  associated  ;  since 
the  nature  which  prompts  international  aggression 
prompts  aggression  of  individuals  on  one  another. 
Hence  the  limit  of  evolution  can  be  reached  by  conduct 


30  THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 

only  in  permanently  peaceful  societies.  That  perfect 
adjustment  of  acts  to  ends  in  maintaining  individual 
life  and  rearing  new  individuals,  which  is  effected  by 
each  without  hindering  others  from  effecting  like  per- 
fect adjustments,  is,  in  its  very  definition,  shown  to  con- 
stitute a  kind  of  conduct  that  can  be  approached  only 
as  war  decreases  and  dies  out. 

A  gap  in  this  outline  must  now  be  filled  up.  There 
remains  a  further  advance  not  yet  even  hinted.  For 
beyond  so  behaving  that  each  achieves  his  ends  without 
preventing  others  from  achieving  their  ends,  the  mem- 
bers of  a  society  may  give  mutual  help  in  the  achieve- 
ment of  ends.  And  if,  either  indirectly  by  industrial 
co-operation,  or  directly  by  volunteered  aid,  fellow-citi- 
zens can  make  easier  for  one  another  the  adjustments 
of  acts  to  ends,  then  their  conduct  assumes  a  still  higher 
phase  of  evolution;  since  whatever  facilitates  the  mak- 
ing of  adjustments  by  each,  increases  the  totality  of  the 
adjustments  made,  and  serves  to  render  the  lives  of  all 
more  complete. 

§  7.  The  reader  who  recalls  certain  passages  in  First 
Principles,  in  the  Principles  of  Biology,  and  in  the  Prin- 
ciples "J'  Psychology,  will  perceive  above  a  restatement, 
in  another  form,  of  generalizations  set  forth  in  those 
works.  Especially  will  he  be  reminded  of  the  proposi- 
tion that  Life  is  "the  definite  combination  of  hetero- 
sis changes,  both  simultaneous  and  successive,  in 
correspondr-nce  with  external  co-existences  and  se- 
quences;"  and  still  more  of  that  abridged  and  less 
specific  formula,  in  which  Life  is  said  to  be  "  the  con- 
tinuous adjustment  of  internal  relations  to  external  re- 
lations." 


THE  EVOLUTION  OF  CONDUCT.  31 

The  presentation  of  the  facts  here  made  differs  from 
the  presentations  before  made,  mainly  by  ignoring  the 
inner  part  of  the  correspondence  and  attending  ex- 
clusively to  that  outer  part  constituted  of  visible  actions. 
But  the  two  are  in  harmony  ;  and  the  reader  who  wishes 
further  to  prepare  himself  for  dealing  with  our  present 
topic  from  the  evolution  point  of  view,  may  advanta- 
geously join  to  the  foregoing  more  special  aspect  of  the 
phenomena,  the  more  general  aspects  before  delineated. 

After  this  passing  remark,  I  recur  to  the  main  prop- 
osition set  forth  in  these  two  chapters,  which  has,  I 
think,  been  fully  justified.  Guided  by  the  truth  that  as 
the  conduct  with  which  Ethics  deals  is  part  of  conduct 
at  large,  conduct  at  large  must  be  generally  understood 
before  this  part  can  be  specially  understood  ;  and  guided 
by  the  further  truth  that  to  understand  conduct  at  large 
we  must  understand  the  evolution  of  conduct,  we  have 
been  led  to  see  that  Ethics  has  for  its  subject-matter 
that  form  which  universal  conduct  assumes  during  the 
last  stages  of  its  evolution.  We  have  also  concluded 
that  these  last  stages  in  the  evolution  of  conduct  are 
those  displayed  by  the  highest  type  of  being,  when  he  is 
forced,  by  increase  of  numbers,  to  live  more  and  more 
in  presence  of  his  fellows.  And  there  has  followed  the 
corollary  that  conduct  gains  ethical  sanction  in  propor- 
tion as  the  activities,  becoming  less  and  less  militant  and 
more  and  more  industrial,  are  such  as  do  not  necessitate 
mutual  injury  or  hinderance,  but  consist  with,  and  are 
furthered  by,  co-operation  and  mutual  aid. 

These  implications  of  the  Evolution-Hypothesis,  we 
shall  now  see  harmonize  with  the  leading  moral  idea* 
men  have  otherwise  reached. 


o2  T11E  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


CHAPTER  III. 

GOOD   AND   BAD   CONDUCT. 

§  8.  By  comparing  its  meanings  in  different  connec- 
tions and  observing  what  they  have  in  common,  we  learn 
the  essential  meaning  of  a  word ;  and  the  essential 
meaning  of  a  word  that  is  variously  applied,  may  best 
be  learned  by  comparing  with  one  another  those  applica- 
tions of  it  which  diverge  most  widely.  Let  us  thus 
ascertain  what  good  and  bad  mean. 

In  which  cases  do  we  distinguish  as  good,  a  knife,  a 
gun,  a  house?  And  what  trait  leads  us  to  speak  of  a 
bad  umbrella  or  a  1  Mil  pair  of  boots?  The  characters 
here  predicted  by  the  words  good  and  bad,  are  not 
intrinsic  characters ;  for  apart  from  human  wants,  such 
things  have  neither  merits  nor  demerits.  We  call  these 
articles  good  or  had  according  as  they  are  well  or  ill 
adapted  to  achieve  prescribed  ends.  The  good  knife  is 
one  which  will  cut;  the  good  gun  is  one  which  carries 
to' and  time;  the  good  house  is  one  which  duly  yields 
the  shelter,  comfort,  and  accommodation  sought  for. 
Conversely,  the  badness  alleged  of  the  umbrella  or  the 
pair  of  boots,  refers  1"  their  failures  in  fulfilling  the 
of  keeping  <>IT  the  rain  and  comfortably  protecting 
the  feci,  with  due  regard  to  appearances. 

is  it  when  we  pass  from  inanimate  objects  toinani- 
actions.      We  call  a  day  had    in  which   storms  pre- 
vent us  from  satisfying  certain  of  our  desires.     A  good 


GOOD  AND  BAV  CONDUCT.  33 

season  is  tho  expression  used  when  the  weather  has 
favored  the  production  of  valuable  crops. 

If  from  lifeless  things  and  actions  we  pass  to  living 
ones,  we  similarly  find  that  these  words  in  their  current 
applications  refer  to  efficient  subservience.  The  goodness 
or  badness  of  a  pointer  or  a  hunter,  of  a  sheep  or  an  ox, 
ignoring  all  other  attributes  of  these  creatures,  refer  in 
the  one  case  to  the  fitness  of  their  actions  for  effecting 
the  ends  men  use  them  for,  and  in  the  other  case  to  the 
qualities  of  their  flesh  as  adapting  it  to  support  human 
life. 

And  those  doings  of  men  which,  morally  considered, 
are  indifferent,  we  class  as  good  or  bad  according  to 
their  success  or  failure.  A  good  jump  is  a  jump  which, 
remoter  ends  ignored,  well  achieves  the  immediate  pur- 
pose of  a  jump  ;  and  a  stroke  at  billiards  is  called  good 
when  the  movements  are  skillfully  adjusted  to  the  re- 
quirements, Oppositely,  the  badness  of  a  walk  that  is 
shuffling  and  an  utterance  that  is  indistinct,  is  alleged 
because  of  the  relative  non-adaptations  of  the  acts  to 
the  ends. 

Thus  recognizing  the  meanings  of  good  and  bad  as 
otherwise  used,  we  shall  understand  better  their  mean- 
ings as  used  in  characterizing  conduct  under  its  ethical 
aspects.  Here,  too,  observation  shows  that  we  apply 
them  according  as  the  adjustments  of  acts  to  ends  are, 
or  are  not,  efficient.  This  truth  is  somewhat  disguised. 
The  entanglement  of  social  relations  is  such  that  men's 
actions  often  simultaneously  affect  the  welfares  of  self, 
of  offspring,  and  of  fellow-citizens.  Hence  results  eon- 
fusion  in  judging  of  actions  as  good  or  bad  ;  since  actions 
well  fitted  to  achieve  ends  of  one  order,  may  prevent 
ends  of  the  other  orders  from  being  achieved.  Never- 
3 


34  TTLE  DATA  OF  ETIIIGS. 

tiheless,  when  we  disentangle  the  three  orders  of  end.-, 
and  consider  each  separately,  it  becomes  clear  that  the 
conduct  which  achieves  each  kind  of  end  is  regarded  as 
relatively  good  :  and  is  regarded  as  relatively  bad  if  it 
fails  to  achieve  it. 

Take    lirst    the    primary    set    of    adjustments — those 

subserving    individual    life.     Apart   from    approval  or 

proval  of  his  ulterior  aims,  a  man  who   rights  is 

said   to    make    a  good  defense,   if  his   defense    is  well 

adapted  for  self-preservation ;  and,   the    judgments    on 

other  aspects   of  his   conduct  remaining  the  same,  he 

brings  down  mi  himself  an  unfavorable  verdict,  in  so  far 

as  his  immediate  acts  are  concerned,  if  these  are  futile. 

The  goodness  ascribed  to  a  man  of  business,  as  such,  is 

measured  by   the   activity  and  ability  with  which  he 

buys  and  sells  to  advantage;  and  may  co-exist  with  a 

hard    treatment    of   dependents    which    is    reprobated. 

Though,  in  repeatedly  lending  money  to  a  friend  who 

sinks  one  loan  after  another,  a  man  is  doing  that  which, 

considered  in  itself,  is  held  praiseworthy;  yet, if  he  does 

it  to  the  extent  of  bringing  on  his  own  ruin,  he  is  held 

blameworthy  for  a  self-sacrifice  carried  too  far.     And 

thus  is  it  with  the  opinions  we  express  from  hour  to 

hour  on  those  ads  of  people  around  which  bear  on  their 

i    and    personal   welfare.     "You   should  not  have 

■  :  ""    is  I'n-  reproof  given  to  one  who  crosses  the 

amid  a  dangerous  rush  of  vehicles.     "You  ought 

banged  your  clothes  ;  '    is  said  to  another  who 

aken  cold  after  getting   wet.     "You  were   righl   to 

wrong   to    invest  without 

common  criticisms.     All  such  approving 

and   disapproving  utterances  make  the  tacit  assertion 

that,  other    things    equal,  conduct  is   right   or  wrong 


GOOD  AXD  BAD  CONDUCT. 

according  as  its  special  acts,  well  or  ill  adjusted  to 
special  ends,  do  or  do  not  further  the  general  end  of 
self-preservation. 

These  ethical  judgments  we  pass  on  self-regarding 
acts  are  ordinarily  little  emphasized;  partly  because 
the  promptings  of  the  self-regarding  desires,  generally 
strong  enough,  do  not  need  moral  enforcement,  and 
partly  because  the  promptings  of  the  other-regarding 
es,  less  strong,  and  often  overridden,  do  need 
moral  enforcement.  Hence  results  a  contrast.  On 
turning  to  that  second  class  of  adjustments  of  acta  to 
ends  which  subserve  the  rearing  of  offspring,  we  no 
longer  find  any  obscurity  in  the  application  of  the 
words  good  and  bad  to  them,  according  as  they  are 
efficient  or  inefficient.  The  expressions  good  nursing 
and  bad  nursing,  whether  they  refer  to  the  supply  of 
food,  the  quantity  and  amount  of  clothing,  or  the  due 
ministration  to  infantine  wants  from  hour  to  hour, 
tacitly  recognize  as  special  ends  which  ought  to  he 
fulfilled,  the  furthering  of  the  vital  functions,  with  a 
view  to  the  general  end  of  continued  life  and  growth. 
A  mother  is  called  good  who,  ministering  to  all  the 
physical  needs  of  her  children,  also  adjusts  her  behavior 
in  ways  conducive  to  their  mental  health  ;  and  a  bad 
father  is  one  who  either  does  not  provide  the  necessa- 
ries of  life  for  his  family  or  otherwise  acts  in  a  manner 
injurious  to  their  bodies  or  minds.  Similarly  of  the 
education  given  to  them,  or  provided  for  them.  Good- 
ness or  badness  is  affirmed  of  it  (often  with  little  consist- 
ency, however)  according  as  its  methods  are  so  adapted 
to  physical  andpsychical  requirements,  as  to  further  the 
children's  lives  for  the  time  being,  while  preparing  them 
for  carrying  on  complete  and  prolonged  adult  life. 


:;•;  the  dAl.i  or  ethics. 

Most  emphatic,  however,  are  the  applications  of  the 
words  good  and  bad  to  conduct  throughout  that  third 
division  of  it  comprising  the  deeds  by  which  men  affect 
one  another.  In  maintaining  their  own  lives  and  fos- 
tering their  offspring,  men's  adjustments  of  acts  to  ends 
are  so  apt  to  hinder  the  kindred  adjustments  of  other 
men,  that  insistence  on  the  needful  limitations  has  to 
be  perpetual;  and  the  mischiefs  caused  by  men's  inter- 
ferences with  one  another's  life-subserving  actions  are 
reat  that  the  interdicts  have  to  be  peremptory. 
Hence,  the  fact  that  the  words  good  and  bad  have  come 
to  be  specially  associated  with  acts  which  further  the 
complete  living  of  others  and  acts  which  obstruct  their 
complete  living.  Goodness,  standing  by  itself,  sug- 
.  above  all  other  things,  the  conduct  of  one  who 
aids  the  sick  in  re-acquiring  normal  vitality,  assists  the 
unfortunate  to  recover  the  means  of  maintaining  them- 
selves, defends  those;  who  are  threatened  with  harm  in 
person,  property,or  reputation,  and  aids  whatever  pi  an  1- 
bo  improve  the  living  of  all  his  fellows.  Contrari- 
.  badness  brings  to  mind,  as  its  leading  correlative, 
On-  conduct  of  one  who,  in  carrying  on  his  own  life, 
damages  the  lives  of  others  by  injuring  their  bodies, 
oying  their  possessions,  defrauding  them,  calum- 
niating them. 

Always,  then,  ads  are  called  good  or  bad  accord  in  g 
as  they  are  well  or  ill  adjusted  to  ends;  and  whatever 
inconsistency  there  is  in  our  uses  of  the  words  arises 
from  inconsistency  of  the  ends.  Here,  however,  the 
of  conduct  in  general,  and  of  the  evolution  of 
conduct,  have  prepared  us  to  harmonize  these  interpre- 
tations. The  foregoing  exposition  shows  that  the  con- 
duct to  which  we  apply  the  name  good,  is  the  relatively 


GOOD  AND  BAD  CONDUCT.  37 

more  evolved  conduct;  and  that  bad  is  the  name  we 
apply  to  conduct  which  is  relatively  less  evolved.  We 
saw  that  evolution,  tending  ever  toward  self-preserva- 
tion, reaches  its  limit  when  individual  life  is  the  great- 
est, both  in  length  and  breadth;  and  now  we  see  that, 
leaving  other  ends  aside,  we  regard  as  good  the  conduct 
furthering  self-preservation,  and  as  bad  the  conduct 
tending  to  self-destruction.  It  was  shown  that  along 
with  increasing  power  of  maintaining  individual  life, 
which  evolution  brings,  there  goes  increasing  power  of 
perpetuating  the  species  by  fostering  progeny,  and  that 
in  this  direction  evolution  reaches  its  limit  when  the 
needful  number  of  young,  preserved  to  maturity,  are 
then  lit  for  a  life  that  is  complete  in  fullness  and  dura- 
tion ;  and  here  it  turns  out  that  parental  conduct  is  called 
good  or  bad  as  it  approaches  or  falls  short  of  this  ideal 
result.  Lastly,  we  inferred  that  establishment  of  an 
associated  state,  both  makes  possible  and  requires  a  form 
of  conduct  such  that  life  may  be  completed  in  each  and 
in  his  offspring,  not  only  without  preventing  comple- 
tion of  it  in  others,  but  with  furtherance  of  it  in  others  ; 
and  we  have  found  above,  that  this  is  the  form  of  con- 
duct most  emphatically  termed  good.  Moreover,  just 
as  we  there  saw  that  evolution  becomes  the  highest  pos- 
sible when  the  conduct  simultaneously  achieves  the 
greatest  totality  of  life  in  self,  in  offspring,  and  in  fel- 
low men  ;  so  here  we  see  that  the  conduct  called  o-ood 
rises  to  the  conduct  conceived  as  best,  when  it  fulfills 
all  three  classes  of  ends  at  the  same  time. 

§  9.  Is  there  any  postulate  involved  in  these  judg- 
ments on  conduct  ?  Is  there  any  assumption  made  in 
calling  good  the  acts  conducive  to  life,  in  self  or  others, 


38  THE  J)  A  TA  OF  ETHICS. 

and  bad  those  which  directly  or  indirectly  tend  toward 
death,  special  or  general?  Yes;  an  assumption  of 
extreme  significance  has  been  made— -an  assumption 
underlying  all  moral  estimates. 

The  question  to  be  definitely  raised  and  answered  be- 
fore entering  on  any  ethical  discussion,  is  the  question 
of  late  much  agitated:  Is  life  worth  living?  Shall  we 
take  the  pessimist  view?  or  shall  we  take  the  optimist 
view?  or  shall  we,  after  weighing  pessimistic  and  op- 
timistic arguments,  conclude  that  the  balance  is  in  favor 
of  a  qualified  optimism  ? 

On  the  answer  to  this  question  depends  entirely  every 
decision  concerning  the  goodness  or  badness  of  conduct. 
By  those  who  think  life  is  not  a  benefit  but  a  misfortune, 
conduet  which  prolongs  it  is  to  be  blamed  rather  than 
praised  ;  the  ending  of  an  undesirable  existence  being 
the  thing  to  be  wished,  that  which  causes  the  ending  of 
it  must  be  applauded  ;  while  actions  furthering  its  con- 
tinuance, cither  in  self  or  others,  must  be  reprobated. 
Those  who,  on  the  other  hand,  take  an  optimistic  view, 
or  who.  if  not  pure  optimists,  yet  hold  that  in  life  the 
good  exceeds  the  evil,  are  committed  to  opposite  esti- 
:  and  must  regard  as  conduct  to  be  approved  that 
which  fosters  hie  in  self  and  others,  and  as  conduct 
to  be  disapproved  that  which  injures  or  endangers  life 
if  or  othi 

The  ultimate  question  therefore  is:  lias  evolution 
been  ;i  mistake  ;  and  especially  that  evolution  which 
improves  the-  adjustment  of  acts  to  ends  in  ascending 
ini/.aiion?  If  it  is  held  that  there  had 
I  not  have  been  an)-  animate  existence  at  all,  and 
that  the  sooner  it  comes  to  an  end  the  better;  then  one 
bet  of  conclusions  with  respect  to  conduct  emerges.     If, 


GOOD  AND  BAD  CONDUCT.  30 

contrariwise,  it  is  held  that  there  is  a  balance  in  favor  of 
animate  existence,  and  if,  still  further,  it  is  held  that 
in  the  future  this  balance  may  be  increased ;  then  the 
opposite  set  of  conclusions  emerges.  Even  should  it  be 
alleged  that  the  worth  of  life  is  not  to  be  judged  by  its 
intrinsic  character,  but  rather  by  its  extrinsic  sequences 
— by  certain  results  to  be  anticipated  when  life  has 
pissed — the  ultimate  issue  reappears  in  a  new  shape. 
For  though  the  accompanying  creed  may  negative  a  de- 
Liberate  shortening  of  life  that  is  miserable,  it  cannot 
justify  a  gratuitous  lengthening  of  such  life.  Legisla- 
tion conducive  to  increased  longevity  would,  on  the  pes- 
simistic view,  remain  blameable,  while  it  would  be  praise- 
worthy on  the  optimistic  view. 

But  now,  have  these  irreconcilable  opinions  anything 
in  common?  Men  being  divisible  into  two  schools  dif- 
fering on  this  ultimate  question,  the  inquiry  arises — Is 
there  anything  which  their  radically  opposed  views  alike 
take  for  granted?  In  the  optimistic  proposition,  tacitly 
made  when  using  the  words  good  and  bad  after  the  or- 
dinary manner  ;  and  in  the  pessimistic  proposition  overtly 
made,  which  implies  that  the  words  good  and  bad  should 
be  used  in  the  reverse  senses  ;  does  examination  disclose 
any  joint  proposition — any  proposition  which,  contained 
in  both  of  them,  may  be  held  more  certain  than  either — 
any  universally  asserted  proposition  ? 

§  10.  Yes,  there  is  one  postulate  in  which  pessimists 
and  optimists  agree.  Both  their  arguments  assume  it 
to  be  self-evident  that  life  is  good  or  bad,  according  as 
it  does,  or  does  not,  bring  a  surplus  of  agreeable  feeling. 
The  pessimist  says  he  condemns  life  because  it  results 
in  more  pain  than  pleasure.     The  optimist  defends  life 


40  THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 

in  the  belief  that  it  brings  more  pleasure  than  pain. 
Bach  makes  the  kind  of  sentiency  which  accompanies 
life  tlif  test.  They  agree  that  the  justification  for  life 
as  a  state  of  being,  turns  on  tins  issue — whether  the 
average  consciousness  rises  above  indifference-point  into 
pleasurable  feeling  or  falls  below  it  into  painful  feeling. 
Tin-  implication  common  to  their  antagonist  views  is, 
that  conduct  should  conduce  to  preservation  of  the  in- 
dividual, of  the  family,  and  of  the  society,  only  suppos- 
ing that  life  brings  more  happiness  than  misery. 

(banging  the  venue  cannot  alter  the  verdict.  If 
cither  the  pessimist,  while  saying  that  the  pains  of  life 
predominate,  or  the  optimist,  while  saying  that  the 
pleasures  predominate,  urges  that  the  pains  borne  here 
are  to  be  compensated  by  pleasures  received  hereafter; 
and  that  bo  life,  whether  or  not  justified  in  its  immediate 
results,  is  justified  in  its  ultimate  results;  the  implica- 
tion remains  the  same.  The  decision  is  still  reached  by 
balancing  pleasures  against  pains.  Animate  existence 
would  be  judged  by  both  a  curse,  if  to  a  surplus  of 
misery  borne  here  were  added  a  surplus  of  misery 
to  be  borne  hereafter.  And  for  either  to  regard 
animate  existence  as  a  blessing,  if  here  its  pains  were 
held  to  exceed  its  pleasures,  he  must  hold  that  hereafter 
its  pleasures  will  exceed  its  pains.  Thus  there  is  no 
escape  from  the  admission  that  in  calling  good  the  con- 
duct, which  subserves  life,  and  bad  the  conduct  which 
binders  or  destroys  it,  and  in  so  implying  that  life  is  a 
ing  and  not  a  curse,  we  are  inevitably  asserting 
that  conduct  is  good  or  bad  according  as  its  total  effects 
are  pleasurable  or  painful. 

One  theory  only  is  imaginable  in  pursuance  of  which 
other    interpretations   of  good  and  bad   can   be    given. 


GOOD  AND  BAD  CONDUCT.  41 

This  theory  is  that  men  were  created  with  the  intention 
that  they  should  besources  of  misery  to  themselves; 
and  that  they  are  bound  to  continue  living-  that  their 
creator  may  have  the  satisfaction  of  contemplating  their 
misery.  Though  this  is  noi  a  theory  avowedly  enter- 
tained by  many — though  it-  is  not  formulated  by  any  in 
this  distinct  way ;  yet  not  a  few  do  accept  it  under  a 
disguised  form.  Inferior  creeds  are  pervaded  by  the 
belief  that  the  sight  of  suffering  is  pleasing  to  the  gods. 
Derived  from  bloodthirsty  ancestors,  such  gods  are 
naturally  conceived  as  gratified  by  the  infliction  of  pain: 
when  living  they  delighted  in  torturing  other  beings; 
and  witnessing  torture  is  supposed  still  to  give  them  de- 
light. The  implied  conceptions  long  survive.  It  needs 
but  to  name  Indian  fakirs  who  hang  on  hooks,  and 
Eastern  dervishes  who  gash  themselves,  to  show  that  in 
societies  considerably  advanced  are  still  to  be  found 
many  who  think  that  submission  to  anguish  brings  di- 
vine favor.  And  without  enlarging  on  facts  and  pen- 
ances, it  will  be  clear  that  there  has  existed,  and  still 
exists,  among  Christian  peoples,  the  belief  that  the  Deity 
whom  Jephtliah  thought  to  propitiate  by  sacrificing  his 
daughter,  may  be  propitiated  by  self-inflicted  pains. 
Further,  the  conception  accompanying  this,  that  acts 
pleasing  to  self  are  offensive  to  God,  has  survived  along 
with  it,  and  still  widely  prevails  ;  if  not  in  formulated 
dogmas,  yet  in  beliefs  that  are  manifestly  operative. 

Doubtless,  in  modern  days  such  beliefs  have  assumed 
qualified  forms.  The  satisfactions  which  ferocious 
gods  were  supposed  to  feel  in  contemplating  tortures, 
has  been,  in  large  measure,  transformed  into  the  satis- 
faction felt  by  a  deity  in  contemplating  that  self- 
infliction   of   pain  which  is    held   to    further   eventual 


42  THE  DATA  OF  ETIIICS. 

happiness.  But  clearly  those  who  entertain  this  modi- 
fied view  are  excluded  from  the  class  whose  position 
we  are  here  considering.  Restricting  ourselves  to  this 
class — supposing  that  from  the  savage  who  immolates 
victims  to  a  cannibal  god,  there  are  descendants  among 
the  civilized,  who  hold  that  mankind  were  made  for 
Buffering,  and  that  it  is  their  duty  to  continue  living 
in  misery  for  the  delight  of  their  maker,  we  can  only  rec- 
ognize the  fact  that  devil-worshipers  are  not  yet  extinct. 

Omitting  people  of  this  class,  if  there  are  any,  as 
beyond  or  beneath  argument,  we  find  that  all  others 
avowedly  or  tacitly  hold  that  the  final  justification  for 
maintaining  life  can  only  be  the  reception  from  it  of 
a  surplus  of  pleasurable  feeling  over  painful  feeling ; 
and  that  goodness  or  badness  can  be  ascribed  to  acts 
which  subserve  life  or  hinder  life  only  on  this  sup- 
position. 

And  here    we  are  brought  round  to   those  primary 

meanings  of  the  words  good  and  bad,  which  we   passed 

over  when   considering  their  secondary  meanings.     For 

on  remembering  that  we  call  good  and  bad  the  things 

which  immediately  produce  agreeable  and  disagreeable 

lions,  and  also   tin;   sensations    themselves — a  good 

wine,  ;(  good  appetite,  a  bad  smell,  ;i  bad  headache — we 

Bee   that  by  referring  directly  to  pleasures  and  pains, 

meanings  harmonize  with  those   which  indirectly 

icfer    to    pleasures    and   pains.     If   Ave    call   good   the 

enjoyable  slate    itself,  as  a  good  laugh — if  we   call  good 

proximate    cause   of   an    enjoyable   state,  as   good 

— if    we     call    good    any    agent    which    conduces 

Immediately  or  remotely  to    an  enjoyable   state,  as  a 

good  shop,  a   good  teacher — if  we   call  good  considered 

intrinsically,    each   act   so    adjusted   to   its    end   as   to 


GOOD  AND  BAD  CONDUCT.  43 

further  self-preservation  and  that  surplus  of  enjo}'ment 
which  makes  self-preservation  desirable — if  we  call 
good  every  kind  of  conduct  which  aids  the  lives  of 
others,  and  do  this  under  the  belief  that  life  brings 
more  happiness  than  misery;  then  it  becomes  unde- 
niable that,  taking  into  account  immediate  and  remote 
effects  on  all  persons,  the  good  is  universally  the  pleas- 
urable. 

§  11.  Sundry  influences  —  moral,  theological,  and 
political — conspire  to  make  people  disguise  from  them- 
selves this  truth.  As  in  narrower  cases  so  in  this 
widest  ease,  they  become  so  preoccupied  with  the 
means  by  which  an  end  is  achieved,  as  eventually  to 
mistake  it  for  the  end.  Just  as  money,  which  is  the 
means  of  satisfying  wants,  comes  to  be  regarded  by  a 
miser  as  the  sole  thing  to  be  worked  for,  leaving  the 
wants  unsatisfied ;  so  the  conduct  men  have  found 
preferable  because  most  conducive  to  happiness  has 
come  to  be  thought  of  as  intrinsically  preferable,  not 
only  to  be  made  a  proximate  end  (which  it  should 
be),  but  to  be  made  an  ultimate  end,  to  the  exclusion 
of  the  true  ultimate  end.  And  yet  cross-examination 
quickly  compels  every  one  to  confess  the  true  ultimate 
end.  Just  as  the  miser,  asked  to  justify  himself,  is 
obliged  to  allege  the  power  of  money  to  purchase  desir- 
able things,  as  his  reason  for  prizing  it;  so  the  moralist 
who  thinks  this  conduct  intrinsically  good  and  that 
intrinsically  bad,  if  pushed  home,  has  no  choice  but  to 
fall  back  on  their  pleasure-giving  and  pain-giving  effects. 
To  prove  this  it  needs  but  to  observe  how  impossible  it 
would  be  to  think  of  them  as  we  do,  if  their  effects  were 
reversed. 


44  THE  DATA   OF  ETHICS. 

Suppose  that  gashes  and  bruises  caused  agreeable 
sensations,  and  brought  in  their  train  increased  power  of 
doing  work  and  receiving  enjoyment ;  should  we  regard 
assaull  in  the  same  manner  as  at  present  ?  Or  suppose 
that  self-mutilation,  say  by  cutting  off  a  hand,  was 
both  intrinsically  pleasant  and  furthered  performance 
of  the  processes  by  which  personal  welfare  and  the 
welfare  of  dependents  is  achieved;  should  we  hold  as 
now,  that  deliberate  injury  to  one's  own  body  is  to  be 
reprobated?  Or  again,  suppose  that  picking  a  man's 
jjocket  excited  in  him  joyful  emotions,  by  brightening 
his  prospects  ;  would  theft  bo  counted  among  crimes,  as 
in  existing  law-books  and  moral  codes?  In  these 
extreme  eases,  no  one  can  deny  that  what  we  call  the 
badness  of  actions  is  ascribed  to   them  solely  for  the 

•  i  thai    they  entail  pain,  immediate  or  remote,  and 
would  not  1)-'  so  ascribed  did  they  entail  pleasure. 

It"  we  examine  our  conceptions  on  their  obverse  side, 
fchisgeneral  fact  forces  itself  on  our  attention  with  equal 
distinctness,  [magine  that  ministering  to  a  sick  per- 
son always  increased  the  pains  of  illness.  Imagine  that 
an  orphan's  relatives  who  took  charge  of  it,  thereby 
garily  brought  miseries  upon  it.  Imagine  that 
liquidating  another  man's  pecuniary  claims  on  you  re- 
dounded to  liis  disadvantage.     Imagine  that  crediting  a 

with  uoble  behavior  hindered  liis  social  welfare  and 
quent  gratification.  What  should  we  say  to  these 
acts  which  now  fall  into  the  class  we  call  praiseworthy? 
Should  we  not  contrariwise  class  them  as  blameworthy? 
rig,  then,  as  our  tests,  these  most  pronounced  forms 
of  good  and  had  conduct,  we  find  it  unquestionable  that 
our  ideas  of  their  goodness  and  badness  really  originate 

:   our  consciousness  of  the  certainty  or  probability 


GOOD  AND  BAD  CONDUCT.  45 

that  they  will  produce  pleasures  or  pains  somewhere. 
And  this  truth  is  brought  out  with  equal  clearness  by 
examining  the  standards  of  different  moral  schools;  for 
analysis  shows  that  every  one  of  them  derives  its  author- 
ity from  this  ultimate  standard.  Ethical  systems  are 
roughly  distinguishable  according  as  they  take  for  their 
cardinal  ideas  (1)  the  character  of  the  agent;  (2)  the 
nature  of  his  motive  ;  (3)  the  quality  of  his  deeds ;  and 
(4)  the  results.  Each  of  these  may  be  characterized  as 
good  or  bad  ,  and  those  who  do  not  estimate  a  mode  of 
life  by  its  effects  on  happiness,  estimate  it  by  the  implied 
goodness  or  badness  in  the  agent,  in  his  motive,  or  in 
his  deeds.  We  have  perfection  in  the  agent  set  up  as  a 
test  by  which  conduct  is  to  be  judged.  Apart  from  the 
agent  we  have  his  feeling  considered  as  moral.  And 
apart  from  the  feeling  we  have  his  action  considered  as 
virtuous. 

Thoufifh  the  distinctions  thus  indicated  have  so  little 
definiteness  that  the  words  marking  them  are  used  in- 
terchangeably, yet  there  correspond  to  them  doctrines 
partially  unlike  one  another ;  which  we  may  he  recon- 
veniently  examine  separately,  with  the  view  of  showing 
that  all  their  tests  of  goodness  are  derivative. 

§  12.  It  is  strange  that  a  notion  so  abstract  as  that  of 
perfection,  or  a  certain  ideal  completeness  of  nature, 
should  ever  have  been  thought  one  from  which  a  sys- 
tem of  guidance  can  be  evolved  ;  as  it  was  in  a  general 
way  by  Plato  and  more  distinctly  by  Jonathan  Edwardee. 
Perfection  is  synonymous  with  goodness  in  the  highest 
degree;  and,  hence,  to  define  good  conduct  in  terms  of 
perfection,  is  indirectly  to  define  good  conduct  in  terms 
of  itself,      Naturally,  therefore,   it   happens   that    tho 


46  THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 

notion  of  perfection  like  the  notion  of  goodness  can  be 
framed  only  in  relation  to  ends. 

We  allege  imperfection  of  any  inanimate  thing,  as  a 
tool,  if  it  lacks  some  part  needful  for  effectual  action,  or 
if  some  part  is  so  shaped  as  not  to  fulfill  its  purpose  in 
the  best  manner.  Perfection  is  alleged  of  a  watch  if  it 
keeps  exact  time,  however  plain  its  case;  and  imperfec- 
tion is  alleged  of  it  because  of  inaccurate  time-keeping, 
however  beautifully  it  is  ornamented.  Though  we  call 
things  imperfect  if  we  detect  in  them  any  injuries  or 
flaws,  even  when  these  do  not  detract  from  efficiency  ; 
yet  we  do  this  because  they  imply  inferior  workman- 
ship, or  that  wear  and  tear,  with  which  inefficiency 
is  commonly  joined  in  experience :  absence  of  minor 
imperfections  being  habitually  associated  with  absence 
of  major  imperfections. 

As  a j >plied  to  living  things,  the  word  perfection  has 

ime  meaning.  The  idea  of  perfect  shape  in  a  race- 
horse is  derived  by  generalization  from  those  observed 
traits  of  race-horses  which  have  usually  gone  along  with 
attainment  of  the  highest  speed ;  and  the  idea  of  per- 
institution  in  a  race-horse  similarly  refers  to  the 
endurance  which  enables  him  to  continue  that  speed  for 

ingest  time.     With  men,  physically  considered,  it 

same  :  we  are  able  to  furnish  no  other  test  of  per- 

fection  than  that  of  complete  power  in  all  the  organs  to 

fulfill  their  respective  functions.     That  our  conception 

of  perfect  balance  among  the  internal  parts,  and  of  per- 

proportion   among   the   external   parts,  originates 

■  lade  clear  by  observing  that  imperfection  of 

any  \  .  heart,  or  liver,  is  ascribed  for  no 

other  reason  than  inability  to  meet  in  full  the  demands 

which  the  activities  of  the  organism  make  on  it ;  and 


GOOD  AND  BAD  COXDUCT.  47 

on  observing  that  the  conception  of  insufficient  size,  or 

i  great  size,  in  a  limb,  is  derived  from  accumulated 

iences  respecting  that  ratio  among  the  limbs  which 

furthers  in  the  highest   degree  the  performance    of  all 

needful  actions. 

And  of  perfection  in  mental  nature  we  have  no  other 
measure.  If  imperfection  of  memory,  of  judgment,  of 
temper,  is  alleged,  it  is  alleged  because  of  inadequacy  to 
the  requirements  of  life ;  and  to  imagine  a  perfect  bal- 
ance of  the  intellectual  powers  and  of  the  emotions,  is 
to  imagine  that  proportion  among  them  which  ensures 
an  entire  discharge  of  each  and  every  obligation  as  the 
occasion  calls  for  it. 

So  that  the  perfection  of  man  considered  as  an  agent, 
means  the  being  constituted  for  effecting  complete 
adjustment  of  acts  to  ends  of  every  kind.  And  since, 
os  shown  above,  the  complete  adjustment  of  acts  to  ends 
is  that  which  both  secures  and  constitutes  the  life  that  is 
most  evolved,  alike  in  breadth  and  length  ;  while,  as 
also  shown,  the  justification  for  whatever  increases  life 
is  the  reception  fromlife  of  more  happiness  than  un- 
it follows  that  conduciveness  to  happiness  is  the  ulti- 
mate test  of  perfection  in  a  man's  nature.  To  be  fully 
convinced  of  this  it  needs  but  to  observe  how  the  propo- 
sition looks  when  inverted.  It  needs  but  to  suppose 
that  every  approach  toward  perfection  involved  greater 
misery  to  self,  or  others,  or  both,  to  show  by  opposition 
that  approach  to  perfection  really  means  approach  to 
that  which  secures  greater  happini 

§  13.  Pass  we  now  from  the  view  of  those  who  make 
excellence  of  being  the  standard  to  the  view  of  those 
who  make  virtuousness  of  action  the  standard.     1  do  not 


48  'I  (IE  DATA  OF  ET3IC8. 

refer  to  moralists  who,  having  decided  empirically 
or  rationally,  inductively  or  deductively,  that  acts  of  cer- 
tain kinds  have  the  character  we  call  virtuous,  argue  that 
such  acts  are  to  be  performed  without  regard  to  proxi- 
mate consequences;  these  have  ample  justification.  But 
1  refer  to  moralists  who  suppose  themselves  to  havecon- 
ceptions  of  virtue  as  an  end,  underived  from  any  other 
end,  who  think  that  the  idea  of  virtue  is  not  resolvable 
into  simpler  ideas. 

This  is  the  doctrine  which  appears  to  have  been  enter- 
tained by  Aristotle.  I  say,  appears  to  have  been,  because 
itements  are  far  from  consistent  with  one  another. 
Recognizing  happiness  as  the  supreme  end  of  human 
endeavor,  it  would  at  first  sight  seem  that  he  cannot  be 
taken  as  typical  of  those  who  make  virtue  the  supreme 
(Mid.  Yet  he  puts  himself  in  this  category  by  seeking 
t<>  define  happiness  in  terms  of  virtue,  instead  of  defin- 
ing virtue  in  terms  of  happiness.  The  imperfect  separa- 
tion of  words  from  things,  which  characterizes  Greek 
speculation  in  general,  seems  to  have  been  the  cause  of 
this.  In  primitive  thought  the  name  and  the  object 
named  are  associated  in  such  wise  that  the  one  is  re- 
garded  ;is  a  part  of  the  other — so  muchso,  that  knowing 
's  name  is  considered  by  him  as  having  some  of 
his  being,  and  a  consequent  power  to  work  evil  on  him. 
This  belief  in  a  real  connection  between  word  and  thing, 
continuing  through  lower  stages  of  progress,  and  long 
surviving  in  the  tacit  assumption  that  Hie  meanings  of 
words  ;tre  intrinsic, pervades  thedialogues  of  I'lato,  and 
is  traceable  even  in  Aristotle.  For  otherwise  it  is  not 
vliy  ho  should  have  so  incompletely  dis- 

iated  the  abstract  idea  of  happiness  from  particular 
forms  of  happine    , 


GOOD  AND  BAD  CONDUCT.  40 

Naturally  where  the  divorcing  of  words  as  symbols, 
from  things  us  symbolized,  is  imperfect,  there  must  be 
difficulty  in  giving  to  abstract  words  a  sufficiently 
abstract  meaning.  If  in  the  first  stages  of  language 
the  concrete  name  cannot  be  separated  in  thought  from 
the  concrete  object  it  belongs  to,  it  is  inferable  that 
in  the  course  of  forming  successively  higher  grades  of 
abstract  names,  there  will  have  to  be  resisted  the  ten- 
dency to  interpret  each  more  abstract  name  in  terms  of 
some  one  class  of  the  less  abstract  names  it  covers. 
Hence,  I  think,  the  fact  that  Aristotle  supposes  happi- 
ness to  be  associated  with  some  one  order  of  human 
activities,  rather  than  with  all  orders  of  human  activi- 
ties. Instead  of  including  in  it  the  pleasurable  feelings 
accompanying  actions  that  constitute  mere  living,  which 
actions  he  says  man  has  in  common  with  vegetables; 
and  instead  of  making  it  include  the  mental  states  which 
the  life  of  external  perception  yields,  which  he  says  man 
has  in  common  with  animals  at  large,  he  excludes  these 
from  his  idea  of  happiness,  and  includes  in  it  only  the 
modes  of  consciousness  accompanying  rational  life. 
Asserting  that  the  proper  work  of  man  "  consists  in  the 
active  exercise  of  the  mental  capacities  conformably  to 
reason,"  he  concludes  that  "  the  supreme  good  of  man 
will  consist  in  performing  this  work  with  excellence  or 
virtue:  herein  he  will  obtain  happiness."  And  he  finds 
confirmation  for  his  view  in  its  correspondence  with 
views  previously  enunciated  :  saying,  "  our  notion  nearly 
agrees  with  theirs  who  place  happiness  in  virtue  ;  for  we 
say  that  it  consists  in  the  action  of  virtue ;  that  is,  not 
merely  in  the  possession,  but  in  the  use." 

Now  the  implied  belief  that  virtue  can  be  defined 
otherwise  than  in  terms  of  happiness  (for  else  the  propo* 
4 


50  THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 

sit  ion  is  that  happiness  is  to  be  obtained  by  actions  con- 
ducive to  happiness)  is  allied  to  the  Platonic  belief  that 
there  is  an  ideal  or  absolute  good,  which  gives  to  par- 
ticular and  relative  goods  their  property  of  goodness ; 
and  an  argument  analogous  to  that  which  Aristotle  uses 
against  Plato's  conception  of  good,  may  be  used  against 
his  own  conception  of  virtue.  As  with  good  so  with 
virtue— it  is  not  singular  but  plural :  in  Aristotle's  own 
classification,  virtue,  when  treated  of  at  large,  is  trans- 
formed into  virtues.  Those  which  he  calls  virtues  must 
railed  in  consequence  of  some  common  character 
that  is  cither  intrinsic  or  extrinsic.  We  may  class  things 
together  cither  because  they  are  made  alike  by  all  hav- 
ing  in  themselves  some  peculiarity,  as  we  do  vertebrate 
animals  because  they  all  have  vertebral  columns;  or  we 
may  class  them  together  because  of  some  community  in 
their  outer  relations,  as  when  we  group  saws,  knives, 
mallets,  harrows,  under  the  head  of  tools.     Are  the  vir- 

classed  as  such  because  of  some  intrinsic  commu- 
nity of  nature  ?  Then  there  must  be  identifiable  a 
ctmiinon  trait  in  all  the  cardinal  virtues  which  Aristotle 
specifies,  "Courage,  Temperance,  Liberality,  Magna- 
nimity. Magnificence,  Meekness,  Amiability  or  Friendli- 

.  Truthfulness,  Justice."  What  now  is  the  trait 
I  in  common  by  Magnificence  and  Meekness? 
and  if  any  such  common  trait  can  be  disentangled,  is  it 
that  which  also  constitutes  the  essential  trait  in  Truth- 
fulness'/ The-  answer  must  be,  No.  The  virtues,  then, 
not  being  such  because  of  an  intrinsic  com- 

munity of  character,  must  be  classed  as  such  because  of 
something  extrinsic  ;  and  this  something  can  be  nothing 

than  the  happiness  which  Aristotle  says  consists  in 
the  practice  of  them.     They  are  united  by  their  common 


GOOD  AND  BAD  COKDUCT.  51 

relation   to  this   result;  while   they  are  not  united  by 
their  inner  natures. 

Perhaps  still  more  clearly  ma}-  the  inference  be  drawn 
thus  :  If  virtue  is  primordial  and  independent,  no  reason 
can  be  given  why  there  should  be  any  correspondence 
between  virtuous  conduct  and  conduct  that  is  pleasure- 
giving  in  its  total  effects  on  self,  or  others,  or  both; 
and  if  there  is  not  a  necessary  correspondence,  it  is  con- 
ceivable that  the  conduct  classed  as  virtuous  should  lie 
pain-giving  in  its  total  effects.  That  we  may  see  the 
consequence  of  so  conceiving  it,  let  us  take  the  two  vir- 
tues considered  as  typically  such  in  ancient  times  and  in 
modern  times — courage  and  chastity.  By  the  hypothe- 
sis, then,  courage,  displayed  alike  in  self-defence  and  in 
defence  of  country,  is  to  be  conceived  as  not  only  entail- 
ing pains  incidentally,  but  as  being  necessarily  a  cause 
of  misery  to  the  individual  and  to  the  state  ;  while,  by 
implication,  the  absence  of  it  redounds  to  personal  and 
general  well-being.  Similarly,  by  the  hypothesis,  we 
have  to  conceive  that  irregular  sexual  relations  are 
directly  and  indirectly  beneficial — that  adultery  is  con- 
ducive to  domestic  harmony  and  the  careful  rearing  of 
children  ;  while  marital  relations,  in  proportion  as  they 
are  persistent,  generate  discord  between  husband  and 
wife  and  entail  on  their  offspring  suffering,  disease  and 
death.  Unless  it  is  asserted  that  courage  and  chastity 
could  still  be  thought  of  as  virtues,  though  thus  pro- 
ductive of  misery,  it  must  be  admitted  that  the  concep- 
tion of  virtue  cannot  be  separated  from  the  conception 
of  happiness-producing  conduct ;  and  that  as  this  holds 
of  all  the  virtues,  however  otherwise  unlike,  it  is  from 
their  conduciveness  to  happiness  that  they  come  to  bo 
classed  as  virtues. 


52  THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 

£  14.  When  from  those  ethical  estimates  which  take 
perfection  of  nature,  or  virtuousness  of  action,  as  tests, 
we  pass  to  those  which  take  for  test  rectitude  of  motive, 
Ave  approach  the  intuitional  theory  of  morals;  and  we 
may  conveniently  deal  with  such  estimates  by  a  criti- 
cism mi  this  theory. 

By  the  intuitional  theory  I  here  mean,  not  that  which 
recognizes  as  produced  by  the  inherited  effects  of  con- 
tinued experiences,  the  feelings  of  liking  and  aversion 
we  have  to  acts  of  certain  kinds  ;  but  I  mean  the  the- 
ory which  regards  such  feelings  as  divinely  given,  and 
as  independent  of  results  experienced  by  self  or  ances- 
tors. -  There  is,  therefore,"  says  Hutcheson,  "as  each 
one  by  close  attention  and  reflection  may  convince 
himself,  a  natural  and  immediate  determination  to  ap- 
prove certain  affections  and  actions  consequent  upon 
them;"  and  since,  in  common  with  others  of  his  time, 
he  believes  in  the  special  creation  of  man,  and  all  other 
beings,  this  "natural  sense  of  immediate  excellence" 
he  c<  insiders  as  a  supernaturally  derived  guide.  Though 
vs  that  the  feelings  and  acts  thus  intuitively 
recognized  as  good,  "all  agree  in  one  general  charac- 
ter, of  tending  to  the  happiness  of  others;"  yet  he  is 
obliged  to  conceive  this  as  a  pre-ordained  correspond- 
ence. Nevertheless,  it  ii lay  be  shown  that  conducive- 
to  happiness,  here  represented  as  an  incidental 
trail  of  the  acts  which  receive  these  innate,  moral  ap- 
provals, is  really  the  test  by  which  these  approvals  are. 
•iize<l  as  moral.  The  inflationists  place  confidence 
in  these  verdicts  of  conscience  simpl}'  because  they 
if  not  distinctly,  perceive  them  to  bo  con- 
sonant with  the  disclosures  of  that  ultimate  test. 
Observe  the  proof. 


GOOD  AND  BAD  CONDUCT. 

By  the  hypothesis,  the  wrongness  of  murder  is 
known  by  a  moral  intuition  which  the  human  mind 
was  originally  constituted  to  }'ield ;  and  the  hypothesis 
therefore,  negatives  the  admission  that  this  sense  of 
its  wrongness  arises,  immediately  or  remotely,  from 
the  consciousness  that  murder  involves  deduction  from 
happiness,  directly  and  indirectly.  But  if  you  ask  an 
adherent  of  this  doctrine  to  contrast  his  intuition  with 
that  of  the  Fijian,  who,  considering  murder  an  honor- 
able actioTi,  is  restless  until  he  has  distinguished  him- 
self by  killing  some  one ;  and  if  you  inquire  of  him  in 
what  way  the  civilized  intuition  is  to  be  justified  in 
opposition  to  the  intuition  of  the  savage,  no  course  is 
open  save  that  of  showing  how  conformity  to  the  one 
conduces  to  well-being,  while  conformity  to  the  other 
entails  suffering,  individual  and  general.  When  asked 
why  the  moral  sense  which  tells  him  that  it  is  wrong 
to  take  another  man's  goods,  should  be  obeyed  rather 
than  the  moral  sense  of  a  Turcoman,  who  proves  how 
meritorious  he  considers  theft  to  be  by  making  pil- 
grimages to  the  tombs  of  noted  robbers  to  make  offer- 
ings, the  intuitionist  can  do  nothing  but  urge  that, 
certainly  under  conditions  like  ours,  if  not  also  under 
conditions  like  those  of  the  Turcomans,  disregard  of 
men's  claims  to  their  property  not  only  inflicts  imme- 
diate misery,  but  involves  a  social  state  inconsistent 
with  happiness.  Or  if,  again,  there  is  required  from 
him  a  justiiieation  for  his  feeling  of  repugnance  to 
lying,  in  contrast  with  the  feeling  of  an  Egyptian,  who 
prides  himself  on  skill  in  lying  (even  thinking  it  praise- 
worthy to  deceive  without  any  further  end  than  that 
of  practicing  deception),  he  can  do  no  more  than 
point   to  the  social  prosperity  furthered  by  entire  trust 


54  THE  LATA  OF  ETBICS. 

between  man  and  man,  and  the  social  disorganization  that 
follows  universal  untruthfulness,  consequences  that  are 
necessarily  conducive  to  agreeable  feelings  and  disa- 
greeable  feelings  respectively. 

The  unavoidable  conclusion  is,  then,  that  the  intui- 
tionist  does  not,  and  cannot,  ignore  the  ultimate  deri- 
vations of  right  and  wrong  from  pleasure  and  pain. 
However  much  he  may  be  guided,  and  rightly  guided, 
by  the  decisions  of  conscience  respecting  the  charac- 
ters of  acts,  he  has  come  to  have  confidence  in  these 
decisions  because  he  perceives,  vaguely  but  positively, 
that  conformity  to  them  furthers  the  welfare  of  him- 
self and  others,  and  that  disregard  of  them  entails  in 
the  long  run  suffering  on  all.  Require  him  to  name 
any  moral-sense  judgment  by  which  he  knows  as  right 
some  kind  of  act  that  will  bring  a  surplus  of  pain, 
taking  into  account  the  totals  in  this  life  and  in  any 
assumed  other  life,  and  you  find  him  unable  to  name 
one;  a  fact  proving  that  underneath  all  these  intuitions 
icting  the  goodness  or  badness  of  acts  there  lies 
the  fundamental  assumption  that  acts  are  good  or  bad 
according  as  their  aggregate  effects  increase  men's 
happiness  or  increase  their  misery. 

;  15.  It  is   curious   to  see  how  the  devil-worship  of 
the  savage,  surviving  in  various  disguises  among  the 
civilized,    and     Leaving    as    one     of    its    products    that 
icism  which  in   ninny  forms  and  degrees  still  pre- 
vails   widely,    is    to    be    found    influencing    in    marked 
nun    who    have    apparently   emancipated    them- 
i   only   from  primitive  superstitions  but  from 
more  developed  superstitions.      Views  of  life  and  con- 
duct   which     originated    with    those    who    propitiated 


GOOT)  AXD  BAD  CONDUCT. 

deified  ancestors  by  self-tortures  enter  even  still  into  the 
ethical  theories  of  many  persons  -who  have  years  since 
cast  away  the  theology  of  the  past,  and  suppose  them- 
selves to  be  no  longer  influenced  by  it. 

In  the  writings  of  one  who  rejects  dogmatic  Chris- 
tianity, together  with  the  Hebrew  cult  which  preceded 
it,  a  career  of  conquest  costing  tens  of  thousands  of 
lives  is  narrated  with  a  sympathy  comparable  to  that 
rejoicing  which  the  Hebrew  traditions  show  us  over 
destruction  of  enemies  in  the  name  of  God.  You  may 
find,  too,  a  delight  in  contemplating  the  exercise  of 
despotic  power,  joined  with  insistence  on  the  salutari 
ness  of  a  state  in  which  the  wills  of  slaves  and  citizens 
are  humbly  subject  to  the  wills  of  masters  and  rulers — 
a  sentiment  also  reminding  us  of  that  ancient  Oriental 
life  which  biblical  narratives  portray.  Along  with  tins 
worship  of  the  strong  man — along  with  this  justifica- 
tion of  whatever  force  may  be  needed  for  carrying  out 
his  ambition — along  with  this  yearning  for  a  form  of 
society  in  which  supremacy  of  the  few  is  unrestrained 
and  the  virtue  of  the  many  consists  in  obedience  to 
them,  we  not  unnaturally  find  repudiation  of  the 
ethical  theory  which  takes,  in  some  shape  or  other,  the 
greatest  happiness  as  the  end  of  conduct :  we  not  un- 
naturally find  this  utilitarian  philosophy  designated  by 
the  contemptuous  title  of  "  pig-philosophy."  And  then, 
serving  to  show  what  comprehension  there  has  been  of 
the  philosophy  so  nicknamed,  we  are  told  that  not  hap- 
piness but  blessedness  must  be  the  end. 

Obviously,  the  implication  is  that  blessedness  is  not 
a  kind  of  happiness ;  and  this  implication  at  once 
suggests  the  question — What  mode  of  feeling  is  it?  If 
it  is  a  state  of  consciousness  at  all,  it  is  necessarily  one 


56  THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 

of  three  slates — painful,  indifferent,  or  pleasurable. 
it  leave  the  possessor  at  the  zero  point  of  sen- 
tieiicv'.'  Then  it  leaves  him  just  as  lie  would  be  if  lie 
had  not  got  it.  Does  it  not  leave  him  at  the  zero 
point?  Then  it  must  leave  him  below  zero  or  above 
zero. 

Bach  of  these  possibilities  may  be  conceived  under 
two  forms.  That  to  which  the  term  blessedness  is 
applied  may  be  a  particular  state  of  consciousness — 
one  among  the  many  states  that  occur ;  and.  on  this 
supposition  we  have  to  recognize  it  as  a  pleasurable 
state,  an  indifferent  state,  or  a  painful  state.  Other- 
wise, blessedness  is  a  word  not  applicable  to  a  particular 
state  of  consciousness,  but  characterizes  the  aggregate 
of  its  states;  and  in  this  case  the  average  of  the  aggre- 
gate is  to  be  conceived  as  one  in  which  the  pleasurable 
predominates,  or  one  in  which  the  painful  predominates, 
or  one  in  which  pleasures  and  pains  exactly  cancel  one 
another.  Let  us  take  in  turn  these  two  imaginable 
applications  of  the  word. 

"Blessed  are  the  merciful;"  "Blessed  are  the 
peace-makers;"  "Blessed  is  he  that  considereth  the 
poor;  "are  sayings  which  we  may  fairly  take  as  con- 
veying the  accepted  meaning  of  blessedness.  What 
now   shall  we  say  of  one  who  is,  for  the  time  being, 

ed  in  performing  an  act  of  mercy?     Is  his  mental 
pleasurable?     If  so  the  hypothesis  is  abandoned: 

edness  is  a  particular  form  of  happiness.  Is  the 
indifferent  or  painful?  In  that  case  the  blessed 
man  is  80  devoid  of  sympathy  that  relieving  another 
from  pain,  or  the  fear  of  pain,  leaves  him  either  wholly 
unmoved,  or  gives  him  an  unpleasant  emotion.  Again, 
if  one  who  is  blessed  in  making  peace  receives  no  grati* 


GOOD  AND  BAD  CONDUCT.  57 

fication  from  the  act,  then  seeing  men  injure  each  other 
does  not  affect  him  at  all,  or  gives  him  a  pleasure  which 
is  changed  into  a  pain  when  he  prevents  the  injury. 
Once  more,  to  say  that  the  blessedness  of  one  who 
"considereth  the  poor  "  implies  no  agreeable  feeling,  is 
to  say  that  his  consideration  for  the  poor  leaves  him 
without  feeling  or  entails  on  him  a  disagreeable  feeling. 
So  that  if  blessedness  is  a  particular  mode  of  conscious- 
ness temporarily  existing  as  a  concomitant  of  each 
kind  of  beneficent  action,  those  who  deny  that  it  is  a 
pleasure,  or  constituent  of  happiness,  confess  them- 
selves either  not  pleased  by  the  welfare  of  others  or 
displeased  by  it. 

Otherwise  understood,  blessedness  must,  as  we  have 
seen,  refer  to  the  totality  of  feelings  experienced  during 
the  life  of  one  who  occupies  himself  with  the  actions 
the  word  connotes.  This  also  presents  the  three  possi- 
bilities— surplus  of  pleasures,  surplus  of  pains,  equality 
of  the  two.  If  the  pleasurable  states  are  in  excess, 
then  the  blessed  life  can  be  distinguished  from  any 
other  pleasurable  life  only  by  the  relative  amount,  or 
the  quality,  of  its  pleasures :  it  is  a  life  which  makes 
happiness  of  a  certain  kind  and  degree  its  end  ;  and  the 
assumption  that  blessedness  is  not  a  form  of  happiness 
lapses.  If  the  blessed  life  is  one  in  which  the  pleasures 
and  the  pains  received  balance  one  another,  so  produc- 
ing an  average  that  is  indifferent ;  or  if  it  is  one  in 
which  the  pleasures  are  outbalanced  by  the  pains,  then 
the  blessed  life  lias  the  character  which  the  pessimist 
alleges  of  life  at  large,  and  therefore  regards  it  as  cursed. 
Annihilation  is  best,  he  will  argue,  since  if  an  average 
that  is  indifferent  is  the  outcome  of  the  blessed  life, 
annihilation  at  once   achieves  it ;  and  if  a  surplus  of 


5S  THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 

suffering  is  the  outcome  of  this  highest  kind  of  life 
railed  blessed,  still  more  should  life  in  general  be  ended. 
A  possible  rejoinder  must  be  named  and  disposed  of. 
While  it  is  admitted  that  the  particular  kind  of  con- 
sciousness  accompanying  conduct  that  is  blessed,  is 
pleasurable,  it  may  be  contended  that  pursuance  of  this 
conduct  and  receipt  of  the  pleasure,  brings  by  the  im- 
plied self-denial,  and  persistent  effort,  and  perhaps 
bodily  injury,  a  suffering  that  exceeds  it  in  amount. 
And  it  may  then  be  urged  that  blessedness,  character- 
ized by  this  excess  of  aggregate  pains  over  aggregate 
pleasures,  should  nevertheless  be  pursued  as  an  end, 
rather  than  the  happiness  constituted  by  excess  of  pleas- 
ures over  pains.  But  now,  defensible  though  this  con- 
ception of  blessedness  may  be  when  limited  to  one  in- 
dividual, or  some  individuals,  it  becomes  indefensible 
when  extended  to  all  individuals;  as  it  must  be  if 
blessedness  is  taken  for  the  end  of  conduct.  To  see 
this  we  need  but  ask  for  what  purpose  are  these  pains 
i?i  excess  of  pleasures  to  be  borne.  Blessedness  being 
the  ideal  state  for  all  persons,  and  the  self-sacrifices 
made  by  each  person  in  pursuance  of  this  ideal  state, 
having  for  their  end  t<>  help  all  other  persons  in  achiev- 
ing the  like  ideal  state,  it  results  that  the  blessed 
though  painful  state  of  each  is  to  be  acquired  by  fur- 
ng  the  like  blessed  though  painful  states  of  others  ; 
tie-  ble  ed  consciousness  is  to  be  constituted  by  the 
contemplation  of  their  consciousnesses  in  a  condition  of 
uffering.  Does  anyone  accept  this  inference? 
If  not.  his  rejection  of  if  involves  the  admission  that 
the  motive  for  beaiing  pains  in  performing  acts  called 
d.  is  not,  the  obtaining  for  others  like  pains  of 
sdness,  but  the  obtaining  of  pleasures  for  others, 


GOOD  AND  BAD  CONDUCT.  59 

and  that  thus  pleasure  somewhere  is  the  tacitly  implied 
ultimate  end. 

In  brief,  then,  blessedness  has  for  its  necessary  con- 
dition of  existence,  increased  happiness,  positive  or  neg- 
ative, in  some  consciousness  or  other,  and  disappears 
utterly  if  we  assume  that  the  actions  called  blessed  are 
known  to  cause  decrease  of  happiness  in  others  as  well 
as  in  the  actor. 

§  16.  To  make  clear  the  meaning  of  the  general  ar- 
gument set  forth  in  this  chapter,  its  successive  parts 
must  be  briefly  summarized. 

That  which  in  the  last  chapter  we  found  to  be  highly 
evolved  conduct,  is  that  which,  in  this  chapter,  we  find 
to  be  what  is  called  good  conduct ;  and  the  ideal  goal 
to  the  natural  evolution  of  conduct  there  recognized  we 
here  recognize  as  the  ideal  standard  of  conduct  ethically 
considered. 

The  acts  adjusted  to  ends  which,  while  constituting 
the  outer  visible  life  from  moment  to  moment  further 
the  continuance  of  life,  we  saw  become,  as  evolution 
progresses,  better  adjusted,  until  filially  i\\ay  make  the 
life  of  each  individual  entire  in  length  and  breadth,  at 
the  same  time  that  they  efficiently  subserve  the  rearing 
of  young,  and  do  both  these,  not  only  without  hindering 
other  individuals  from  doing  the  like,  but  while  giving 
aid  to  them  in  doing  the  like.  And  here  we  see  that 
goodness  is  asserted  of  such  conduct  under  each  of 
these  three  aspects.  Other  things  equal,  well-adjusted 
self-ccmserving  acts  we  call  good;  other  things  equal, 
we  call  good  the  acts  that  are  well  adjusted  for  bringing 
up  progeny  capable  of  complete  living;  and  other  things 
equal,  we  ascribe  goodness  to  acts  which  further  the 
complete  living  of  others. 


60  THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 

This  judging  as  good,  conduct  which  conduces  to  life 
in  each  and  all,  we  found  to  involve  the  assumption 
that  animate  existence  is  desirable.  By  the  pessimist, 
conduct  which  observes  life  cannot  consistently  be 
called  good :  to  call  it  good  implies  some  form  of 
optimism.  We  saw,  however,  that  pessimists  and 
optimists  both  start  with  the  postulate  that  life  is  a 
blessing  or  a  curse,  according  as  the  average  conscious- 
ness accompanying  it  is  pleasurable  or  painful.  And 
since  avowed  or  implied  pessimists,  and  optimists  of 
one  or  other  shade,  taken  together  constitute  all  men, 
it  results  that  this  postulate  is  universally  accepted-. 
Whence  it  follows  that  if  we  call  good  the  conduct  con- 
ducive to  life,  we  can  do  so  only  with  the  implication 
that  it  is  conducive  to  a  surplus  of  pleasures  over  pains. 

The  truth  that  conduct  is  considered  by  us  as  good 
or  bad,  according  as  its  aggregate  results,  to  self  or 
others  or  both,  are  pleasurable  or  painful,  we  found  on 
examination  to  be  involved  in  all  the  current  judg- 
ments on  conduct :  the  proof  being  that  reversing  the 
Applications  of  the  words  creates  absurdities.  And  we 
found  that  every  other  proposed  standard  of  conduct 
deriv-  authority   from   this   standard.      Whether 

perfection  of  nature  is  the  assigned  proper  aim,  or  vir- 
tuousness  of  action,  or  rectitude  of  motive,  we  saw 
that  definition  of  the  perfection,  the  virtue,  the  recti- 
tnde,  inevitably  brings  us  down  to  happiness  experi- 
enced  in  some  form,  at  some  time,  by  some  person,  as 
fundamental  idea.  Nor  could  we-  discover  any 
intelligible  conception  of  blessedness,  save  one  which 
implies  a  raising  of  consciousness,  individual  or  general, 
to  a  happier  state  ;  either  by  mitigating  pains  or  increas- 
ing pleasures. 


GOOD  AND  BAD  CONDUCT.  61 

Even  with  those  who  judge  of  conduct  from  the 
religious  point  of  view,  rather  than  from  the  ethical 
point  of  view,  it  is  the  same.  Men  who  seek  to  pro- 
pitiate God  by  inflicting  pains  on  themselves,  or  refrain 
from  pleasures  to  avoid  offending  him,  do  so  to  escape 
greater  ultimate  pains  or  to  get  greater  ultimate 
pleasures.  If  by  positive  or  negative  suffering  here, 
they  expected  to  achieve  more  suffering  hereafter,  they 
would  not  do  as  they  do.  That  which  they  now  think  duty 
they  would  not  think  duty  if  it  promised  eternal  misery 
instead  of  eternal  happiness.  Nay,  if  there  be  any  who 
believe  that  human  beings  were  created  to  be  unhappy, 
and  that  they  ought  to  continue  living  to  display  their 
anhappiness  for  the  satisfaction  of  their  creator,  such 
believers  are  obliged  to  use  this  standard  of  judgment ; 
for  the  pleasure  of  their  diabolical  god  is  the  end  to 
be  achieved. 

So  that  no  school  can  avoid  taking  for  the  ultimate 
moral  aim  a  desirable  state  of  feeling  called  by  what- 
ever name — gratification,  enjoyment,  happiness.  Pleas- 
ure somewhere,  at  some  time,  to  some  being  or  beings, 
is  an  inexpugnable  element  of  the  conception.  It  is  as 
much  a  necessary  form  of  moral  intuition  as  space  is  a 
necessary  form  of  intellectual  intuition. 


62  TUE  DA  TA  OF  ETHICS. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

WAYS   OF   JUDGING   CONDUCT. 

1 17.  Intellectual  progress  is  by  no  one  trait  so 
Lately  characterized  as  by  development  of  the  idea 
of  causation,  since  development  of  this  idea  involves  de- 
velopment of  bo  many  other  ideas.  Before  any  way  can 
be  made,  thought  and  language  must  have  advanced  far 
enough  to  render  properties  or  attributes  thinkable  as 
such,  apart  from  objects ;  which,  in  low  stages  of 
human  intelligence,  they  are  not.  Again,  even  the 
simplest  notion  of  cause,  as  we  understand  it,  can  be 
reached  only  after  many  like  instances  have  been 
grouped  into  a  simple  generalization  ;  and  through  all 
ascending  steps,  higher  notions  of  causation  imply 
wider  notions  of  generality.  Further,  as  there  musi  be 
clustered  in  the  mind  concrete  causes  of  many  kinds  be- 
the  conception  of  cause,  apart  from 
:ular  causes,  it.  follows  that].  i  abstractness 

of  thought  is  implied.     Concomitantly,  there  is  implied 
the  recognition  of  constant  relations  among  phenomena, 
leas  of  uniformity  of  sequence  and  ot  co- 
— the    idea   of  natural  law.     These   advances 
can    go    on  only  as    fast  as  perceptions  and  resulting 
thoughts  are  made  definite  by  the  use  of  measures,  serving 
to  familiarize  the  mind  with  exact  correspondence,  truth, 
nty.      And    only    when    growing   science  accumu- 
exaraples  of  quantitative,  relations,  foreseen  and 


u  .1  r8  OF  JXJDGUtQ  ro.VDUCT.  C*Z 

verifieci,  throughout  a  widening  range  of  phenomena, 
does  causation  come  to  be  conceived  as  necessary  and 
universal.  So  that  though  all  these  cardinal  concep- 
tions aid  one  another  in  developing,  we  may  properly 
say  that  the  conception  of  causation  especially  depends 
for  its  development  on  the  development  of  the  rest ;  and 
therefore  is  the  Lest  measure  of  intellectual  development 
at  large. 

How  slowly,  as  a  consequence  of  its  dependence,  the 
conception  of  causation  evolves,  a  glance  at  the  evidence 
shows.  We  hear  with  surprise  of  the  savage  who,  fall- 
ing down  a  precipice,  ascribes  the  failure  of  his  foothold 
to  a  malicious  demon  ;  and  we  smile  at  the  kindred  no- 
tion of  the  ancient  Greek,  that  his  death  was  prevented 
by  a  goddess  who  unfastened  for  lain  the  thong  of  the 
helmet  by  which  his  enemy  was  dragging  him.  But 
daily,  without  surprise,  we  hear  men  who  describe  them- 
selves as  saved  from  shipwreck  by  "  divine  interposi- 
tion," who  speak  of  having  "  providentially  "  missed  a 
train  which  met  with  a  fatal  disaster,  and  who  called  it 
a  "  mercy  "  to  have  escaped  injury  from  a  falling  chim- 
ney-pot— men  who,  in  such  cases,  recognize  physical 
causation  no  more  than  do  the  uncivilized  or  semi-civi- 
lized. The  Veddah  who  thinks  that  failure  to  hit  an 
animal  with  his  arrow  resulted  from  inadequate  invoca- 
tion of  an  ancestral  spirit,  and  the  Christian  priest  who 
says  prayers  over  a  sick  man  in  the  expectation  that  the 
course  of  his  disease  will  so  be  stayed,  differ  only  in  re- 
spect of  the  agent  from  whom  they  expect  supernatural 
aid  and  the  phenomena  to  be  altered  by  him  :  the  neces- 
sary relations  among  causes  and  effects  are  tacitly  ig- 
nored by  the  last  as  much  as  by  the  first.  Deficient  be- 
lief in  causation  is,  indeed,  exeinplilied   even   in  those 


64  THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 

whose  discipline  has  been  specially  fitted  to  generate 
this  belief — even  in  men  of  science.  For  a  generation 
after  geologists  had  become  uniformitarians  in  Geology, 
they  remained  catastrophists  in  Biology  :  while  recog- 
nizing none  but  natural  agencies  in  the  genesis  of  the 
earth's  crust,  they  ascribed  to  supernatural  agency  the 
genesis  of  the  organisms  on  its  surface.  Nay  more — 
among  those  who  are  convinced  that  living  things  in 
general  have  been  evolved  by  the  continued  interaction 
of  forces  everywhere  operating,  there  are  some  who 
make  an  exception  of  man  ;  or  who,  if  they  admit  that 
his  body  has  been  evolved  in  the  same  manner  as  the 
bodies  of  other  creatures,  allege  that  his  mind  has  been 
not  evolved  but  specially  created.  If,  then,  universal 
and  necessary  causation  is  only  now  approaching  full 
recognition,  even  by  those  whose  investigations  are  daily 
re-illustrating  it,  we  may  expect  to  find  it  very  little 
recognized  among  men  at  large,  whose  culture  has  not 
been  calculated  to  impress  them  with  it ;  and  we  may 
expect  to  find  it  least  recognized  by  them  in  respect  of 
those  classes  of  phenomena  amid  which,  in  consequence 
of  their  complexity,  causation  is  most  difficult  to  trace 
— the  psychical,  the  social,  the  moral. 

Why  do  I  here  make  these  reflections  on  what  seems 
an  irrelevant  subject?  I  do  it  because  on  studying  the 
various  ethical  theories  I  am  struck  with  the  fact 
that  they  are  all  eharacterized  either  by  entire  absence 
of  the  i<lea  of  causation,  or  by  inadequate  presence 
of  it.  Whether  theological,  political,  intuitional,  or 
utilitarian,  they  all  display,  if  not  in  the  same  degree, 
still,  each  in  a  large  degree,  the  defects  which  result 
from  this  lack.  We  will  consider  them  in  the  order 
named. 


H.I  )'s  OP  3ULGINQ  CONDUCT.  65 

§  18.  The  school  of  morals  properly  to  be  considered 
as  the  still  extant  representative  of  the  most  ancient 
school,  is  that  which  recognizes  no  other  rule  of  conduct 
than  the  alleged  will  of  God.  It  originates  with  the 
savage  whose  only  restraint  beyond  fear  of  his  fellow 
man,  is  fear  of  an  ancestral  spirit;  and  whose  notion  of 
moral  duty  as  distinguished  from  his  notion  of  social 
prudence,  arises  from  this  fear.  Here  the  ethical  doc- 
trine and  the  religious  doctrine  are  identical — have  in 
no  degree  differentiated. 

This  primitive  form  of  ethical  doctrine,  changed  only 
by  the  gradual  dying  out  of  multitudinous  minor  super- 
natural agents  and  accompanying  development  of  one 
universal  supernatural  agent,  survives  in  great  strength 
down  to  our  own  day.  Religious  creeds,  established  and 
dissenting,  all  embody  the  belief  that  right  and  wrong 
are  right  and  wrong  simply  in  virtue  of  divine  enact- 
ment. And  this  tacit  assumption  has  passed  from  sys- 
tems of  theology  into  systems  of  morality ;  or  rather  let 
us  say  that  moral  systems  in  early  stages  of  develop- 
ment, little  differentiated  from  the  accompanying  the- 
ological systems,  have  participated  in  this  assumption. 
We  see  this  in  the  works  of  the  Stoics,  as  well  as  in  the 
works  of  certain  Christian  moralists.  Among  recent 
ones  I  may  instance  the  "Essays  on  the  Principles  of 
Morality,  by  Jonathan  Dymond,  a  Quaker,  which  makes 
"  the  authority  of  the  Deity  the  sole  ground  of  duty, 
and  His  communicated  will  the  only  ultimate  standard 
of  right  and  wrong."  Nor  is  it  by  writers  belonging  to 
so  relatively  unphilosophical  a  sect  only  that  this  view 
is  held  ;  it  is  held  with  a  difference  by  writers  belonging 
to  sects  contrariwise  distinguished.  For  these  assert 
that  in  the  absence  of  belief  in  a  deity,  there  would  be 


66  THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 

no  moral  guidance  ;  and  tins  amounts  to  asserting  that 
moral  truths  have  no  other  origin  than  the  will  of  God, 
which,  if  not  considered  as  revealed  in  sacred  writings, 
must  be  considered  as  revealed  in  conscience. 

This  assumption,  when  examined,  proves  to  be  sui- 
cidal.  If  there  are  no  other  origins  for  right  and  wrong 
than  this  enunciated  or  intuited  divine  will,  then,  as 
alleged,  were  there  no  knowlege  of  the  divine  will,  the 
acts  now  known  as  wrong  would  not  be  known  as  wrong. 
But  if  men  did  not  know  such  acts  to  be  wrong  because 
contrary  to  the  divine  will,  and  so,  in  committing  them, 
did  not  offend  by  disobedience ;  and,  if  they  could  not 
otherwise  know  them  to  be  wrong,  then  they  might  com- 
mit them  indifferently  with  the  acts  now  classed  as  right : 
the  results,  practically  considered,  would  be  the  same. 
In  so  far  as  secular  matters  are  concerned,  there  would 
be  no  difference  between  the  two  ;  for  to  say  that  in  the 
affairs  of  life  any  evils  would  arise  from  continuing  to 
do  the  acts  called  wrong,  and  ceasing  to  do  the  acts 
called  right,  is  to  say  that  these  produce  in  themselves 
certain  mischievous  consequences  and  certain  benefi- 
cial consequences:  which  is  to  say  there  is  another 
si  mice  for  moral  rules  than  the  revealed  or  inferred 
divine  will :  they  may  be  established  by  induction  from 
■  observed  consequences. 

From  this  implication  I  see  no  escape.  It  must  be 
either  admitted  or  denied  that  the  acts  called  good  and 
the  acts  called  bad,  nal  urally  conduce,  the  one  to  human 
well-being  and  the  other  to  human  ill-being.  Is  it  ad- 
mitted '  Then  the  admission  amounts  to  an  assertion 
that  the  conduciveness  is  shown  by  experience  ;  and  this 
involves  abandonment  of  the  doctrine  that  there  is  no 
origin  lor  morals  apart  from  divine  injunctions.     Is  it 


WATS  OF  JUDGING  CONDUCT.  67 

denied  that  acts  classed  as  good  and  bad  differ  in  their 
effect?  Then  it  is  tacitly  affirmed  that  human  affairs 
would  go  on  just  as  well  in  ignorance  of  the  distinction  ; 
and  the  alleged  need  for  commandments  from  God  dis- 
appears. 

And  here  we  see  how  entirely  wanting  is  the  concep- 
tion of  cause.  This  notion  that  such  and  such  actions 
are  made  respectively  good  and  had  simply  by  divine  in- 
junction, is  tantamount  to  the  notion  that  such  and  such 
actions  have  not  in  the  nature  of  things  such  and  such 
kinds  of  effects.  If  there  is  not  an  unconsciousness  of 
causation  there  is  an  ignoring  of  it. 

§  19.  Following  Plato  and  Aristotle,  who  make  State 
enactments  the  sources  of  right  and  wrong  ;  and  follow- 
ing Hobbes,  who  holds  that  there  can  be  neither  justice 
nor  injustice  till  a  regularly  constituted  coercive  power 
exists  to  issue  and  enforce  commands ;  not  a  few  mod- 
ern thinkers  hold  that  there  is  no  other  origin  for  good 
and  bad  in  conduct  than  law.  And  this  implies  the  be- 
lief that  moral  obligation  originates  with  acts  of  parlia- 
ment, and  can  be  changed  this  way  or  that  way  by 
majorities.  They  ridicule  the  idea  that  men  have  any 
natural  rights,  and  allege  that  rights  are  wholly  results 
of  convention:  the  necessary  implication  being  that 
duties  are  so  too.  Before  considering  whether  this 
theory  coheres  with  outside  truths,  let  us  observe  how 
far  it  is  coherent  within  itself. 

In  pursuance  of  his  argument  that  rights  and  duties 
originate  with  established  social  arrangements,  Hobbes 
says  : 

••  Where  no  covenant  hath  preceded,  there  hath  no  right  be«n 
transferred,  and  every  man  has  a  right  t«  everything  ;  and  conse* 


63  THE  DATA   OF  ETIIICS. 

quently,  no  action  can  be  unjust.  But  when  a  covenant  is  made, 
then  tn  break  it  is  unjust  ;  and  the  definitions  of  injustice  is  no 
other  than  tin'  not  performance  of  covenant.  And  whatsoever  is 
nut  unjust,  is  just.  Therefore,  before  the  names  of  just  and  unjust 
can  have  place,  there  must  lie  some  coercive  power.to  compel  men 
equally  to  the  performance  of  their  covenants,  by  the  terror  of 
some  punishment  greater  than  the  benefit  they  expect  by  the 
breach  of  their  covenant."* 

Iii  this  paragraph  the  essential  propositions  are  :  jus- 
tice is  fulfillment  of  covenant;  fulfillment  of  covenant 
implies  a  power  of  enforcing  it :  "just  and  unjust  can 
have  no  place  "  unless  men  are  compelled  to  perform 
their  covenants.  But  this  is  to  say  that  men  can  not 
perform  their  covenants  without  compulsion.  Grant 
that  justice  is  performance  of  covenant.  Now  suppose 
it  to  be  performed  voluntarily:  there  is  justice.  In 
such  case,  however,  there  is  justice  in  the  absence  of  co- 
ercion ;  which  is  contrary  to  the  hypothesis.  The  only 
conceivable  rejoinder  is  an  absurd  one — voluntary  per- 
formance of  covenant  is  impossible.  Assert  this,  and  the 
doctrine  that  right  and  wrong  come  into  existence  with. 
the  establishment  of  sovereignty  is  defensible.  Decline 
it,  and  the  doctrine  vanishes. 

From  inner  incongruities  pass  now  to  outer  ones. 
The  justification  for  his  doctrine  of  absolute  civil  author- 
ity as  the  source  of  rules  of  conduct,  Hobbes  seeks 
in  the  miseries  entailed  by  the  chronic  war  between  man 
and  man  which  must  exist  in  the  absence  of  society; 
holding  that  under  an}-  kind  of  government  a  better  life 
tsible  than  in  the  state  of  nature.  Now  whether 
we  accept  the  gratuitous  and  baseless  theory  that  men 
surrendered  their  liberties  to  a  sovereign  power  of  some 
kind,  with  a  view  to  the  promised  increase  of  satisfac- 
*  Leviathan,  ch.  iv. 


WAYS  OF  JUDGING  CONDUCT.  00 

tions;  or  whether  we  accept  the  rational  theory,  induc- 
tively bused,  thai  a  stale  of  political  subordination 
gradually  became  established  through  experience  of  the 
increased  satisfactions  derived  under  it;  it  equally  re- 
mains obvious  that  the  acts  of  the  sovereign  power  have 
no  other  warrant  than  their  subservience  to  the  purpose 
for  which  it  came  into  existence.  The  necessities  which 
initiate  government,  themselves  prescribe  the  actions  of 
government.  If  its  actions  do  not  respond  to  the  neces- 
sities, they  arc  unwarranted.  The  authority  of  law  is, 
then,  by  the  hypothesis,  derived:  and  can  never  tran- 
scend the  authority  of  that  from  which  it  is  derived.  If 
general  good,  or  welfare,  or  utility,  is  the  supreme  end, 
and  if  State  enactments  are  justified  as  means  to  this 
supreme  end,  then,  State  enactments  have  such  author- 
ity only  as  arises  from  conduciveness  to  this  supreme 
end.  When  they  are  right,  it  is  only  because  the 
original  authority  endorses  them;  and  they  are  wrong  if 
they  do  not  hear  its  endorsement.  That  is  to  say,  con- 
duct cannot  be  made  good  or  bad  by  law;  but  its  good- 
ness or  badness  is  to  the  last  determined  by  its  effects  as 
naturally  furthering,  or  not  furthering,  the  lives  of 
citizens. 

Still  more  when  considered  in  the  concrete,  than 
when  considered  in  the  abstract,  do  the  views  of  Hobbes 
and  his  disciples  prove  to  be  inconsistent.  Joining  in 
the  general  belief  that  without  such  security  for  life  as 
enables  men  to  go  fearlessly  about  their  business,  there 
can  be  neither  happiness  nor  prosperity,  individual  or 
general,  they  agree  that  measures  for  preventing  mur- 
der, manslaughter,  assault,  etc.,  are  requisite  ;  and  they 
advocate  this  or  that  penal  system  as  furnishing  the  best 
deterrents  :  so  arguing,  both  in  respect  of  the  evils  and 


70  777E  DA  TA   OF  ETIJ! 

the  remedies,  that  such  and  such  causes  will,  by  the 
nature  of  things,  produce  such  and  such  effects.  They 
recognize  as  inferable  d priori,  the  truth  that  men  will 
not  lay  by  property  unless  they  can  count  with  great 
probability  on  reaping  advantages  from  it ;  that  con- 
sequently where  robbery  is  unchecked,  or  where  a 
rapacious  ruler  appropriates  whatever  earnings  his  sub- 
do  not  effectually  hide,  production  will  scarcely 
exceed  immediate  consumption  :  and  that  necessarily 
there  will  be  none  of  that  accumulation  of  capital  re- 
quired for  social  development,  with  all  its  aids  to  well- 
fare.  In  neither  case,  however,  do  they  perceive  that 
they  are  tacitly  asserting  the  need  for  certain  restraints 
on  conduct  as  deducible  from  the  necessary  con- 
ditions to  complete  life  in  the  social  state  :  and  are 
so  making  the  authority  of  law  derivative  and  not 
original. 

If  it  be  said  by  any  belonging  to  this  school  that  cer- 
tain moral  obligations,  to  be  distinguished,  as  cardinal, 
must  be  admitted  to  have  a  basis  deeper  than  legislation, 
and  that  it  is  for  legislation  not  to  create  but  merely  to 
enforce  them — if.  I  say,  admitting  this,  they  go  on  to 
allege  a  legislative  origin  for  minor  claims  and  duties  ; 
then  we  have  the  implication   that  wl.  ome  kinds 

of  conduct  do,  in  the  nature  of  tilings,  tend  to  work  out 
in  kinds  of  results,  other  kinds  of  conduct  do  not, 
in  the  nature  of  things,  tend  to  work  out  certain  kinds 
alts.     While  of  these  ads  the   naturally  good  <>r 
bad  consequences  tnusl  1»-  allowed,  it  may  be  denied  of 
acts  that   they  have   naturally  good   or  bad   con- 
sequences.    Only  after  asserting   this  can    it  be  consist- 
ently asserted  that  acts  of  the  last  class   are  made  right 
or  wrong  by   law.     For  if  such   acts  have  any  intrinsic 


WAYS  OF  JUDGING  CONDUCT.  71 

tendencies  to  produce  beneficial  or  mischievous  effects, 
then  these  intrinsic  tendencies  furnish  the  warrant  for 
legislative  requirements  or  interdicts  ;  and  to  say  that 
the  requirements  or  interdicts  make  them  right  or  wrong 
is  to  say  that  they  have  no  intrinsic  tendencies  to  pro- 
duce beneficial  or  mischievous  effects. 

Here,  then,  we  have  another  theory  betraying  deficient 
consciousness  of  causation.  An  adequate  consciousness 
of  causation  yields  the  irresistible  belief  that  from  the 
most  serious  to  the  most  trivial  actions  of  men  in  society, 
there  must  flow  consequences  which,  quite  apart  from 
legal  agency,  conduce  to  well-being  or  ill-being  in 
greater  or  smaller  degrees.  If  murders  are  socially  in- 
jurious whether  forbidden  by  law  or  not — if  one  man's 
appropriation  of  another's  gains  by  force  brings  special 
and  general  evils,  whether  it  is  or  is  not  contrary  to  a 
ruler's  edicts — if  non-fulfillment  of  contract,  if  cheating, 
if  adulteration,  work  mischiefs  on  a  community  in  pro- 
portion as  they  are  common,  quite  irrespective  of  pro- 
hibitions ;  then,  is  it  not  manifest  that  the  like  holds 
throughout  all  the  details  of  men's  behavior?  Is  it  not 
clear  that  when  legislation  insists  on  certain  acts  winch 
have  naturally  beneficial  effects,  and  forbids  others  that 
have  naturally  injurious  effects,  the  acts  are  not  made 
good  or  bad  by  legislation  ;  but  the  legislation  derives 
its  authority  from  the  natural  effects  of  the  acts  ? 
Non-recognition  of  this  implies  non-recognition  of 
natural  causation. 

§  20.  Nor  is  it  otherwise  with  the  pure  intuitionists, 
who  hold  that  moral  perceptions  are  innate  in  the  origi- 
nal sense — thinkers  whose  view  is  that  men  have  been 
divinely  endowed  with  moral  faculties  ;  not  that  these 


72  THE  DATA    OF  ETHICS. 

have  resulted  from  inherited  modifications  caused  by 
accumulated  experiences. 

To  affirm  that  we  know  some  things  to  be  right  and 
other  things  to  be  wrong, , by  virtue  of  a  supernaturally 
given  conscience  ;  and  thus  tacitly  to  affirm  that  we  do 
not  otherwise  know  right  from  wrong  ;  is  tacitly  to  deny 
any  natural  relations  between  acts  and  results.  For  if 
there  exist  any  such  relations,  then  we  may  ascertain 
by  induction,  or  deduction,  or  both,  what  these  are. 
And  if  it  be  admitted  that  because  of  such  natural  re- 
lations, happiness  is  produced  by  this  kind  of  conduct, 
which  is  therefore  to  be  approved,  while  misery  is  pro- 
duced by  that  kind  of  conduct,  which  is  therefore  to  be 
condemned  ;  then  it  is  admitted  that  the  lightness  or 
wrongness  of  actions  are  determinable,  and  must  finally 
be  determined,  by  the  goodness  or  badness  of  the  effects 
that  flow  from  them  ;  which  is  contrary  to  the  hypothesis. 

It  may,  indeed,  be  rejoined  that  effects  are  deliber- 
ately ignored  by  this  school ;  which  teaches  that 
courses  recognized  by  moral  intuition  as  right,  must 
be  pursued  without  regard  to  consequences.  But  on 
inquiry  it  turns  out  that  the  consequences  to  be  disre- 
garded are  particular  consequences,  and  not  general 
consequences.  When,  for  example,  it  is  said  that  prop- 
erty 1"  i  by  another  ought  to  be  restored,  irrespective 
of  evil  to  tin;  finder,  who  possibly  may,  by  restoring  it, 
lose  that  which  would  have  preserved  him  from  starva- 
tion, it  is  meant  that  in  pursuance  of  the  principle,  the 
immediate  and  special  consequences  must  be  disregarded, 
not  the  diffused  and  remote  consequences.  By  which 
we  are  shown  that  though  the  theory  forbids  overt  rec- 
ognition of  causation,  there  is  anunavowed  recognition, 
of  it. 


WATS  OF  JUDGING  CONDUCT.  75 

And  this  implies  the  trait  to  which  I  am  drawing 
attention.  The  conception  of  natural  causation  is  so 
imperfectly  devoloped  that  there  is  only  an  indistinct 
consciousness  that  throughout  the  whole  of  human  ((in- 
duct necessary  relations  of  causes  and  effects  prevail, 
and  that  from  them  are  ultimately  derived  all  moral 
rules,  however  much  these  may  be  proximately  derived 
from  moral  intuitions. 

§  21.  Strange  to  say,  even  the  ultilitarian  school, 
which,  at  first  sight,  appears  to  be  distinguished  from 
the  rest  by  recognizing  natural  causation,  is,  if  not  so 
far  from  complete  recognition  of  it,  yet  very  far. 

Conduct,  according  to  its  theory,  is  to  be  estimated 
by  observation  of  results.  When,  in  sufficiently  numer- 
ous cases,  it  has  been  found  that  behavior  of  this 
kind  works  evil  while  behavior  of  that  kind  works 
good,  these  kinds  of  behavior  are  to  be  judged  as 
wrong  and  right  respectively.  Now  though  it  seems 
that  the  origin  of  moral  rules  in  natural  causes,  is  thus 
asserted  by  implication,  it  is  but  partially  asserted.  The 
implication  is  simply  that  we  are  to  ascertain  by  induc- 
tion that  such  and  such  mischiefs  or  benefits  do  go  along 
with  such  and  such  acts;  and  are  then  to  infer  that  the 
like  relations  will  hold  in  future.  But  acceptance  of 
these  generalizations  and  the  inferences  from  them  does 
not  amount  to  recognition  of  causation  in  the  full  sense 
of  the  word.  So  long  as  only  some  relation  between 
cause  and  effect  in  conduct  is  recognized,  and  not  the 
relation,  a  completely  scientific  form  of  knowledge  has 
not  been  reached.  At  present,  utilitarians  pay  no  atten- 
tion to  this  distinction.  Even  when  it  is  pointed  out 
they  disregard  the  fact  that  empirical  utilitarianism  is 


74  THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 

but  a  transitional  form  to  be  passed  through  on  the  way 
to  rational  utilitarianism. 

In  a  letter  to  Mr.  Mill,  written  some  sixteen  years 
ago,  repudiating  the  title  anti-utilitarian,  which  he  had 
applied  to  me  (a  letter  subsequently  published  in  Mr. 
Rain's  work  on  Mental  and  Moral  Science),  I  endeav- 
ored to  make  clear  the  difference  above  indicated;  and 
I  must  here  quote  certain  passages  from  that  letter. 

The  view  for  which  I  contend  is,  that  Morality,  properly  so-called 
— the  science  of  right  conduct — has  for  its  object  to  determine  how 
and  why  certain  modes  of  conduct  are  detrimental,  and  certain 
other  modes  beneficial.  These  good  and  bad  results  cannot  be  ac- 
cidental, but  must  be  necessary  consequences  of  the  constitution  of 
things  ;  and  I  conceive  it  to  be  the  business  of  Moral  Science  to  de- 
duce, from  the  laws  of  life  and  the  conditions  of  existence,  what 
kinds  of  action  necessarily  tend  to  produce  happiness,  and  what 
kinds  to  produce  unhappiness.  Having  done  this,  its  deductions 
are  to  be  recognized  as  laws  of  conduct ;  and  are  to  be  conformed 
to  irrespective  of  a  direct  estimation  of  happiness  or  misery. 

Perhaps  an  analogy  will  most  clearly  show  my  meaning.  During 
its  early  stages,  planetary  Astronomy  consisted  of  nothing  more 
than  accumulated  observations  respecting  the  positions  and  motions 
of  the  sun  and  planets  ;  from  which  accumulated  observations  it 
came  by  and  by  to  be  empirically  predicted,  with  an  approach  to 
truth,  that  certain  of  the  heavenly  bodies  would  have  certain  posi- 
tions at  certain  times.  But  the  modern  science  of  planetary  As- 
tronomy consists  of  deductions  from  the  law  of  gravitation — deduc- 
bowing  why  the  celestial  bodies  necessarily  occupy  certain 
places  at  certain  times.  Now,  the  kind  of  relation  which  thus  ex- 
ists between  ancient  and  modern  Astronomy  is  analogous  to  the 
kind  of  relation  which,  I  conceive,  exists  between  the  Expediency- 
Morality  and  Moral  Science,  properly  so  called.  And  the  objec- 
tion which  I  have  to  the  current  Utilitarianism  is,  that  it  recognizes 
no  more  developed  form  of  Morality — does  not  see  that  it  has 
reached  hut  the  initial  stage  of  Moral  Science. 

Doubtless  if  utilitarians  are,  asked  whether  it  can  be 
by  mere  chance  that  this  kind  of  action  works  evil  and 


WAYS  OF  JUDGING  CONDUCT.  75 

that  works  good,  they  will  answer — No  :  they  will  ad- 
mit that  such  sequences  are  parts  of  a  necessary  order 
among  phenomena.  But  though  this  truth  is  beyond 
question  ;  and  though  if  there  are  causal  relations  be- 
tween acts  and  their  results,  rules  of  conduct  can  become 
scientific  only  when  they  are  deduced  from  these  causal 
relations  ;  there  continues  to  be  entire  satisfaction  with 
that  form  of  utilitarianism  in  which  these  causal  rela- 
tions are  practically  ignored.  It  is  supposed  that  in 
future,  as  now,  utility  is  to  be  determined  only  by  ob- 
servation of  results ;  and  that  there  is  no  possibility  of 
knowing,  by  deduction  from  fundamental  principles, 
what  condnct  must  be  detrimental  and  what  conduct 
must  be  beneficial. 

§  22.  To  make  more  specific  that  conception  of  ethical 
science  here  indicated,  let  me  present  it  under  a  concrete 
aspect,  beginning  with  a  simple  illustration  and  compli- 
cating this  illustration  by  successive  steps. 

If,  by  tying  its  main  artery,  we  stop  most  of  the  blood 
going  to  a  limb,  then,  for  as  long  as  the  limb  performs 
its  function,  those  parts  which  are  called  into  play  must 
be  wasted  faster  than  they  are  repaired  :  whence  event- 
ual disablement.  The  relation  between  due  receipt  of 
nutritive  matters  through  its  arteries,  and  due  discharge 
of  its  duties  by  the  limb  is  a  part  of  the  physical  order. 
If,  instead  of  cutting  off  the  supply  to  a  particular  limb, 
we  bleed  the  patient  largely,  so  drafting  away  the  mate- 
rials needed  for  repairing  not  one  limb  but  all  limbs, 
and  not  limbs  only  but  viscera,  there  results  both  a  mus- 
cular debility  and  an  enfeeblement  of  the  vital  functions. 
Here,  again,  cause  and  effect  are  necessarily  related. 
The  mischief  that  results  from  great  depletion,  results 


70  TUE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 

apart  from  any  divine  command,  or  political  enactment, 
or  moral  intuition.  Now  advance  a  step.  Suppose  the 
man  to  be  prevented  from  taking  in  enough  of  the  solid 
and  liquid  food  containing  those  substances  continually 
abstracted  from  his  blood  in  repairing  his  tissues  :  sup- 
pose  he  has  cancer  of  the  esophagus  and  cannot  swallow 
— -what  happens?  By  this  indirect  depletion,  as  by  di- 
rect depletion,  he  is  inevitably  made  incapable  of  per- 
forming the  actions  of  one  in  health.  In  this  case,  as  in 
the  other  cases,  the  connection  between  cause  and  effect 
is  one  thai  cannot  be  established,  or  altered,  by  any 
authority  external  to  the  phenomena  themselves.  Again, 
let  us  say  that  instead  of  being  stopped  after  passing  his 
mouth,  tl iiit  which  he  would  swallow  is  stopped  before 
reaching  his  mouth  ;  so  that  day  after  day  the  man  is 
required  to  waste  his  tissues  in  getting  food,  and  day 
after  day  the  food  he  has  got  to  meet  this  waste,  he  is 
forcibly  prevented  from  eating.  As  bef ore,  the  progress 
toward  death  by  starvation  is  inevitable — the  connection 
between  acts  and  effects  is  independent  of  any  alleged 
theological  or  political  authority.  And  similarly  if,  be- 
ing forced  by  the  whip  to  labor,  no  adequate  return  in 
food  is  supplied  to  him,  there  are  equally  certain  evils, 
equally  independent  of  sacred  or  secular  enactment. 

Pass  now  to  those,  actions  more  commonly  thought  of 
as  the  occasions  for  rules  of  conduct.  Let  us  assume 
tin-  man  to  he  continually  robbed  of  that  which  was  given 
him  in  exchange  for  his  labor,  and  by  which  he  was  to 
up  for  nervo-muscular  expenditure  and  renew  his 
powers.     No  Less  than  before  is  the  connection  hctween 

conduct  and  consequence  rooted  in  the  constitution  of 
things  ;  unchangeable  by  State-made  law,  and  not  need- 
ing  establishment   by  empirical  generalization.     If   the 


WATS  OF  JUDGING  CONDUCT.  77 

action  by  which  the  man  is  affected  is  a  stage  farther 
away  from  the  results,  or  produces  results  of  a  less  de- 
cisive kind,  still  we  see  the  same  basis  for  morality  in 
the  physical  order.  Imagine  that  payment  for  his  serv- 
ices  is  made  partly  in  bad  coin  ;  or  that  it  is  delayed 
beyond  the  date  agreed  upon ;  or  that  what  he  buys  to 
eat  is  adulterated  with innutritive  matter.  Manifestly, 
by  any  of  these  deeds  which  we  condemn  as  unjust,  and 
which  are  punished  by  law,  there  is,  as  before,  an  inter- 
ference with  the  normal  adjustment  of  physiological  re- 
pair to  physiological  waste.  Nor  is  it  otherwise  when  we 
pass  to  kinds  of  conduct  still  more  remotely  operative. 
If  he  is  hindered  from  enforcing  his  claim,  if  class-pre- 
dominance prevents  him  from  proceeding,  or  if  a  bribed 
judge  gives  a  verdict  contrary  to  evidence,  or  if  a  wit- 
swears  falsely,  have  not  these  deeds,  though  they 
affect  him  more  indirectly,  the  same  original  cause  for 
their  wrongness  ? 

Even  with  actions  which  work  diffused  and  indefinite 
mischiefs  it  is  the  same.  Suppose  that  the  man,  instead  of 
being  dealt  with  fraudulently,  is  calumniated.  There 
i:>,  as  before,  a  hinderance  to  the  carrying  on  of  life- 
sustaining  activities;  for  the  loss  of  character  detriment- 
ally affects  his  business.  Nor  is  this  all.  The  mental 
depression  caused  partially  incapacitates  him  for  ener- 
getic activity,  and  perhaps  brings  on  ill-health.  So  thai 
malieiously  or  carelessly  propagating  false  statements 
tends  both  to  diminish  his  life  and  to  diminish  his  ability 
to  maintain  life.     Hence  its  flagitiousness. 

Moreover,  if  we  trace  to  their  ultimate  ramifications 
the  effects  wrought  by  any  of  these  acts  which  morality 
called  intuitive  reprobates — if  we  ask  what  results  not 
to  the  individual  himself  only,  but  also  to  his  belongings 


78  THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 

— if  we  observe  how  impoverishment  hinders  the  rearing 
of  his  children,  by  entailing  under-feeding  or  inadequate 
clothing,  resulting  perhaps  in  the  death  of  some  and  the 
constitutional  injury  of  others  ;  we  see  that  by  the  nec- 
essary connections  of  things  these  acts,  besides  tending 
primarily  to  lower  the  life  of  the  individual  aggressed, 
upon,  tend,  secondarily,  to  lower  the  lives  of  all  his  family 
and  thirdly,  to  lower  the  life  of  society  at  large  ;  which 
is  damaged  by  whatever  damages  its  units. 

A  more  distinct  meaning  will  now  be  seen  in  the 
statement  that  the  utilitarianism  which  recognizes  only 
the  principles  of  conduct  reached  by  induction,  is  but 
preparatory  to  the  utilitarianism  which  deduces  these 
principles  from  the  processes  of  life  as  carried  on  under 
established  conditions  of  existence. 

§  22.  Thus,  then,  is  justified  the  allegation  made  at 
tin-  outset,  that,  irrespective  of  their  distinctive  char- 
acters and  their  special  tendencies,  all  the  current 
methods  of  ethics  have  one  general  defect — they  neglect 
ultimate  causal  connections.  Of  course  I  do  not  mean 
that  they  wholly  ignore  the  natural  consequences  of 
actions  ;  but  I  mean  that  they  recognize  them  only  in- 
cidentally. They  do  not  erect  into  a  method  the  as- 
certaining  of  necessary  relations  between  causes  and 
effects,  and  deducing  rules  of  conduct  from  formulated 
sments  of  them. 

ry  science  begins  by  accumulating  observations, 
and  presently  generalizes  these  empirically ;  but  only 
when  it  reaches  the  stage  at  which  its  empirical  gen- 
eralizations are  included  in  a  rational  generalization, 
does  it  heroine  developed  science.  Astronomy  has 
already  passed  through  its  successive  stages :  first  col- 


WAYS  OF  JUDGING  CONDUCT.  79 

lections  of  facts  ;  then  inductions  from  them  ;  and  lastly 
deductive  interpretations  of  these,  as  corollaries  from  a 
universal  principle  of  action  among  masses  in  space. 
Accounts  of  structures  and  tabulations  of  strata,  grouped 
and  compared,  have  led  gradually  to  the  assigning  of 
various  classes  of  geological  changes  to  igneous  and 
aqueous  actions;  and  it  is  now  tacitly  admitted  that 
Geology  becomes  a  science  proper,  only  as  fast  as  such 
changes  are  explained  in  terms  of  those  natural  processes 
which  have  arisen  in  the  cooling  and  solidifying  earth, 
exposed  to  the  sun's  heat  and  the  action  of  the  moon 
upon  its  ocean.  The  science  of  life  has  been,  and  is 
still,  exhibiting  a  like  series  of  steps  ;  the  evolution  of 
organic  forms  at  large  is  being  affiliated  on  physical 
actions  in  operations  from  the  beginning  ;  and  the  vital 
phenomena  each  organism  presents  are  coming  to  be 
understood  as  connected  sets  of  changes,  in  parts  formed 
of  matters  that  are  affected  by  certain  forces  and  dis- 
engage other  forces.  So  is  it  with  mind.  Early  ideas 
concerning  thought  and  feeling  ignored  everything  like 
cause,  save  in  recognizing  those  effects  of  habits  which 
were  forced  on  men's  attention  and  expressed  in  prov- 
erbs; but  there  are  growing  up  interpretations  of 
thought  and  feeling  as  correlates  of  the  actions  and  re- 
actions of  a  nervous  structure,  that  is  influenced  by 
outer  changes  and  works  in  the  body  adapted  changes  : 
the  implication  being  that  Psycholog}^  becomes  a  science 
as  fast  as  these  relations  of  phenomena  are  explained  as 
consequences  of  ultimate  principles.  Sociology,  too, 
represented  down  to  recent  times  only  by  stray  ideas 
about  social  organization,  scattered  through  the  masses 
of  worthless  gossip  furnished  us  by  historians,  is  coming 
to  be  recognized  by  some  as  also  a  science ;  and  such 


80  mi:  DATA  or  irnncs. 

adumbrations  of  it  as  have  from  time  to  time  appeared 
in  the  shape  of  empirical  generalizations,  are  now  begin- 
ning tn  assume   the  character  of  generalizations  made 
coherent  by  derivation    from    causes   lying   in   human 
nature    placed  under  given  conditions.     Clearly  then, 
Ethics,  which  is  a  science  dealing  with  the  conduct  of 
associated    human    beings,  regarded   under   one   of   its 
ts,  has  to  undergo  a  like  transformation:  and,  at 
:it    undeveloped,  can   be  considered   a   developed 
science  only  when  it  has  undergone  this  transformation. 
A  preparation  in  the  simpler  sciences  is  pre-supposed. 
Ethics  has  a  physical  aspect;  since  it  treats  of  human 
activities  which,  in  common  with  all  expenditures  or 
energy,  conform  to  the  law  of  the  persistence  of  energy: 
moral  principles  must  conform  to  physical  necessities. 
It    has   a    biological   aspect;  since   it  concerns   certain 
effects,  inner  and  outer,  individual  and  social,  of  the 
vital  changes  going  on  in  the  highest  type  of  animal. 
It  has  a  psychological  aspect;  for  its  subject  matter  is 
rate  of  actions  that   are  prompted  by  feelings 
and  guided  by  intelligence.     And  it  has  a  sociological 
'  ;   for  these  actions,  some,  of  them  directly  and  all 
of  them  indirectly,  affect  associated  beings. 

What  is  the  implication?  Belonging  under  one 
aspect  to  each  of  these  sciences — physical,  biological, 
psychological,  sociological — it  can  find  its  ultimate 
interpretations  only  in  those  fundamental  truths  which 
are  common  to  all  of  them.  Already  we  have  con- 
cluded in  ;i  general  way  that  conduct  at  large,  includ- 
ing the  conduct  Ethics  deals  with,  is  to  be  fully  under- 
stood only  as  an  aspect  of  evolving  life;  and  now 
we  arc  brought  to  this  conclusion  in  a  more  special 
way. 


WA  TB  OF  JUDGING  roXDUCT.  81 

§  23.  Hero,  then,  we  have  to  inter  on  the  considera- 
tion of  moral  phenomena  as  phenomena  of  evolution; 
being  forced  to  do  this  by  iinding  that  they  form  a 
part  of  the  aggregate  of  phenomena  which  evolution 
has  wrought  out.  If  the  entire  visible  universe  has 
been  evolved — if  the  solar  system  as  a  whole,  the  earth 
as  a  part  of  it,  the  life  in  general  which  the  earth  bears, 
as  well  as  that  of  each  individual  organism — if  the 
mental  phenomena  displayed  by  all  creatures,  up  to  the 
highest,  in  common  with  the  phenomena  presented  by- 
aggregates  of  these  highest — if  one  and  all  conform  to 
the  laws  of  evolution  ;  then  the  necessary  implication  is 
that  those  phenomena  of  conduct  in  these  highest  creat- 
ures with  which  Morality  is  concerned,  also  conform. 

The  preceding  volumes  have  prepared  the  way  for 
dealing  with  morals  as  thus  conceived.  Utilizing  the 
conclusions  they  contain,  let  us  now  observe  what  data 
are  furnished  by  these.  We  will  take  in  succession — 
the  physical  view,  the  biological  view,  the  psychological 

view,  and  the  sociological  view. 
6 


82  TEE  DATA  OF  ETHICS, 


CHAPTER  V. 

THE  PHYSICAL  VIEW. 

§  24.  Every  moment  we  pass  instantly  from  men's 
perceived  actions  to  the  motives  implied  by  them  ;  and 
so  are  led  to  formulate  these  actions  in  mental  terms 
rather  than  in  bodily  terms.  Thoughts  and  feelings 
are  referred  to  when  we  speak  of  any  one's  deeds  with 
praise  or  blame  j  not  those  outer  manifestations  which 
reveal  the  thoughts  and  feelings.  Hence  we  become 
oblivious  of  the  truth  that  conduct  as  actually  ex- 
perienced consists  of  changes  recognized  by  touch, 
sight  and  hearing. 

This  habit  of  contemplating  only  the  psychical  face 
of  conduct  is  so  confirmed  that  an  effort  is  required  to 
contemplate  only  the  physical  face.  Undeniable  as  it 
is  that  another's  behavior  to  us  is  made  up  of  move- 
ments of  his  body  and  limbs,  of  his  facial  muscles,  and 
of  his  vocal  apparatus,  it  yet  seems  paradoxical  to  say 
that  these  are  the  only  elements  of  conduct  really 
known  by  us,  while  the  elements  of  conduct  which  we 
exclusively  think  of  as  constituting  it,  are  not  known 
but  inferred. 

Here,  however,  ignoring  for  the  time  being  the 
infilled  elements  in  conduct,  we  have  to  deal  with  the 
perceived  elements — we  have  to  observe  its  traits  con 
sidered  as  a  set  of  combined  motions.  Taking  the 
evolution  point  of  view,  and  remembering  that  while 


THE  PHYSICAL  VIEW.  83 

an  aggregate  evolves,  not  only  the  matter  composing 
it,  but  also  the  motion  of  that  matter,  passes  from  an 
indefinite  incoherent  homogeneity  to  a  definite  coherent 
Heterogeneity,  we  have  now  to  ask  whether  conduct  as 
it  rises  to  its  higher  forms,  displays  in  increasing 
degrees  these  characters ,  and  whether  it  does  not  dis- 
play them  in  the  greatest  degree  when  it  reaches  that 
highest  form  which  we  call  moral. 

§  25.  It  will  be  convenient  to  deal  first  with  the 
trait  of  increasing  coherence.  The  conduct  of  lowly- 
organized  creatures  is  broadly  contrasted  with  the 
conduct  of  highly-organized  creatures  in  having  its 
successive  portions  feebly  connected.  The  random 
movements  which  animalcules  make  have  severally  no 
reference  to  movements  made  a  moment  before  ;  nor 
do  they  affect  in  specific  ways  the  movements  made 
immediately  after.  To-day's  wanderings  of  a  fish  in 
search  of  food,  though  perhaps  showing  by  their 
adjustments  to  catching  different  kinds  of  prey  at  dif- 
ferent hours,  a  slightly-determined  order,  are  unrelated 
to  the  wanderings  of  yesterday  and  to-morrow.  But 
such  more  developed  creatures  as  birds,  show  us  in  the 
building  of  nests,  the  sitting  on  eggs,  the  rearing  of 
chicks,  and  the  aiding  of  them  after  they  fly,  sets  of 
motions  which  form  a  dependent  series,  extending  over 
a  considerable  period.  And  on  observing  the  complex- 
ity of  the  acts  performed  in  fetching  and  fixing  the 
fibres  of  the  nest  or  in  catching  and  bringing  to  the 
young  each  portion  of  food,  we  discover  in  the  com- 
bined motions,  lateral  cohesion  as  well  as  longitudinal 
cohesion. 

Man,  even  in  his  lowest  state,  displays  in  his  conduct 


84  TITE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 

far  more  coherent  combinations  of  motions.  By  the 
elaborate  manipulations  gone  through  in  making 
weapons  that  are  to  serve  for  the  chase  next  year,  or 
in  building  canoes  and  wigwams  for  permanent  uses — 
by  acts  of  aggression  and  defense  which  are  connected 
with  injuries  long  since  received  or  committed,  the 
savage  exhibits  an  aggregate  of  motions  which,  in 
some  of  its  parts,  holds  together  over  great  periods. 
Moreover,  if  we  consider  the  many  movements  implied 
by  the  transactions  of  each  day,  in  the  wood,  on  the 
water,  in  the  camp,  in  the  family,  we  see  that  this 
coherent  aggregate  of  movements  is  composed  of  many 
minor  aggregates  that  are  severally  coherent  within 
themselves  and  with  one  another. 

In  civilized  man  this  trait  of  developed  conduct 
becomes  more  conspicuous  still.  Be  his  business  what 
it  may,  its  processes  involve  relatively  numerous 
dependent  motions  ;  and  day  by  day  it  is  so  carried  on 
as  to  show  connections  between  present  motions  and 
motions  long  gone  by,  as  well  as  motions  anticipated 
in  the  distant  future.  Besides  the  many  doings, 
related  to  one  another,  which  the  farmer  goes  through 
in  Looking  after  his  cattle,  directing  his  laborers,  keep- 
i  c\i-  on  his  dairy,  buying  his  implements,  selling 
his  produce,  etc.,  the  business  of  getting  his  lease 
involves  numerous  combined  movements  on  which  the 
movements  of  subsequenl  years  depend  ;  and  in  manur- 
ing hia  fields  with  a  view  to  larger  returns,  or  putting 
down  drains  with  the  like  motive,  he  is  performing  acts 
which  are  parts  of  a  coherent  combination  rela- 
tively extensive.  That  the  Like  holds  of  the  shop- 
keeper,  manufacturer,  banker,  is  manifest;  and  this 
increased   coherence   of   conduct    among1  the   civilize*} 


TI1E  PHYSICAL  VIEW. 

will  strike  us  even  more  when  we  remember  how  its 
parts  are  often  continued  in  a  connected  arrangement 
through  life,  for  the  purpose  of  making  a  fortune, 
founding  ;i  family,  gaining  a  seat  in  Parliament. 

Now  mark  that  a  greater  coherence  among  its  com- 
ponent motions  broadly  distinguishes  the  conduct  we 
call  moral  from  the  conduct  we  call  immoral.  The 
application  of  the  word  dissolute  to  the  last,  and  of  the 
word  self-restrained  to  the  first,  implies  this — implies 
that  conduct  of  the  lower  kind,  constituted  of  disor- 
derly acts,  has  its  parts  relatively  loose  in  their  rela- 
tions with  one  another;  while  conduct  of  the  higher 
kind,  habitually  following  a  fixed  order,  so  gains  a 
characteristic  unity  and  coherence.  In  proportion  as 
the  conduct  is  what  we  call  moral,  it  exhibits  com- 
paratively settled  connections  between  antecedents 
and  consequents ;  for  the  doing  right  implies  that 
under  driven  conditions  the  combined  motions  const  it  ut- 
ing  conduct  will  follow  in  a  way  that  can  be  specified. 
Contrariwise,  in  the  conduct  of  one  whose  principles 
are  not  high,  the  sequences  of  motions  are  doubtful. 
He  may  pay  the  money  or  he  may  not ;  he  may  keep 
his  appointment  or  he  may  fail  ;  he  may  tell  the  truth 
or  lie  may  lie.  The  words  trustworthiness  and  untrust- 
worthiness,  as  used  to  characterize  the  two  respectively, 
sufficientlv  imply  that  the  actions  of  the  one  can  be 
foreknown  while  those  of  the  other  cannot  :  and  this 
implies  that  the  successive  movements  composing 
the  one  bear  more  constant  relations  to  one  another 
than  do  those  composing  the  other — are  more  coherent. 

§  26.  Indefiniteness  accompanies  incoherence  in  con- 
duct that  is  little  evolved  ;  and   throughout  the  ascwMi- 


86  THE  DATA   OF  ETHICS. 

ing  stages  of  evolving  conduct  there  is  an  increasingly 
definite  co-ordination  of  the  motions  constituting  it. 

Such  changes  of  form  as  the  rudest  protozoa  show  us, 
are  utterly  vague — admit  of  no  precise  description  ; 
and  though  in  higher  kinds  the  movements  of  the 
parts  are  more  definable,  yet  the  movement  of  the 
whole  in  respect  of  direction  is  indeterminate  :  there 
is  no  adjustment  of  it  to  this  or  the  other  point  in 
space.  In  such  coelenterate  animals  as  polypes  we  see 
the  parts  moving  in  ways  which  lack  precision;  and 
in  one  of  the  locomotive  forms,  as  a  medusa,  the 
course  taken,  otherwise  at  random,  can  be  described 
only  as  one  which  carries  it  toward  the  light  where 
degrees  of  light  and  darkness  are  present.  Among 
annulose  creatures  the  contrast  between  the  track 
of  a  worm,  turning  this  way  or  that  at  hazard, 
and  the  definite  course  taken  by  a  bee  in  its  flight 
from  flower  to  flower  or  back  to  the  hive,  shows  us 
the  same  tiling;  the  bee's  acts  in  building  cells  and 
feeding  larva-  further  exhibiting  precision  in  the  sim- 
ultaneous movements  as  well  as  in  the  successive 
ments.  Though  the  motions  made  by  a  fish  in 
pursuing  its  prey  have  considerable  definiteness,  yet 
they  are  'if  a  simple  kind,  and  are  in  this  respect  con- 
tract, -d  with  the  mail)'  definite  motions  of  body,  head, 
and  limits  gone  through  by  a  carnivorous  mammal  in 
course  "I  waylaying,  running  down,  and  seizing 
a  herbivore;  and  further,  the  fish  shows  us  none  of 
definitely  adjusted  sets  of  motions  which  in  the 
mammal  subserve  the  rearing  of  young. 

Much  greater  definiteness,  if  not  in  the  combined 
movements  forming  single  acts,  still  in  the  adjustments 
of  many   combined   acts   to  various   purposes,  charac- 


THE  PHYSICAL  VIEW.  87 

terizes  human  conduct,  even  in  its  lowest  stages.  In 
making  and  using  weapons  and  in  the  maneuvering* 
of  savage  warfare,  numerous  movements,  all  precise  in 
their  adaptations  to  proximate  ends,  are  arranged  for 
the  achievement  of  remote  ends,  with  a  precision  not 
paralleled  among  lower  creatures.  The  lives  of  civ- 
ilized men  exhibit  this  trait  far  more  conspicuously. 
Each  industrial  art  exemplifies  the  effects  of  move- 
ments which  are  severally  definite  ;  and  which  are 
definitely  arranged  in  simultaneous  and  successive 
order.  Business  transactions  of  every  kind  are  char- 
acterized by  exact  relations  between  the  sets  of 
motions  constituting  acts,  and  the  purposes  fulfilled, 
in  time,  place,  and  quantity.  Further,  the  daily  rou- 
tine of  each  person  shows  us  in  the  periods  and 
amounts  of  activity,  of  rest,  of  relaxation,  a  meas- 
ured arrangement  which  is  not  shown  us  by  the  doings 
of  the  wandering  savage,  who  has  no  fixed  times  for 
hunting,  sleeping,  feeding,  or  any  one  kind  of  action. 

Moral  conduct  differs  from  immoral  conduct  in  the 
same  manner  and  in  a  like  degree.  The  conscientious 
man  is  exact  in  all  his  transactions.  He  supplies  a 
precise  weight  for  a  specified  sum  ;  he  gives  a  definite 
quality  in  fulfillment  of  understanding ;  he  pays  the 
full  amount  he  bargained  to  do.  In  times  as  well  as 
in  quantities,  his  acts  answer  completely  to  anticipa- 
tions. If  he  lias  made  a  business  contract  he  is  to  the 
day ;  if  an  appointment  he  is  to  the  minute.  Similarly 
in  respect  of  truth :  his  statements  correspond  accu- 
rately with  the  facts.  It  is  thus  too  in  his  family  life. 
He  maintains  marital  relations  that  are  definite  in 
contrast  with  the  relations  that  result  from  breach  of 
the  marriage  contract;  and  as  a  father,  fitting  his  be- 


88  THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 

liavior  with  care   to  the  nature  of  each   child  and   to 

the    occasion ;    he    avoids  the    too    much  and    the    too 

of   praise  or  blame,  reward  or  penalty.     Nor  is 

berwise    in   his    miscellaneous   acts.     To   say  that 

la    equitably   with   those   he   employs,    whether 

they  behave  well  or  ill,  is  to  say  that  he  adjusts  his 

to  their  deserts  ;  and  to  say  that  he  is  judicious  in 
Lis  charities,  is  to  say  that  he  portions  out  his  aid  with 

imination  instead  of  distributing  it  indiscriminately 
to  good  and  bad,  as  do  those  who  have  no  adequate 
Bense  of  their  social  responsibilities. 

That  progress  toward  rectitude  of  conduct  is  progress 
toward  duly-proportioned  conduct,  and  that  duly-pro- 
portioned conduct  is  relatively  definite,  we  may  see  from 
another  point  of  view.  One  of  the  traits  of  conduct  we 
call  immoral,  is  excess ;  while  moderation  habitually 
characterizes  moral  conduct.  Now  excesses  imply  ex- 
treme divergences  of  actions  from  some  medium,  while 
maintenance  of  the  medium  is  implied  by  moderation; 
whence  it  follows  that  actions  of  the  last  kind  can  be  de- 
fined more  nearly  than  those  of  the  first.  Clearly,  con- 
duct which,  being  unrestrained,  runs  into  great  and  in- 
calculable oscillations,  therein  differs  from  restrained 
conduct  of  which,  by  implication,  the  oscillations  fall 
within  narrower  limits.  And  falling  within  narrower 
limil  itates  relative  definiteness  of  movements 

17.   That   throughout  the    ascending   forms  of  life, 
with   increasing  heterogeneity  of  structure  and 
function,  there  goes  increasing hel  ty  of  conduct 

— increasing  diversity  in  the  sets  of  external  motions 
and  combined  sets  of  such  motions — needs  not  be  shown 
in  detail.     Xor  need  it  be  shown  thut  becoming  relatively 


THE  PHYSICAL  VIEW.  89 

great  in  the  motions  constituting  the  conduct  of  the  un- 
civilized man,  this  heterogeneity  lias  become  still  greater 
in  those  which  the  civilized  man  goes  through..  We 
may  pass  al  once  to  that  further  degree  of  the  like  con- 
trast which  we  see  on  ascending  from  the  conduct  of  the 
immoral  to  that  of  the  moral. 

Instead  of  recognizing  this  contrast,  most  readers  will 
be  inclined  to  identify  a  moral  life  with  a  life  little 
varied  in  its  activities.  I5ut  here  we  come  upon  a  de- 
fect in  the  current  conception  of  morality.  This  <•<  m- 
parative  uniformity  in  the  aggregate  of  motions,  which 
goes  along  with  morality  as  commonly  conceived,  is  not 
only  not  moral  hut  is  the  reverse  of  moral.  The  better 
a  man  fulliils  every  requirement  of  life,  alike  as  regards 
his  own  body  and  mind,  as  regards  the  bodies  and  minds 
of  those  dependent  on  him,  and  as  regards  the  bodies 
and  minds  of  his  fellow  citizens,  the  more  varied  do  his 
activities  become.  The  more  fully  he  does  all  these 
things,  the  more  heterogeneous  must  be  his  movements. 

One  who  satisfies  personal  needs  only,  goes  through, 
other  things  equal,  less  multiform  processes  than  one 
who  also  administers  to  the  needs  of  wife  and  children. 
Supposing  there  are  no  other  differences,  the  addition  of 
family  relations  necessarily  renders  the  actions  of  the 
man  who  full fi Is  the  duties  of  husband  and  parent,  more 
heterogeneous  than  those  of  the  man  who  has  no  such 
duties  to  fulfill,  or,  having  them,  does  not  fulfill  them  ; 
and  to  say  that  his  actions  are  more  heterogeneous  is  to 
say  that  there  is  a  greater  heterogeneity  in  the  combined 
motions  1.  e  through.  The  like  holds  of  social  obli- 
gations. These,  in  proportion  as  a  citizen  duly  performs 
them,  complicate  his  movements  considerably.  If  he  is 
helpful  to  inferiors  dependent  on  hini,  if  he  takes  a  part 


90  THE  DA  TA  OF  ETHICS. 

in  political  agitation,  if  lie  aids  in  diffusing  knowledge, 
he,  in  each  of  these  ways,  adds  to  his  kinds  of  activity 
— makes  his  sets  of  movements  more  multiform ;  so  dif- 
fering from  the  man  who  is  the  slave  of  one  desire  or 
group  of  desires. 

Though  it  is  unusual  to  consider  as  having  a  moral 
aspect,  those  activities  which  culture  involves,  yet  to 
the  few  who  hold  that  due  exercise  of  all  the  higher 
faculties,  intellectual  and  aesthetic,  must  be  included  in 
the  conception  of  complete  life,  here  identified  with  the 
ideally  moral  life,  it  will  be  manifest  that  a  further 
heterogeneity  is  implied  by  them.  For  each  of  such  ac- 
tivities, constituted  by  that  play  of  these  faculties  which 
is  eventually  added  to  their  life-subserving  uses,  adds  to 
the  multiformity  of  the  aggregated  motions. 

Briefly,  then,  if  the  conduct  is  the  best  possible  on 
every  occasion,  it  follows  that  as  the  occasions  are  end- 
lessly  varied  the  acts  will  be  endlessly  varied  to  suit  — 
the  heterogeneity  in  the  combinations  of  motions  will  be 
extreme. 

Involution  in  conduct  considered  under  its  moral 
'.  is  like  all  other  evolution,  toward  equilibrium. 
I  dn  not  mean  that  it  is  toward  the  equilibrium  reached 
at  death,  though  this  is,  of  course,  the  final  state  which 
the  evolution  of  the  highest  man  has  in  common  with 
all  lever  evolution  ;  but  I  mean  that  it  is  toward  a  mo  v- 
in'_r  equilibrium. 

We  have  seen  that  maintaining  life,  expressed  in 
physical  terms,  is  maintaining  a  balanced  combination 
of  internal  actions  in  face  of  external  forces  tending  to 
overthrow  it;  and  we  have  seen  that  advance  toward  a 
higher  life,  has  been  an  acquirement  of  ability  to  main- 


THE  PT1YSICAL  VIEW.  91 

tain  the  balance  for  a  longer  period,  by  the  successive 
additions  of  organic  appliances  -which  by  their  actions 
counteract,  more  and  more  fully,  the  disturbing  forces. 
Here,  then,  we  are  led  to  the  conclusion  that  the  life 
called  moral  is  one  in  which  this  maintenance  of  the 
moving  equilibrium  reaches  completeness,  or  approaches 
most  nearly  to  completeness. 

This  truth  is  clearly  disclosed  on  observing  how  those 
physiological  rhythms  which  vaguely  show  themselves 
when  organization  begins,  become  more  regular,  as  well 
as  more  various  in  their  kinds,  as  organization  advances. 
Periodicity  is  but  feebly  marked  in  the  actions,  inner 
and  outer,  of  the  rudest  types.  Where  life  is  low  ther& 
is  passive  dependence  on  the  accidents  of  the  environ- 
ment ;  and  this  entails  great  irregularities  in  the  vital 
processes.  The  taking  in  of  food  by  a  polype  is  at  in- 
tervals now  short,  now  very  long,  as  circumstances  de- 
termine ;  and  the  utilization  of  it  is  by  a  slow  dispersion 
of  the  absorbed  part  through  the  tissues,  aided  only  by 
the  irregular  movements  of  the  creature's  body ;  while 
such  aeration  as  is  effected  is  similarly  without  a  trace 
of  rhythm.  Much  higher  up  we  still  find  very  imper- 
fect periodicities ;  as  in  the  inferior  molluscs  which, 
though  possessed  of  vascular  systems,  have  no  proper 
circulation,  but  merely  a  slow  movement  of  the  crude 
blood,  now  in  one  direction  through  the  vessels  and 
then,  after  a  pause,  in  the  opposite  direction.  Only 
with  well-developed  structures  do  there  come  a  rhyth- 
mical pulse  and  a  rhythm  of  the  respiratory  actions. 
And  then  in  birds  and  mammals,  along  with  great  rapid- 
ity and  regularity  in  these  essential  rhythms,  and  along 
with  a  consequently  great  vital  activity  and  therefore 
great  expenditure,  comparative  regularity  in  the  rhythm 


92  THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 

of  the  alimentary  actions  is  established,  as  well  as  in  the 
rhythm  of  activity  and  rest;  since  the  rapid  waste  to 
which  rapid  pulsation  and  respiration  are  instrumental, 
tolerably  regular  supplies  of  nutriment,  as 
well  as  recurring  intervals  of  sleep  during  which  repair 
may  overtake  waste.  And  from  these  stages  the  mov- 
ing equilibrium  characterized  by  such  interdependent 
rhythms,  is  continually  made  better  by  the  counteract- 
ing of  more  and  more  of  those  actions  which  tend  to 
perturb  it. 

So  is  it  as  we  ascend  from  savage  to  civilized  find 
from  the  lowest  among  the  civilized  to  the  highest. 
The  rhythm  of  external  actions  required  to  maintain 
the  rhythm  of  internal  actions  becomes  at  once  more 
complicated  and  more  complete,  making  them  into  a 
better  moving  equilibrium.  The  irregularities  which 
their  conditions  of  existence  entail  on  primitive  men, 
continually  cause  wide  deviations,  from  the  mean  state 
of  the  moving  equilibrium — wide  oscillations;  which 
imply  imperfection  of  it  for  the  time  being,  and  bring 
about  its  premature  overthrow.  In  such  civilized  men 
call  ill-conducted,  frequent  perturbations  of  the 
moving  equilibrium  are  caused  by  those  excesses  char- 
acterizing a  career  in  which  the  periodicities  are  much 
broken  ;  and  a  common  result  is  that  the  rhythm  of 
the  interna]  actions  being  often  deranged,  the  moving 
equilibrium,  rendered  by  so  much  imperfect,  is  gener- 
ally shortened  in  duration.  While  one  in  whom  the 
oal  rhythms  are  bei  t  maintained  is  one  by  whom 
the  external  actions  required  to  fulfill  all  needs  and 
duties,  1\   performed  on  the  recurring  occasions, 

conduce   to    a  moving  equilibrium   that  is  at  once  in« 
volved  and  prolonged. 


THE  PHYSICAL  VIEW.  03 

Of  course  the  implication  is  that  the  man  who  thus 
reaches  the  limit  of  evolution,  exists  in  a  society  con- 
gruous -with  his  nature,  is  a  man  among  men  Similarly 
constituted,  who  are  severally  in  harmony  with  that 
social  environment  which  they  have  formed.  This  is, 
indeed,  the  only  possibility.  For  the  production  of  the 
highesi  tj^pe  of  man  can  go  on  only  pari  passu  with  the 
production  of  the  highest  type  of  society.  The  implied 
conditions  are  those  before  described  as  accompanying 
the  most  evolved  conduct — conditions  under  which  each 
can  fulfil]  all  his  needs  and  rear  the  due  number  of  pro- 
geny, not  only  without  hindering  others  from  doing  the 
like,  but  while  aiding  them  in  doing-  the  like.  Anil 
evidently,  considered  under  its  physical  aspect,  the  con- 
duct of  the  individual  so  constituted,  and  associated 
with  like  individuals,  is  one  in  which  all  the  actions, 
that  is  the  combined  motions  of  all  kinds,  have  become 
such  as  duly  to  meet  every  daily  process,  every  ordinary 
occurrence,  and  every  contingency  in  his  environment. 
(  oniplete  life  in  a  complete  society  is  but  another  name 
for  complete  equilibrium  between  the  co-ordinated  ac- 
tivities of  each  social  unit  and  those  of  the  aggregate 
of  units. 

£  29.  I'". wn  to  readers  of  preceding  volumes,  and  still 
more  to  other  readers,  there  will  seem  a  strangeness, 
or  even  an  absurdity,  in  this  presentation  of  moral  con- 
duel  in  physical  terms.  It  has  been  needful  to  make 
it,  however.  If  thai  re-distribution  of  matter  and  mo- 
tion constituting  evolution   crocs  on  in   all  acrsTeeates, 

O  O  go         O 

its  laws  must  be  fulfilled  in  the  most  developed  being 
as  in  every  other  thing;  and  his  actions,  when  decom- 
posed into  motions,  must  exemplify  its  laws.     This  wo 


94  THE  DA  TA  OF  ETHICS. 

find  that  they  do.  There  is  an  entire  correspondence 
between  moral  evolution  and  evolution  as  physically 
defined. 

Conduct,  as  actually  known  to  us  in  perception,  and 
not  as  interpreted  into  the  accompanying  feelings  and 
ideas,  consists  of  combined  motions.  On  ascending 
tlnough  the  various  grades  of  animate  creatures,  we 
find  these  combined  motions  characterized  by  increasing 
coherence,  increasing  definiteness  considered  singly  and 
in  their  co-ordinated  groups,  and  increasing  heteroge- 
neity ;  and  in  advancing  from  lower  to  higher  types  of 
man,  as  well  as  in  advancing  from  the  less  moral  to  the 
more  moral  type  of  man,  these  traits  of  evolving  conduct 
become  more  marked  still.  Further,  we  see  that  the 
increasing  coherence,  definiteness,  and  heterogeneity,  of 
the  combined  motions,  are  instrumental  to  the  better 
maintenance  of  a  moving  equilibrium.  Where  the  evo- 
lution is  small  this  is  very  imperfect  and  soon  cut  short ; 
with  advancing  evolution,  bringing  "greater  power  and 
intelligence,  it  becomes  more  steady  and  longer  con- 
tinued in  face  of  adverse  actions  ;  in  the  human  race  at 
large  it  is  comparatively  regular  and  enduring  ;  and  its 
regularity  and  enduringness  are  greatest  in  the  highest. 


THE  BIOLOGICAL  VIEW.  95 


CHAPTER  VI. 

THE   BIOLOGICAL   VIEW. 

§  30.  The  truth  that  the  ideally  moral  man  is  one  in 
whom  the  moving  equilibrium  is  perfect,  or  approaches 
nearest  to  perfection,  becomes,  when  translated  into 
physiological  language,  the  truth  that  he  is  one  in  whom 
the  functions  of  all  kinds  are  duly  fulfilled.  Each  func- 
tion has  some  relation,  direct  or  indirect,  to  the  needs  of 
life  :  the  fact  of  its  existence  as  a  result  of  evolution, 
being  itself  a  proof  that  it  has  been  entailed,  imme- 
diately or  remotely,  by  the  adjustment  of  inner  actions 
to  outer  actions.  Consequently,  non-fulfillment  of  it  in 
normal  proportion  is  non-fulfillment  of  a  requisite  to 
complete  life.  If  there  is  defective  discharge  of  the 
function,  the  organism  experiences  some  detrimental  re- 
sult caused  by  the  inadequacy.  If  the  discharge  is  in 
excess,  there  is  entailed  a  reaction  upon  the  other  func- 
tions, which  in  some  way  diminishes  their  efficiencies. 

It  is  true  that  during  full  vigor,  while  the  momentum 
of  the  organic  actions  is  great,  the  disorder  caused  by 
moderate  excess  or  defect  of  any  one  function,  soon  dis- 
appears— the  balance  is  re-established.  But  it  is  none 
the  less  true  that  always  some  disorder  results  from  ex- 
cess or  defect,  that  it  influences  every  function,  bodily 
and  mental,  and  that  it  constitutes  a  lowering  of  the  life 
for  the  time  being. 

Beyond  the  temporary  falling  short  of  complete  life 


Till:  DATA    OF  ETIIICS. 

implied  by  undue  or  inadequate  discharge  of  a  function, 
there  is  entailed,  as  an  ultimate  result,  decreased  length 
of  life.  If  some  function  is  habitually  performed  in  ex- 
if  the  requirement,  or  in  defect  of  the  requirement; 
and  if,  as  a  consequence,  there  is  an  often  repeated  per- 
turbation of  the  functions  at  large,  there  results  some 
chronic  derangement  in  the  balance  of  the  functions. 
issarily  reacting  on  the  structures,  and  registering 
in  them  its  accumulated  effects,  this  derangement  works 
a  general  deterioration;  and. when  the  vital  energies  be- 
gin to  decline,  the  moving  equilibrium,  further  from 
perfection  than  it  would  else  have  been,  is  sooner  over- 
thrown :  death  is  more  or  less  premature. 

Hence  the  moral  man  is  one  whose  functions — many 
and  varied  in  their  kinds,  as  we  have  seen — are  all  dis- 
charged in  degrees  duly  adjusted  to  the  conditions  of 
existence 

1.  Strange  as  the  conclusion  looks,  it  is  never- 
theless a  conclusion  to  be  here  drawn,  that  the  per- 
formance of  every  function  is,  in  a  sense,  a  moral  obli- 
gation. 

It  is  usually  thought  that  morality  requires  us  only 
strain  such  vital  activities  as,  in  our  present  state, 
ten  pushed  to  excess,  or  such  as  conflictwith  aver- 
elfare,  special  or  general ;  but  it  also  requires  us 
i  ry   on    these    vital   activities  up   to  their  normal 
All  the  animal   functions,  in  common  with  all 
the   higher   functions,  have,  as  thus   understood,  their 
While  recognizing  the  fact  that  in  our 
osition,   characterized    by    very   imperfect 
adaptation  of  constitution  of  conditions,  moral  obliga- 
tions of  supreme  kinds  often  necessitate  conduct  which 


TT7E  BIOLOGICAL  VIEW.  07 

is  physically  injurious  :  we  must  also  recognize  the  fact 
that,  considered  apart  from  other  effects,  it  is  immoral 
BO  to  treat  the  body  as  in  any  way  to  diminish  the  full- 
ness or  vigor  of  its  vitality. 

Hence  results  one  test  of  actions.  There  may  in  every 
case  be  put  the  questions — Does  the  action  tend  to  main- 
tenance of  complete  life  for  the  time  being?  and  does  it 
tend  to  prolongation  of  life  to  its  full  extent  ?  To 
answer  yes  or  no  to  either  of  these  questions,  is  im- 
plicitly to  class  the  action  as  right  or  wrong  in  respect 
of  its  immediate  bearings,  whatever  it  may  be  in  respect 
of  its  remote  bearings. 

The  seeming  paradoxicalness  of  this  statement  results 
from  the  tendency,  so  difficult  of  avoidance,  to  judge  a 
conclusion  which  presupposes  an  ideal  humanity,  by  its 
applicability  to  humanity  as  now  existing.  The  fore- 
going conclusion  refers  to  that  highest  conduct  in  which, 
as  we  have  seen,  the  evolution  of  conduct  terminates — 
that  conduct  in  which  the  making  of  all  adjustments  of 
aits  to  ends  subserving  complete  individual  life,  together 
with  all  those  subserving  maintenance  of  offspring  and 
preparation  of  them  for  maturity,  not  only  consist  with 
tin-  making  of  like  adjustments  h}'  others,  but  furthers 
it.  And  this  conception  of  conduct  in  its  ultimate  form 
implies  the  conception  of  a  nature  having  such  conduct 
for  its  spontaneous  outcome — the  product  of  its  normal 
activities.  So  understanding  the  matter,  it  becomes 
manifest  that  under  such  conditions  any  falling  short  of 
faction,  as  well  as  any  excess  of  function,  implies  devia- 
tion from  the  best  conduct  or  from  perfectly  moral  con- 
duct. 


§  32.  Thus  far  in  treating  of  conduct  from  the  bio- 
7 


98  THE  DATA  OF  ETUICS. 

logical  point  of  view,  we  have  considered  its  constituent 
actions  under  their  physiological  aspects  only  ;  leaving 
out  of  sight  their  psychological  aspects.  We  have 
recognized  the  bodity  changes  and  have  ignored  the 
accompanying  mental  changes.  And  at  first  sight  it 
seems  needful  for  us  hereto  do  this;  since  taking  ac- 
count  of  states  of  consciousness  apparently  implies  an 
inclusion  of  the  psychological  view  in  the  biological 
view. 

This  is  not  so  however.  As  was  pointed  out  in  the 
Principles  of  Psychology,  §§  52,  53,  we  enter  upon 
psychology  proper  only  when  we  begin  to  treat  of  men- 
tal states  and  their  relations  considered  as  referring  to 
external  agents  and  their  relations.  While  we  concern 
ourselves  exclusively  with  modes  of  mind  as  correlatives 
of  nervous  changes,  we  are  treating  of  what  was  there 
distinguished  ;is  aestho-physiology.  We  pass  to  psy- 
chology only  when  Ave  consider  the  correspondence  be- 
tween  the  connections  among  subjective  states  and  the 
connections  among  objective  actions.  Here,  then,  with- 
out ti  ing  the  limits  of  our  immediate  topic,  Ave 
may  deal  with  feelings  and  functions  in  their  mutual 
dependencies. 

We  cannol  omit  doing  this;  because  the  psychical 
changes  which  accompany  many  of  the  physical  changes 
in  the  organism  arc  biological  factors  in  two  ways. 
Those  feelings,  classed  as  sensations,  which,  directly 
initiate!  in  the  bodily  framework,  go  alongwith  certain 
states  of  the  vital  organs  and  more  conspicuously  with 
ates  of  the  external  organs,  now  serve  mainly 
tide  to  the  performance  of  functions,  but  partly  as 
stimuli,  and  now  serve  mainly  as  stimuli,  but  in  a 
smaller  degree  as  guides.     Visual  sensations  which,  as 


THE  BIOLOGICAL  VIEW.  99 

co-ordinated,  enable  us  to  direct  our  movements,  also,  if 
vivid,  raise  the  rate  of  respiration  ;  while  sensations  of 
cold  and  heat,  greatly  depressing  or  raising  the  vital 
actions,  serve  also  for  purposes  of  discrimination.  So, 
too,  the  feelings,  classed  as  emotions,  which  are  not 
Localizable  in  the  hodily  framework,  act  in  more  general 
ways,  alike  as  guides  and  stimuli — having  influences 
over  the  performance  of  functions  more  potent  even 
than  have  most  sensations.  Fear,  at  the  same  time  that 
it  urges  flight  and  evolves  the  forces  spent  in  it,  also 
affects  the  heart  and  the  alimentary  canal ;  while  joy, 
prompting  persistence  in  the  actions  bringing  it  simul- 
taneously exalts  the  visceral  processes. 

Hence,  in  treating  of  conduct  under  its  biological 
aspect,  we  are  compelled  to  consider  that  interaction  of 
feelings  and  functions  which  is  essential  to  animal  life 
in  all  its  more  developed  forms. 

§  33.  In  the  Principles  of  Psychology,  §  124,  it  was 
shown  that  necessarily  throughout  the  animate  world  at 
large,  "pains are  the  correlatives  of  actions  injurious  to 
the  organism,  while  pleasures  are  the  correlatives  of 
actions  conducive  to  its  welfare ;  "  since  "  it  is  an  in- 
evitable deduction  from  the  hypothesis  of  Evolution, 
that  races  of  sentient  creatures  could  have  come  into 
existence  under  no  other  conditions."  The  argument 
was  as  follows: 

If  we  substitute  for  the  word  Pleasure  the  equivalent  phrase — a 
feeling  which  we  seek  to  bring  into  consciousness  and  retain  there, 
and  if  wo  substitute  for  the  word  Pain  the  equivalent  phrase — a 
feeling  which  we  seek  to  get  out  of  consciousness  and  to  keep  out ; 
we  see  at  once  that  if  the  states  of  consciousness  which  a  creature 
endeavors  to  maintain  are  the  correlatives  of  injurious  actions,  and 
if  the  states  of  consciousness  which  it  endeavors  to  expel  are  the 


100  THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 

correlatives  of  beneficial  actions,  it  must  quickly  disappear  through 
persistence  in  the  injurious,  and  avoidance  of  the  beneficial.  In 
other  words,  those  races  of  beings  only  can  havesurvived  in 'which, 
on  the  average,  agreeable  or  desired  feelings  went  along  with  activ- 
ities conducive  to  the  maintenance  of  life,  while  disagreeable  and 
habitually  avoided  feelings  went  along  with  activities  directly  or 
indirectly  destructive  of  life  ;  and  there  must  ever  have  been,  other 
things  equal,  the  most  numerous  and  long-continued  survivals 
among  races  in  which  these  adjustments  of  feelings  to  actions  were 
the  best,  tending  ever  to  bring  about  perfect  adjustment. 

Fit  connections  between  acts  and  results  must  estab- 
lish themselves  in  living  things,  even  before  conscious- 
ness arises ;  and  after  the  rise  of  consciousness  these 
connections  can  change  in  no  other  way  than  to  become 
better  established.  At  the  very  outset,  life  is  maintained 
by  persistence  in  acts  which  conduce  to  it.  and  desist- 
ance  from  acts  which  impede  it ;  and  whenever  senti- 
ency  make  its  appearance  as  an  accompaniment,  its  forms 
must  be  such  that  in  the  one  case  the  produced  feeling 
i:  of  a  kind  that  will  be  sought — pleasure,  and  in  the 
other  case  is  of  a  kind  that  will  be  shunned — pain.  Ob- 
serve the  necessity  of  these  relations  as  exhibited  in  the 
concrete. 

A  plant  which  envelops  a  buried  bone  with  a  plexus 
of  rootlets,  or  a  potato  which  directs  its  blanched  shoots 
toward  a  grating  through  which  light  comes  into  the 
cellar,  shows  us  that  the  changes  which  outer  agents 
themselves  set  up  in  its  tissues  are  changes  which  aid 
the  utilization  of  these  agents.  If  wc  ask  what  would 
happen  if  a  plant's  roots  grew  not  toward  the  place  where 
there  was  moisture,  but  away  from  it,  or  if  its  leaves, 
enabled  by  light  to  assimilate,  nevertheless  bent  them- 
selves toward  the  darkness,  we  see  that  death  would  re- 
sult in  the  absence  of  the  existing  adjustments.      This 


TT1E  BIOLOGICAL  VTEW.  101 

general  relation  is  still  better  shown  in  an  insectivorous 
plant,  such  as  the  Dioncea  muscipula,  which  keeps  its 
fcrap  dosed  around  animal  matter,  but  not  round  other 
matter.  Here  it  is  manifest  that  the  stimulus  arising 
from  the  first  part  of  the  absorbed  substance  itself  sets 
up  those  actions  by  which  the  mass  of  the  substance  is 
utilized  lor  the.  plant's  benefit. 

When  we  pass  from  vegetal  organisms  to  unconscious 
animal  organisms,  we  see  a  like  connection  between 
proclivity  and  advantage.  On  observing  how  the  ten- 
tacles of  a  polype  attach  themselves  to,  and  begin  to 
close  round,  a  living  creature,  or  some  animal  substance, 
Avhile  they  are  indifferent  to  the  touch  of  other  sub- 
stance, we  are  similarly  shown  that  diffusion  of  some  of 
the  nutritive  juices  into  the  tentacles,  which  is  an  in- 
cipient assimilation,  causes  the  motions  effecting  pre- 
hension. And  it  is  obvious  that  life  would  cease  were 
these  relations  reversed. 

Nor  is  it  otherwise  with  this  fundamental  connection 
between  contact  with  food  and  taking  in  of  food,  among 
conscious  creatures,  up  to  the  very  highest.  Tasting  a 
substance  implies  the  passage  of  its  molecules  through 
the  mucous  membrane  of  the  tongue  and  palate  ;  and 
this  absorption,  when  it  occurs  with  a  substance  serving 
for  food,  is  but  a  commencement  of  the  absorption  car- 
ried on  throughout  the  alimentary  canal.  Moreover, 
the  sensation  accompanying  this  absorption,  when  it  is 
of  the  kind  produced  by  food,  initiates  at  the  place 
where  it  is  strongest,  in  front  of  the  pharnyx,  an 
automatic  act  of  swallowing,  in  a  manner  rudely  anal- 
ogous to  that  in  which  the  stimulus  of  absorption  in  a 
polype's  tentacles  initiates  prehension. 

If   from   these   processes   and   relations    that    imply 


102  TEE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 

contact  between  a  creature's  surface  and  the  substance 
it  takes  in,  we  turn  to  those  set  up  by  diffused  particles 
of  the  substance,  constituting  to  conscious  creatures  its 
odor,  we  meet  a  kindred  general  truth.  Just  as,  after 
contact,  some  molecules  of  a  mass  of  food  are  absorbed 
by  the  pari  touched,  and  excite  the  act  of  prehension, 
so  are  absorbed  such  of  its  molecules  as,  spreading 
through  the  water,  reach  the  organism;  and,  being 
absorbed  b}r  it.  excite  those  actions  by  which  contact 
with  tin-  mass  is  effected.  If  the  physical  stimulation 
caused  by  the  dispersed  particles  is  not  accompanied 
by  consciousness,  still  the  motor  changes  set  up  must 
conduce  to  survival  of  the  organism,  if  they  are  such 
as  end  in  contact ;  and  there  must  be  relative  innutri- 
tion and  mortality  of  organisms  in  which  the  produced 
contractions  do  not  bring  about  this  result.  Nor  can 
it  be  questioned  that  whenever  and  wherever  the 
physical  stimulation  has  a  concomitant  sentiency,  this 
must  be  such  as  consists  with,  and  conduces  to,  move- 
ment toward  the  nutritive  matter:  it  must  be  not  a 
repulsive  but  an  attractive  sentiency.  And  this  which 
holds  with  the  lowest  consciousness,  must  hold  through- 
out ;  as  we  see  it  <h>  in  ;ill  such  superior  creatures  as  are 
drawn  to  their  food  by  odor. 

I;  jides  those  movements  which  cause  locomotion 
which  erred  seizure  must  no  less  certainly  become 
thus  adjusted.  The  molecular  changes  caused  by 
absorption  of  nutritive  matter  from  organic  substance 
in  contact,  or  from  adjacenl  organic  substance,  initiate 
motions  which  are  indefinite  where  the  organization  is 
low,  and  which  become  more  definite  with  the  advance 
of  organization.  At  the  outset,  while  the  undifTereri* 
tiated   protoplasm    is  everywhere  absorbent  and  every- 


TTIE  BIOLOGICAL   VIEW.  103 

where  contractile,  the  changes  of  form  initiated  by  the 
physical  stimulation  of  adjacent:  nutritive  matter  are 
vague,  and  ineffectually  adapted  to  utilization  of  it; 
but  gradually,  along  with  the  specialization  into  parts 
that  are  contractile  and  pails  that  are  absorbent,  these 
motions  become  better  adapted;  for  necessarily  indi- 
viduals in  which  they  are  least  adapted  disappear 
faster  than  those  in  which  they  are  most  adapted. 
Recognizing  this  necessity  we  have  here  especially  to 
recognize  a  further  necessity.  The  relation  between 
stimulations  and  adjusted  contractions  must  be 
such  that  increase  of  the  one  causes  increase  of  the 
other;  since  the  directions  of  the  discharges  being 
once  established,  greater  stimulation  causes  greater 
contraction,  and  the  greater  contraction  causing  closer 
contact  with  the  stimulating  agent,  causes  increase  of 
stimulus  and  is  thereby  itself  further  increased.  And 
now  wre  reach  the  corollary  which  more  particularly 
concerns  us.  Clearly  as  fast  as  an  accompanying 
sentiency  arises,  this  cannot  be  one  that  is  disagree- 
able, prompting  desistance,  but  must  be  one  that  is 
agreeable,  prompting  persistence.  The  pleasurable 
sensation  must  be  itself  the  stimulus  to  the  contraction 
by  which  the  pleasurable  sensation  is  maintained  and 
increased;  or  must  be  so  bound  up  with  the  stimulus 
that  the  two  increase  together.  And  this  relation 
which  we  see  is  directly  established  in  the  case  of  a 
fundamental  function,  must  be  indirectly  established 
with  all  other  functions  ;  since  non-establishment  of  it 
in  any  particular  case  implies,  in  so  far,  unfitness  to  the 
conditions  of  existence. 

In  two  ways  then,  it  is  demonstrable  that  there  exists 
a  primordial    connection   between  pleasure-giving  acts 


104  THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 

and  continuance  or  increase  of  life,  and,  by  impli- 
cation, between  pain-giving  acts  and  decrease  or  loss  of 
life.  On  the  one  hand,  setting  out  with  the  lowest 
living  things,  we  see  that  the  beneficial  act  and  the  act 
which  there  is  a  tendency  to  perform,  are  originally 
two  sides  of  the  same  ;  and  cannot  be  disconnected, 
without  fatal  results.  On  the  other  hand,  if  we  con- 
template developed  creatures  as  now  existing,  we  see 
that  each  individual  and  species  is  from  day  today  kept 
alive  by  pursuit  of  the  agreeable  and  avoidance  of  the 
disagreeable. 

Thus  approaching  the  facts  from  a  different  side,  anal- 
ysis brings  us  down  to  another  face  of  that  ultimate  truth 
disclosed  by  analysis  in  a  preceding  chapter.  We  found 
it  was  no  more  possible  to  frame  ethical  conceptions 
Erom  which  the  consciousness  of  pleasure,  of  some  kind, 
;it  some  time,  to  some  being,  is  absent,  than  it  is  pos- 
sible to  frame  the  conception  of  an  object  from  which 
the  consciousness  of  spare  is  absent.  And  now  we  see 
that  this  necessity  of  thought  originates  in  the  very 
nature  of  sentient  existence.  Sentient  existence  can 
evolve  only  on  condition  that  pleasure-giving  acts  are 
life-sustaining  acts. 

§  34.  Notwithstanding  explanations  already  made, 
the  naked  enunciation  of  this  as  an  ultimate  truth,  un- 
.  ing  all  estimations  of  right  and  wrong,  will  in 
many,  if  not  in  most,  cause  astonishment.  Having  in 
view  certain  beneficial  results  that  are  preceded  by 
disagreeable  states  of  consciousness,  such  as  those  com- 
monly accompanying  labor;  and  having  in  view  the 
injurious  results  that  follow  the  receipt  of  certain  gratis 
.  -u'li   as   those   which  excess  in   drinking   pro- 


THE  BIOLOGICAL  71 B  W.  105 

duces;  the  majority  tacitly  or  avowedly  believe  that 
the  bearing  of  pains  is  on  the  whole  beneficial,  and  that 
the  receipt  of  pleasures   is  on   the   whole   detrimental. 

The  exceptions  so  fill  their  minds  as  to  exclude  the 
rule. 

When  asked,  they  are  obliged  to  admit  that  the  pains 
accompanying  wounds,  bruises,  sprains,  are  the  con- 
comitants of  evils,  alike  to  the  sufferer  and  to  those 
around  him;  and  that  the  anticipations  of  such  pains 
serve  as  deterrents  from  careless  or  dangerous  acts. 
They  cannot  deny  that  the  tortures  of  burning  or  scald- 
ing, and  the  miseries  which  intense  cold,  starvation, 
and  thirst  produce,  are  indissolubly  connected  with 
permanent  or  temporary  mischiefs,  tending  to  in- 
capacitate one  who  bears  them  for  doing  things  that 
should  be  done,  either  for  his  own  welfare  or  the  welfare 
of  others.  The  agony  of  incipient  suffocation  they  are 
compelled  to  recognize  as  a  safeguard  to  life,  and  must 
allow  that  avoidance  of  it  is  conducive  to  all  that  life 
can  bring  or  achieve.  Nor  will  they  refuse  to  own  that 
one  who  is  chained  in  a  cold,  damp  dungeon,  in  dark- 
ness and  silence,  is  injured  in  health  and  efficiency, alike 
by  the  positive  pains  thus  inflicted  on  him  and  by  the 
accompanying  negative  pains  due  to  absence  of  light,  of 
freedom,  of  companionship. 

Conversely,  they  do  not  doubt  that  notwithstanding 
occasional  excesses  the  pleasure  which  accompanies  the 
taking  of  food  goes  along  with  physical  benefit;  and 
that  the  benefit  is  the  greater  the  keener  the  satis- 
faction of  appetite.  They  have  no  choice  but  to 
acknowledge  that  the  instincts  and  sentiments  which 
so  overpoweringly  prompt  marriage,  and  those  which 
find    their   gratification  in    the    fostering    of   offspring, 


106  TIIE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 

■work  out  an  immense  surplus  of  benefit  after  deducting 
all  evils.  Nor  dare  they  question  that  the  pleasure 
taken  in  accumulating  property,  leaves  a  large  balance 
of  advantage,  private  and  public,  after  making  all 
drawbacks.  Yet  many  and  conspicuous  as  are  the  cases 
in  which  pleasures  and  pains,  sensational,  and  emotional, 
serve  as  incentives  to  proper  acts  and  deterrents  from 
improper  ads,  these  pass  unnoticed;  and  notice  is  taken 
only  of  those  cases  in  which  men  are  directly  or  in- 
directly misled  by  them.  The  well-working  in  essential 
matters  is  ignored  ;  and  the  ill-working  in  unessential 
matters  is  alone  recognized. 

Is  it  replied   that  the   more  intense  pains  and  pleas- 
.  which  have  immediate  reference  to  bodily  needs, 
guide  us  rightly  ;  while  the  weaker  pains  and  pleasures, 
not    immediately  connected  with    the    maintenance  of 
liff.  guide   us   wrongly?     Then  the  implication  is  that 
the  system   <>f  guidance   by  pleasures  and  pains,  which 
has   answered   with   all  types  of   creatures   below   the 
human,   fails   with  the  human.     Or  rather,  the  admis- 
sion   Icing  that  with   mankind   it  succeeds  in  so  far  as 
fulfillment  of  certain  imperative  wants  goes,  it  fails  in 
ct  of  wants  that  are  not  imperative.     Those  who 
think   this  are  required,   in   the  first  place,  to  show  us 
how  the  line  is    to    be    drawn   between  the  two;    and 
then  i<>  show  us  why  the  system  which  succeeds  in  the 
r  will  not  succeed  in  the  higher. 

5.  Doubtless,  however,  after  all  that  has  been  said, 
there  will  be  raised  afresh  the  same,  difficulty — there 
will  be  instanced  the  mischievous  pleasures  and  the 
beneficent  pains.  The  drunkard,  the  gambler,  thethief, 
who  severally  pursue  gratifications,  will  be  named   in 


THE  BIOLOGICAL  VIEW.  107 

proof  that  the  pursuit  of  gratifications  misleads  ;  while 
the  self-sacrificing  relative,  the  worker  who  perseveres 
through  weariness,  the  honest  man  who  stints  himself  to 
pay  his  way,  will  be  named  in  proof  that  disagreeable 
modes  of  consciousness  accompany  acts  that  are  really 
beneficial.  But  after  recalling  the  fact  pointed  out  in 
§  20,  that  this  objection  does  not  tell  against  guidance 
by  pleasures  and  pains  at  large,  since  it  merely  implies 
that  special  and  proximate  pleasures  and  pains  must  bo 
disregarded  out  of  consideration  for  remote  and  diffused 
pleasures  and  pains;  and,  after  admitting  that  in  man- 
kind, as  at  present  constituted,  guidance  by  proximate 
pleasures  and  pains  fails  throughout  a  wide  range  of 
cases ;  I  go  on  to  set  forth  the  interpretation  Biology 
gives  of  these  anomalies,  as  being  not  necessary  and  per- 
manent, but  incidental  and  temporary. 

Already,  while  showing  that  among  inferior  creatures, 
pleasures  and  pains  have  all  along  guided  the  conduct 
by  which  life  has  been  evolved  and  maintained,  I  have 
pointed  out  that  since  the  conditions  of  existence  for 
each  species  have  been  occasionally  changing,  there  have 
been  occasionally  arising  partial  misadjustments  of  the 
feelings  to  the  requirements,  necessitating  readjustments. 
This  general  cause  of  derangement,  operating  on  all 
sentient  beings,  has  been  operating  on  human  beings  in 
a  manner  unusually  decided,  persistent,  and  involved. 
It  needs  but  to  contrast  the  mode  of  life  followed  by 
primitive  men,  wandering  in  the  forests  and  living  on 
wild  food,  with  the  mode  of  life  followed  by  rustics, 
artisans,  traders,  and  professional  men  in  a  civilized  com- 
munity, to  see  that  the  constitution,  bodily  and  mental, 
well-adjusted  to  the  one,  is  ill-adapted  to  the  other. 
It    needs    but    to    observe    the    emotions  kept  awake 


TIIF  DATA   OF  ETHICS. 

in  each  savage  tribe,  chronically  hostile  to  neigh- 
boring  tribes,  and  then  to  observe  the  emotions 
which  peaceful  production  and  exchange  bring  into 
play,  to  see  that  the  two  are  not  only  unlike,  but 
opposed.  And  it  needs  but  to  note  how,  during  social 
evolution,  the  ideas  and  sentiments  appropriate  to  the 
militant  activities  carried  on  by  coercive  co-operation 
have  been  at  variance  with  the  ideas  and  sentiments 
appropriate  to  the  industrial  activities,  carried  on  by 
voluntary  co-operation,  to  see  that  there  has  ever  been 
within  each  society,  and  still  continues,  a  conflict  be- 
tween the  two  moral  natures  adjusted  to  these  two  un- 
like modes  of  life.  Manifestly,  then,  this  readjustment 
of  constitution  to  conditions,  involving  readjustment  of 

ures  and  pains  for  guidance,  which  all  creatures 
from  time  to  time  undergo,  has  been  in  the  human  race 
during  civilization  especially  difficult,  not  only  be- 
cause of  the  greatness  of  the  change  from  small  nomadic 
groups  to  vast  settled  societies,  and  from  predatory 
habits  to  peaceful  habits,  but  also  because  the  old  life 
of  enmity  between  societies  has  been  maintained  along 
with  the  new  life  of  amity  within  each  society.  While 
two  ways  of  life  so  radically  opposed  as 

militant  and  the  industrial,  human  nature  cannot 
become  properly  adapted  to  either. 

That  hence  results  such  failure  of  guidance  by  pleas- 

and  pains  as  is  daily  exhibited,  we  discover  on 
observing  in  what  parts  of  conduct   the   failure  is  most 

icuous.  As  above  shown,  the  pleasurable  and 
painful  sensations  are  fairly  well  adjusted  to  the  per- 
emptory physical  requirements:  the  benefits  of  conform- 
ing to  tl  •  ions  which  prompt  us  in  respect  of 
nutrition,  respiration,  maintenance  of  temperature,  etc., 


77/  /•;  BIOL  OGICA  L  VIEW.  109 

immensely  exceed  the  incidental  evils,  and  such  mis- 
adjustments  as  occur  may  be  ascribed  to  tbe  change 
from  the  outdoor  life  of  the  primitive  man  to  the  in- 
door life  which  the  civilized  man  is  often  compelled  to 
lead.  It  is  the  emotional  pleasures  and  pains  which 
are  in  so  considerable  a  degree  out  of  adjustment  to  the 
needs  of  life  as  carried  on  in  society,  and  it  is  of  these 
that  the  readjustment  is  made  in  the  way  above  shown, 
so  tardy  because  so  difficult. 

From  the  hiological  point  of  view,  then,  we  see  that 
the  connections  between  pleasure  and  beneficial  action 
and  between  pain  and  detrimental  action,  which  arose 
when  sentient  existence  began,  and  have  continued 
among  animate  creatures  up  to  man,  are  generally  dis- 
played in  him  also  throughout  the  lower  and  more  com- 
pletely organized  part  of  his  nature  ;  and  must  be  more 
and  more  fully  displayed  throughout  the  higher  part 
of  his  nature,  as  fast  as  his  adaptation  to  the  conditions 
of  social  life  increases. 

§  36.  Biology  has  a  further  judgment  to  pass  on  the 
relations  of  pleasures  and  pains  to  welfare.  Beyond 
the  connections  between  acts  beneficial  to  the  organism 
and  the  pleasures  accompanying  performance  of  them, 
and  between  acts  detrimental  to  the  organism  and  the 
pains  causing  desistauce  from  them,  there  are  connec- 
tions between  pleasure  in  general  and  physiological  ex- 
altation, and  between  pain  in  general  and  physiological 
depression.  Every  pleasure  increases  vitality :  even- 
pain  decreases  vitality.  Every  pleasure  raises  the  tide 
of  life;  every  pain  lowers  the  tide  of  life.  Let  us  con- 
sider, first,  the  pains. 

By  the  general  mischiefs  that  result  from  submission 


110  TITE  DATA   OF  ETHICS. 

ins,  T  do  not  mean  those  arising  from  the  diffused 
effects  of  local  organic  lesions,  sucli  as  follow  an  aneur- 
ism caused  by  intense  effort  spite  of  protesting  sensa- 
tions, or  such  as  follow  the  varicose  veins  brought  on 
by  continued  disregard  of  fatigue  in  the  legs,  or  such 
low  the  atrophy  set  up  in  muscles  that  are  per- 
sistently exerted  when  extremely  weary;  but  I  mean 
tlx'  general  mischiefs  caused  by  that  constitutional  dis- 
turbance which  pain  forthwith  sets  up.  These  are  con- 
spicuous when  the  pains  are  acute,  whether  they  be  sen- 
sational or  emotional. 

Bodily  agony  long  borne  produces  death  by  exhaus- 
tion.    More  frequently,  arresting  the  action  of  the  heart 
for  a  time,  it  causes  that  temporary  death  we  call  faint- 
On  other  occasions  vomiting  is    a  consequence. 
And  where  such  manifest  derangements  do  not  result, 
ill,  in  the  pallor  and  trembling,  trace  the  general 
prostration.     Beyond  the  actual  loss  of  life  caused  by 
subjection  to  intense  cold  there  are  depressions  of  vi- 
tality less  marked  caused  by  cold  less  extreme — tempo- 
rary enfeeblement  following  too  long  an  immersion  in 
i<v  water ;  enervation  and  pining  away  consequent  on 
inadequate  clothing.     Similarly  is   it  with   submission 
:   we  have  lassitude  reaching  occasionally 
baustiorj  ;  we  have,  in  weak  persons,  fainting,  suc- 
1  by  temporary  debilitation  ;  and  in  steaming  trop- 
ical jungles    Europeans    contract   fevers    which,  when 
not  fatal,  often  entail  life-long  incapacities.     Consider, 
again,  the  evils  that  follow  violent  exertion  continued 
in  spite   of  painful  feelings — now  a  fatigue  which  de- 
stroys appetite  or  arrests  digestion  if  food  is  taken,  im- 
plying failure  of  the  reparative  processes  when  they  are 
raoot  needed ;  and  now  a  prostration  of  the  heart,  here 


Ill i;  BIOLOGICAL  VIEW.  Ill 

lusting-  for  a  lime  and  there,  where  the  transgression 
h;is  been  repeated  day  after  day,  made  permanent:  re- 
ducing the  rest  of  life  to  a  lower  level. 

No  less  conspicuous  are  the  depressing  effects  of 
emotional  pains.  There  are  occasional  cases  of  (hath 
from  grief  ;  and  in  other  cases  the  mental  suffering  which 
a  calamity  causes,  like  bodily  suffering,  shows  its  effects 
by  syncope.  Often  a  piece  of  bad  news  is  succeeded 
by  sickness  ;  and  continued  anxiety  will  produce  loss  of 
appetite,  perpetual  indigestion  and  diminished  strength. 
Excessive  tear,  whether  aroused  b}^  physical  or  moral 
danger,  will,  in  like  manner,  arrest  for  a  time  the  pro- 
cesses of  nutrition  ;  and,  not  unfrequently,  in  pregnant 
women  brings  on  miscarriage  ;  while,  in  less  extreme 
cases,  the  cold  perspiration  and  unsteady  hands  indicate 
a  general  lowering  of  the  vital  activities,  entailing  par- 
tial incapacity  of  body  or  mind  or  both.  How  greatly 
emotional  pain  deranges  the  visceral  actions  is  shown 
us  by  the  fact  that  incessant  worry  is  not  unfrequently 
followed  by  jaundice.  And  here,  indeed,  the  relation 
between  cause  and  effect  happens  to  have  been  proved 
by  direct  experiment.  Making  such  arrangements  that 
the  bile-duct  of  a  dog  delivered  its  product  outside  the 
body,  Claude  Bernard  observed  that  so  long  as  he  petted 
the  dog  and  kept  him  in  good  spirits,  secretion  went  on 
at  its  normal  rate;  but  on  speaking  angrily,  and  for  a 
time  so  treating  him  as  to  produce  depression,  the  flow 
of  bile  was  arrested. 

Should  it  be  said  that  evil  results  of  such  kinds  are 
proved  to  occur  only  when  the  pains,  bodily  or  mental, 
are  great,  the  reply  is  that  in  healthy  persons  the 
injurious  perturbations  caused  by  small  pains,  though 
jiot  easily  traced,  are  still  produced;  and  that  in  those 


112  THE  DATA   OF  ETHICS. 

whose  vital  powers  are  much  reduced  by  illness,  slight 
physical  irritations  and  trifling  moral  annoyances,  often 
cause  relapses. 

Quite  opposite  are  the  constitutional  effects  of  pleas- 
It  sometimes,  though  rarely,  happens  that  in 
feeble  persons  intense  pleasure — pleasure  that  is  almost 
pain— gives  a  nervous  shock  that  is  mischievous;  but 
it  d<»es  no1  do  this  in  those  who  are  undebilitated  by 
voluntary  or  enforced  submission  to  actions  injurious  to 
the  organism.  In  the  normal  order,  pleasures,  great  and 
small,  are  stimulants  to  the  processes  by  which  life  is 
maintained. 

Among  the  sensations  may  be  instanced  those  pro- 
duced by  bright  light.  Sunshine  is  enlivening  in  com- 
parison with  gloom — even  a  gleam  excites  a  wave  of 
pleasure;  and  experiments  have  shown  that  sunshine 
-  the  rate  of  respiration:  raised  respiration  being 
an  index  of  raised  vital  activities  in  general.  A  warmth 
thai  is  agreeable  in  degree  favors  the  heart's  action,  and 
furthers  the  various  functions  to  which  this  is  instru- 
mental. Though  those  who  are  in  full  vigor  and  fitly 
clothed  can  maintain  their  temperature  in  winter,  and 
can  digesl  additional  food  to  make  up  for  the  loss  of 
it  is  otherwise  with  the  feeble;  and,  as  vigor 
decline-,  the  beneficence  of  warmth  becomes  conspic- 
That  benefits  accompany  the  agreeable  sensa- 
tions produced  by  fresh  air,  and  the  agreeable  sensa- 
tions thai  accompany  muscular  action  after  due  rest, 
and  the  agreeable  sensations  caused  by  rest  after  exer- 
tion cannot  he  questioned.  Receipt  of  these  pleasures 
conduces  to  the  maintenance  of  the  body  in  fit  condi- 
tion for  all  the  purposes  of  life. 

More  manifest  still  are  the  physiological  benefits  of 


THE  BIOLOGICAL  VIEW.  IP; 

emotional  pleasures.  Every  power,  bodily  and  mental, 
is  increased  by  "good  spirits,"  which  is  our  name  for 
a  general  emotional  satisfaction.  The  truth  that  the 
fundamental  vital  actions  —  those  of  nutrition  —  are 
furthered  by  laughter-moving  conversation,  or  rather 
by  the  pleasurable  feeling  causing  laughter,  is  one  of 
old  standing ;  and  every  dyspeptic  knows  that  in 
exhilarating  company,  a  large  and  varied  dinner,  includ- 
ing not  very  digestible  things,  may  be  eaten  with 
impunity,  and,  indeed,  with  benefit,  while  a  small, 
carefully  chosen  dinner  of  simple  things,  eaten  in  soli- 
tude, will  be  followed  by  indigestion.  This  striking 
effect  on  the  alimentary  system  is  accompanied  by 
effects,  equally  certain  though  less  manifest,  on  the 
circulation  and  the  respiration.  Again,  one  who, 
released  from  daily  labors  and  anxieties,  receives 
delights  from  fine  scenery  or  is  enlivened  by  the  novel- 
ties he  sees  abroad,  comes  back  showing  by  toned-up 
face  and  vivacious  manner,  the  greater  energy  with 
which  he  is  prepared  to  pursue  his  avocation.  Invalids 
especially,  on  whose  narrowed  margin  of  vitality  the 
influence  of  conditions  is  most  visible,  habitually  show 
the  benefits  derived  from  agreeable  states  of  feelino;. 
A  lively  social  circle,  the  call  of  an  old  friend,  or  even 
removal  to  a  brighter  room,  will,  by  the  induced  cheer- 
fulness, much  improve  the  physical  state.  In  brief,  as 
every  medical  man  knows,  there  is  no  such  tonic  as 
happiness. 

These  diffused  physiological  effects  of  pleasures  and 
pains,  which  are  joined  with  the  local  or  special  physi- 
ological effects,  arc,  indeed,  obviously  inevitable.  We 
haye  seen  {Principle*  of  Psychology,  §§  123-125)  that 
while  craving,  or  negative  pain,  accompanies  the  under- 


1U  Tin:  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 

activity  of  an  organ,  and  while  positive  pain  accompa* 
its  over-activity,  pleasure  accompanies  its  normal 
activity;  We  have  seen  that  by  evolution  no  other  rela- 
tions could  be  established;  since,  through  all  inferior 
types  of  creatures,  if  defect  or  excess  of  function  pro- 
duced  no  disagreeable  sentiency,  and  medium  function 
no  agreeable  sentiency,  there  would  be  nothing  to  insure 
a  proportioned  performance  of  function.  And  as  it  is 
one  of  the  laws  of  nervous  action  that  each  stimulus, 
1  id  a  direct  discharge  to  the  particular  organ  acted 
on,  indirectly  causes  a  general  discharge  throughout 
the  nervous  system  (Prin.  of  Psy.,  §§  21,39),  it  results 
that  the  rest  of  the  organs,  all  influenced  as  they  are 
by  the  nervous  system,  participate  in  the  stimulation. 
So  that  beyond  the  aid,  more  slowly  shown,  which  the 
organs  yield  to  one  another  through  the  physiological 
division  of  labor,  there  is  the  aid,  more  quickly  shown, 
which  mutual  excitation  gives.  While  there  is  a  ben- 
efit to  be  presently  felt  by  the  whole  organism  from 
the  due  performance  of  each  function,  there  is  an  im- 
te  benefit  from  the  exaltation  of  its  functions  at 
i  caused  by  the  accompanying  pleasure;  and  from 
pains,  whether  of  excess  or  defect,  there  also  come 
these  double  •.•fleets,  immediate  and  remote. 

7.  Non-recognition  of  these  general  truths  vitiates 
moral  speculation  at  large.  From  the  estimates  of  right 
and  wrong  habitually  framed,  these  physiological  effects 
wroughl  "!i  the  actor  by  his  feelings  are  entirely  omitted. 
It  is  tacitly  assumed  that  pleasures  and  pains  have  no 
ions  on  the  body  of  the  recipient,  affecting  his 
i  for  the  duties  of  life.  The  only  reactions  recog- 
nized are  those  on  character ;  respecting  which  the  cur- 


THE  BIOLOG ICA I   VIEW.  11  5 

rent  supposition  is,  that  acceptance  of  pleasures  is  det- 
rimental and  submission  to  pains  beneficial.  The 
notion,  remotely  descended  from  the  ghost-theory  of 
llic  savage,  that  mind  and  body  arc  independent,  has, 
among  its  various  implications,  this  belief  that  states  of 
consciousness  are  in  no  wise  related  to  bodily  states. 
"  You  have  had  your  gratification — it  is  past ;  and 
you  are  as  you  were  before,"  says  the  moralist  to  one. 
And  to  another  he  says,  "  You  have  borne  the  suffering 
— it  is  over;  and  there  the  matter  ends."  Both  state- 
ments are  false.  Leaving  out  of  view  indirect  results, 
the  direct  results  are  that  the  one  has  moved  a  step 
away  from  death  and  the  other  has  moved  a  step  toward 
death. 

Leaving  out  of  view,  I  say,  the  indirect  results.  It 
is  these  indirect  results,  here  for  the  moment  left  out 
of  view,  which  the  moralist  has  exclusively  in  view, 
being  so  occupied  by  them  that  he  ignores  the  direct 
results.  The  gratification,  perhaps  purchased  at  undue 
cost,  perhaps  enjoyed  when  work  should  have  been 
done,  perhaps  snatched  from  the  rightful  claimant,  is 
considered  only  in  relation  to  remote  injurious  effects, 
and  no  set-off  is  made  for  immediate  beneficial  effects. 
Conversehv,  from  positive  and  negative  pains,  borne 
now  in  the  pursuit  of  some  future  advantage,  now  in 
discharge  of  responsibilities,  now  in  performing  a  gen- 
erous act,  the  distant  good  is  alone  dwelt  on  and  the 
proximate  evil  ignored.  Consequences,  pleasurable  and 
painful,  experienced  by  the  actor  forthwith,  are  of  no 
importance;  and  they  become  of  importance  only  when 
anticipated  as  occurring  hereafter  to  the  actor  or  to  other 
persons.  And  further,  future  evils  borne  by  the  actor 
are  considered  of  no  account  if  they  result  from  self* 


11(5  TUK  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 

denial,  and  are  emphasized  only  when  they  result  from 
self-gratification.  Obviously,  estimates  so  framed  are 
erroneous;  and  obviously,  the  pervading  judgments  of 
conduct  based  on  such  estimates  must  be  distorted. 
Mark  the  anomalies  of  opinion  produced. 

[f,  as  the  sequence  of  a  malady  contracted  in  pursuit 
of  illegitimate  gratification,  an  attack  of  iritis  injures 
vision,  the  mischief  is  to  be  counted  among  those  en- 
tailed by  immoral  conduct;  but  if,  regardless  of  protest- 
ing sensations,  the  eyes  are  used  in  study  too  soon  after 
ophthalmia,  and  there  follows  blindness  for  years  or  for 
life,  rut  ailing  not  only  personal  unhappiness,  but  a  bur- 
den on  others,  moralists  are  silent.  The  broken  leg 
which  a  drunkard's  accident  causes  counts  among  those 
miseries  brought  on  self  and  family  by  intemperance, 
which  form  the  ground  for  reprobating  it ;  but  if  anxiety 
to  fullill  duties  prompts  the  continued  use  of  a  sprained 
knee  spite  of  the  pain,  and  brings  on  a  chronic  lameness 
involving  lack  of  exercise,  consequent  ill-health,  ineffi- 
ciency, anxiety,  and  unhappiness,  it  is  supposed  that 
ethics  has  no  verdict  to  give  in  the  matter.  A  student 
who  is  plucked  because  he  has  spent  in  amusement  the 
time  and  money  that  should  have  gone  in  study,  is 
blamed  for  thus  making  parents  unhappy  and  preparing 
for  himself  a  miserable  future;  but  another  who,  think- 
ing exclusively  of  claims  on  him,  reads  night  after  night 

with  hot   or  aching  head,  and,  breaking  down,  cannot 

.  but    returns  home  shattered  in  health 

and  unabl  iport  himself,  is  named  with  pity  only, 

il   subjeei    to  any  moral   judgment;  or  rather,  the 

moral  judgment  passed  is  wholly  favorable. 

Thus  recognizing  the  evils  caused  by  some  kinds  of 
conduct  only,  men  at  large,  and  moralists  as  exponents 


THE  BIOLOGICAL   VIEW.  117 

of  their  beliefs,  ignore  the  suffering  and  death  daily 
caused  around  them  by  disregard  of  that  guidance  which 
has  established  itself  in  the  course  of  evolution.  Led 
by  the  tacit  assumption  common  to  Pagan  stoics  and 
Christian  ascetics,  that  we  are  so  diabolically  organized 
that  pleasures  are  injurious  and  pains  beneficial,  people 
on  all  sides  yield  examples  of  lives  blasted  by  persisting 
in  actions  against  which  their  sensations  rebel.  Here  is 
one  who,  drenched  to  the  skin  and  sitting  in  a  cold  wind, 
pooh-poohs  his  shiverings  and  gets  rheumatic  fever,  with 
subsequent  heart-disease,  which  makes  worthless  the 
short  life  remaining  to  him.  Here  is  another  who,  dis- 
regarding painful  feelings,  works  too  soon  after  a  debili- 
tating illness,  and  establishes  disordered  health  that  lasts 
for  the  rest  of  his  days,  and  makes  him  useless  to  him- 
self and  others.  Now  the  account  is  of  a  youth  who^ 
persisting  in  gymnastic  feats  spite  of  scarcely  bearable 
straining,  bursts  a  blood-vessel,  and,  long  laid  on  the 
shelf,  is  permanently  damaged  ;  while  now  it  is  of  a  man 
in  middle  life  who,  pushing  muscular  effort  to  painful 
excess,  suddenly  brings  on  hernia.  In  this  family  is  a 
case  of  aphasia,  spreading  paralysis  and  death,  caused  by 
eating  too  little  and  doing  too  much  ;  in  that,  softening 
of  the  brain  has  been  brought  on  by  ceaseless  mental 
efforts  against  which  the  feelings  hourly  protested  :  and 
in  others,  less  serious  brain  affections  have  been  con- 
tracted by  over-study  continued  regardless  of  discomfort, 
and  the  cravings  for  fresh  air  and  exercise.*  Even  with- 
out  accumulating  special  examples,  the  truth  is  forced 
on  us  by  the  visible  traits  of  classes.  The  careworn  man 
of  business  too  long  at  his  office,  the  cadaverous  barris- 

*I  can  count  up  more  thau  a  dozen  such  cases  among  those  per- 
sonally well  known  to  me. 


118  THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 

fcer  poring  half  the  night  over  his  briefs,  the  feeble  fac- 
tory hands  and  unhealthy  seamstresses  passing  long 
hours  in  bad  air,  the  anaemic,  flat-chested  school-girls, 
bending  over  many  lessons  and  forbidden  boisterous 
play,  no  less  than  Sheffield  grinders  who  die  of  suffo- 
cating dust,  and  peasants  crippled  with  rheumatism  due 
(tsnie.  show  us  the  widespread  miseries  caused  by 
ivering  in  actions  repugnant  to  the  sensations  and 
neglecting  actions  which  the  sensations  prompt.  Nay, 
the  evidence  is  still  more  extensive  and  conspicuous. 
What  are  the  puny  malformed  children,  seen  in  poverty- 
stricken  districts,  but  children  whose  appetites  for  food 
and  desires  for  warmth  have  not  been  adecpuately  satis- 
lied  ?  What  are  populations  stinted  in  growth  and  pre- 
maturely aged,  such  as  parts  of  France  show  us,  but 
populations  injured  by  work  in  excess  and  food  in  de- 
fect :  the  one  implying  positive  pain,  the  other  negative 
pain  ?  What  is  the  implication  of  that  greater  mortality 
which  occurs  among  people  who  are  weakened  by  priva- 
tions, unless  it  is  that  bodily  miseries  conduce  to  fatal 
'  Or  once  more,  what  must  we  infer  from  the 
frightful  amount  of  disease  and  death  suffered  by  armies 
in  the  field,  fed  on  scanty  and  bad  provisions,  lying  on 
damp  ground,  exposed  to  extremes  of  heat  and  cold,  in- 
adequately sheltered  from  rain,  and  subject  to  exhaust- 
ing efforts;  unless  it  be  the  terrible  mischiefs  caused  by 
continuously  subjecting  the  body  to  treatment  which  the 
feelings  protest  against? 

It  matters  not  to  the  argument  whether  the  actions 
entailing  such  effects  are  voluntary  or  involuntary.  It 
matters  not  from  the  biological  point  of  view  whether 
the  motive--  prompting  them  are  high  or  low.  The  vital 
functions  accept  no  apologies  on  the  ground  that  neglect 


TT1E  BIOLOGICAL    VIEW.  119 

of  them  was  unavoidable,  or  that  the  reason  fo  neglect 
was  noble.     The  direct  and  indirect  sufferings  utused  by 

non-conformity  to  the  laws  of  life  are  the  same  whatever 
induces  the  non-conformity;  and  cannot  be  omitted  in 
any  rational  estimate  of  conduct.  If  the  purpose  i  E 
ethical  inquiry  is  to  establish  rules  of  right  living  ;  and 
if  the  rules  of  right  living  are  those  of  which  the  total 
results,  individual  and  general,  direct  and  indirect,  are 
most  conducive  to  human  happiness ;  then  it  is  absurd 
to  ignore  the  immediate  results  and  recognize  only  the 
remote  results. 

§  38.  Here  might  be  urged  the  necessity  for  prelud- 
ing the  study  of  moral  science  by  the  study  of  biologi- 
cal science.  Here  might  be  dwelt  on  the  error  men 
make  in  thinking  they  can  understand  those  special 
phenomena  of  human  life  with  which  Ethics  deals,  while 
paying  little  or  no  attention  to  the  general  phenomena 
of  human  life,  and  while  utterly  ignoring  the  phenomena 
of  life  at  large.  And,  doubtless,  there  would  be  truth 
in  the  inference  that  such  accpuaintance  with  the  world 
of  living  things,  as  discloses  the  part  which  pleasures 
and  pains  have  played  in  organic  evolution,  would  help 
to  rectify  these  one-sided  conceptions  of  moralists.  It 
cannot  be  held,  however,  that  lack  of  this  knowledge  is 
the  sole  cause,  or  the  main  cause,  of  their  one-sidedness. 
For  facts  of  the  kind  above  instanced,  which,  duly  at- 
tended to,  would  prevent  such  distortions  of  moral 
theory,  are  facts  which  it  needs  no  biological  inquiries 
to  learn,  but  which  are  daily  thrust  before  tl 
all.  The  truth  is,  rather,  that  the  general  conscious 
is  so  possessed  by  sentiments  and  ideas  at  variance  with 
the   conclusions  necessitated  by  familiar  evidence  that 


120  THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 

the  evidence  gets  no  attention.  These  adverse  senti- 
ments  and  ideas  have  several  roots. 

There  is  the  theological  root.  As  before  shown,  from 
the  worship  of  cannibal  ancestors  who  delighted  in 
witnessing  tortures,  there  resulted  the  primitive  concep- 
tion of  deities  who  were  propitiated  by  the  bearing  of 
pains,  and.  consequently,  angered  by  the  receipt  of 
pleasures.  Through  the  religions  of  the  semi-civilized, 
in  which  this  conception  of  the  divine  nature  remains 
conspicuous,  it  has  persisted,  in  progressively  modified 
forms,  down  to  our  own  times;  and  still  colors  the  be- 
both  of  those  who  adhere  to  the  current  creed  and 
of  those'  who  nominally  reject  it. 

There  i.s  another  root  in  the  primitive  and  still-surviv- 
ing militancy.  While  social  antagonisms  continue  to 
generate  war,  which  consists  in  endeavors  to  inflict  pain 
and  death  while  submitting  to  the  risks  of  pain  and 
death,  and  which  necessarily  involves  great  privations, 
it  is  needful  that  physical  suffering,  whether  considered 
in  itself  or  in  the  evils  it  bequeaths,  should  be  thought 
little  of,  and  that  among  pleasures  recognized  as  most 
worthy  should  be  those  which  victory  brings. 

Nor  does  partially  developed  industrialism  fail  to 
furnish  a  root.  With  social  evolution,  which  implies 
ition  from  the  life-  of  wandering  hunters  to  the  life 
of  settled  peoples  engaged  in  labor,  and  which  therefore 
entails  activities  widely  unlike  those  to  which  the  abo- 
il constitution  is  adapted,  there  comes  an  under- 
of  faculties  for  which  the  social  slate  affords  no 

,  and  an   overtaxing  of  faculties  required  for  the 

the  one  implying  denial   of  certain  pleas* 

and  the  other  submission  to  certain  pains.     Hence, 

along  with  that  growth  of  population  which  makes  the 


THE  BIOLOGICAL  VIEW.  121 

struggle  for  existence  intense,  bearing  of  pains  and  sac- 
rifice of  pleasures  is  daily  necessitated. 

Now  always  and  everywhere,  there  arises  among  men 
a  theory  conforming  to  their  practice.  The  savage 
nature,  originating  the  conception  of  a  savage  deity, 
evolves  a  theory  of  supernatural  control  sufficiently 
stringent  and  cruel  to  influence  his  conduct.  With  sub- 
mission to  despotic  government  severe  enough  in  its 
restraints  to  keep  in  order  barbarous  natures,  there 
grows  up  a  theory  of  divine  right  to  rule,  and  the  duty 
of  absolute  submission.  Where  war  is  made  the  busi- 
ness of  life  by  the  existence  of  warlike  neighbors,  vir- 
tues which  are  required  for  war  come  to  be  regarded  as 
supreme  virtues;  while,  contrariwise,  when  industrial- 
ism has  grown  predominant,  the  violence  and  the  decep- 
tion which  warriors  glory  in  come  to  be  held  criminal. 
In  like  manner,  then,  there  arises  a  tolerable  adjustment 
of  the  actually  accepted  (not  the  nominally  accepted) 
theory  of  right  living,  to  living  as  it  is  daily  carried  on. 
If  the  life  is  one  that  necessitates  habitual  denial  of 
pleasures  and  bearing  of  pains,  there  grows  up  an  an- 
swering ethical  system  under  which  the  receipt  of  pleas- 
ures is  tacitly  disapproved  and  the  bearing  of  pains 
avowedly  approved.  The  mischiefs  entailed  by  pleas- 
ures in  excess  are  dwelt  on,  while  the  benefits  which 
normal  pleasures  bring  are  ignored;  and  the  good  re- 
sults achieved  by  submission  to  pains  are  fully  set  forth, 
while  the  evils  are  overlooked. 

But  while  recognizing  the  desirableness  of,  and  indeed 
the  necessity  for,  systems  of  ethics  adapted,  like  religious 
systems  and  political  systems,  to  their  respective  times 
and  places,  we  have  here  to  regard  the  first  as,  like  the 
others,  transitional.     We  must  infer  that  like  a  purer 


122  TTTE  DATA   OF  ETTTICS. 

creed  and  a  better  government,  a  truer  ethics  belongs  to 
a  more  advanced  social  state 

Led,  d  priori^  to  conclude  that  distortions  must  exist, 
we  are  enabled  to  recognize  as  such  the  distortions  we 
find:  answering  in  nature,  as  these  do,  to  expectation. 
And  there  is  forced  on  us  the  truth  that  a  scientific  mor- 
ality arises  only  as  fast  as  the  one-sided  conceptions 
adapted  to  transitory  conditions  are  developed  into  both- 
sided  conceptions.  The  science  of  right  living  has  to 
take  account  of  all  consequences  in  so  far  as  they  affect 
happiness,  personally  or  socially,  directly  or  indirectly; 
and  by  as  much  as  it  ignores  any  class  of  consequences, 
by  so  much  does  it  fail  to  be  science. 

§  39.  Like  the  physical  view,  then,  the  biological 
view  corresponds  with  the  view  gained  by  looking  at 
conduct  in  general  from  the  standpoint  of  Evolution. 

That  which  was  physically  defined  as  a  moving 
equilibrium,  we  define  biologically  as  a  balance  of 
functions.  The  implication  of  such  a  balance  is  that 
the  several  functions,  in  their  kinds,  amounts,  and  com- 
binations, are  adjusted  to  the  several  activities  which 
maintain  and  constitute  complete  life;  and  to  be  so  ad- 
I  is  to  have  reached  the  goal  toward  which  the  evo- 
lution of  conduct  continually  tends. 

I'  jsing  to  the  feelings  which  accompany  the  perform- 
ance  of  functions,  we  see  that  of  necessity  during  the 
evolution  of  organic  life,  pleasures  have  become  the  con- 
comitants of  normal  amounts  of  functions,  while  pains, 
positive  and  negative,  have  become  the  concomitants  of 
and  defects  of  functions.  And  though  in  every 
species  derangements  of  these  relations  are  often  caused 
by  changes   of  conditions,  they  ever  re-establish  them- 


THE  BIOLOGICAL  VIEW.  123 

selves :  disappearance  of  the  species  being  the  alterna- 
tive. 

Mankind,  inheriting  from  creatures  of  lower  kinds, 
such  adjustments  between  feelings  and  functions  as  con- 
cern fundamental  bodily  requirements  ;  and  daily  forced 
by  peremptory  feelings  to  do  the  things  which  maintain 
life  and  avoid  those  which  bring  immediate  death  ;  has 
been  subject  to  a  change  of  conditions  unusually  great 
and  involved.  This  has  considerably  deranged  the  guid- 
ance by  sensations,  and  has  deranged  in  a  much  greater 
degree  the  guidance  by  emotions.  The  result  is  that  in 
many  cases  pleasures  are  not  connected  with  actions 
which  must  be  performed,  nor  pains  with  actions  which 
must  be  avoided,  but  contrariwise. 

Several  influences  have  conspired  to  make  men  ignore 
the  well-working  of  these  relations  between  feelings  and 
functions,  and  to  observe  whatever  of  ill-working  is  seen 
in  them.  Hence,  while  the  evils  which  some  pleasures 
entail  are  dilated  upon,  the  benefits  habitually  accom- 
panying receipt  of  pleasures  are  unnoticed  ;  at  the  same 
time  that  the  benefits  achieved  through  certain  pains  are 
magnified  while  the  immense  mischiefs  which  pains 
bring  are  made  little  of. 

The  ethical  theories  characterized  by  these  perversions 
are  products  of,  and  are  appropriate  to  the  forms  of 
social  life  which  the  imperfectly  adapted  constitutions 
of  men  produce.  But  with  the  progress  of  adaptation, 
bringing  faculties  and  recpuirements  into  harmony,  such 
incongruities  of  experience,  and  consequent  distortions 
of  theory,  must  diminish ;  until,  along  with  complete 
adjustment  of  humanity  to  the  social  state,  will  go 
recognition  of  the  truths  that  actions  are  completely 
right  only  when,  besides  being  conducive  to  future  hap- 


124  THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 

piness,  special  and  genera],  they  are  immediately  pleas- 
urable, and  that  painfulness,  not  only  ultimate  but 
proximate,  is  the  concomitant  of  actions  which  are 
wrong. 

So  that  from  the  biological  point  of  view,  ethical 
science  becomes  a  specification  of  the  conduct  of  associ- 
ated men  who  are  severally  so  constituted  that  the  vari- 
ous self-preserving  activities,  the  activities  required  for 
rearing  offspring,  and  those  which  social  welfare  de- 
mands, are  fulfilled  in  the  spontaneous  exercise  of  duly 
proportioned  faculties,  each  yielding  when  in  action  its 
quantum  of  pleasure,  and  who  are,  by  consequence,  so 
constituted  that  excess  or  defect  in  any  one  of  these 
actions  brings  its  quantum  of  pain,  immediate  and 
remote. 

Note  to  §  33.  In  his  Physical  Ethics,  Mr.  Alfred  Barratt  lias 
expressed  a  view  which  here  calls  for  notice.  Postulating  Evolu- 
tion and  its  general  laws,  he  refers  to  certain  passages  in  the  Prin- 
ciples  nf  Psychology  (1st  ed.  Pt.  III.  ch.  viii.  pp.  395,  sqq.  cf.  Pt. 
IV.  ch.  iv.)  in  which  I  have  treated  of  the  relation  between  irrita- 
tion and  contraction  which  "  marks  the  dawn  of  sensitive  life  ;" 
have  pointed  out  that  "  the  primordial  tissue  must  be  differently 
affected  by  contact  with  nutritive  and  with  innutritive  matters" — 
the  two  being  for  aquatic  creatures  respectively  the  soluble  and  the 
insoluble;  and  have  argued  that  the  contraction  by  which  a  pro- 
truded part  of  a  rhizopod  draws  in  a  fragment  of  assimilable  matter 
'•  is  caused  by  a  commencing  absorption  of  the  assimilable  matter.'' 
Mr.  Barratt,  holding  that  consciousness  "  must  lie  considered  as  an 
invariable  property  of  animal  life,  and  ultimately,  in  its  elements,  of 
the  material  universe"  (p.  43),  regards  these  responses  of  animal  tis- 
sue to  stimuli,  .-is  implying  feeling  of  one  or  other  kind.  "  Some 
kinds  of  impressed  force,"  hesays,  "  are  followed  by  movements  of 
retraction  and  withdrawal,  others  by  such  as  secure  a  continuance  of 
the  impression.  These  two  kinds  of  contraction  are  the  phenomena 
and  external  marks  of  pain  and  pleasure  respectively.  Hence  the 
tissue  acta  so  as  to  secure  pleasure  and  avoid  pain  by  a  law  as  truly 
physical  and  natural  as  that  whereby  a  needle  turns  to  the  pole,  or 


THE  PHYSICAL  VIEW.  125 

a  tree  to  the  light"  (p.  53).  Not  without  questioning  that  the  raw 
material  of  consciousness  is  present  even  in  undifferentiated  pro- 
toplasm, and  everywhere  exists  potentially  in  that  Unknowable 
Power  which,  otherwise  conditioned,  is  manifested  in  physical 
action  (Prin.  of  Psy.,  %  '-272-8),  I  demur  to  the  conclusion  that  it  at 
first  exists  under  the  forms  of  pleasure  and  pain.  These,  I  con- 
ceive, arise,  as  the  more  special  feelings  do,  by  a  compounding  of 
of  the  ultimate  elements  of  consciousness  (Prin.  of  Psy.,  §§60,  61)  : 
being,  indeed,  general  aspects  of  these  more  special  feelings  when 
they  reach  certain  intensities.  Considering  that  even  in  creat- 
ures which  have  developed  nervous  systems,  a  great  part  of  the 
vital  processes  are  carried  on  by  unconscious  reflex  actions,  I  see 
no  propriety  in  assuming  the  existence  of  what  we  understand  by 
consciousness  in  creatures  not  only  devoid  of  nervous  systems  but 
devoid  of  structures  in  general. 

Note  to  §  36.  More  than  once  in  the  Emotions  and  the  Will, 
Dr.  Bain  insists  on  the  connection  between  pleasure  and  exaltation 
of  vitality,  and  the  connection  between  pain  and  depression  of  vital- 
ity. As  above  shown,  I  concur  in  the  view  taken  by  him  ;  which 
is,  indeed,  put  beyond  dispute  by  general  experience  as  well  as  by 
the  more  special  experience  of  medical  men. 

When,  however,  from  the  invigorating  and  relaxing  effects  of 
pleasure  and  pain  respectively,  Dr.  Bain  derives  the  original  ten- 
dencies to  persist  in  acts  which  give  pleasure  and  to  desist  from 
those  which  give  pain,  I  find  myself  unable  to  go  with  him.  He 
says:  "We  suppose  movements  spontaneously  begun,  and  acci- 
dentally causing  pleasure  ;  we  then  assume  that  with  the  pleasure 
there  will  be  an  increase  of  vital  energy,  in  which  increase 
the  fortunate  movements  will  share,  and  thereby  increase  the 
pleasure.  Or,  on  the  other  hand,  we  suppose  the  spontane- 
ous movements  to  give  pain,  and  assume  that,  with  the  pain, 
there  will  be  a  decrease  of  energy,  extending  to  the  move- 
ments that  cause  the  evil,  and  thereby  providing  a  remedy" 
(3d  ed.  p.  315).  This  interpretation,  implying  that  "  the  fortunate 
movements'"  merely  share  in  the  effects  of  augmented  vital  energy 
caused  by  the  pleasure,  does  not  seem  to  me  congruous  with  obser- 
vation. The  truth  appears  rather  to  be  that  though  there  is  a  con- 
comitant general  increase  of  muscular  tone,  the  muscles  specially 
excited  are  those  which,  by  their  increased  contraction,  conduce 
to  increased  pleasure.  Conversely,  the  implication  that  desistance 
from  spontaneous  movements  which  cause  pain,  is  due  to  a  general 


126  THE  DATA   OF  ETFllCfi. 

muscular  relaxation  shared  in  by  the  muscles  causing  these  par- 
ticular movements,  seems  to  me  at  variance  with  the  fact  that  the 
retractation  commonly  takes  the  form  not  of  a  passive  lapse  but 
of  an  active  withdrawal.  Further,  it  may  be  remarked  that  de- 
pressing  as  pain  eventually  is  to  the  system  at  large,  we  cannot 
say  that  it  at  once  depresses  the  muscular  energies.  Not  simply, 
as  Dr.  Main  admits,  does  an  acute  smart  produce  spasmodic  move- 
mints,  but  pains  of  all  kinds,  both  sensational  and  emotional, 
stimulate  the  muscles  {Essays,  1st  series,  p.  3G0,  1,  or  2d  ed.  Vol. 
I.  p.  211,12).  Pain,  however  (and  also  pleasure  when  very  intense), 
simultaneously  has  an  inhibitory  effect  on  all  the  reflex  actions  ; 
and  as  the  vital  functions  in  general  are  carried  on  by  reflex 
actions,  this  inhibition,  increasing  with  the  intensity  of  the  pain, 
proportionately  depressesthe  vital  functions.  Arrest  of  the  heart's 
action  and  fainting  is  an  extreme  result  of  this  inhibition  ;  and  the 
viscera  at  large  feel  its  effects  in  degree's  proportioned  to  the  de- 
grees of  pain.  Pain,  therefore,  while'  directly  causing  a  discharge 
of  muscular  energy  as  pleasure  does,  eventually  lowers  muscular 
power  by  lowering  those  vital  processes  on  which  the  supply  of 
energy  depends.  Hence  we  cannot,  I  think,  ascribe  the  prompt 
ince  from  muscular  movements  causing  pain,  to  decrease  in 
the  flow  of  energy  ;  for  this  decrease  is  felt  only  after  an  interval. 
Conversely,  we  cannot  ascribe  the  persistence  in  a  muscular  act 
which  yields  pleasure  to  the  resulting  exaltation  of  energy;  but 
must,  as  indicated  in  §  33,  ascribe  it  to  the  establishment  of  lines 
of  discharge  between  the  place  of  pleasurable  stimulation  and  those 
contractile  structures  which  maintain  and  increase  the  act  causing 
the  stimulation — connections  allied  with  the  reflex,  into  which  they 
pass  by  insensible  gradations. 


THE  1'SYCllOLOGICAL  VIEW.  127 


CHAPTER  VII. 

THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL   VIEW. 

§  40.  The  last  chapter,  in  so  far  as  it  dealt  with  feel- 
ings in  their  relations  to  conduct,  recognized  only  their 
physiological  aspects  :  their  psychological  aspects  were 
passed  over.  In  this  chapter,  conversely,  we  are  not 
concerned  with  the  constitutional  connections  between 
feelings,  as  incentives  or  deterrents,  and  physical  bene- 
fits to  be  gained,  or  mischiefs  to  be  avoided;  nor  with 
the  reactive  effects  of  feelings  on  the  state  of  the  organ- 
ism, as  fitting  or  unfitting  it  for  future  action.  Here  we 
have  to  consider  represented  pleasures  and  pains,  sensa- 
tional and  emotional,  as  constituting  deliberate  motives 
— as  forming  factors  in  the  conscious  adjustments  of 
acts  to  ends. 

§  41.  The  rudimentary  psychical  act,  not  yet  differ- 
entiated from  a  physical  act,  implies  an  excitation  and  a 
motion.  In  a  creature  of  low  type  the  touch  of  food 
excites  prehension.  In  a  somewhat  higher  creature  the 
odor  from  nutritive  matter  sets  up  motion  of  the  body 
toward  the  matter.  And  where  rudimentary  vision  ex- 
ists, sudden  obscuration  of  light,  implying  the  passage 
of  something  large,  causes  convulsive  muscular  move- 
ments which  mostly  carry  the  body  away  from  the  source 
of  danger.  In  each  of  these  cases  we  may  distinguish 
four  factors.     There  is  (a)  that  property  of  the  external 


1  28  THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 

object  which  primarily  affects  the  organism — the  taste, 
smell,  or  opacity ;  arid  connected  with  such  property 
there  is  in  the  external  object  that  character  (b~)  which 
renders  seizure  of  it,  or  escape  from  it,  beneficial. 
Within  the  organism  there  is  (>)  the  impression  or  sen- 
sation which  the  property  (a)  produces,  serving  as 
stimulus ;  and  there  is  connected  with  it,  the  motor 
change  (t7)  by  which  seizure  or  escape  is  effected. 

Now  Psychology  is  chiefly  concerned  with  the  connec- 
tion between  the  relation  a  6,  and  the  relation  c  d,  under 
all  those  forms  which  they  assume  in  the  course  of  evo- 
lution. Each  of  the  factors,  and  each  of  the  relations, 
grows  more  involved  as  organization  advances.  Instead 
of  being  single,  the  identifying  attribute  a,  often  be- 
comes, in  the  environment  of  a  superior  animal,  a  cluster 
of  attributes  ;  such  as  the  size,  form,  colors,  motions, 
displayed  by  a  distant  creature  that  is  dangerous.  The 
factor  1>,  with  which  this  combination  of  attributes  is  as- 
sociated, becomes  the  congeries  of  characters,  powers, 
habits,  which  constitute  it  an  enemy.  Of  the  subjective 
factors,  e  becomes  a  complicated  set  of  visual  sensations 
co-ordinated  with  one  another  and  with  the  ideas  and 
Feelings  established  by  experience  of  such  enemies,  and 
constituting  the  motive  to  escape  ;  while  d  becomes  the 
intricate  and  often  prolonged  series  of  runs,  leaps, 
doubles,  dives,  etc.,  made  in  eluding  the  enemy. 

In  human  life  we  find  the  same  four  outer  and 
inner  factors,  still  more  multiform  and  entangled  in 
their  compositions  and  connections.  The  entire  assem- 
blage of  physical  attributes  a,  presented  by  an  estate 
that  is  advertised  for  sale,  passes  enumeration;  and 
the  assemblage  of  various  utilities,  b,  going  along  with 
these  attributes,  is  also  beyond  brief  specification.     The 


THE  PBTCItOLOGICAL  VIEW.  129 

perceptions  and  ideas,  likes  and  dislikes,  <\  set  up  by 
the  aspeet  of  the  estate,  and  wliieli,  compounded  and  re- 
compouncled,  eventually  form  the  motive  for  buying  it, 
make  a  whole  too  large  and  complex  for  description; 
and  the  transactions,  legal,  pecuniary,  and  other,  gone 
through  in  making  the  purchase  and  taking  possession, 
are  scarcely  Less  numerous  and  elaborate. 

Nor  must  we  overlook  the  fact  that  as  evolution  pro- 
gresses, not  only  do  the  factors  increase  in  complexity, 
but  also  the  relations  among  them.  Originally,  a  is 
directly  and  simply  connected  with  b,  while  c  is  directly 
and  simply  connected  with  <1.  But  eventually,  the  con- 
nections between  a  and  Z>,  and  between  c  and  cZ,  become 
very  indirect  and  involved.  On  the  one  hand,  as  the 
first  illustration  shows  us,  sapidity  and  nutritiveness  are 
closely  bound  together ;  as  are  also  the  stimulation 
caused  by  the  one  and  the  contraction  which  utilizes 
the  other.  But,  as  we  see  in  the  last  illustration,  the 
connection  between  the  visible  traits  of  an  estate  and 
those  characters  which  constitute  its  value,  is  at  once 
remote  and  complicated  ;  while  the  transition  from  the 
purchaser's  highly  composite  motive  to  the  numerous 
actions  of  sensory  and  motor  organs,  severally  intricate, 
which  effect  the  purchase,  is  through  an  entangled 
plexus  of  thoughts  and  feelings  constituting  his  de- 
cision. 

After  this  explanation  will  be  apprehended  a  truth 
otherwise  set  forth  in  the  Principles  of  Psychology. 
Mind  consists  of  feelings  and  the  relations  among  feel- 
ings. By  composition  of  the  relations,  and  ideas  of 
relations,  intelligence  arises.  By  composition  of  the 
feelings,  and  ideas  of  feelings,  emotion  arises.  And, 
other  things  equal,  the  evolution  of  either  is  great  in 
9 


130  THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 

proportion  as  the  composition  is  great.  One  of  the 
necessary  implications  is  that  cognition  becomes  higher 
in  proportion  as  it  is  remoter  from  reflex  action;  while 
emotion  becomes  higher  in  proportion  as  it  is  remoter 
from  sensation. 

And  now  of  the  various  corollaries  from  this  broad 
view  of  psychological  evolution,  let  us  observe  those 
which  concern  the  motives  and  actions  that  are  classed 
as  moral  and  immoral. 

§  42.  The  mental  process  by  which,  in  any  case,  the 
adjustment  of  acts  to  ends  is  effected,  and  which,  under 
its  higher  forms,  becomes  the  subject-matter  of  ethical 
judgments,  is,  as  above  implied,  divisible  into  the  rise 
of  a  feeling  or  feelings  constituting  the  motive,  and 
the  thought  or  thoughts  through  which  the  motive  is 
shaped  and  finally  issues  in  action.  The  first  of  these 
elements,  originally  an  excitement,  becomes  a  simple 
sensation  ;  then  a  compound  sensation  ;  then  a  cluster 
of  partially  presentative  and  partially  representative 
sensations,  forming  an  incipient  emotion;  then  a  clus- 
ter of  exclusively  ideal  or  representative  sensations, 
forming  an  emotion  proper  ;  then  a  cluster  of  such  clus- 
ters, forming  a  compound  emotion  ;  and  eventually  be- 
comes  a  still  more  involved  emotion  composed  of  the 
ideal  forms  of  such  compound  emotions.  The  other 
elemeni,  beginning  with  that  immediate  passage  of  a 
single  stimulus  into  a  single  motion,  called  reflex  action, 
presently  comes  to  be  a  set  of  associated  discharges  of 
stimuli  producing  associated  motions,  constituting  in- 
stinct. Step  bystep  arise  more  entangled  combinations 
of  stimuli.  hat  variable   in  their  modes   of  union, 

leading  to  complex  motions  similarly  variable  in  their 


ttte  Psychological  view.  131 

adjustments  ;  whence  occasional  hesitations  in  the  sen- 

sori-motor  processes.  Presently  is  reached  a  stage  at 
which  the  combined  clusters  of  impressions,  not  all 
present  together,  issue  in  actions  not  all  simultaneous ; 
implying  representation  of  results,  or  thought.  After- 
ward follow  stages  in  which  various  thoughts  have  time 
to  pass  before  the  composite  motives  produce  the  ap- 
propriate actions.  Until  at  last  arise  those  long  de- 
liberations during  which  the  probabilities  of  various 
consequences  are  estimated,  and  the  promptings  of  the 
correlative  feelings  balanced,  constituting  calm  judg- 
ment. That  under  either  of  its  aspects  the  later  forms 
of  this  mental  process  are  the  higher,  ethically  con- 
sidered as  well  as  otherwise  considered,  will  be  readily 
seen. 

For  from  the  first,  complication  of  sentiency  has  ac- 
companied better  and  more  numerous  adjustments  of 
acts  to  ends  ;  as  also  has  complication  of  movement, 
and  complication  of  the  co-ordinating  or  intellectual 
process  uniting  the  two.  Whence  it  follows  that  the 
acts  characterized  by  the  more  complex  motives  and 
the  more  involved  thoughts,  have  all  along  been  of 
higher  authority  for  guidance.  Some  examples  will 
make  this  clear. 

Here  is  an  aquatic  creature  guided  by  the  odor  of 
organic  matter  toward  things  serving  for  food;  but  a 
creature  which,  lacking  any  other  guidance,  is  at  the 
mercy  of  larger  creatures  coming  near.  Here  is 
another  which,  also  guided  to  food  by  odor,  possesses 
rudimentary  vision  ;  and  so  is  made  to  start  spasmod- 
ically away  from  a  moving  body  which  diffuses  this 
odor,  in  those  cases  where  it  is  large  enough  to  produce 
sudden  obscuration  of  light — usually  an  enemy.     Evi- 


1  32  THE  DA  TA   OF  ETHICS. 

dentlv  life  will  frequently  be  saved  by  conforming  to 
the  Later  and  higher  stimulus,  instead  of  to  the  earlier 
and  lower. 

Observe  at  a  more  advanced  stage  a  parallel  conflict. 
This  is  a  beast  which  pursues  others  for  prey,  and, 
either  lacking  experience  or  prompted  by  raging  hun- 
ger, attacks  one  more  powerful  than  itself,  and  gets 
destroyed.  Conversely,  thai  is  a  beast  which,  prompted 
by  a  1 1 unger  equally  keen,  but  either  by  individual  ex- 
perience or  effects  of  inherited  experience,  made  con- 
scious of  evil  by  the  aspect  of  one  more  powerful  than 
itself,  is  deterred  from  attacking,  and  saves  its  life  by 
subordinating  the  primary  motive,  consisting  of  crav- 
ing sensations,  to  the  secondary  motive,  consisting  of 
ideal  feelings,  distinct  or  vague. 

Ascending  at  once  from  these  examples  of  conduct  in 
animals  to  examples  of  human  conduct,  we  shall  see 
that  the  contrast  between  inferior  and  superior  have 
habitually  the  same  traits.  The  savage  of  lowest  type 
devours  all  the  food  captured  by  to-day's  chase,  and, 
hungry  on  the  morrow,  has  perhaps  for  days  to  bear  the 
paries  of  starvation.  The  superior  savage,  conceiving 
more  vividly  the  entailed  sufferings  if  no  game  is  to  be 
found,  is  deterred  by  his  complex  feeling  from  giving 
way  entirely  to  his  .simple  feeling.  Similarly  are 
two  contrasted  in  the  inertness  which  goes  along 
with  lack  of  forethought,  and  the  activity  which  due 
forethought  produces.  The  primitive  man,  idly 
inclined,  and  ruled  by  the  sensations  of  the  moment, 
will  not  exert  himself  until  actual  pains  have  to  be 
•d  ;  but  the  man  somewhat  advanced,  able  more 
.  ctly  to  imagine  future  gratifications  and  suffer- 
ings, is  prompted  by  the  thought  of  these  to  overcome 


THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  VIEW.  133 

his  love  of  ease  :  decrease  of  misery  and  mortality  re- 
sulting from  this  predominance  of  the  representative 
feelings  over  the  presentative  feelings. 

Without  dwelling  on  the  fact  that  among  the  civi- 
lized, those  who  lead  the  life  of  the  senses  are  contrasted 
in  the  same  way  with  those  whose  lives  are  largely 
occupied  with  pleasures  not  of  a  sensual  kind,  let 
me  point  out  that  there  are  analogous  contrasts  be- 
tween guidance  by  the  less  complex  representative 
feelings,  or  lower  emotions,  and  guidance  by  the  more 
complex  representative  feelings,  or  higher  emotions. 
When  led  by  his  acquisitiveness  —  are-representative 
feeling  which,  acting  under  due  control,  conduces  to 
welfare — the  thief  takes  another  man's  property  ;  his  act 
is  determined  by  certain  imagined  proximate  pleasures 
of  relatively  simple  kinds,  rather  than  by  less  clearly 
imagined  possible  pains  that  are  more  remote  and  of 
relatively  involved  kinds.  But  in  the  conscientious 
man,  there  is  an  adequate  restraining  motive,  still 
more  re-representative  in  its  nature,  including  not  only 
ideas  of  punishment,  and  not  only  ideas  of  lost  reputa- 
tion and  ruin,  but  including  ideas  of  the  claims  of 
the  person  owning  the  property,  and  of  the  pains  which 
loss  of  it  will  entail  on  him  :  all  joined  with  a  general 
aversion  to  acts  injurious  to  others,  which  arises  from 
the  inherited  effects  of  experience.  And  here  at  the 
end  we  see,  as  we  saw  at  the  beginning,  that  guidance 
by  the  more  complex  feeling,  on  the  average,  conduces 
to  welfare  more  than  does  guidance  by  the  simpler 
feeling. 

The  like  holds  with  the  intellectual  co-ordinations 
through  which  stimuli  issue  in  motions.  The  lowest 
actions,  called  reflex,  iu  whieh  an  impression  made  on 


134  THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 

an  afferent  nerve  causes  by  discharge  through  an 
efferent  nerve  a  contraction,  shows  us  a  very  limited 
adjustment  of  acts  to  ends :  the  impression  being 
simple,  and  the  resulting  motion  simple,  the  internal 
co-ordination  is  also  simple.  Evidently  when  there  are 
several  senses  which  can  be  together  affected  by  an 
outer  object;  and  when,  according  as  such  object  is 
discriminated  as  of  one  or  other  kind,  the  movements 
made  in  response  are  combined  in  one  or  other  way ; 
the  intermediate  co-ordinations  are  necessarily  more 
involved.  And  evidently  each  further  step  in  the  evo- 
lution of  intelligence,  always  instrumental  to  better 
self-preservation,  exhibits  this  same  general  trait.  The 
adjustments  by  which  the  more  involved  actions  are 
made  appropriate  to  the  more  involved  circumstances, 
imply  more  intricate,  and,  consequently,  more  deliber- 
ate and  conscious  co-ordinations;  until,  when  we  come 
to  civilized  men,  who  in  their  daily  business,  taking 
into  account  many  data  and  conditions,  adjust  their 
proceedings  to  various  consequences,  we  see  that  the 
intellectual  actions,  becoming  of  the  kind  we  call  judi- 
cial, are  at  once  very  elaborate  and  very  deliberate. 

Observe,  then,  what  follows  respecting  the  relative 
authorities  of  motives.  Throughout  the  ascent  from 
low  creatures  up  to  man,  and  from  the  lowest  types  of 
man  up  to  the  highest,  self-preservation  has  been 
increased  by  the  subordination  of  simple  excitations  to 
compound  excitations — the  subjection  of  immediate( 
lions  to  the  ideas  of  sensations  to  come — the  over- 
ruling of  presentative  feelings  by  representative  feel- 
ings, and  of  representative  f'-clings  by  re-representative 
feelings.  As  life  has  advanced,  the  accompanying 
lentiency  has    become    increasingly  ideal;  and  among 


THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  VIEW.  135 

feelings  produced  by  the  compounding  of  ideas,  the 
highest,  and  those  which  have  evolved  latest,  are  the 
re-compounded  or  doubly  ideal.  Hence  it  follows  that 
as  guides,  the  feelings  have  authorities  proportionate  to, 
the  degrees  in  which  they  are  removed  by  their  com- 
plexity and  their  ideality  from  simple  sensations  and ' 
appetites. 

A  further  implication  is  made  clear  by  studying  the 
intellectual  sides  of  these  mental  processes  by  which 
acts  are  adjusted  to  ends.  Where  they  are  low  and 
simple,  these  comprehend  the  guiding  only  of  imme- 
diate arts  by  immediate  stimuli — the  entire  transaction 
in  each  case,  lasting  but  a  moment,  refers  only  to  a 
proximate  result.  But  with  the  development  of  intel- 
ligence, and  the  growing  ideality  of  the  motives,  the 
ends  to  which  the  acts  are  adjusted  cease  to  be  exclu- 
sively immediate.  The  more  ideal  motives  concern 
ends  that  are  more  distant ;  and  with  approach  to  the 
highest  types,  present  ends  become  increasingly  sub- 
ordinate to  those  future  ends  which  the  ideal  motives 
have  for  their  objects.  Hence  there  arises  a  certain 
presumption  in  favor  of  a  motive  which  refers  to  a 
remote  good,  in  comparison  with  one  which  refers  to  a 
proximate  good. 

§  4:',.  In  the  last  chapter  I  hinted  that  besides  the 
several  influences  there  named  as  fostering  the  ascetic 
belief  that  doing  things  which  are  agreeable  is  detri- 
mental while  bearing  disagreeable  tilings  is  beneficial, 
there  remained  to  be  named  an  influence  of  deeper 
origin.  This  is  shadowed  forth  in  the  foregoing  para- 
graphs. 

For  the  general  truth   that  guidance  by  such  simple 


136  TIJE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 

pleasures  and  pains  as  result  from  fulfilling  or  denying 
bodily  desires,  is,  under  one  aspect,  inferior  to  guidance 
by  those  pleasures  and  pains  which  the  complex  ideal 
feelings  yield,  lias  led  to  the  belief  that  the  promptings 
of  bodily  desires  should  be  disregarded.  Further,  the 
general  truth  that  pursuit  of  proximate  satisfactions  is, 
under  one  aspect,  inferior  to  pursuit  of  ultimate  satis- 
factions, lias  led  to  the  belief  that  proximate  satisfac- 
tions must  not  be  valued. 

In  the  earl)-  stages  of  every  science,  the  generaliza- 
tions reached  are  not  qualified  enough.  The  discrimi- 
nating statements  of  the  truths  formulated,  rise  after- 
ward,  by  limitation  of  the  undiscriminating  statements. 
As  with  bodily  vision,  which  at  first  appreciates  only 
the  broadest  traits  of  objects,  and  so  leads  to  rude 
classings,  which  developed  vision,  impressible  by  minor 
differences,  has  to  correct,  so  with  mental  vision  in 
relation  to  general  truths,  it  happens  that  at  first  the 
inductions,  wrongly  made  all-embracing,  have  to  wait 
for  skepticism  and  critical  observation  to  restrict  them, 
by  taking  account  of  unnoticed  differences.  Hence,  we 
may  expect  to  find  the  current  ethical  conclusions  too 
sweeping.  Let  us  note  how,  in  three  ways,  these 
dominant  beliefs,  alike  of  professed  moralists  and  of 
people  at  Large,  are  made  erroneous  by  lack  of  qualifi- 
cal  ions. 

In  the  first  place,  the  authority  of  the  lower  feelings 
rides  is  by  no  means  always  inferior  to  the  authority 
of  the  higher  feelings,  but  is  often  superior.  Daily 
occur  occasions  on  which  sensations  must  be  obeyed 
rather  than  sentiments.  Let  any  one  think  of  sitting 
all  night  naked  in  a  snow-storm,  or  going  a  week  with- 
out food,  or  letting  his  head  be  held  under  water  for 


THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  VIEW.  137 

ten  minutes,  and  he  will  see  that  the  pleasures  and 
pains  directly  related  to  maintenance  of  life  may  not 
be  wholly  subordinated  to  the  pleasures  and  pains  in- 
directly related  to  maintenance  of  life.  Though  in 
many  cases  guidance  by  the  simple  feelings  rather  than 
by  the  complex  feelings  is  injurious,  in  other  cases 
guidance  by  the  complex  feelings  rather  than  by  the 
simple  feelings  is  fatal  ;  and  throughout  a  wide  range 
of  cases  their  relative  authorities  as  guides  are  indeter- 
minate. Grant  that  in  a  man  pursued,  the  protesting 
feelings  accompanying  intense  and  prolonged  effort, 
must,  to  preserve  life,  be  overruled  by  the  fear  of  his 
pursuers;  it  may  yet  happen  that,  persisting  till  ho 
drops,  the  resulting  exhaustion  causes  death,  though, 
the  pursuit  having  been  abandoned,  death  would  not 
otherwise  have  resulted.  Grant  that  a  widow  left  in 
poverty  must  deny  her  appetite  that  she  may  give 
enough  food  to  her  children  to  keep  them  alive ;  yet 
the  denial  of  her  appetite  pushed  too  far  may  leave 
them  not  only  entirely  without  food  but  without 
guardianship.  Grant  that,  working  his  brain  unceas- 
ingly from  dawn  till  dark,  the  man  in  pecuniary  diffi- 
culties must  disregard  rebellious  bodily  sensations  in 
obedience  to  the  conscientious  desire  to  liquidate  the 
claims  on  him ;  yet  he  may  carry  this  subjection  of 
simple  feelings  to  complex  feelings  to  the  extent 
of  shattering  his  health,  and  failing  in  that  end 
which,  with  less  of  this  subjection,  he  might  have 
achieved.  Clearly,  then,  the  subordination  of  lower 
feelings  must  be  a  conditional  subordination.  The 
supremacy  of  higher  feelings  must  be  a  qualified 
supremacy. 

In   another   way  does    the   generalization   ordinarily 


138  THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 

made  err  by  excess.  With  the  truth  that  life  is  high 
in  proportion  as  the  simple  preservative  feelings  are 
under  the  control  of  the  compound  representative 
feelings,  it  joins,  as  though  they  were  corollaries,  cer- 
tain propositions  which  are  not  corollaries.  The  cur- 
rent conception  is,  not  that  the  lower  must  yield  to 
the  higher  when  the  two  conflict,  but  that  the  lower 
must  be  disregarded  even  when  there  is  no  conflict. 
This  tendency  which  the  growth  of  moral  ideas  has 
generated,  to  condemn  obedience  to  inferior  feelings 
when  superior  feelings  protest,  has  begotten  a  tendency 
to  condemn  inferior  feelings  considered  intrinsically. 
"  I  really  think  she  does  things  because  she  likes  to  do 
them,"  once  said  to  me  one  lady  concerning  another : 
the  form  of  expression  and  the  manner  both  implying 
the  belief  not  only  that  such  behavior  is  wrong,  but 
also  that  every  one  must  recognize  it  as  wrong.  And 
there  prevails  widely  a  notion  of  this  kind.  In 
practice,  indeed,  the  notion  is  very  generally  inoperative. 
Though  it  prompts  various  incidental  asceticisms,  as 
of  those  who  tliink  it  alike  manly  and  salutary  to  go 
without  a  great-coat  in  cold  weather,  or  to  persevere 
through  the  winter  in  taking  an  out-of-door  plunge, 
yet,  generally,  the  pleasurable  feelings  accompanying 
due  fulfillment  of  bodily  needs,  are  accepted  :  accept- 
ance  being,  indeed,  sufficiently  peremptory.  But 
oblivious  of  these  contradictions  in  their  practice,  men 
commonly  betray  a  vague  idea  that  there  is  something 
degrading,  or  injurious,  or  both,  in  doing  that  which 
ible  and  avoiding  that  which  is  disagreeable. 
"Pleasant  but  wrong,"  is  a  phrase  frequently  used  in  a 
way  implying  that  the  two  are  naturally  connected. 
As  above  hinted,  however,  such  beliefs  result  from  a 


THE  -PSYCHOLOGICAL  VIEW.  139 

confused  apprehension  of  the  general  truth  that  the 
more  compound  and  representative  feelings  are,  on  the 
average,  of  higher  authority  than  the  simple  and  pre- 
sentative  feelings.  Apprehended  with  discrimination, 
this  truth  implies  that  the  authority  of  the  simple, 
ordinarily  less  than  that  of  the  compound  but  occasion- 
ally greater,  is  habitually  to  be  accepted  when  the  com- 
pound do  not  oppose. 

In  yet  a  third  way  is  this  principle  of  subordination 
misconceived.  One  of  the  contrasts  between  the  earlier 
evolved  feelings  and  the  later  evolved  feelings,  is  that 
they  refer  respectively  to  the  more  immediate  effects  of 
actions  and  to  the  more  remote  effects ;  and  speaking 
generally,  guidance  by  that  which  is  near  is  inferior  to 
guidance  by  that  which  is  distant.  Hence  has  resulted 
the  belief  that,  irrespective  of  their  kinds,  the  pleasures 
of  the  present  must  be  sacrificed  to  the  pleasures  of  the 
future.  We  see  this  in  the  maxim  often  impressed  on 
children  when  eating  their  meals,  that  they  should  re- 
serve the  nicest  morsel  till  the  last :  the  check  on  im- 
provident yielding  to  immediate  impulse,  being  here 
joined  with  the  tacit  teaching  that  the  same  gratifica- 
tion becomes  more  valuable  as  it  becomes  more  distant. 
Such  thinking  is  traceable  throughout  daily  conduct ; 
by  no  means  indeed  in  all,  but  in  those  who  are  dis- 
tinguished as  prudent  and  well  regulated  in  their  con- 
duet.  I  lurrying  over  his  breakfast  that  he  may  catch 
the  train,  snatching  a  sandwicli  in  the  middle  of  the  day, 
and  eating  a  late  dinner  when  he  is  so  worn  out  that  he 
is  incapacitated  for  evening  recreation,  the  man  of  busi- 
ness pursues  a  life  in  which  not  only  the  satisfactions  of 
bodily  desires,  but  also  those  of  higher  tastes  and  feel- 
ings, are,  as    far  as  may  be,  disregarded,  that  distant 


L40  111 E  DA TA  OF  ETHICS. 

ends  may  be  achieved;  and  yet  if  you  ask  what  are 
these  distant  cuds,  you  find  (in  eases  where  there  are  no 
parental  responsibilities)  that  they  are  included  under 
the  conception  of  more  comfortable  living  in  time  to 
come.  So  ingrained  is  this  belief  that  it  is  wrong  to 
seek  immediate  enjoyments  and  right  to  seek  remote 
oiks  only,  that  you  may  hear  from  a  busy  man  who  has 
been  on  a  pleasure  excursion  a  kind  of  apology  for  his 
conduct.  He  deprecates  the  unfavorable  judgments  of 
his  friends  by  explaining  that  the  state  of  his  health  had 
compelled  him  to  take  a  holiday.  Nevertheless,  if  you 
sound  him  with  respect  to  his  future,  you  find  that  his 
mill  )it  inn  is  ly-and-byto  retire  and  devote  himself  wholly 
to  the  relaxations  which  he  is  now  somewhat  ashamed 
of  taking. 

The  general  truth  disclosed  by  the  study  of  evolving 
conduct,  sub-human  and  human,  that  for  the  better  pre- 
servation of  life  the  primitive,  simple,  preservative  feel- 
ings must  l»c  i  on  trolled  by  the  later-evolved,  compound, 
and  representative  feelings,  has  thus  come,  in  the  course 
of  civilization,  to  be  recogn.iz.ed by  men  ;  but  necessarily 
at  first  in  too  indiscriminate  a  way.  The  current  con- 
ception,  while  it  errs  by  implying  that  the  authority  of 
the  higher  over  the  lower  is  unlimited,  errs  also  by  im- 
plying thai  the  rule  of  the  lower  must  be  resisted  even 
when  it  does  not  conflict  with  the  rule  of  the  higher, 
and  further  ens  by  implying  that  a  gratification  which 
forms  a  proper  aim  if  it  is  remote,  forms  an  improper 
aim  if  it  is  proximate. 

.'   11.   Withoul    explicitly  saying  so,    we   have   been 

tracing    the    genesis    of  the  moral  consciousness. 

For  unquestionably  the  essential  trait  in  the  moral  com 


THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL   VIEW.  141 

sciousness  is  the  control  of  some  feeling  or  feelings  by 
some  other  feelinc:  or  feelings. 

Among  the  higher  animals  we  may  see,  distinctly 
enough,  the  conflict  of  feelings  and  the  subjection  of 
simpler  to  more;  compound  ;  as  when  a  dog  is  restrained 
from  snatching  food  by  fear  of  the  penalties  which  may 
come  if  he  yields  to  his  appetite;  or  as  when  lie  desists 
from  scratching  at  a  hole  lest  he  should  lose  his  master, 
who  has  walked  on.  Here,  however,  though  there  is 
subordination,  there  is  not  conscious  subordination — 
there  is  no  introspection  revealing  the  fact  that  one 
feeling  has  yielded  to  another.  So  is  it  even  with 
human  beings  when  little  developed  mentally.  The 
pre-social  man,  wandering  about  in  families  and  ruled 
by  such  sensations  and  emotions  as  are  caused  by  the 
circumstances  of  the  moment,  though  occasionally  sub- 
ject to  conflicts  of  motives,  meets  with  comparatively 
few  cases  in  which  the  advantage  of  postponing  the 
immediate  to  the  remote  is  forced  on  his  attention ;  nor 
has  he  the  intelligence  requisite  for  analyzing  and  gen- 
eralizing such  of  these  cases  as  occur.  Only  as  social 
evolution  renders  the  life  more  complex,  the  restraints 
many  and  strong,  the  evils  of  impulsive  conduct  marked, 
and  the  comforts  to  be  gained  by  providing  for  the 
future  tolerably  certain,  can  there  come  experiences 
numerous  enough  to  make  familiar  the  benefit  of  subor- 
dinating the  simpler  feelings  to  the  more  complex  ones. 
Only  then,  too,  <]nt^  there  arise  a  sufficient  intellectual 
power  to  make  an  induction  from  these  experiences, 
followed  by  a  sufficient  massing  of  individual  induc- 
tions into  a  public  and  traditional  induction  impressed 
on  each  generation  as  it  grows  up. 

And  here  we  are  introduced  to  certain  facts  of  pro- 


14-2  THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 

found  significance.  This  conscious  relinquishment  of 
immediate  and  special  good  to  gain  distant  and  general 
good,  while  it  is  a  cardinal  trait  of  the  self-restraint 
called  moral,  is  also  a  cardinal  trait  of  self-restraints 
other  than  those  called  moral — the  restraints  that  origi- 
nate  from  fear  of  the  visible  ruler,  of  the  invisible  ruler, 
and  of  society  at  large.  Whenever  the  individual  re 
trains  from  doing  that  which  the  passing  desire  prompts 
lest  he  should  afterward  suffer  legal  punishment,  <y 
divine  vengeance,  or  public  reprobation,  or  all  of  tbfarn. 
lie  surrenders  the  near  and  definite  pleasure  rath?/  /".liar, 
risk  the  remote  and  greater,  though  less  definite,  pains., 
which  taking  it  may  bring  on  him  ;  and,  conversely, 
when  he  undergoes  some  present  pain,  that  Wi  may  reap 
some  probable  future  pleasure,  political ,  religious,  or 
social.  But  though  all  these  four  kinds  (J,  internal  con- 
trol have  the  common  character  that  the  simpler  and 
less  ideal  feelings  are  consciously  overruled  by  the  mora 
complex  and  ideal  feelings  ;  and  though,  at  first,  they 
are  practically  co-extensive  and  undistinguished,  yet,  iti 
the  course  of  social  evolution,  tl'.ey  differentiate ;  and, 
eventually,  the  moral  control,  with  its  accompanying 
conceptions  and  sentiments,  emerges  as  independ- 
ent. Let  us  glance  at  the  leading  aspects  of  the 
process. 

While,  as  in  the  rudest  groups,  neither  political  nor 
ions  rule  exists,  the  leading  check  to  the  immediate 
satisfaction  of  each  desire  as  it  arises,  is  consciousness  of 
the  evils  which  the  anger  of  fellow-savages  may  entail, 
if  satisfaction  of  the  desire  is  obtained  at  their  cost.  In 
this  early  stage  the  imagined  pains  which  constitute  the 
ning  motive  are  those  apt  to  be  inflicted  by  beings 
of  like  nature,  undistinguished  in  power :  the   political, 


THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  VIEW.  143 

religious,  and  social  restraints  are  as  yet  represented 
only  by  this  mutual  dread  of  vengeance. 

When  special  strength,  skill  or  courage,  makes  one  of 
them  a  leader  in  battle,  he  necessarily  inspires  greater 
fear  than  any  other,  and  there  comes  to  be  a  more  de- 
cided check  on  such  satisfactions  of  the  desires  as  will 
injure  or  offend  him.  Gradually  as,  by  habitual  warfare, 
chieftainship  is  established,  the  evils  thought  of  as  likely 
to  arise  from  angering  the  chief,  not  only  by  aggression 
upon  him,  but  by  disobedience  to  him,  become  dis- 
tinguishable both  from  the  smaller  evils  which  other 
personal  antagonisms  cause,  and  from  the  more  diffused 
evils  thought  of  as  arising  from  social  reprobation.  That 
is,  political  control  begins  to  differentiate  from  the  more 
indefinite  control  of  mutual  dread. 

Meanwhile  there  has  been  developing  the  ghost 
theory.  In  all  but  the  rudest  groups  the  double  of  a 
deceased  man,  propitiated  at  death  and  afterward,  is 
conceived  as  able  to  injure  the  survivors.  Consequently, 
as  fast  as  the  ghost  theory  becomes  established  and 
definite,  there  grows  up  another  kind  of  check  on  im- 
mediate satisfaction  of  the  desires — a  check  constituted 
by  ideas  of  the  evils  which  ghosts  may  inflict  if  offended  ; 
and  when  political  headship  gets  settled,  and  the  ghosts 
of  dead  chiefs,  thought  of  as  more  powerful  and  relent- 
less than  other  ghosts,  are  especially  dreaded,  there 
begins  to  take  shape  the  form  of  restraint  distinguished 
as  religious. 

For  a  long  time  these  three  sets  of  restraints,  which 
their  correlative  sanctions,  though  becoming  separate 
in  consciousness,  remain  co-extensive,  and  do  so  because 
they  mostly  refer  to  one  end — success  in  war.  The 
duty  of  blood-revenge   is    insisted  on  even   while  yet 


I  I  [  THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 

nothing  to  be  called  social  organization  exists.  As  the 
chief  gains  predominance,  the  killing  of  enemies  becomes 
a  political  duty:  and  as  1  lie  anger  of  the  dead  chief 
comes  to  be  dreaded,  the  killing  of  enemies  becomes  a 
religious  duty.  Loyalty  to  the  ruler  while  he  lives  and 
after  he  dies  is  increasingly  shown  by  holding  life  at  his 
disposal  for  purposes  of  war.  The  earliest  enacted  pun- 
ishments are  those  for  insubordination  and  for  breaches 
of  observances  which  express  subordination — all  of  them 
militant  in  origin.  While  the  divine  injunctions, 
in  iginally  traditions  of  the  dead  king's  will,  mainly  refer 
to  the  destruction  of  peoples  with  whom  he  was  at 
enmity,  and  divine  anger  or  approval  are  conceived  as 
determined  by  the  degrees  in  which  subjection  to  him  is 
.shown,  directly  by  worship  and  indirectly  by  fulfilling 
these  injunctions.  The  Fijian,  who  is  said  on  entering 
the  other  world  to  commend  himself  by  narrating  his 
successes  in  battle,  and  who,  when  alive,  is  described 
as  sometimes  greatly  distressed  if  he  thinks  he 
lias  not  killed  enemies  enough  to  please  his  gods, 
.shows  ns  the.  resulting  ideas  and  feelings,  and  reminds 
us  of  kindred  ideas  and  feelings  betrayed  by  ancient 
race-. 

To  all  which  add  that  the  control  of  social  opinion, 
besides  being  directly  exercised,  as  in  the  earliest  stage, 
by  praise  of  the  brave  and  blame  of  the  cowardly,  comes 
t<>  be  indirectly  exercised  with  a  kindred  general  effect 
by  applause  of  loyalty  to  the  ruler  and  piety  to  the  god. 
So  that  the  three  differentiated  tonus  of  control  which 
ii]!  along  with  militant  organization  and  action, 
while  enforcing  kindred  restraints  and  incentives,  also 
enforce  one  another  j  and  their  separate  and  joint  dis- 
ciplines have  the  common  character  that  they  involve 


THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL    VIEW.  145 

the  sacrifice  of  immediate  special  benefits  to  obtain  more 
distant  and  general  benefits. 

At  the  same  time  there  have  been  developing  under 
the  same  three  sanctions,  restraints  and  incentives  of 
another  order,  similarly  characterized  by  subordination 
of  the  proximate  to  the  remote.  Joint  aggressions  upon 
men  outside  the  society  cannot  prosper  if  there  are  many 
aggressions  of  man  on  man  within  the  society.  War 
implies  co-operation;  and  co-operation  is  prevented  by 
antagonisms  among  those  who  are  to  co-operate.  We 
saw  that  in  the  primitive  ungoverned  group,  the  main 
check  on  immediate  satisfaction  of  his  desires  by  each 
man,  is  the  fear  of  other  men's  vengeance  if  they  are  in- 
jured   by   taking    the   satisfaction;    and    through   early 

s  of  social  development  this  dread  of  retaliation 
continues  to  be  the  chief  motive  to  such  forbearance  as 
exists.  But  though  long  after  political  authority  has 
become  established  the  taking  of  personal  satisfaction 
for  injuries  persists,  the  growth  of  political  authority 
gradually  checks  it.  Tin.'  fact  that  success  in  war  is 
endangered    if  his    followers    fight  among   themselves, 

3  itself  on  the  attention  of  the  ruler.  He  has  a 
strong  motive  for  restraining  quarrels,  and  therefore  for 
preventing  the  aggressions  which  cause  quarrels;  and 
a-  his  power  becomes  greater  he  forbids  the  aggressions 
and  inllicts  punishments  for  disobedience.  Presently, 
politieal  restraints  of  this  class,  like  those  of  the  preced- 
ing class,  are  enforced  by  religious  restraints.  The 
sagacious  chief,  succeeding  in  war  partly  because  he 
thus  enforces  order  among  his  followers,  leaves  behind 
him  a  tradition  of  the  commands  he  habitually  gave. 
Dread  of  Iris  ghost  tends  to  produce  regard  for  these 
commands ;    and   they   eventually    acquire   sacredness. 

10 


140  THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 

With  further  social  evolution  come,  in  like  manner, 
further  interdicts,  checking  aggressions  of  less  serious 
kinds;  until  eventually  there  grows  up  a  body  of  civil 
laws.  And  then,  in  the  way  shown,  arise  beliefs  con- 
cerning the  divine  disapproval  of  these  minor,  as  well 
as  of  the  major,  civil  offenses  :  ending,  occasionally,  in 
of  religious  injunctions  harmonizing  with,  and  en- 
forcing,  the  political  injunctions ;  while  simultaneously 
there  develops,  as  before,  a  social  sanction  for  these 
rules  of  internal  conduct,  strengthening  the  political 
and  religious  sanctions. 

But  now  observe  that  while  these  three  controls,  polit> 
ical,  religious,  and  social,  severally  lead  men  to  sub* 
ordinate  proximate  satisfactions  to  remote  satisfactions ; 
and  while  they  are  in  this  respect  like  the  moral  control, 
which  habitually  requires  the  subjection  of  simple  pre~ 
sentative  feelings  to  complex  representative  feelings  and 
postponement  of  present  to  future ;  yet  they  do  not 
constitute  the  moral  control,  but  are  only  preparatory 
t'»  it — are  controls  within  which  the  moral  control 
evolves.  The  command  of  the  political  ruler  is  at 
first  obeyed,  not  because  of  its  perceived  rectitude, 
but  simply  because  it  is  his  command,  which  there 
will  be  a  penalty  for  disobeying.  The  check  is  not  a 
mental  representation  of  the  evil  consequences  which 
orbidden  act  will,  in  the  nature  of  things,  cause : 
but  it  is  a  mental  representation  of  the  factitious  evil 
consequences.  Down  to  our  own  time  we  trace  in 
ises,  the  original  doctrine  that  the  aggression 
of  one  citizen  on  another  is  wrong,  and  will  be  punished, 
>  much  because  of  the  injury  done  him,  as  because 
of  the  implied  disregard  of  the  king's  will.  Similarly, 
the    sinfulness    of  breaking   a   divine    injunction    was 


THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL   VIEW.  147 

universally  at  one  time,  and  is  still  by  many,  held  to 
consist  in  the  disobedience  to  God,  rather  than  in  the 
deliberate  entailing  of  injury;  and  even  now  it  is  a  com- 
mon belief  that  acts  are  right  only  if  performed  in  con- 
scious fulfillment  of  the  divine  will :  nay,  are  even 
wrong  if  otherwise  performed.  The  like  holds,  too,  with 
that  further  control  exercised  by  public  opinion.  On 
listening  to  the  remarks  made  respecting  conformity  to 
social  rules,  it  is  noticeable  that  breach  of  them  is  con- 
demned not  so  much  because  of  any  essential  impropriety 
as  because  the  world's  authority  is  ignored.  How  im- 
perfectly the  truly  moral  control  is  even  now  differen- 
tiated from  these  controls  within  which  it  has  been 
evolving,  we  see  in  the  fact  that  the  systems  of  morality 
criticised  at  the  outset,  severally  identify  moral  control 
with  one  or  other  of  them.  For  moralists  of  one  class 
derive  moral  rules  from  the  commands  of  a  supreme  po- 
litical power.  Those  of  another  class  recognize  no  other 
origin  for  them  than  the  revealed  divine  will.  And 
though  men  who  take  social  prescription  for  their  guide 
do  not  formulate  their  doctrine,  yet  the  belief,  fre- 
quently betrayed,  that  conduct  which  society  permits  is 
not  blameworthy,  implies  that  there  are  those  who  think 
right  and  wrong  can  be  made  such  by  public  opinion. 

Before  taking  a  further  step  we  must  put  together  the 
results  of  this  analysis.  The  essential  truths  to  be  car- 
ried with  us,  respecting  these  three  forms  of  external 
control  to  which  the  social  unit  is  subject,  are  these  : 
First,  that  they  have  evolved  with  the  evolution  of 
society,  as  means  to  social  self-preservation,  neces?arv 
under  the  conditions  ;  and  that,  by  implication,  they  are 
in  the  main  congruous  with  one  another.  Second,  that 
the  correlative  internal  restraints  generated  in  the  social 


148  THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 

unit  are  representations  of  remote  results  which  are  in- 
cidental rather  than  necessary — a  legal  penalty,  a  super- 
natural punishment,  a  social  reprobation.  Third,  that 
results,  simpler  and  more  directly  wrought  by  per- 
gonal agencies,  can  be  more  vividly  conceived  than  can 
the  results  which,  in  the  course  of  things,  actions  natu- 
rally entail :  and  the  conceptions  of  them  are,  therefore, 
more  potent  over  undeveloped  minds.  Fourth,  that  as 
with  the  restraints  thus  generated  is  always  joined  the 
thought  of  external  coercion,  there  arises  the  notion  of 
obligation  ;  which  so  becomes  habitually  associated  with 
the  surrender  of  immediate  special  benefits  for  the  sake 
of  distant  and  general  benefits.  Fifth,  that  the  moral 
control  corresponds  in  large  measure  with  the  three  con- 
trols thus  originating,  in  respect  of  its  injunctions  ;  and 
corresponds,  too,  in  the  general  nature  of  the  mental 
processes  producing  conformity  to  those  injunctions ; 
but  differs  in  their  special  nature. 

§  45.  For  now  we  are  prepared  to  see  that  the  re- 
straints,  properly    distinguished   as    moral,  are    unlike 
jtraints  out   of  which   they  evolve,  and  with 
which  they  are  long  confounded,  in  this — they  refer  not 
to  the  extrinsic  effects  of  actions  but  to   their   intrinsic 
effects.     The   truly  moral  deterrent  from  murder  is  not 
constituted  by  a  representation  of  hanging  as  a  conse- 
quence,  or  by  a  representation  of  tortures  in   bell   as  a 
quence,  or  bjr  a  representation  of  the  horror  and 
hatred  excited  in  fellow-men ;  but  by  a  representation 
of  the  neces  »ary  natural  results,  the  infliction  of  death' 
agony  on  the  victim,  the  destruction  of  all  his  possibili- 
f  happiness,  the  entailed  sufferings  to  Lis  belongings. 
Neither  the    thought   of   imprisonment,  nor  of  divine 


THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  VIEW.  149 

anger,  nor  of  social  disgrace,  is  that  which  constitutes 
the  moral  check  on  theft;  but  the  thought  of  injury  to 
the  person  robbed,  joined  with  a  vague  consciousness  of 
the  general  evils  caused  by  disregard  of  proprietary 
rights.  Those  who  reprobate  the  adulterer  on  moral 
grounds  have  their  minds  idled,  not  with  ideas  of  an  ac- 
tion for  damages,  or  of  future  punishment  following  the 
breach  of  a  commandment,  or  of  loss  of  reputation  ;  but 
the}T  are  occupied  with  ideas  of  nnhappiness  entailed  on 
the  aggrieved  wife  or  husband,  the  damaged  lives  of 
children,  itml  the  diffused  mischiefs  which  go  along  with 
disregard  of  the  marriage  tie.  Conversely,  the  man  who 
is  moved  by  a  moral  feeling  to  help  another  in  difficulty, 
does  not  picture  to  himself  any  reward  here  or  here- 
after ;  but  pictures  only  the  better  condition  he  is  trying 
to  bring  about.  One  who  is  morally  prompted  to  fight 
against  a  social  evil  has  neither  material  benefit  nor 
popular  applause  before  his  mind,  but  only  the  mischiefs 
he  seeks  to  remove  and  the  increased  well-being  which 
will  follow  their  removal.  Throughout,  then,  the  moral 
motive  differs  from  the  motives  it  is  associated  with  in 
this,  that  instead  of  being  constituted  by  representations 
of  incidental,  collateral,  non-necessary  consequences  of 
acts,  it  is  constituted  by  representations  of  consequences 
which  the  acts  naturally  produce.  These  representa- 
tions are  not  all  distinct,  though  some  of  such  are 
usually  present ;  but  they  form  an  assemblage  of  indis- 
tinct representations  accumulated  by  experience  of  the 
results  of  like  acts  in  the  life  of  the  individual,  super- 
posed on  a  still  more  indistinct  but  voluminous  con- 
sciousness due  to  the  inherited  effects  of  such  experiences 
in  progenitors,  forming  a  feeling  that  is  at  once  massive 
and  vague. 


L50  THE  DATA   OF  ETHICS. 

And  now  we  see  why  the  moral  feelings  and  correla- 
tive restraints  have  arisen  later  than  the  feelings  and 
restraints  that  originate  from  political,  religions,  and 
social  authorities,  and  have  so  slowly,  and  even  yet  so 
incompletely,  disentangled  themselves.  For  only  by 
these  lower  feelings  and  restraints  could  be  maintained 
the  conditions  under  which  the  higher  feelings  and  re- 
straints evolve.  It  is  thus  alike  with  the  self-regarding 
feelings  and  with  the  other-regarding  feelings.  The 
pains  which  improvidence  will  bring,  and  the  pleasures 
to  be  gained  by  storing  up  things  for  future  use,  and  by 
laboring  to  get  such  things,  can  be  habitually  contrasted 
in  thought,  only  as  fast  as  settled  social  arrangements 
make  accumulation  possible  ;  and  that  there  may  arise 
such  settled  arrangements,  fear  of  the  seen  ruler,  of  the 
unseen  ruler,  and  of  public  opinion,  must  come  into  play. 
Only  after  political,  religious  and  social  restraints  have 
produced  a  stable  community  can  there  be  sufficient  ex- 
perience  of  the  pains,  positive  and  negative,  sensational 
and  emotional,  whieh  crimes  of  aggression  cause,  as  to 
generate  thai  moral  aversion  to  them  constituted  by  con- 
sciousness  of  their  intrinsically  evil  results.  And  more 
manifest  still  is  it  that  such  a  moral  sentiment  as  that  of 
acl  equity,  which  is  offended  not  only  by  material 
injuries  don.;  to  men,  but  also  by  political  arrangements 
that  place  them  at  a  disadvantage,  can  evolve  only  after 
the  social  stage  reached  gives  familiar  experience,  both 
of  the  pains  flowing  directly  from  injustices,  and  also  of 
those  flowing  indirectly  from  the  class  privileges  which 
make  Lnj  easy. 

That  til-  feelings  called  moral  have  the  nature  and 
origin  alleged  is  further  shown  by  the  fact  that  we  as- 
sociate the  name  with  them  in  proportion  to  the  degree 


THE  PSYCnOLOGICAL  VIEW.  151 

in  which  they  have  these  characters — firstly,  of  being 
re-representative ;  secondly,  of  being  concerned  with 
indirect  rather  than  with  direct  effects,  and  generally 
with  remote  rather  than  immediate ;  and  thirdly,  of  re- 
ferring to  effects  that  are  mostly  general  rather  than 
special.  Thus,  though  we  condemn  one  man  for  ex- 
travagance and  approve  the  economy  shown  by  another 
man,  we  do  not  class  their  acts  as  respectively  vicious 
and  virtuous.  These  words  are  too  strong  ;  the  present 
and  future  results  here  differ  too  little  in  concreteness 
and  ideality  to  make  the  words  fully  applicable.  Sup- 
pose, however,  that  the  extravagance  necessarily  brings 
distress  on  wife  and  children — brings  pains  diffused 
over  the  lives  of  others  as  well  as  of  self,  and  the  vi- 
ciousness  of  the  extravagance  becomes  clear.  Suppose, 
further,  that  prompted  by  the  wish  to  relieve  his  family 
from  the  misery  he  has  brought  on  them,  the  spendthrift 
forges  a  bill  or  commits  some  other  fraud.  Though, 
estimated  apart,  we  characterize  his  overruling  emotion 
as  moral,  and  make  allowance  for  him  in  consideration 
of  it,  yet  his  action,  taken  as  a  whole,  we  condemn  as 
immoral :  we  regard  as  of  superior  authority  the  feel- 
ings which  respond  to  men's  proprietary  claims — feel- 
ings which  are  re-representative  in  a  higher  degree  and 
refer  to  more  remote  diffused  consequences.  The  dif- 
ference, habitually  recognized,  between  the  relative 
elevations  of  justice  and  generosity,  well  illustrates  this 
truth.  The  motive  causing  a  generous  act  has  reference 
to  effects  of  a  more  concrete,  special,  and  proximate 
kind  than  has  the  motive  to  do  justice,  which,  beyond 
the  proximate  effects,  usually  themselves  less  concrete 
than  those  that  generosity  contemplates,  includes  a  con- 
sciousness of  the  distant,  involved,  diffused  effects  of 


152  TUK  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 

maintaining  equitable  relations.     And  justice  we  hold 
ti»  be  higher  generosity. 

Comprehension  of  this  long  argument  will  be  aided 
by  here  quoting  a  further  passage  from  the  before-named 
letter  to  Mr.  Mill,  following  the  passage  already  quoted 
from  it. 

"To  make  any  position  fully  understood,  it  seems  needful  to 
add  that,  corresponding  to  the  fundamental  propositions  of  a  de- 
veloped  Moral  Science,  there  have  been,  and  still  are,  developing 
in  the  race,  certain  fundamental  moral  intuitions  ;  and  that,  though 
these  moral  intuitions  are  the  results  of  accumulated  experiences 
of  Utility,  gradually  organized  and  inherited,  they  have  come  to 
be  quite  independent  of  conscious  experience.  Justin  the  same 
way  that  I  believe  the  intuition  of  space,  possessed  by  any  living 
individual,  to  have  arisen  from  organized  and  consolidated  experi- 
ences of  all  antecedent  individuals  who  bequeathed  to  him  their 
slowly  developed  nervous  organizations — just  as  I  believe  that  this 
intuition,  requiring  only  to  be  made  definite  and  complete  by  per- 
sonal  experiences,  lias  practically  become  a  form  of  thought,  ap- 
parently quite  independent  of  experience  ;  so  do  I  believe  that  the 
experiences  of  utility  organized  and  consolidated  through  all  past 
generations  of  the  human  race,  have  been  producing  correspond- 
ing nervous  modifications,  which,  by  continued  transmission  and 
accumulation,  have  heroine  in  us  certain  faculties  of  moral  intui- 
tion— certain  emotions  responding  to  right  and  wrong  conduct, 
which  have  no  apparent  hasis  in  the  individual  experiences  of 
utility.  I  also  hold  that  jusl  as  the  space  intuition  responds  to  the 
demonstrations  of  (ieometry,  and  has  its  rough  conclusions 
interpreted  and  verified  by  them  ;  so  will  moral  intuitions  respond 
to  the  demonstrations  of  Moral  Science,  and  will  have  their  rough 
conclusions  interpreted  and  verified  by  them." 

To  this,  in  passing,  I  will  add  only  that  the  evolution- 
hypothesis  thus  enables  us  to  reconcile  opposed  moral 
theori  enables  us  to   reconcile  opposed  theories 

of  knowledge.     For  as  the  doctrine  of  innate  forms  of 
lectual  intuition  falls  into  harmony  with  the  experi- 
ential doctrine,  when  we    recognize   the  production   of 


THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL   VIEW.  153 

intellectual  faculties  by  inheritance  of  effects  wrought 
by  experience  ;  so  the  doctrine  of  innate  powers  of 
moral  perception  becomes  congruous  with  the  utilitarian 

doctrine,  when  it  is  seen  that  preferences  and  aversions 
are  rendered  organic  by  inheritance  of  the  effects  of 
pleasurable  and  painful  experiences  in  progenitors. 

§  40.  One  further  question  has  to  be  answered — How 
does  there  arise  the  feeling  of  moral  obligation  in  gen- 
eral ?  Whence  comes  the  sentiment  of  duty,  considered 
as  distinct  from  the  several  sentiments  which  prompt 
temperance,  providence,  kindness,  justice,  truthfulness, 
etc.?  The  answer  is  that  it  is  an  abstract  sentiment 
generated  in  a  manner  analogous  to  that  in  which  ab- 
stracl  ideas  are  generated. 

The  idea  of  each  color  had  originally  entire  concrete- 
ness  given  to  it  by  an  object  possessing  the  color;  as 
some  of  the  unmodified  names,  such  as  orange  and  vio- 
let, show  us.  The  dissociation  of  each  color  from  the 
object  specially  associated  with  it  in  thought  at  the 
outset,  went  on  as  fast  as  the  color  came  to  be  associated 
in  thought  with  objects  unlike  the  first,  and  unlike  one 
another.  The  idea  of  orange  was  conceived  in  the 
abstract  more  fully  in  proportion  as  the  various  orange- 
colored  objects  remembered,  cancelled  one  another's 
diverse  attributes,  and  left  outstanding  their  common 
attribute. 

So  is  it  if  we  ascend  a  stage  and  note  how  there  arises 
the  abstract  idea  of  color  apart  from  particular  colors. 
Were  all  things  red  the  conception  of  color  in  the 
abstract  could  not  exist.  Imagine  that  every  object 
was  either  red  or  green,  and  it  is  manifest  that  the 
tal  habit  would  be  to  think  of  one  or  other  of  these  two 


154  THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 

colors  in  connection  with  anything  named.  But  multi- 
ply the  colors  so  that  thought  rambles  undecidedly 
among  the  ideas  of  them  that  occur  along  with  any  ob- 
ject named,  and  there  results  the  notion  of  indetermi- 
nate color — the  common  property  which  objects  possess 
of  affecting  us  by  light  from  their  surfaces,  as  well  as 
by  their  forms.  For  evidently  the  notion  of  this  com- 
mon property  is  that  which  remains  constant  while  im- 
agination is  picturing  every  possible  variety  of  color.  It 
is  the  uniform  trait  in  all  colored  things;  that  is — color 
in  the  abstract. 

Words  referring  to  quantity  furnish  cases  of  more 
marked  dissociation  of  abstract  from  concrete.  Group- 
ing various  things  as  small  in  comparison  either  with 
those  of  their  kind  or  with  those  of  other  kinds,  and 
similarly  grouping  some  objects  as  comparatively  great, 
t  the  opposite  abstract  notions  of  smallness  and 
greatness.  Applied  as  these  are  to  innumerable  very 
diverse  things — not  objects  only,  but  forces,  times, 
numbers,  values — they  have  become  so  little  connected 
with  concretes,  that  their  abstract  meanings  are  very 
vague. 

Further,  we  must  note  that  an  abstract  idea  thus 
formed  of  ten  acquires  an  illusive  independence;  as  we 
may  perceive  in  the  case  of  motion,  which,  dissociated, 
in  thought  from  all  particular  bodies  and  velocities  and 
ions,  is  sometimes  referred  to  as  though  it  could 
be  conceived  apart  from  something  moving. 

Now  all  this  holds  of  the  subjective  as  well  as  of 
the  objective;  and  among  other  states  of  conscious- 
holds  of  the  emotions  as  known  by  introspection. 
By  the  grouping  of  those  re-representative  feelings 
above  described,  which,  differing  among  themselves  in 


THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  VIEW.  155 

other  respects,  have  a  component  in  common,  and  by 
the  consequent  mutual  canceling  of  their  diverse  com- 
ponents, this  common  component  is  made  relatively 
appreciable,  and  becomes  an  abstract  feeling.  Thus  is 
produced  the  sentiment  of  moral  obligation  or  duty. 
Let  us  observe  its  genesis. 

We  have  seen  that  during  the  progress  of  animate 
existence,  the  later  evolved,  more  compound  and  more 
representative  feelings,  serving  to  adjust  the  conduct 
to  more  distant  and  general  needs,  have  all  along  had 
an  authority  as  guides  superior  to  that  of  the  earlier 
and  simpler  feelings — excluding  cases  in  which  these, 
last  are  intense.  This  superior  authority,  unrecogniza- 
ble by  lower  types  of  creatures  which  cannot  generalize, 
and  little  recognizable  by  primitive  men  who  have  but 
feeble  powers  of  generalization,  has  become  distinctly 
recognized  as  civilization  and  accompanying  mental 
development  have  gone  on.  Accumulated  experiences 
have  produced  the  consciousness  that  guidance  by  feel- 
ings which  refer  to  remote  and  general  results  is 
usually  more  conducive  to  welfare  than  guidance  by 
feelings  to  be  immediately  gratified.  For  what  is  the 
common  character  of  the  feelings  that  prompt  honesty, 
truthfulness,  diligence,  providence,  etc.,  which  men 
habitually  find  to  be  better  prompters  than  the  appetites 
and  simple  impulses  ?  They  are  all  complex,  re-repre- 
sentative feelings,  occupied  with  the  future  rather  than 
the  present.  The  idea  of  authoritativeness  has,  there- 
fore, come  to  be  connected  with  feelings  having  these 
traits:  the  implication  being  that  the  lower  and  simpler 
feelings  are  without  authority.  And  this  idea  of 
authoritativeness  is  one  element  in  the  abstract  con- 
sciousness of  duty. 


156  THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 

But  there  is  another  element — the  element  of  coer- 
civeness.  This  originates  from  experience  of  those 
several  forms  of  restraint  that  have,  as  above  described, 
established  themselves  in  the  course  of  civilization — 
the  political,  religious  and  social.  To  the  effects  of 
punishments  inflicted  by  law  and  public  opinion  on 
conduct  of  certain  kinds,  Dr.  Bain  ascribes  the  feeling 
of  moral  obligation.  And  I  agree  with  him  to  the 
extent  of  thinking  that  by  them  is  generated  the  sense 
of  compulsion  which  the  consciousness  of  duty  includes, 
and  which  the  word  obligation  indicates.  The  exist- 
ence of  an  earlier  and  deeper  element,  generated  as 
above  described,  is,  however,  I  think,  implied  by  the 
fact  that  certain  of  the  higher  self-regarding  feelings 
instigating  prudence  and  economy,  have  a  moral  au- 
thority in  opposition  to  the  simpler   self-regarding   feel- 

.  showing  that  apart  from  any  thought  of  factitious 
penalties  on  improvidence,  the  feeling  constituted  by 
representation  of  the  natural  penalties  has  acquired  an 
acknowledged  superiority.  But  accepting  in  the  main 
tin;  view  that  fears  of  the  political  and  social  penalties 
Cto  which,  I  think,  the  religious  must  be  added)  have 
generated  that  sense  of  coerciveness  which  goes  along 
with  tin.-   thought  of  postponing  present  to  future  and 

mal  desires  to  the  claims  of  others,  it  here  chiefly 
concerns  us  to  note  that  this  sense  of  coerciveness  be- 
comes  indirectly  connected  with  the  feelings  distin- 
guished as  moral.  For  since  the  political,  religious 
and  social  restraining  motives  are  mainly  formed  of 
•  I  future  results  ;  and  since  the  moral  restrain- 
ing motive   is  mainly  formed  of  represented  future  re- 

:  it  happens  thai  flie  representations,  having  much 
in  common,  and  being  often   aroused  at  the  same  time, 


THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL   VIEW.  Vol 

the  fear  joined  with  three  sets  of  them  becomes,  by 
association,  joined  with  the  fourth.  Thinking  of  the 
extrinsic  effects  of  a  forbidden  act,  excites  a  dread 
which  continues  present  while  the  intrinsic  effects  of 
the  act  are,  thought  of;  and  being  thus  linked  with 
these  intrinsic  effects  causes  a  vague  sense  of  moral 
compulsion.  Emerging  as  the  moral  motive  does  but 
slowly  from  amidst  the  political,  religious  and  social 
motives,  it  long  participates  in  that  consciousness  of 
subordination  to  some  external  agency  which  is  joined 
with  them  ;  and  only  as  it  becomes  distinct  and  pre- 
dominant does  it  lose  this  associated  consciousness — 
only  then  does  the  feeling  of  obligation  fade. 

This  remark  implies  the  tacit  conclusion,  which  will 
be  to  most  very  startling,  that  the  sense  of  duty  or 
moral  obligation  is  transitory,  and  will  diminish  as  fast 
as  moralization  increases.  Startling  though  it  is,  this 
conclusion  may  be  satisfactorily  defended.  Even  now 
progress  toward  the  implied  ultimate  state  is  traceable. 
The  observation  is  not  infrequent  that  persistence  in 
performing  a  duty  ends  in  making  it  a  pleasure  ;  and 
this  amounts  to  the  admission  that  while  at  first  the 
motive  contains  an  element  of  coercion,  at  last  this 
element  of  coercion  dies  out,  and  the  act  is  performed 
without  any  consciousness  of  being  obliged  to  perform 
it.  The  contrast  between  the  youth  on  whom  diligence 
is  enjoined,  and  the  man  of  business  so  absorbed  in 
affairs  that  he  cannot  he  induced  to  relax,  shows  us  how 
the  doing  of  work,  originally  under  the  consciousness 
that  it  ought  to  be  done,  may  eventually  cease  to  have 
any  such  accompanying  consciousness.  Sometimes, 
indeed,  the  relation  comes  to  be  reversed  ;  and  the  man 
of  business  persists  in  work  from  pure  love  of  it  when 


J58  THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 

told  that  he  ought  not.  Nor  is  it  thus  with  self-regard- 
ing feelings  only.  That  the  maintaining  and  protecting 
of  wife  by  husband  often  result  solely  from  feelings 
directly  gratified  by  these  actions,  without  any  thought 
of  must;  and  that  the  fostering  of  children  by  parents 
is  in  many  cases  made  an  absorbing  occupation  without 
any  coercive  feeling  of  ought ;  are  obvious  truths  which 
show  us  that  even  now,  with  some  of  the  fundamental 
other-regarding  duties,  the  sense  of  obligation  has 
retreated  into  the  background  of  the  mind.  And  it  is 
in  some  degree  so  with  other-regarding  duties  of  a 
higher  kind.  Conscientiousness  has  in  many  outgrowp. 
that  stage  in  which  the  sense  of  a  compelling  power  k 
joined  with  rectitude  of  action.  The  truly  honest  man, 
here  and  there  to  be  found,  is  not  only  without  thought 
of  legal,  religious,  or  social  compulsion,  when  he  dis- 
charges an  equitable  claim  on  him,  but  he  is  without 
thought  of  self-compulsion.  He  does  the  right  thing 
with  a  simple  feeling  of  satisfaction  in  doing  it ;  and  is, 
indeed,  impatient  if  anything  prevents  him  from  having 
the  satisfaction  of  doing  it. 

Evidently,  then,  witli  complete  adaptation  to  the 
social  state,  that  element  in  the  moral  consciousness 
which  is  expressed  by  the  word  obligation,  will  disap- 
pear. Tin'  higher  actions  required  for  the  harmonious 
carrying  on  of  life  will  be  as  much  matters  of  course 
as  .no  those  lower  actions  which  the  simple,  desires 
prompt.  In  their  proper  times  and  places  and  propor- 
tions, the  moral  sentiments  will  guide  men  just  as  spon- 
taneously and  adequately  as  now  do  the  sensations. 
And  though,  joined  with  their  regulating  influence 
when  this  is  called  for,  will  exist  latent  ideas  of  the 
evils   which    nonconformity   would   bring ;    these   will 


THE  I'syt'UOLOGICAL  VIEW.  1  .".'.* 

occupy  the  mind  no  more  than  do  ideas  of  the  evils  of 
starvation  at  the  time  when  a  healthy  appetite  is  being 
satisfied  by  a  meal. 

§  47.  This  elaborate  exposition,  which  the  extreme 
complexity  of  the  subject  has  necessitated,  may  have  its 
leading  ideas  restated  thus  : 

Symbolizing  by  a  and  6,  related  phenomena  in  the 
environment,  which  in  some  way  concern  the  welfare  of 
the  organism ;  and  symbolizing  by  c  and  d,  the  impres- 
sions, simple  or  compound,  which  the  organism 
receives  from  the  one,  and  the  motions,  single  or  com- 
bined, by  which  its  acts  are  adapted  to  meet  the  other  ; 
we  saw  that  psychology  in  general  is  concerned  with 
the  connection  between  the  relation  a  b  and  the  rela- 
tion c  d.  Further,  we  saw  that  by  implication  the 
psychological  aspect  of  Ethics,  is  that  aspect  under 
which  the  adjustment  of  c  d  to  a  6,  appears,  not  as  an 
intellectual  co-ordination  simply,  but  as  a  co-ordination 
in  which  pleasures  and  pains  are  alike  factors  and 
results. 

It  was  shown  that  throughout  Evolution,  motive 
and  act  become  more  complex,  as  the  adaptation  of 
inner  related  actions  to  outer  related  actions  extends  in 
range  and  variety.  Whence  followed  the  corollary 
that  the  latter  evolved  feelings,  more  representative 
and  re-representative  in  their  constitution,  and  referring 
to  remoter  and  wider  needs,  have  on  the  average,  an 
authority  as  guides  greater  than  have  the  earlier  and 
simpler  feelings. 

After  thus  observing  that  even  an  inferior  creature  is 
ruled  by  a  hierarchy  of  feelings  so  constituted  that 
general  welfare   depends  on  a  certain  subordination  of. 


THE  DATA   OF  ETHICS. 

iw  that  in  man.  as  he  passes  into 
the  s  ises  the  need   for  sundry  addi- 

tional subordinations  of  lower  to  higher:  ccroperation 
-  made  possible  only  by  them.      To  the  restraints 

-entations  of  the  intrinsic 
.  which,  in  their  simpler  forms,  have 
Lving  from  the  beginning,   are  added  the  re- 
straints  caused  by  mental  representations  of  extrinsic 
j,    in    the  shape  of  political,   religions,    and  social 
penal 

With  the  evolution  of  society,  made  possible  by 
it  ions  maintaining  order,  and  associating  in  men's 
minds  the  sense  of  obligation  with  prescribed  acts  and 
with  desistances  from  forbidden  acts,  there  arose  oppor- 
tunities t  the  had  consequences  naturally  flow- 
ing from  the  conduct  interdicted  and  the  good  conse- 
quences from  the  conduct  required.  Hence  eventually 
grew  up  morally  aversions  and  approvals:  experience 
of  the  intrinsic  effects  necessarily  here  coming  later  than 
experience  of  the  i  •  effects,  and  therefore  produc- 
ing its  results  lat 

The  thoughts  and  feelings  constituting  these  moral 

I  approvals,  being   all  along  clos<  ly  con- 

dwith  the  thoughts  and  feelings  constituting  fears 

of  political,  religious,  and  social   penaltii    .  sarily 

te  in  the  accompanying  sense  of  obli- 

:.     The  coercive  element  in  the  consciousm 

Ived    by    <-o\  .  ith    external 

d    ties,  diffusa  '1    itself  by 

■  n    tlirough    that  coi  sss   of  iJw.y.   properly 

i  moral,   which  is  occupied  within  trinsic  results 

■  . 

But  this  self-compulsion,  which  at  a  relatively  high 


TIIF  PSYCHOLOGICAL    VIEW.  101 

stage  becomes  more  and  more  a  substitute  for  compul- 
sion from  without,  must  itself,  at  a  still  higher  b\ 
practically  disappear.  If  some  action  to  which  the 
special  motive  is  insufficient,  is  performed  in  obedience 
to  the  feeling  of  moral  obligation,  the  fact  proves  that 
the  special  faculty  concerned  is  not  yet  equal  to  its 
function — lias  not  acquired  such  strength  that  the  re- 
quired activity  has  become  its  normal  activity,  yielding 
its  due  amount  of  pleasure.  With  complete  evolution 
then,  the  sense  of  obligation,  not  ordinarily  present  in 
consciousness,  will  be  awakened  only  on  those  extraor- 
dinary occasions  that  prompt  breach  of  the  laws  other- 
wise spontaneously  conformed  to. 

And  this  brings  us  to  the  psychological  aspect  of  that 
conclusion  which,  in  the  last  chapter,  was  reached  under 
its  biological  aspect.  The  pleasures  and  pains  which 
the  moral  sentiments  originate  will,  like  bodily  pleas- 
ures and  pains,  become  incentives  and  deterrents  so  id- 
justed  in  their  strengths  to  the  needs  that  the  moral 

conduct  will  be  the  natural  conduct. 
U 


162  THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

THE   SOCIOLOGICAL   VIEW. 

§  48.  Not  for  the  human  race  only,  but  for  every 
race,  there  are  laws  of  right  living.  Given  its  environ- 
ment and  its  structure,  and  there  is  for  each  kind  of 
creature  a  set  of  actions  adapted  in  their  kinds,  amounts, 
and  combinations,  to  secure  the  highest  conservation  its 
nature  permits.  The  animal,  like  the  man,  has  needs 
for  food,  warmth,  activity,  rest,  and  so  forth,  which  must 
be  fulfilled  in  certain  relative  degrees  to  make  its  life 
whole.  Maintenance  of  its  race  implies  satisfaction  of 
special  desires,  sexual  and  philo-progenitive,  in  due  pro- 
portions. Hence  there  is  a  supposable  formula  for  the 
activities  of  each  species,  which,  could  it  be  drawn  out, 
would  constitute  a  system  of  morality  for  that  species. 
But  such  a  system  of  morality  would  have  little  or  no 
reference  to  the  welfare  of  others  than  self  and  offspring. 
Indifferent  to  individuals  of  its  own  kind,  as  an  inferior 
creature  is,  and  habitually  hostile  to  individuals  of  other 
kinds,  the  formula  for  its  life  could  take  no  cognizance 
of  tin-  lives  of  those  with  which  it  came  in  contact;  or 
rather,  such  formula  would  imply  that  maintenance  of 
its  lii  '  variance  with  maintenance  of  their  lives. 

lint  cm  ascending  from  beings  of  lower  kinds  to  the 

ind  of  being,  man  ;  or,  more  strictly,  on  ascend- 

rom  man  in  his  pre-social  singe  to  man  in  his  social 

stage,  the  formula  has  to  include  an  additional  factor. 


THE  SOCIOLOGICAL   VIEW.  103 

Though  not  peculiar  to  human  life  under  its  developed 
form,  the  presence  of  this  factor  is  still,  in  the  highest 
degree,  characteristic  of  it.  Though  there  are  inferior 
species  displaying  considerable  degrees  of  socialit}r,  and, 
though,  the  formulas  for  their  complete  lives  would  have 
to  take  account  of  the  relations  arising  from  union,  yet 
our  own  species  is,  on  the  whole,  to  be  distinguished  as 
having  a  formula  for  complete  life  which  specially  rec- 
ognizes the  relations  of  each  individual  to  others,  in 
presence  of  whom,  and  in  co-operation  with  whom,  he 
has  to  live. 

This  additional  factor  in  the  problem  of  complete  liv- 
ing is,  indeed,  so  important  that  the  necessitated  modi- 
fications of  conduct  have  come  to  form  a  chief  part  of 
the  code  of  conduct.  Because  the  inherited  desires 
which  directly  refer  to  the  maintenance  of  individual 
life  are  fairly  adjusted  to  the  requirements,  there  has 
been  no  need  to  insist  on  that  conformity  to  them  which 
furthers  self-conservation.  Conversely,  because  these 
desires  prompt  activities  that  often  conflict  with  the  ac- 
tivities of  others  ;  and  because  the  sentiments  respond- 
ing to  others'  claims  are  relatively  weak,  moral  codes 
emphasize  those  restraints  on  conduct  which  the  pres- 
ence of  fellow-men  entails. 

From  the  sociological  [joint  of  view,  then,  Ethics  be- 
comes nothing  else  than  a  definite  account  of  the  forms 
of  conduct  that  are  fitted  to  the  associated  state,  in  such 
wise  that  the  lives  of  each  and  all  may  be  the  greatest 
possible,  alike  in  length  and  breadth. 

§  49.  But  here  we  are  met  by  a  fact  which  forbids  us 
thus  to  put  in  the  foreground  the  welfares  of  citizens, 
individually  considered,  and  requires  us  to  put  in  the 


1G4  THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 

foreground  the  welfare  of  the  society  as  a  whole.  The 
life  of  the  social  organism  must,  as  an  end,  rank  above 
the  lives  of  its  units.  These  two  ends  are  not  harmo- 
nious at  the  outset ;  and,  though  the  tendency  is  toward 
harmonization  of  them,  they  are  still  partially  conflict- 
ing. 

As  fast  as  the  social  state  establishes  itself,  the 
preservation  of  the  society  becomes  a  means  of  pre- 
serving its  units.  Living  together  arose  because,  on 
the  average,  it  proved  more  advantageous  to  each  than 
living  apart ;  and  this  implies  that  maintenance  of 
combination  is  maintenance  of  the  conditions  to  more 
satisfactory  living  than  the  combined  persons  would 
otherwise  have.  Hence,  social  self-preservation  be- 
comes a  proximate  aim  taking  precedence  of  the 
ultimate  aim,  individual  self-preservation. 

This  subordination  of  personal  to  social  welfare  is, 
however,  contingent :  it  depends  on  the  presence  of 
antagonistic  societies.  So  long  as  the  existence  of  a 
community  is  endangered  by  the  actions  of  communi- 
ties around,  it  must  remain  true  that  the  interests  of 
individuals  must  be  sacrificed  to  the  interests  of  the 
community,  as  far  as  is  needful  for  the  community's 
Balvation.  But  if  this  is  manifest,  it  is,  by  implication, 
manifest,  thai  when  social  antagonisms  cease,  this  need 
for  sacrifice  of  private  claims  to  public  claims  ceases 
also;  or  rather,  there  cease  to  be  any  public  claims  at 
variance  with  private  claims.  All  along,  furtherance 
of  individual  lives  has  been  the  ultimate  end ;  and,  if 
this  ultimate  end  has  been  postponed  to  the  proximate 
end  of  preserving  the  community's  life,  it  has  been  so 
only  because  tins  proximate  end  was  instrumental  to 
the  ultimate  end.     When  the  aggregate  is  no  longer  in 


THE  SOCIOLOGICAL  VIEW.  165 

danger,  the  final  object  of  pursuit,  the  welfare  of  the 
units,  no  longer  needing  to  he  postponed,  becomes  the 
immediate  object  of  pursuit. 

Consequently,  unlike  sets  of  conclusions  respecting 
human  conduct  emerge,  according  as  we  are  concerned 
with  a  state  of  habitual  or  occasional  war,  or  are  con- 
cerned with  a  state  of  permanent  and  general  peace. 
Let  us  glance  at  these  alternative  states  and  the  alter- 
native implications. 

§  50.  At  present  the  individual  man  has  to  carry  on 
his  life  with  due  regard  to  the  lives  of  others  belong- 
ing to  the  same  society  ;  while  he  is  sometimes  called 
on  to  be  regardless  of  the  lives  of  those  belonging  to 
other  societies.  The  same  mental  constitution,  having 
to  fulfill  both  these  requirements,  is  necessarily  incon- 
gruous ;  and  the  correlative  conduct,  adjusted  first  to 
the  one  need  and  then  to  the  other,  cannot  be  brought 
within  any  consistent  ethical  system. 

Hate  and  destroy  your  fellow-man  is  now  the  com- 
mand; and  then  the  command  is,  love  and  aid  your 
fellow-man.  Use  every  means  to  deceive,  says  the  one 
code  of  conduct ;  while  the  other  code  says,  be  truth- 
ful in  word  and  deed.  Seize  what  property  you  can 
and  burn  all  you  cannot  take  away,  are  injunctions 
which  the  religion  of  enmity  countenances;  while  by 
the  religion  of  amity,  theft  and  arson  are  condemned 
as  crimes.  And  as  conduct  has  to  be  made  up  of  parts 
thus  at  variance  with  one  another,  the  theory  of  con- 
duct remains  confused. 

There  co-exists  a  kindred  irreconcilability  between 
the  sentiments  answering  to  the  forms  of  co-operation 
required   for  militancy  and  industrialism  respectively. 


166  THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 

While  social  antagonisms  are  habitual,  and  while,  for 
efficient  action  against  other  societies,  there  needs  great 
subordination  to  men  who  command,  the  virtue  of 
loyalty  and  the  duty  of  implicit  obedience  have  to  be 
insisted  on  ;  disregard  of  the  rulers  will  is  punished 
with  death.  But  when  war  ceases  to  be  chronic,  and 
growing  industrialism  habituates  men  to  maintaining 
their  own  claims  while  respecting  the  claims  of  others, 
loyalty  becomes  less  profound,  the  authority  of  the 
ruler  is  questioned  or  denied  in  respect  of  various 
private  actions  and  beliefs.  State  dictation  is  in  many 
directions  successfully  defied,  and  the  political  inde- 
pendence of  the  citizen  comes  to  be  regarded  as  a 
( laim  which  it  is  virtuous  to  maintain  and  vicious 
to  yield  up.  Necessarily  during  the  transition,  these 
opposite  sentiments  are  incongruously  mingled. 

So  is  it,  too,  with  domestic  institutions  under  the  two 
rSgimes.  While  the  first  is  dominant,  ownership  of  a 
slave  is  honorable,  and  in  the  slave  submission  is  praise- 
worthy :  hut  as  the  last  glows  dominant,  slave-owning 
becomes  a  crime  and  servile  obedience  excites  contempt. 
Nor  is  it  otherwise  in  the  family.  The  subjection  of 
women  to  men,  complete  while  war  is  habitual  but 
qualified  as  fast  as  peaceful  occupations  replace  it, 
comes  eventually  to  be  thought  wrong,  and  equality 
before  tin-  Law  is  asserted.  At  the  same  time  the  opin- 
ion concerning  paternal  power  changes.  The  once  un- 
questioned right  of  the  father  to  take  his  children's 
is  denied,  and  the  duly  of  absolute  submission 
to  1 1 i in.  long  insisted  on,  is  changed  into  the  duty  of 
obedience  within  reasonable  Limits. 

Were  the  ratio  between  the  life  of  antagonism  with 
alien  societies,   and   the    life    of  peaceful    co-operation 


THE  SOCIOLOGICAL   VIEW.  107 

within  each  society,  a  constant  ratio,  some  permanent 
compromise  between  the  conflicting  rules  of  conduct 
appropriate  to  the  two  lives  might  bo  reached.  But 
since  this  ratio  is  a  variable  one,  the  compromise  can 
never  be  more  than  temporary.  Ever  the  tendency  is 
toward  congruity  between  beliefs  and  requirements. 
Either  the  social  arrangements  are  gradually  changed 
until  they  come  into  harmony  with  prevailing  ideas 
and  sentiments  ;  or,  if  surrounding  conditions  prevent 
change  in  the  social  arrangements,  the  necessitated 
habits  of  life  modify  the  prevailing  ideas  and  sentiments 
to  the  requisite  extent.  Hence,  for  each  kind  and  de- 
gree of  social  evolution  determined  by  external  conflict 
and  internal  friendship,  there  is  an  appropriate  com- 
promise between  the  moral  code  of  enmity  and  the 
moral  code  of  amity:  not,  indeed,  a  definable,  con- 
sistent compromise,  but  a  compromise  fairly  well  un- 
derstood. 

This  compromise,  vague,  ambiguous,  illogical,  though 
it  may  be,  is  nevertheless  for  the  time  being  authori- 
tative. For  if,  as  above  shown,  the  welfare  of  the 
society  must  take  precedence  of  the  welfares  of  its  com- 
ponent individuals,  during  those  stages  in  which  the 
individuals  have  to  preserve  themselves  by  preserving 
their  society,  then  such  temporary  compromise  between 
the  two  codes  of  conduct  as  duly  regards  external  de- 
fense, while  favoring  internal  co-operation  to  the  great- 
est extent  practicable,  subserves  the  maintenance  of  life 
in  the  highest  degree  :  and  thus  gains  the  ultimate  sanc- 
tion. So  that  the  perplexed  and  inconsistent  moralities 
of  which  each  society  and  each  age  shows  us  a  more 
or  less  different  one,  are  severally  justified  as  being 
approximately  the  best  under  the  circumstances. 


J68  THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 

But  such  moralities  are,  by  their  definitions,  shown  to 
belong  to  incomplete  conduct ;  not  to  conduct  that  is 
fully  evolved.  We  saw  that  the  adjustments  of  acts  to 
c\u\>  which,  while  constituting  the  external  manifesta- 
tions of  life,  conduce  to  the  continuance  of  life,  have 
been  rising  to  a  certain  ideal  form  now  approached  by 
the  civilized  man.  But  this  form  is  not  reached  so 
long  as  there  continue  aggressions  of  one  society  upon 
another.  Whether  the  hinderances  to  complete  living 
result  from  the  trespasses  of  fellow-citizens,  or  from  the 
trespasses  of  aliens,  matters  not;  if  they  occur  there  does 
not  yet  exist  the  state  defined.  The  limit  to  the  evolu- 
tion of  conduct  is  arrived  at  by  members  of  each  society 
only  when,  being  arrived  at  by  members  of  other  so- 
3  also,  the  causes  of  international  antagonism  end 
.simultaneously  with  the  causes  of  antagonism  between 
individuals. 

And  now  having  from  the  sociological  point  of  view 
recognized  the  need  for,  and  authority  of,  these  chang- 
es of  ethics,  proper  to  changing  ratios  between 
warlike  activities  and  peaceful  activities,  we  have,  from 
the  same  point  of  view,  to  consider  the  system  of  ethics 
proper  to  the  state  in  which  peaceful  activities  are 
undisi  iirbed. 

1.   [f,  excluding  all  thought  of  danger  or  hinder- 

Erom  causes  external  to  a  society,  we  set  ourselves 

to  specify  those  conditions  under  which  the  life  of  each 

person,  and  therefore  of  the  aggregate,  may  be  the  great- 

ome  upon  certain  simple  ones  which,  as 

-luted,  assume  the  form  of  truisms. 

For,  as  we  ha  \  e  seen,  the  definition  of  that  highest  life 

opanying  completely  evolved   conduct,  itself  ex- 


THE  SOCIOLOGICAL  VIEW.  1 09 

eludes  all  ;u(s  of  aggression — not  only  murder,  assault, 
robbery,  and  the  major  offenses  generally,  but  minor 
offenses,  such  as  libel,  injury  to  property  and  so  forth. 
While  directly  deducting  from  individual  life,  these  in- 
directly cause  perturbations  of  social  life.  Trespasses 
against  others  rouse  antagonisms  in  them ;  and  if  these 
are  numerous  the  group  loses  coherence.  Hence,  whether 
the  integrity  of  the  group  itself  is  considered  as  the  end, 
or  whether  the  end  considered  is  the  benefit  ultimately 
secured  to  its  units  by  maintaining  its  integrity,  or 
whether  the  immediate  benefit  of  its  units  taken  sepa- 
rately is  considered  the  end.  the  implication  is  the  same  : 
such  acts  are  at  variance  with  achievement  of  the  end. 
That  these  inferences  are  self-evident  and  trite  (as  in- 
deed the  first  inferences  drawn  from  the  data  of  every 
science  that  reaches  the  deductive  stage  naturally  are) 
must  not  make  us  pass  lightly  over  the  all-important  fact 
that,  from  the  sociological  point  of  view,  the  leading 
moral  laws  are  seen  to  follow  as  corollaries  from  the  defi- 
nition of  complete  life  carried  on  under  social  condi- 
tions. 

Respect  for  these  primary  moral  laws  is  not  enough, 
however.  Associated  men  pursuing  their  several  lives 
without  injuring  one  another  but  without  helping  one 
another,  reap  no  advantages  from  association  beyond 
those  of  companionship.  If,  while  there  is  no  co-opera- 
tion for  defensive  purposes  (which  is  here  excluded  by 
the  hypothesis)  there  is  also  no  co-operation  for  satisfy- 
ing wants,  the  social  state  loses  its  rni^<ni  d'etre — almost, 
if  not  entirely.  There  are,  indeed,  people  who  live  in  a 
condition  little  removed  from  this:  as  the  Esquimaux. 
But  though  these,  exhibiting  none  of  the  co-operation 
necessitated  by  war,  which  is  unknown  to  them,  lead 


170  THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 

lives  such  that  each  family  is  substantially  independent 
of  others,  occasional  co-operation  occurs.  And,  inde<  d, 
thai  families  should  live  in  company  without  ever  yield- 
ing mutual  aid,  is  scarcely  conceivable. 

Nevertheless,  whether  actually  existing  or  only  ap- 
proached, we  must  here  recognize  as  hypothetically  pos- 
sible a  state  in  which  these  primary  moral  laws  are 
conformed  to;  for  the  purpose  of  observing,  in  their  un- 
complicated forms,  what  are  the  negative  conditions  to 
harmonious  social  life.  Whether  the  members  of  a  social 
group  do  or  do  not  co-operate,  certain  limitations  to  their 
individual  activities  are  necessitated  by  their  associa- 
tion; and,  after  recognizing  these  as  arising  in  the 
absence  of  co-operation,  we  shall  be  the  better  prepared 
to  understand  how  conformity  to  them  is  effected  when 
co-operation  begins. 

§  52.  For  whether  men  live  together  in  quite  inde- 
pendent ways,  careful  only  to  avoid  ag  .'  ;  or 
whether,  advancing  from  passive  association  to  active 
iation,  they  co-operate,  their  conduct  must  be  such 
that  tin-  achievement  of  ends  by  each  shall  at  least  not 
be  hindered.  And  it  becomes  obvious  that  when  they 
(■><-<  perate  there  must  not  only  be  no  resulting  hinder- 
bu1  there  musl  be  facilitation  :  since,  in  t!,(;  absence 
of  facilitation,  there  can  be  no  motive  to  co-operatei 
What  shape,  then,  must  the  mutual  restraints  take  when 
co-operation  begins?  or  rather— What,  in  addition  to 
lutual  restraints  already  specified,  are  those 
secondary  mutual  restraints  required  to  make  co-opera- 
tion possibk    ' 

'  I  e  who,  living  in  an  isolated  way,  expends  effort  in 
pursuit  of  an  end,  gets  compensation  for  the  effort  by 


THE  SOCIOLOGICAL  VIEW.  171 

securing  the  end,  and  so  achieves  satisfaction.  If  lie 
expends  the  effort  without  achieving  the  end  there 
results  dissatisfaction.  The  satisfaction  and  the  dis- 
satisfaction are  measures  of  success  and  failure  in  life- 
sustaining  acts  ;  since  that  which  is  achieved  by  effort 
is  something  which  directly  or  indirectly  furthers  life, 
and  so  pays  for  the  cost  of  the  effort ;  while  if  the  effort 
fails  there  is  nothing  to  pay  for  the  cost  of  it,  and  so 
much  life  is  wasted.  What  must  result  from  this  when 
men's  efforts  are  joined  ?  The  reply  will  be  made  clearer 
if  we  take  the  successive  forms  of  co-operation  in  the 
order  of  ascending  complexity.  We  may  distinguish  as 
homogeneous  co-operation  (1)  that  in  which  like  efforts 
are  joined  for  like  ends  that  are  simultaneously  en- 
joyed. As  co-operation  that  is  not  completely  homoge- 
neous we  may  distinguish  (2)  that  in  which  like  efforts 
are  joined  for  like  ends  that  are  not  simultaneously  en- 
joyed. A  co-operation  of  which  the  heterogeneity  is 
more  distinct  is  (3)  that  in  which  unlike  efforts  are 
joined  for  like  ends.  And  lastly  comes  the  decidedly 
heterogeneous  co-operation  (4)  that  in  which  unlike 
efforts  are  joined  for  unlike  ends. 

The  simplest  and  earliest  of  these  in  which  men's 
powers, similar  in  kind  and  degree,  are  united  in  pursuit 
of  a  benefit  which,  when  obtained,  they  all  participate- 
in,  is  most  familiarly  exemplified  in  the  catching  of 
game  by  primitive  men  :  this  simplest  and  earliest  form 
of  industrial  co-operation  being  also  that  which  is  least 
differentiated  from  a  militant  co-operation  ;  for  the  co- 
operators  are  the  same,  and  the  processes,  both  destruc- 
tive of  life,  are  carried  on  in  analogous  ways.  The  con- 
dition under  which  such  co-operation  may  be  sir 
fully  carried  on  is  that  the  co-operators  shall  share  alike 


172  Tin:  DATA   OF  ETHICS. 

in  the  produce.  Bach  thus  being  enabled  to  repay  him- 
self in  food  for  the  expended  effort,  and  being  further 
enabled  to  achieve  other  such  desired  ends  as  mainte- 
nance of  family,  obtains  satisfaction:  there  is  no  ag- 
gression of  one  on  another,  and  the  co-operation  is 
harmonious.  Of  course  the  divided  produce  can  be  but 
roughly  proportioned  to  the  several  efforts  joined  in  ob- 
taining  it.  but  there  is  actually  among  savages,  as  we 
see  that  for  harmonious  co-operation  there  must  be,  a 
recognition  of  the  principle  that  efforts  when  combined 
shall  severally  bring  equivalent  benefits,  as  they  would 
do  if  they  were  separate.  Moreover,  beyond  the  taking 
equal  shares  in  return  for  labors  that  are  approximately 
equal,  there  is  generally  an  attempt  at  proportioning 
it  to  achievement, by  assigning  something  extra,  in 
the  shape  of  the  best  part  of  the  trophy,  to  the  actual 
slaver  of  the  game.  And  obviously,  if  there  is  a  wide 
departure  from  this  system  of  sharing  benefits  when 
there  has  been  a  sharing  of  efforts,  the  co-operation  will 
Individual  hunters  will  prefer  to  do  the  best 
they  can  i<>v  themselves  separately. 

Passing   from   this  simplest  case  of  co-operation  to  a 

nut    quite   so  simple — a  case  in  which  the  homo- 

geniety  is  incompletx — let  us  ask  how  a  member  of  the 

group    may    be    Led    without    dissatisfaction   to   expend 

:  in  achieving  a  benefit  which,  when  achieved,  is 
enjoyed  exclusively  by  another?  Clearly  he  may  do 
this  on  condition  thai  the  other  shall  afterward  expend 
a  like  effort,  the  beneficial  result  of  which  shall  be 
similarly  rendered  up  by  him  in  return.  This  exchange 
of  equivalents  of  effort  is  tin'  form  which  social  co- 
ition takes  while  yt  there  is  little  or  no  division 
of  labor,  save  that  between  the  sexes.     For  example, 


THE  SOCIOLOGICAL  VIEW.  173 

the  Bodo  and  Dhimals  "  mutually  assist  each  other  for 
the  nonce,  as  well  in  constructing  their  houses  as  in 
clearing  their  plots  for  cultivation."  And  this  prin- 
ciple— I  will  help  you  if  you  will  help  me — common  in 
simple  communities  where  the  occupations  are  alike 
in  kind,  and  occasionally  acted  upon  in  more  advanced 
communities,  is  one  under  which  the  relation  between 
effort  and  benefit,  no  longer  directly  maintained,  is 
maintained  indirectly.  For  whereas  when  men's  activities 
are  carried  on  separately,  or  are  joined  in  the  way 
exemplified  above,  effort  is  immediately  paid  for  by 
benefit,  in  this  form  of  co-operation  the  benefit  achieved 
by  effort  is  exchanged  for  a  like  benefit  to  be  afterward 
received  when  asked  for.  And  in  this  case  as  in  the 
preceding  case,  co-operation  can  be  maintained  only  by 
fulfillment  of  the  tacit  agreements.  For  if  they  are 
habitually  not  fulfilled,  there  will  commonly  be  refusal 
to  give  aid  when  asked  ;  and  each  man  will  be  left  to  do 
the  best  he  can  by  himself.  All  those  advantages  to  be 
gained  by  union  of  efforts  in  doing  things  that  are 
beyond  the  powers  of  the  single  individual,  will  be 
unachievable.  At  the  outset,  then,  fulfillment  of  con- 
tracts  that  are  implied  if  not  expressed,  becomes  a  con- 
dition to  social  co-operation,  and  therefore  to  social 
development. 

From  these  simple  forms  of  co-operation  in  which 
the  labors  men  cany  on  are  of  like  kinds,  let  us  turn 
to  the  more  complex  forms  in  which  they  carry  on 
labors  of  unlike  kinds.  "Where  men  mutually  aid  in 
building  huts  or  felling  trees,  the  number  of  days' 
work  now  given  by  one  to  another  is  readily  balanced 
by  an  equal  number  of  days'  work  afterward  given  by 
the  other  to  him.     And  no  estimation  of  the  relative 


174  TIIE  DATA  OF  ETIIICS. 

values  of  the  labors  being  required,  a  definite  under- 
standing is  Little  needed.  But  when  division  of  labor 
5  —when  there  come  transactions  between  one 
who  makes  weapons  and  another  who  dresses  skins  for 
clothing,  or  between  a  grower  of  roots  and  a  catcher  of 
ii>h — neither  the  relative  amounts  nor  the  relative 
qualities  of  their  labors  admit  of  easy  measure;  and 
with  the  multiplication  of  businesses,  implying  numer- 
ous kinds  of  skill  and  power,  there  ceases  to  be  any- 
thing like  manifest  equivalence  between  either  the 
bodily  and  mental  efforts  set  against  one  another,  or 
between  their  products.  Hence  the  arrangement  can- 
not now  be  taken  for  granted,  as  while  the  things  ex- 
changed are  like  in  kind :  it  has  to  be  stated.  If  A 
allows  B  to  appropriate  a  product  of  his  special  skill, 
on  condition  that  he  is  allowed  to  appropriate  a  differ- 
ent product  of  B's  special  skill,  it  results  that  as  equiv- 
alence of  the  two  products  cannot  be  determined  by 
direct  comparison  of  their  quantities  and  qualities, 
there  must  be  a  distinct  understanding  as  to  how  much 
of  the  one  may  be  taken  in  consideration  of  so  much  of. 
the  other. 

Only  Under  voluntary  agreement,  then,  no  longer 
tacit  and  vague,  but  overt  and  definite,  can  co-opera- 
tion be  harmoniously  carried  on  when  division  of  labor 
becomes  established.  And  as  in  t lie  simplest  co-opera- 
tion, where  like  efforts  are  joined  to  secure  a  common 
good,  the  dissatisfaction  caused  in  those  who,  having 
expended  their  Labors  do  not  get  their  shares  of  the 
.  prompts  them  to  cease  co-operating;  as  in  the 
ed  co-operation,  achieved  by  exchanging 
equal  labors  of  like  kind  expended  at  different  times, 
aversion   to   co-operate   is   generated   if   the    expected 


THE  SOCIOLOGICAL  VIEW.  t7;'( 

equivalent  of  labor  is  not  rendered;  so  in  this  devel- 
oped co-operation,  the  failure  of  either  to  surrender  to 
the  other  that  which  was  avowedly  recognized  as  of 
.like  value  with  the  labor  or  product  given,  tends  to 
prevent  co-operation  by  exciting  discontent  with  its 
results.  And  evidently,  while  antagonisms  thus  caused 
impede  the  lives  of  the  units,  the  life  of  the  aggregate 
is  endangered  by  diminished  cohesion. 

§  53.  Beyond  these  comparatively  direct  mischiefs, 
special  and  general,  there  have  to  be  noted  indirect 
mischiefs.  As  already  implied  by  the  reasoning  in  the 
last  paragraph,  not  only  social  integration  but  also 
social  differentiation,  is  hindered  by  breach  of  contract. 

In  Part  II  of  the  Principles  of  Sociology,  it  was 
shown  that  the  fundamental  principles  of  organisation 
arc  the  same  for  an  individual  organism  and  for  a 
social  organism ;  because  both  consist  of  mutually  de- 
pendent parts.  In  the  one  case  as  in  the  other,  the 
assumption  of  unlike  activities  by  the  component  mem- 
bers, is  possible  only  on  condition  that  they  severally 
benefit  in  due  degrees  by  one  another's  activities.  That 
we  may  the  better  see  what  are  the  implications  in 
respect  of  social  structures,  let  us  first  note  the  impli- 
cations in  respect  of  individual  structures. 

The  welfare  of  a  living  body  implies  an  approximate 
equilibrium  between  waste  and  repair.  If  the  activities 
involve  an  expenditure  not  made  good  by  nutrition, 
dwindling  follows.  If  the  tissues  are  enabled  to  take 
up  from  the  blood  enriched  by  food,  fit  substances 
enough  to  replace  those  used  up  in  efforts  made,  the 
weight  may  be  maintained.  And  if  the  gain  exceeds 
the  loss,  growth  results. 


176  THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 

That  which  is  true  of  the  whole  in  its  relations  to  the 
external  world,  is  no  less  true  of  the  parts  in  their  re- 
lations to  one  another.  Each  organ,  like  the  entire 
organism,  is  wasted  by  performing  its  function,  and  has 
to  restore  itself  from  the  materials  brought  to  it.  If 
the  quantity  of  materials  furnished  by  the  joint  agency 
of  the  other  organs  is  deficient,  the  particular  organ 
dwindles.  If  they  are  sufficient,  it  can  maintain  its 
integrity.  If  they  are  in  excess,  it  is  enabled  to  in- 
crease. To  say  that  this  arrangement  constitutes  the 
physiological  contract,  is  to  use  a  metaphor  which, 
though  not  true  in  aspect  is  true  in  essence.  For  the 
relations  of  structures  are  actually  such  that,  by  the 
help  of  a  central  regulative  system,  each  organ  is  sup- 
plied witli  blood  in  proportion  to  the  work  it  does.  As 
was  pointed  out  (Principles  of  Sociology,  §  254)  well- 
developed  animals  are  so  constituted  that  each  muscle  or 
viscus,  when  called  into  action,  sends  to  the  vaso-motor 
centres  through  certain  nerve-fibres,  an  impulse  caused 
by  its  action;  whereupon,  through  other  nerve-fibres, 
there  comes  an  impulse  causing  dilatation  of  its  blood- 

Ls.  Thai  is  to  say,  all  other  parts  of  the  organism, 
when  they  jointly  require  it  to  labor,  forthwith  begin  to 
pay  it  in  blood.  During  the  ordinary  state  of  physiolog- 
ical equilibrium,  the  loss  and  the  gain  balance,  and  the 

i  does  hoi  sensibly  change.  If  the  amount  of  its 
function  is  increased  within  such  moderate  limits  that 
the  local  blood-vessels  can  bring  adequately-increased 
supplies,  the  organ  grows:  beyond  replacing  its  losses 
by  its  gains,  it  makes  a  profit  on  its  extra  transactions; 
bo  being  enabled  by  extra  structures  to  meet  extra  de- 
mands. But  if  the  demands  made  on  it  become  so 
great  that  the   supply  of  materials  cannot   keep  pace 


THE  SOCIOLOGICAL   VIEW.  177 

with  the  expenditure,  either  because  the  local  blood-ves- 
sels are  not  large  enough,  or  for  any  other  reason,  then 
the  organ  begins  to  decrease  from  excess  of  waste  over 
repair;  there  sets  in  what  is  known  as  atrophy.  Now, 
since  each  of  the  organs  has  thus  to  he  paid  in  nutri- 
ment for  its  services  by  the  rest,  it  follows  that  the  due 
balancing  of  their  respective  claims  and  payments  is 
requisite,  directly  for  the  welfare  of  each  organ,  and 
indirectly  for  the  welfare  of  the  organism.  For  in  a 
whole  formed  of  mutually  dependent  parts,  anything 
which  prevents  due  performance  of  its  duty  by  one  part 
reacts  injuriously  on  all  the  parts. 

With  change  of  terms  these  statements  and  inferences 
hold  of  a  society.  That  social  division  of  labor  which 
parallels  in  so  many  other  respects  the  physiological 
division  of  labor,  parallels  it  in  this  respect  also.  As 
was  shown  at  large  in  the  Principles  of  Socioh><j;i,  Pari 
II,  each  order  of  functionaries  and  each  group  of  pro- 
ducers, severally  performing  some  action  or  making 
some  article  not  for  direct  satisfaction  of  their  own 
needs  but  for  satisfaction  of  the  needs  of  fellow-citizens 
in  general,  otherwise  occupied,  can  continue  to  do  this 
only  so  long  as  the  expenditures  of  effort  and  returns 
of  profit  are  approximately  equivalent.  Social  organs, 
like  individual  organs,  remain  stationary  if  there  come 
to  them  normal  proportions  of  the  commodities  produced 
by  the  society  as  a  whole.  If  because  the  demands 
made  on  an  industry  or  profession  are  unusually  great, 
those  engaged  in  it  make  excessive  profits, more  citizens 
Hock  to  it  and  the  social  structure  constituted  by  its 
members  grows  ;  while  decrease  of  the  demands  and 
therefore  of  the  profits,  either  leads  its  members  to 
choose  other  careers  or  stops  the   accessions  needful  to 

13 


178  III)'  DATA    OF  ETTIICS. 

replace  those  who  die,  and  the  structure  dwindles. 
Thus  is  maintained  that  proportion  among  the  powers 
of  the  component  parts  which  is  most  conducive  to  the 
welfare  of  the  whole. 

And  now  mark  that  the  primary  condition  to 
achievement  of  this  result  is  fulfillment  of  contract. 
If  Erom  the  members  of  any  part  payment  is  frequently 
withheld,  or  falls  short  of  the  promised  amount,  then, 
through  ruin  of  some  and  abandonment  of  the  occupa- 
tion by  others,  the  part  diminishes;  and  if  it  was  before 
not  more  than  competent  to  its  duty,  it  now  becomes 
incompetent,  and  the  society  suffers.  Or  if  social  needs 
tli row  on  some  part  great  increase  of  function,  and  the 
members  of  it  are  enabled  to  get  for  their  services  un- 
usually high  juices;  fulfillment  of  the  agreements  to 
give  them  these  high  prices,  is  the  only  way  of  drawing 
to  the  pari  such  additional  number  of  members  as  will 
make  it  equal  to  the  augmented  demands.  For  citizens 
will  not  come  to  it  if  they  find  the  high  prices  agreed 
upon  are  not  paid. 

Briefly,  then,  the  universal  basis  of  co-operation  is 
the  proportioning  of  benefits  received  to  services 
rendered.  Without  this  there  can  be  no  physiological 
division  of  labor;  without  this  there  can  be  no  socio- 
d  division  of  labor.  And  since  division  of  labor, 
physiological  or  sociological,  profits  the  whole  and 
each  pari  ;  it  results  that  on  maintenance  of  the  arrange- 
ments necessary  to  it.  depend  both  special  and  general 
welfare.  In  a  society  such  arrangements  are  main- 
tained only  if  bargains,  overt  or  tacit,  are  carried  out. 
So  that  beyond  the  primary  requirement  to  harmonious 
istence  in  a  society,  that  its  units  shall  not  directly 
aggress    on   one    another;  there    comes    this  secondary 


THE  SOCIOLOGICAL   VIEW.  179 

requirement,  that    they  shall  not  indirectly  aggress  by 
breaking  agreements. 

§  54.  But  now  we  have  to  recognize  the  fact  that 
complete  fulfillment  of  these  conditions,  original  and 
derived,  is  not  enough.  Social  co-operation  may  be 
such  that  no  one  is  impeded  in  the  obtainment  of  the 
normal  return  for  effort,  but  contrariwise  is  aided  by 
equitable  exchange  of  services ,  and  yet  much  may 
remain  to  be  achieved.  There  is  a  theoretically  possi- 
ble form  of  society,  purely  industrial  in  its  activities, 
which,  though  approaching  nearer  to  the  moral  ideal  in 
its  code  of  conduct  than  any  society  not  purely  indus- 
trial, does  not  fully  reach  it. 

For  while  industrialism  requires  the  life  of  each 
citizen  to  be  such  that  it  may  be  carried  on  without 
direct  or  indirect  aggressions  on  other  citizens,  it  does 
not  require  his  life  to  be  such  that  it  shall  directly 
further  the  lives  of  other  citizens.  It  is  not  a  necessary 
implication  of  industrialism,  as  thus  far  defined,  that 
each,  beyond  the  benefits  given  and  received  by  ex- 
change of  services,  shall  give  and  receive  other  benefits. 
A  society  is  conceivable  formed  of  men  leading  per- 
fectly inoffensive  lives,  scrupulously  fulfilling  their 
contracts,  and  efficiently  rearing  their  offspring,  who 
yet,  yielding  to  one  another  no  advantages  beyond  those 
agreed  upon,  fall  short  of  that  highest  degree  of  life 
which  the  gratuitous  rendering  of  services  makes  pos- 
sible. Daily  experiences  prove  that  every  one  would 
suffer  many  evils  and  lose  many  goods  did  none  give 
him  unpaid  assistance.  The  life  of  each  would  be  more 
or  less  damaged  had  he  to  meet  all  contingencies  single- 
handed,     Further,  if  no  one  did  for  his  fellows  any- 


180  TH  K  DA  /'.  1  OF  ETHICS. 

tiling  more  than  was  required  by  strict  performance  of 
contract,  private  interests  would  suffer  from  the  absence 
of  attention  to  public  interests.  The  limit  of  evolution 
of  conduct  is  consequently  not  reached,  until,  beyond 
avoidance  of  direct  and  indirect  injuries  to  others,  there 
are  spontaneous  efforts  to  further  the  welfare  of  others. 
It  may  be  shown  that  the  form  of  nature  which  thus 
to  justice  adds  beneficence,  is  one  which  adaption  to  the 
social  state  produces.  The  social  man  has  not  reached 
that  harmonization  of  constitution  with  conditions  form- 
ing the  limit  of  evolution,  so  long  as  there  remains 
.spate  for  the  growth  of  faculties  which,  by  their  ex- 
ercise, bring  positive  benefit  to  others  and  satisfaction 
to  self.  If  the  presence  of  fellow-men,  while  putting 
certain  limits  to  each  man's  sphere  of  activit}-,  opens 
certain  other  spheres  of  activity  in  which  feelings,  while 
achieving  their  gratifications,  do  not  diminish,  but  add 
to  the  gratifications  of  others,  then  such  spheres  will 
inevitably  be  occupied.  Recognition  of  this  truth  does 
not,  however,  call  on  us  to  qualify  greatly  that  concep- 
tion of  the  industrial  state  above  set  forth,  since  sym- 
pathy is  the  root  of  both  justice  and  beneficence. 

5.  Thus  the  sociological  view  of  Ethics  supple- 
ments the  physical,  the  biological,  and  the  psychological 
jlosing  those  conditions  under  which  only 

ited  activities  can  be  so  carried  on,  that  the  com- 
plete  living  of  each  consists  with,  and  conduces  to,  the 
complete  living  of  all. 

first    the  welfare  of  social  groups,  habitually  in 

•  >nism  with  other  such  groups,  takes   precedence 
of  individual  welfare  ;  and  the  rules  of  conduct  which 
athoritative  for  the  time  being,  involve  incomplete- 
ness of  individual  life  that  the  general  life  maybe  main- 


THE  SOCIOLOGICAL  VIEW.  181 

tainecl.     At  t lio  same  time  the  rules  have  to  enforce  the 

claims  of  individual  life  as  far  us  may  be,  since  on  the 
welfare  of  the  units  the  welfare  of  the  aggregate  largely 
depends. 

In  proportion  as  societies  endanger  one  another  less, 
the  need  for  subordinating  individual  lives  to  the  gen- 
eral life,  decreases  ;  and  with  approach  to  a' peaceful 
state,  the  general  life,  having  from  the  beginning  had 
furtherance  of  individual  lives  as  its  ultimate  purpose, 
comes  to  have  this  as  its  proximate  purpose. 

During  the  transitional  stages  there  are  necessitated 
successive  compromises  between  the  moral  code  which 
asserts  the  claims  of  the  society  versus  those  of  the  in- 
dividual, and  the  moral  code  which  asserts  the  claims 
of  the  inividual  versus  those  of  the  society.  And  evi- 
dently each  such  compromise,  though  for  the  time  being 
authoritative,  admits  of  no  consistent  or  definite  ex- 
pression. 

But  gradually  as  war  declines — gradually  as  the  com- 
pulsory co-operation  needful  in  dealing  with  external 
enemies  becomes  unnecessary,  and  leaves  behind  the 
voluntary  co-operation  which  effectually  achieves  in- 
ternal sustentation,  there  grows  increasingly  clear  the 
code  of  conduct  which  voluntary  co-operation  implies. 
And  this  final  permanent  code  alone  admits  of  being 
definitely  formulated,  and  so  constituting  ethics  as  a 
science  in  contrast  with  empirical  ethics. 

The  leading  traits  of  a  code,  under  which  complete 
living  through  voluntary  co-operation  is  secured,  may  be 
simply  stated.  The  fundamental  requirement  is  that 
the  life-sustaining  actions  of  each  shall  severally  bring 
him  the  amounts  and  kinds  of  advantage  naturally 
achieved  by  them,  and  this  implies  firstly  that  he  shall 


182  THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 

Buffer  no  direct  aggressions  on  his  person  or  propt-, ;  , 
and,  secondly,  that  lie  shall  suffer  no  indirect  aggres- 
sions by  breach  of  contract.  Observance  of  these  nega- 
tive conditions  to  voluntary  co-operation  having  facili- 
tated life  to  the  greatest  extent  by  exchange  of  services 
under  agreement,  life  is  to  be  further  facilitated  by  ex- 
change of  services  beyond  agreement:  the  highest  life 
being  reached  only  when,  besides  helping  to  complete 
one  another's  lives  by  specified  reciprocities  of  aid,  men 
otherwise  help  to  complete  one  another's  lives. 


CRITICISMS  AND  EXPLANATION 8.  183 


CHAPTER  IX. 

CRITICISMS  AND   EXPLANATIONS. 

§  56.  Comparisons  of  the  foregoing  chapters,  with 
one  another,  suggest  sundry  questions  which  must  be 
answered  partially,  if  not  completely,  before  anything 
can  be  done  toward  reducing  ethical  principles  from 
abstract  forms  to  concrete  forms. 

We  have  seen  that  to  admit  the  desirableness  of  con- 
scious existence  is  to  admit  that  conduct  should  be  such 
as  will  produce  a  consciousness  which  is  desirable — a 
consciousness  which  is  as  much  pleasurable  and  as  little 
painful  as  may  be.  We  have  also  seen  that  this  neces- 
sary implication  corresponds  with  the  a  priori  inference, 
that  the  evolution  of  life  has  been  made  possible  only 
by  the  establishment  of  connections  between  pleasures 
and  beneficial  actions,  and  between  pains  and  detrimental 
actions.  But  the  general  conclusion  reached  in  both  of 
these  ways,  though  it  covers  the  area  within  which  our 
special  conclusions  must  fall,  does  not  help  us  to  reach 
those  special  conclusions. 

Were  pleasures  all  of  one  kind,  differing  only  in  de- 
gree ;  were  pains  all  of  one  kind,  differing  only  in  de- 
gree ;  and  could  pleasures  be  measured  against  pains 
with  definite  results,  the  problems  of  conduct  would  be 
greatly  simplified.  Were  the  pleasures  and  pains  serv- 
ing as  incentives  and  deterrents,  simultaneously  present 
to  consciousness  with  like  vividness,  or  were  they  all 


1  -  [  THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 

immediately  impending,  or  were  they  all  equidistant  in 
time;  the  problems  would  be  further  simplified.  And 
they  would  be  still  further  simplified  if  the  pleasures 
and  pains  were  exclusively  those  of  the  actor.  But 
both  the  desirable  and  the  undesirable  feelings  are  of 
various  kinds,  making  quantitative  comparisons  difficult; 
some  are  present  and  some  are  future,  increasing  the 
difficulty  of  quantitative  comparison;  some  are  entailed 
on  self  and  some  are  entailed  on  others;  again  increasing 
the  difficulty.  So  that  the  guidance  yielded  by  the 
primary  principle  reached  is  of  little  service  unless  sup- 
plemented by  the  guidance  of  secondary  principles. 

Already,  in  recognizing  the  needful  subordination  of 
presentative  feelings  to  representative  feelings,  and  the 
implied  postponement  of  present  to  future  throughout  a 
wide  range  of  cases,  some  approach  toward  a  secondary 
principle  of  guidance  has  been  made.  Already,  too,  in 
recognizing  the  limitations  which  men's  associated  state 
puts  to  their  actions,  with  the  implied  need  for  restrain- 
ing feelings  of  some  kinds  by  feelings  of  other  kinds, 
we  have  come  in  sight  of  another  secondary  principle  of 
guidance.  Still,  there  remains  much  to  be  decided 
respecting  the  relative  claims  of  these  guiding  princi- 
ple, genera]  and  special. 

Some  elucidation  of  the  questions  involved  will  be 
obtained  by  here  discussing  certain  views  and  arguments 
set  forth  by  past  and  present  moralists. 

§  o7.  Using  the  name  hedonism  for  that  ethical 
theory  which  makes  happiness  the  end  of  action,  and 
distinguishing  hedonism  into  the  two  kinds, egoistic  and 
universalistic,  according  as  the  happiness  sought  is  that 
of  the   actor  himself,  or  is  that  of  all,  Mr.  Sidgwick 


CBITICISMS  AND  EXPLANATIONS.  185 

alleges  its  implied  belief  to  be  that  pleasures  and  pains 
are  commensurable.  In  his  criticism  on  (empirical) 
egoistic  hedonism  he  says  : 

"The  fundamental  assumption  of  Hedonism,  clearly  stated,  is 
that  all  feelings  considered  merely  as  feelings  can  be  arranged  in 
a  certain  scale  of  desirability,  so  that  the  desirability  or  pleasant- 
ness of  each  hears  a  definite  ratio  to  that  of  all  the  others." — Meth- 
ods of  Ethics,  2d  ed.  p.  115. 

And  asserting  this  to  be  its  assumption  he  proceeds 
to  point  out  difficulties  in  the  way  of  the  hedonistic 
calculation ;  apparently  for  the  purpose  of  implying 
that  these  difficulties  tell  against  the  hedonistic  theory. 

Now,  though  it  may  be  shown  that  by  naming  the 
intensity,  the  duration,  the  certainty,  and  the  proxim- 
ity, of  a  pleasure  or  a  pain,  as  traits  entering  into  the 
estimation  of  its  relative  value,  Bentham  has  com- 
mitted himself  to  the  specified  assumption  ;  and,  though, 
it  is,  perhaps,  reasonably  taken  for  granted  that 
hedonism,  as  represented  by  him,  is  identical  with 
hedonism  at  large  ;  yet  it  seems  to  me  that  the  hedon- 
ist, empirical  or  other,  is  not  necessarily  committed  to 
this  assumption.  That  the  greatest  surplus  of  pleasures 
over  pains  ought  to  be  the  end  of  action  is  a  belief 
which  he  may  still  consistently  hold  after  admitting 
that  the  valuations  of  pleasures  and  pains  are  com- 
monly vague  and  often  erroneous.  He  may  say  th;it 
though  indefinite  things  do  not  admit  of  definite 
measurements,  yet  approximately  true  estimates  of 
their  relative  values  may  be  made  when  they  differ  con- 
siderably, and  he  may  further  say,  that  even  when  their 
relative  values  are  not  determinable,  it  remains  true 
that  the  most  valuable  should  be  chosen.  Let  us  listen 
to  him. 


1SG  THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 

'•  A  debtor  who  cannot  pay  me  offers  to  compound  for 
his  debt  by  making  over  one  of  sundry  things  he  pos- 
— a  diamond  ornament,' a  silver  vase,  a  picture,  a 
carriage.  Other  questions  being  set  aside  I  assert  it  to 
he  my  pecuniary  interest  to  choose  the  most  valuable  of 
these,  but  I  cannot  say  which  is  the  most  valuable. 
Does  the  proposition  that  it  is  my  pecuniary  interest  to 
choose  the  most  valuable,  therefore,  become  doubtful? 
Musi  I  not  choose  as  well  as  lean,  and  if  I  choose  wrongly 
must  I  give  up  my  ground  of  choice  ?  Must  I  infer 
that  in  matters  of  business  I  may  not  act  on  the  principle 
that,  other  tilings  equal,  the  more  profitable  transaction 
is  to  be  preferred,  because,  in  many  cases,  I  cannot  say 
which  is  the  more  profitable,  and  have  often  chosen  the 
less  profitable?  Because  I  believe  that  of  many  danger- 
ous courses  I  ought  to  take  the  least  dangerous,  do  I 
make  k  the  fundamental  assumption  '  that  courses  can  be 
arranged  according  to  a  scale  of  dangerousness,  and 
must  I  abandon  my  belief  if  I  cannot  so  arrange  them? 
if  I  am  not  by  consistency  bound  to  do  this,  then  I  am 
no  more  by  consistency  bound  to  give  up  the  principle 
that  the  greatest  surplus  of  pleasures  over  pains  should 
be  the  end  of  action,  because  the  '  commensurability  of 
pleasures  and  pains'  cannot  be  asserted." 

At  the  close  of  his  chapters  on  empirical  hedonism, 
Mi.  Sidgwick  himself  says  he  docs  "not  think  that  the 
common  experience  of  mankind,  impartially  examined, 
really  sustains  the  view  that  Egoistic  Hedonism  is  neces- 
sarily suicidal  ;  "  adding,  however,  that  the  "uncertainty 
of  hedonistic  calculation  cannot  be  denied  to  have 
weight."  But  here  the  fundamental  assumption 
of  hedonism,  that  happiness  is  the  end  of  action,  is  still 
supposed  to  involve  the  assumption  that  "feelings  can 


CRITICISMS  AN  I)  EXPLANATIONS.  187 

be  arranged  in  a  certain  scale  of  desirability."  This  we 
have  seen  it  does  not :  its  fundamental  assumption  is  in 
no  degree  invalidated  by  proof  that  such  arrangement 
of  them  is  impracticable. 

To  Mr.  Sidsrwick's  argument  there  is  the  further  ob- 
jection,  no  less  serious,  that  to  whatever  degree  it  tells 
against  egoistic  hedonism,  it  tells  in  a  greater  degree 
against  universalistic  hedonism,  or  utilitarianism.  He 
admits  that  it  tells  as  much;  saying  "whatever  weight 
is  to  be  attached  to  the  objections  brought  against  this 
assumption  [the  commensurability  of  pleasures  and 
pains]  must  of  course  tell  against  the  present  method." 
Not  only  does  it  tell,  but  it  tells  in  a  double  way.  I  do 
not  mean  merely  that,  as  he  points  out,  the  assumption 
becomes  greatly  complicated  if  we  take  all  sentient  be- 
ings into  account,  and  if  we  include  posterity  along  with 
existing  individuals.  I  mean  that,  taking  as  the  end  to 
be  achieved  the  greatest  happiness  of  the  existing  in- 
dividuals forming  a  single  community,  the  set  of  diffi- 
culties standing  in  the  way  of  egoistic  hedonism,  is  com- 
pounded with  another  set  of  difficulties  no  less  great, 
when  we  pass  from  it  to  universalistic  hedonism.  For 
if  the  dictates  of  universalistic  hedonism  are  to  be  ful- 
filled, it  must  be  under  the  guidance  of  individual  judg- 
ments, or  of  corporate  judgments,  or  of  both.  Now  any 
one  of  such  judgments  issuing  from  a  single  mind,  or 
from  any  aggregate  of  minds,  necessarily  embodies  con- 
clusions respecting  the  happiness  of  other  persons  ;  few 
of  them  known,  and  the  great  mass  never  seen.  All 
these  persons  have  natures  differing  in  countless  ways 
and  degrees  from  the  natures  of  those  who  form  the 
judgments;  and  the  happiness  of  which  they  are  sever- 
ally capable  differ  from  one  another,  and  differ  from  the 


1  vs  THE  DATA  OF  ETUICS. 

happinesses  of  those  who  form  the  judgments.  Conse- 
quently, if  against  the  method  of  egoistic  hedonism  there 
is  the  objection  that  a  man's  own  pleasures  and  pains, 
unlike  in  their  kinds,  intensities,  and  times  of  occurrence, 
are  incommensurable  ;  then  against  the  method  of  uni- 
versalistic  hedonism  it  may  be  urged  that  to  the  incom- 
mensurability of  each  judge's  own  pleasures  and  pains 
(which  he  must  use  as  standards)  has  now  to  be  added 
the  much  more  decided  incommensurability  of  the  pleas- 
ures and  pains  which  he  conceives  to  be  experienced  by 
innumerable  other  persons,  all  differently  constituted 
from  himself  and  from  one  another. 

Nay  more — there  is  a  triple  set  of  difficulties  in  the 
way  of  universalistic  hedonism.  To  the  double  inde- 
terminateness  of  the  end  has  to  be  added  the  indeter- 
minateness  of  the  means.  If  hedonism,  egoistic  or  uni- 
versalistic, is  to  pass  from  dead  theory  into  living 
practice,  acts  of  one  or  other  kind  must  be  decided  on 
to  achieve  proposed  objects ;  and  in  estimating  the  two 
methods  we  have  to  consider  how  far  the  fitness  of  the 
acts  respectively  required  can  be  judged.  If,  in  pur- 
suing his  own  ends,  the  individual  is  liable  to  be  led  by 
erroneous  opinions  to  adjust  his  acts  wrongly,  much 
more  liable  is  he.  to  be  led  by  erroneous  opinions  to 
adjust  wrongly  more  complex  acts  to  the  more  complex 
ends  constituted  by  other  men's  welfares.  It  is  so  if  he 
operates  singly  to  benefit  a  few  others;  and  it  is  still 
more  so  if  lie  co-operates  with  many  to  benefit  all. 
Abiking  general  happiness  the  immediate  object  of  pur- 
suit, Implies  numerous  and  complicated  instrumental- 
itii-s  officered  by  thousands  of  unseen  and  unlike  per- 
sons,  and  working  on  millions  of  other  persons  unseen 
and   unlike.     Even   the   few   factors   in  this  immense 


CRTTICT*VK  AND  EXPLANATIONS.  189 

aggregate  of  appliances  and  processes  which  are  known, 
are  very  imperfectly  known,  and  the  great  mass  of 
them  are  unknown.  So  that  even  supposing  valua- 
tion of  pleasures  and  pains  for  the  community  at  large 
is  more  practicable  than,  or  even  as  practicable  as,  valua- 
tion of  his  own  pleasures  and  pains  by  the  individual ; 
yet  the  ruling  of  conduct  with  a  view  to  the  one  end  is 
far  more  difficult  than  the  ruling  of  it  with  a  view  to 
the  other.  Hence,  if  the  method  of  egoistic  hedonism 
is  unsatisfactor}',  far  more  unsatisfactory  for  the  same 
and  kindled  reasons,  is  the  method  of  universalLstic 
hedonism,  or  utilitarianism. 

And  here  we  come  in  sight  of  the  conclusion  which 
it  has  been  the  purpose  of  the  foregoing  criticism  to 
bring  into  view.  The  objection  made  to  the  hedonistic 
method  contains  a  truth,  but  includes  with  it  an  un- 
truth. For  while  the  proposition  that  happiness, 
whether  individual  or  general,  is  the  end  of  action,  is 
not  invalidated  by  proof  that  it  cannot  under  either 
form  be  estimated  by  measurement  of  its  components ; 
yet  it  may  be  admitted  that  guidance  in  the  pursuit  of 
happiness  by  a  mere  balancing  of  pleasures  and  pains, 
is,  if  partially  practicable  throughout  a  certain  range  of 
conduct,  futile  throughout  a  much  wider  range.  It  is 
quite  consistent  to  assert  that  happiness  is  the  ultimate 
aim  of  action,  and  at  the  same  time  to  deny  that  it  can 
be  reached  by  making  it  the  immediate  aim.  I  go  with 
Air.  Sidgwick  as  far  as  the  conclusion  that  "we  must  at 
least  admit  the  desirability  of  confirming  or  correcting 
the  results  of  such  comparisons  [of  pleasures  and  pains] 
by  any  other  method  upon  which  we  may  find  reason 
to  rely  ; "  and  then  I  go  further,  and  say  that  through- 
out a  large  part  of  conduct  guidance  by  such  compari- 


190  TIIE  DA  TA  OF  ETHICS. 

sons  is  to  be   entirely  set  aside  and  replaced  by  other 

guidance. 

§  58.  The  antithesis  here  insisted  upon  between  the 
hedonistic  end  considered  in  the  abstract,  and  the  method 
which  current  hedonism,  whether  egoistic  or  universal- 
istic,  associates  with  that  end;  and  the  joining  accept- 
ance of  the  one  with  rejection  of  the  other ;  commits  us 
to  an  overt  discussion  of  the  two  cardinal  elements  of 
ethical  t  1km >ry.  I  may  conveniently  initiate  this  discus- 
sion by  criticising  another  of  Mr.  Sidgwick's  criticisms 
on  the  method  of  hedonism. 

Though  Ave  can  give  no  account  of  those  simple  pleas- 
ures which  the  senses  yield,  because  they  are  undecom- 
posable,  yet  we  distinctly  know  their  characters  as  states 
of  consciousness.  Conversely,  the  complex  pleasures 
formed  by  compounding  and  re-compounding  the  ideas 
of  simple  pleasures,  though  theoretically  resolvable  into 
their  components,  are  not  easy  to  resolve;  and  in  pro- 
portion as  they  are  heterogeneous  in  composition  the 
difficulty  of  framing  intelligible  conceptions  of  them  in- 
creases.  This  is  especially  the  case  with  the  pleasures 
which  accompany  our  sports.  Treating  of  these,  along 
with  tin-  pleasures  of  pursuit  in  general,  for  the  purpose 
of  showing  thai  k-  in  order  to  get  them  one  must  forget 
them,"  Mr.  Sidgwick remarks : 

••  A  mas  who  maintains  throughout  an  epicurean  mood,  fixing 
In-  aim  on  his  own  pleasure,  does  not  catch  the  full  spirit  of  the 
chase;  his<  never  gets  just  the  sharpness  of  edge  which 

imparts  to  the  pi  •       t  and  flavor.     Here  comes  into 

view  what  we  ma;  <••.:!]  the  fundamental  paradox  of  Hedonism, 
that  the  impulse  toward  pleasure,  if  too  predominant,  defeats  its 
own  aim.  This  effect  i->  not  risible,  or  al  any  rate  is  scarcely  visi- 
ble, in  the  case  of  passive  sensual  pleasures.    But  of  our  active  en- 


CRITICISMS  AND  EXPLANATIONS.  101 

joyments  generally,  whether  the  activities  on  which  they  attend 

an-  classed  as  '  bodily '  or  as  '  intellectual '  (as  well  as  of  many 
emotional  pleasures),  it  may  certainly  be  said  that  we  cannot  at- 
tain them,  at  least  in  their  best  form,  so  long  as  we  concentrate 
our  aim  on  them." — Methods  of  Ethics.  2d  ed.  p.  41. 

Now  I  think  wo  shall  not  regard  this  truth  as  para- 
doxical after  we  have  duly  analyzed  the  pleasure  of  pur- 
suit. The  chief  components  of  this  pleasure  are :  First, 
a  renewed  consciousness  of  personal  efficiency  (made 
vivid  by  actual  success  and  partially  excited  by  impend- 
ing success)  which  consciousness  of  personal  efficiency, 
connected  in  experience  with  achieved  ends  of  every 
kind,  arouses  a  vague  but  massive  consciousness  of  re- 
sulting gratifications ;  and  second,  a  representation  of 
the  applause  which  recognition  of  this  efficiency  by 
others  has  before  brought,  and  will  again  bring.  Games 
of  skill  show  us  this  clearly.  Considered  as  an  end  in 
itself,  the  good  cannon  which  a  billiard  player  makes 
yields  no  pleasure.  Whence,  then,  does  the  pleasure 
of  making  it  arise  ?  Partly  from  the  fresh  proof  of 
capability  which  the  player  gives  to  himself,  and  partly 
from  the  imagined  admiration  of  those  who  witness  the 
proof  of  his  capability:  the  last  being  the  chief,  since 
he  soon  tires  of  making  cannons  in  the  absence  of 
witnesses.  When  from  games  which,  yielding  the 
pleasures  of  success,  yield  no  pleasure  derived  from  the 
end  considered  intrinsically,  we  pass  to  sports  in  which 
the  end  has  intrinsic  value  as  a  source  of  pleasure,  we 
see  substantially  the  same  thing.  Though  the  bird 
which  the  sportsman  brings  down  is  useful  as  food,  yet 
his  satisfaction  arises  mainly  from  having  made  a  good 
shot,  and  from  having  added  to  the  bag  which  will 
presently  bring  praise  of  his  skill.     The  gratification  of 


192  THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 

self-esteem  he  immediately  experiences ;  and  the  grati- 
fication of  receiving  applause  he  experiences,  if  not  im- 
mediately and  in  full  degree,  yet  by  representation;  for 
the  ideal  pleasure  is  nothing  else  than  a  faint  revival  of 
the  real  pleasure.  These  two  kinds  of  agreeable  excite- 
ment present  in  the  sportsman  during  the  chase  consti- 
tute the  mass  of  the  desires  stimulating  him  to  continue 
it  ;  for  all  desires  are  nascent  forms  of  the  feelings  to  be 
obtained  by  the  efforts  they  prompt.  And  though  while 
seeking  more  birds  these  representative  feelings  are  not 
so  vividly  excited  as  by  success  just  achieved,  yet  they 
are  excited  by  imaginations  of  further  successes  ;  and  so 
make  enjoyable  the  activities  constituting  the  pursuit. 
Recognizing,  then,  the  truth  that  the  pleasures  of 
pursuit  are  much  more  those  derived  from  the  efficient 
use  of  means  than  those  derived  from  the  end  itself,  we 
see  that  "  the  fundamental  paradox  of  hedonism  "  dis- 
appears. 

These  remarks  concerning  ends  and  means,  and  the 
pleasure  accompanying  use  of  the  means  as  added  to  the 
pleasure  derived  from  the  end,  I  have  made  for  the  pur- 
pose of  drawing  attention  to  a  fact  of  profound  signif- 
icance. During  evolution  there  has  been  a  superposing 
of  new  and  more  complex  sets  of  means  upon  older 
and  simpler  sets  of  means,  and  a  superposing  of  the 
pleasures  accompanying  the  uses  of  these  successive  sets 
of  means,  with  the  result  that  each  of  these  pleasures 
;^elf  eventually  become  an  end.  We  begin  with  a 
simple  animal  which,  without  ancillary  appliances,  swal- 
srach  food  as  accident  brings  in  its  way;  and  so,  as 
we  may  assume,  stills  some  kind  of  craving.  Here  we 
have  the  primary  end  of  nutrition  with  its  accompany- 
ing satisfaction,   in   their  simple   forms.     We  pass   to 


Criticisms  .1  VD  i:\rLA\ATIONS.  10.1 

higher  types  having  jaws  for  seizing  and  "biting — jaws 
which  thus,  by  their  actions,  facilitate  achievement  of 
the  primary  end.  On  observing  animals  furnished  with 
these  organs,  we  get  evidence  that  the  use  of  them  be- 
comes in  itself  pleasurable  irrespective  of  the  end: 
instance  a  squirrel  which,  apart  from  food  to  be  so  ob- 
tained, delights  in  nibbling  everything  it  gets  hold  of. 
Turning  from  jaws  to  limbs  we  see  that  these,  serving 
some  creatures  for  pursuit  and  others  for  escape,  simi- 
larly yield  gratification  by  their  exercise  ;  as  in  lambs 
which  skip  and  horses  which  prance.  How  the  com- 
bined use  of  limbs  and  jaws,  originally  subserving  the 
satisfaction  of  appetite,  grows  to  be  in  itself  pleasur- 
able, is  daily  illustrated  in  the  playing  of  dogs.  For 
that  throwing  down  and  worrying  which,  when  prey  is 
caught,  precedes  eating,  is,  in  their  mimic  fights,  carried 
b}'  each  as  far  as  he  dares.  Coming  to  means  still  more 
remote  from  the  end,  namely,  those  by  which  creatures 
chased  are  caught,  Ave  are  again  shown  by  dogs  that 
when  no  creature  is  caught  there  is  still  a  gratification 
in  the  act  of  catching.  The  eagerness  with  which  a 
dog  runs  after  stones,  or  dances  and  barks  in  anticipa- 
tion of  jumping  into  the  water  after  a  stick,  proves  that 
apart  from  the  satisfaction  of  appetite,  and  apart  even 
from  the  satisfaction  of  killing  prey,  there  is  a  satis- 
faction in  the  successful  pursuit  of  a  moving  object. 
Throughout,  then,  we  see  that  the  pleasure  attendant 
on  the  use  of  means  to  achieve  an  end,  itself  becomes  an 
end. 

Now  if  we  contemplate  these  as  phenomena  of  conduct 
in  general,  some  facts  worthy  of  note  may  be  discerned 
— facts  which,  if  we  appreciate  their  significance,  will 

aid  us  in  developing  our  ethical  conceptions. 
13 


194  TEE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 

One  of  them  is  that  among  the  successive  sets  of 
means,  the  later  are  the  more  remote  from  the  primary 
end  ;  are,  as  co-ordinating  earlier  and  simpler  means,  the 
more  complex ;  and  are  accompanied  by  feelings  which 
are  more  representative. 

Another  fact  is  that  each  set  of  means,  with  its  accom- 
panying satisfactions,  eventually  becomes  in  its  turn 
dependent  on  one  originating  later  than  itself.  Before 
the  gullet  swallows,  the  jaws  must  lay  hold;  before  the 
jaws  tear  out  and  bring  within  the  grasp  of  the  gullet  a 
piece  fit  for  swallowing,  there  must  be  that  co-operation 
of  limbs  and  senses  required  for  killing  the  prey  ;  before 
this  co-operation  can  take  place,  there  needs  the  much 
longer  co-operation  constituting  the  chase ;  and  even 
before  this  there  must  be  persisted  activities  of  limbs, 
eyes,  and  nose  in  seeking  prey.  The  pleasure  attending 
each  set  of  acts,  while  making  possible  the  pleasure  at- 
tending the  set  of  acts  which  follows,  is  joined  with  a 
representation  of  this  subsequent  set  of  acts  and  its 
pleasure,  and  of  the  others  which  succeed  in  order  ;  so 
that  along  with  the  feelings  accompanying  the  search 
for  prey,  are  partially  aroused  the  feelings  accompanying 
the  actual  chase,  the  actual  destruction,  the  actual  de- 
vouring, and  the  eventual  satisfaction  of  appetite. 

A  third  fact  is  that  the  use  of  each  set  of  means  in 
due  order,  constitutes  an  obligation.  Maintenance  of 
its  lift,-  being  regarded  as  an  end  of  its  conduct,  the 
creature  is  obliged  to  use  in  succession  the  means  of 
finding  prey,  the  means  of  catching  prey,  the  means  of 
killing  prey,  the  means  of  devouring  prey. 

Lastly,  it  follows  that  though  the  assuaging  of  hunger, 
directly  associated  with  sustentation,  remains  to  the  last 
the  ultimate  end  ;  yet  tho  successful  use  of  each  set  of 


CBFTICISMS  AND  EXPLANATIONS.  195 

means  in  its  turn  is  the  proximate  end — the  end  which 
takes  temporary  precedence  in  authoritativene 

§  59.  The  relations  between  means  and  ends  thus 
traced  throughout  the  earlier  stages  of  evolving  conduct, 
are  traceable  throughout  later  stages  and  hold  true  of 
human  conduct,  up  even  to  its  highest  forms.  As  fast 
as,  for  the  better  maintenance  of  life,  the  simpler  sets  of 
means  and  the  pleasures  accompanying  the  uses  of  them, 
come  to  be  supplemented  by  the  more  complex  sets  of 
means  and  their  pleasures,  these  begin  to  take  precedence 
in  time  and  in  imperativeness.  To  use  effectually  each 
more  complex  set  of  means  becomes  the  proximate  end, 
and  the  accompanying  feeling  becomes  the  immediate 
gratification  sought;  though  there  maybe  and  habitually 
is,  an  associated  consciousness  of  the  remoter  ends  and 
remoter  gratifications  to  be  obtained.  An  example  will 
make  clear  the  parallelism. 

Absorbed  in  his  business  the  trader,  if  asked  what  is 
his  main  end.  will  say — making  money.  He  readily 
grants  that  achievement  of  this  end  is  desired  by  him 
in  furtherance  of  ends  beyond  it.  He  knows  that  in 
directly  seeking  money  he  is  indirectly  seeking  food, 
clothes,  house-room,  and  the  comforts  of  life  for  self 
and  family.  But  while  admitting  that  money  is  but  a 
means  to  these  ends,  he  urges  that  the  money-getting 
actions  precede  in  order  of  time  and  obligation,  the 
various  actions  and  concomitant  pleasures  subserved 
by  them ;  and  he  testifies  to  the  fact  that  making 
money  has  become  itself  an  end,  and  success  in  it  a 
source  of  satisfaction,  apart  from  these  more  distant 
ends. 

Again,  on  observing  more  closely  the  trader's  pro- 


196  THE  DATA  OF  ETFLICS. 

ceedings,  we  find  that  though  to  the  end  of  living  com 
fortably  he  gets  money,  and  though  to  the  end  of  get- 
ting money  he  buj-s  and  sells  at  a  profit,  which  so 
becomes  a  means  more  immediately  pursued,  yet  he  is 
chiefly  occupied  with  means  still  more  remote  from 
ultimate  ends,  and  in  relation  to  which  even  the  selling 
at  a  profit  becomes  an  end.  For  leaving  to  subordinates 
the  actual  measuring  out  of  goods  and  receiving  of  pro- 
ceeds, he  busies  himself  mainly  with  his  general  affairs — 
inquiries  concerning  markets,  judgments  of  future  prices, 
calculations,  negotiations,  correspondence  :  the  anxiety 
from  hour  to  hour  being  to  do  well  each  one  of  these 
things  indirectly  conducive  to  the  making  of  profits. 
And  these  ends  precede  in  time  and  obligation  the 
effecting  of  profitable  sales,  just  as  the  effecting  of  profit- 
able sales  precedes  the  end  of  money-making,  and  just 
as  the  end  of  money-making  precedes  the  end  of  satis- 
factory living. 

His    bookkeeping  best  exemplifies    the    principle  at 
large.     Entries  to  the  debtor  or  creditor  sides  are  being 
made  all  through  the  day  ;  the  items  are  classified  and 
arranged  in  such  way  that  at  a  moment's  notice  the 
state  of  each  account  may  be  ascertained;  and  then, 
from  time  to  time,  the  books  are  balanced,  and  it  is 
required  that  the  results  shall  come  right  to  a  penny  : 
iction   following   proved    correctness   and    annoy- 
being  caused  by  error.     If  you  ask  why  all  this 
elaborate  process,  so  remote  from  the  actual  getting  of 
money,  and  still   more  remote  from  the  enjoyments  of 
life,   the   answer  is   that  keeping  accounts  correctly  is 
fulfilling  a  condition  t<>  the  end  of  money-making,  and 
in   itself  a  proximate   end — a  duty  to   be   dis- 
charged, that  there  may  be  discharged  the  duty  of  get> 


CttttlClBitB  AM)   L.\  /'LAXATIONS.  19? 

ting  an  income,  that  there  ma}*  he  discharged  the  duty 
of  maintaining  self,  wife  and  children. 

Approaching  as  we  here  do  to  moral  obligation,  are 
we  not  shown  its  relations  to  conduct  at  large  ?  Is  it 
not  clear  that  observance  of  moral  principles  is  fulfill- 
ment of  certain  general  conditions  to  the  successful 
carrying  on  of  special  activities  ?  That  the  trader  may 
prosper,  he  must  not  only  keep  his  books  correctly,  but 
must  pay  those  he  employs  according  to  agreement,  and 
must  meet  his  engagements  with  creditors.  May  we 
not  say,  then,  that  conformity  to  the  second  and  third 
of  these  requirements  is,  like  conformity  to  the  first,  an 
indirect  means  to  effectual  use  of  the  more  direct  means 
of  achieving  welfare  ?  May  we  not  say,  too,  that  as  the 
use  of  each  more  indirect  means  in  due  order  becomes 
itself  an  end,  and  a  source  of  gratification ;  so,  event- 
ually, becomes  the  use  of  this  most  indirect  means  ? 
And  may  we  not  infer  that  thou  di  conformity  to  moral 
requirements  precedes  in  imperativeness  conformity  to 
other  requirements  ;  )ret  that  this  imperativeness  arises 
from  the  fact  that  fulfillment  of  the  other  requirements, 
by  self  or  others,  or  both,  is  thus  furthered  ? 

§  GO.  This  question  brings  us  round  to  another  side 
of  the  issue  before  raised.  When  alleging  that  empir- 
ical utilitarianism  is  but  introductory  to  rational  utili- 
tarianism, I  pointed  out  that  the  last  does  not  take 
welfare  for  its  immediate  object  of  pursuit,  but  takes 
for  its  immediate  object  of  pursuit  conformity  to  certain 
principles  which,  in  the  nature  of  things,  casually  deter- 
mine welfare.  And  now  we  see  that  this  amounts  to 
recognition  of  that  law,  traceable  throughout  the  evolu- 
tion of  conduct  in  general,  that  each  later  and  higher 


198  THE  DATA  OF  ETIIICS. 

order  of  means  takes  precedence  in  time  and  authorita- 
tiveness  of  each  earlier  and  lower  order  of  means.  The 
contrast  between  the  ethical  methods  thus  distinguished, 
made  tolerably  clear  by  the  above  illustrations,  will  be 
made  still  clearer  by  contemplating  the  two  as  put  in 
opposition  by  the  leading  exponent  of  empirical  utili- 
tarianism.   Treating  of  legislative  aims,  Bentham  writes  : 

"  But  justice,  what  is  it  that  we  are  to  understand  by  justice  : 
and  why  not  happiness  but  justice  ?  What  happiness  is,  every 
man  knows,  because,  what  pleasure  is,  every  man  knows,  and 
what  pain  is,  every  man  knows.  But  what  justice  is — this  is  what 
on  every  occasion  is  the  subject-matter  of  dispute.  Be  the  mean- 
ing of  the  word  justice  what  it  will  what  regard  is  it  entitled  to 
otherwise  than  as  a  means  of  happiness."  * 

Let  us  first  consider  the  assertion  here  made  respect- 
ing the  relative  intelligibilities  of  these  two  ends,  and 
let  us  afterward  consider  what  is  implied  by  the  choice 
of  happiness  instead  of  justice. 

Bentham's  positive  assertion  that,  "  what  happiness  is 
every  man  knows,  because,  what  pleasure  is,  every  man 
knows,''  is  met  by  counter-assertions  equally  positive. 
"Who  can  tell,"  asks  Plato,  "what  pleasure  really  is, 
or  know  it  in  its  essence,  except  the  philosopher,  who 
alone  is  conversant  with  realities."!  Aristotle,  too, 
after  commenting  on  the  different  opinions  held  by  the 
vulgar,  by  the  political,  by  the  contemplative,  says  of 
happiness  that,  "to  some  it  seems  to  be  virtue,  to  others 
prudence,  and  to  others  a  kind  of  wisdom  :  to  some 
again,  these,  or  some  one  of  these,  with  pleasure,  or  at 
least,  not  without  pleasure  ;  others  again   include  ex- 

*  Constitutional  (  ode,  chap,  xvi,  Supremo  Legislative — Section 
vi,  Omnicompt  U 
f  Rejjublic,  Bk.  bu 


CBITJCI8M8  AND  EXPLANATIONS.  109 

ternal  prosperity."*  And  Aristotle,  like  Plato,  comes 
to  the  remarkable  conclusion  that  the  pleasures  of  the 
intellect,  reached  by  the  contemplative  life,  constitute 
the  highest  happiness  !  f 

How  disagreements  concerning  the  nature  of  happiness 
and  the  relative  values  of  pleasures,  thus  exhibited  in 
ancient  times,  continue  down  to  modern  times,  is  shown 
by  Mr.  Sidgwick's  discussion  of  egoistic  hedonism, 
above  commented  upon.  Further,  as  was  pointed  out 
before,  the  indefiniteness  attending  the  estimations  of 
pleasures  and  pains,  which  stands  in  the  way  of  egoistic 
hedonism  as  ordinarily  conceived,  is  immensely  in- 
creased on  passing  to  universalistic  hedonism  as  ordi- 
narily conceived ;  since  its  theory  implies  that  the 
imagined  pleasures  and  pains  of  others  are  to  be  esti- 
mated  by  the  help  of  these  pleasures  and  pains  of  self 
already  so  difficult  to  estimate.  And  that  any  one  after 
observing  the  various  pursuits  into  which  some  eagerly 
enter,  but  which  others  shun,  and  after  listening  to  the 
different  opinions  concerning  the  likeableness  of  this  or 
that  occupation  or  amusement,  expressed  at  every  table, 
should  assert  that  the  nature  of  happiness  can  be  fully 
agreed  upon,  so  as  to  render  it  a  fit  end  for  direct  legis- 
lative action,  is  surprising. 

The  accompanying  proposition  that  justice  is  unin- 
telligible as  an  end  is  no  less  surprising.  Though  prim- 
itive men  have  no  words  for  either  happiness  or  justice, 
yet  even  among  them  an  approach  to  the  conception  of 
justice  is  traceable.  The  law  of  retaliation,  requiring 
that  a  death  inflicted  b}T  one  tribe  on  another,  shall  be 
balanced  by  the  death  either  of  the  murderer  or  some 

*  Xicomaelican  Ethics,  Bk.  i.  chap.  8.  f  Bk.  x.  chap.  7. 


200  TUE  DATA   OF  XTIITCS. 

member  ofhis  tribe,  shows  us  in  a  vague  shape  that  notion 
of  equalness  of  treatment  which  forms  an  essential  ele- 
ment in  it. 

When  we  come  to  early  races  who  have  given  their 
thoughts  and  feelings  literary  form  we  find  this  con- 
ception  of  justice,  as  involving  equalness  of  action,  be- 
coming distinct.  Among  the  Jews,  David  expressed  in 
words  this  association  of  ideas  when,  praying  to  God  to 
"  hear  the  right,"  he  said,  "Let  my  sentence  come  forth 
from  thy  presence  ;  let  thine  eyes  behold  the  things  that 
are  equal ;  "  as  also,  among  early  Christians,  did  Paul 
when  to  the  Colossians  he  wrote,  "  Masters,  give  unto 
your  servants  that  which  is  just  and  equal."  Comment- 
ing on  the  different  meanings  of  justice,  Aristotle  con- 
cludes that  "  the  just  will,  therefore  be  the  lawful  and 
the  equal,  and  the  unjust  the  unlawful  and  the  unequal. 
But  since  the  unjust  man  is  also  one  who  takes  more 
than  his  share,"  etc.  And  that  justice  was  similarly 
conceived  by  the  Romans  they  proved  by  including 
under  it  such  meanings  as  exact,  proportionate,  impartial, 
severally  implying  fairness  of  division,  and  still  better 
by  identification  of  it  with  equity,  which  is  a  derivative 
of  ceqwm:  tin;  word  cpquu*  itself  having  for  one  of  its 
meanings  just  or  impartial. 

This  coincidence  of  view  among  ancient  peoples  re- 
Bpecting  the  oature  of  justice,  has  extended  to  modern 
peoples  :  who  by  a  general  agreement  in  certain  cardi- 
nal principles  which  their  systems  of  law  embody,  for- 
bidding direcl  aggressions,  which  are  forms  of  unequal 
action-,  and  forbidding  indirect  aggressions  by  breaches 
of  contract,  which  are  other  forms  of  unequal  actions, 
one  and  all  show  us  the  identification  of  justice  with 
equalness.     Bentham,  then,  is  wrong   when  he  says — - 


CBITICIBM8  AND  EA'l'L  ANA  TIONS.  20 1 

"But  what  justice  is — this  is  what  on  every  occasion  is 
tin- subject-matter  of  dispute."'  He  is  more  wrong,  in- 
deed, than  has  thus  far  appeared.  For,  in  the  first 
place,  he  misrepresents  utterly  by  ignoring  the  fact  in 
ninety-nine  out  of  every  hundred  daily  transactions 
between  men,  no  dispute  about  justice  arises  ;  but  the 
business  done  is  recognized  on  both  sides  as  justly  done. 
And  in  the  second  place  if,  with  respect  to  the  hun- 
dredth transaction  there  is  a  dispute,  the  subject  matter 
of  it  is  not  "what  justice  is,"  for  it  is  admitted  to  be 
equity  or  equalness;  but  the  subject  matter  of  dispute 
always  is  what,  under  these  particular  circumstances, 
constitutes  equalness? — a    widely  different  question. 

It  is  not  then  self-evident,  as  Bentham  alleges,  that 
happiness  is  an  intelligible  end  while  justice  is  not;  but 
contrariwise  examination  makes  evident  the  greater  in- 
telligibility of  justice  as  an  end.  And  analysis  shows 
why  it  is  more  intelligible.  For  justice,  or  equity,  or 
equalness,  is  concerned  exclusivel}-  with  quantity  under 
stated  conditions;  whereas  happiness  is  concerned  with 
both  quantity  and  qualify  under  conditions  not  stated. 
When,  as  in  case  of  theft,  a  benefit  is  taken  while  no 
equivalent  benefit  is  yielded — -when,  as  in  case  of  adul- 
terated goods  bought  or  base  coin  paid,  that  which  is 
agreed  to  be  given  in  exchange  as  of  equal  value  is  not 
given,  but  something  of  less  value — when,  as  in  case  of 
broken  contract,  the  obligation  on  one  side  has  been  dis- 
charged while  there  has  been  no  discharge,  or  in- 
complete discharge,  of  the  obligation  on  the  other;  we 
see  that,  the  circumstances  being  specified,  the  injustice 
complained  of  refers  to  the  relative  amounts  of  actions, 
or  products,  or  benefits,  the  natures  of  which  are  recog- 
nized only  so  far  as  is  needful    for  saying   whether   as 


202  THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 

much  has  been  given,  or  done,  or  allowed,  by  each  con- 
cerned, as  was  implied  by  tacit  or  overt  understanding 
to  be  an  equivalent.  But  when  the  end  proposed  is  hap- 
piness, thr  circumstances  remaining  unspecified,  the  prob- 
lem is  that  of  estimating  both  quantities  and  qualities, 
unhelped  by  any  such  definite  measures  as  acts  of  ex- 
change imply,  or  as  contracts  imply,  or  as  are  implied 
by  t lie  differences  between  the  doings  of  one  aggressing 
and  one  aggressed  upon.  The  mere  fact  that  Bentham 
himself  includes  as  elements  in  the  estimation  of  each 
pleasure  or  pain,  its  intensity,  duration,  certainty,  and 
proximit}',  suffices  to  show  how  difficult  is  this  problem. 
And  when  it  is  remembered  that  all  pleasures  and  pains, 
not  felt  in  particular  cases  only  but  in  the  aggregate  of 
cases,  and  severally  regarded  under  these  four  aspects, 
have  to  be  compared  with  one  another  and  their  relative 
values  determined,  simply  by  introspection  ;  it  will  be 
manifest  both  that  the  problem  is  complicated  by  the 
addition  of  indefinite  judgments  of  qualities  to  indefinite 
measures  of  quantities,  and  that  it  is  further  compli- 
cated by  the  multitudinousness  of  these  vague  estima- 
tions to  be  gone  through  and  summed  up. 

But  now  passing  over  this  assertion  of  Bentham 
that  happiness  is  a  more  intelligible  end  than  justice, 
which  we  find  to  be  the  reverse  of  truth,  let  us  note  the 
several  implications  of  the  doctrine  that  the  supreme 
lative  body  ought  to  make  the  greatest  happiness 
of  the  greatest  numltcr  its  immediate  aim. 

It  implies,  in  the  first  place,  that  happiness  may  be 
compassed  by  methods  framed  directly  for  the  purpose, 
without  any  previous  inquiry  respecting  the  conditions 
that  must  be  fulfilled;  and  this  pre-supposes  a  belief 
that  there  are  no  such  conditions.     For  if  there  are  any 


CRITICISMS  AND  EXPLANATIONS.  203 

conditions  without  fulfillment  of  which  happiness  can- 
not be  compassed,  then  the  first  step  must  be  to  ascertain 
these  conditions  with  a  view  to  fulfilling  them  ;  and  to 
admit  this  is  to  admit  that  not  happiness  itself  must  be 
the  immediate  end,  but  fulfillment  of  the  conditions  to 
its  attainment  must  be  the  immediate  end.  The  alter- 
natives are  simple  :  Either  the  achievement  of  happiness 
is  not  conditional,  in  which  case  one  mode  of  action  is  as 
good  as  another,  or  it  is  conditional,  in  which  case  the 
required  mode  of  action  must  be  the  direct  aim  and  not 
the  happiness  to  be  achieved  by  it. 

Assuming  it  conceded,  as  it  will  be,  that  there  exist 
conditions  which  must  be  fulfilled  before  happiness  can 
be  attained,  let  us  next  ask  what  is  implied  by  proposing 
modes  of  so  controlling  conduct  as  to  further  happiness, 
without  previously  inquiring  whether  any  such  modes 
are  already  known  ?  The  implication  is  that  human  in- 
telligence throughout  the  past,  operating  on  experiences, 
has  failed  to  discover  any  such  modes  ;  whereas  present 
human  intelligence  may  be  expected  forthwith  to  dis- 
cover them.  Unless  this  be  asserted,  it  must  be  admit- 
ted that  certain  conditions  to  the  achievement  of  hap- 
piness have  already  been  partially,  if  not  wholly,  ascer 
tained ;  and  if  so,  our  first  business  should  be  to  look  for 
them.  Having  found  them,  our  rational  course  is  to 
bring  existing  intelligence  to  bear  on  these  products  of 
past  intelligence,  with  the  expectation  that  it  will  verify 
the  substance  of  them  while  possibly  correcting  the  form. 
But  to  suppose  that  no  regulative  principles  for  the 
conduct  of  associated  human  beings  have  thus  far  been 
established,  and  that  they  are  now  to  be  established  de 
novo,  is  to  suppose  that  man  as  he  is  differs  from  man  as 
he  was  in  an  incredible  degree. 


204  THE  DATA   OF  ETHICS. 

Beyond  ignoring  the  probability,  or  rather  the  cer- 
tainty, that  past  experience  generalized  by  past  intelli- 
gence, must  })y  this  time  have  disclosed  partially,  ii 
not  wholly,  some  of  the  essential  conditions  to  the 
achievement  of  happiness,  Bentham's  proposition  ignores 
the  formulated  knowledge  of  them  actually  existing. 
For  whence  come  the  conception  of  justice  and  the 
answering  sentiment.  He  will  scarcely  say  that  they 
are  meaningless,  although  his  proposition  implies  as 
much  ;  and  if  he  admits  that  they  have  meanings,  he 
must  choose  between  two  alternatives  either  of  which 
is  fatal  to  his  hypothesis.  Are  they  supernaturally 
caused  modes  of  thinking  and  feeling,  tending  to  make 
men  fulfill  the  conditions  to  happiness?  If  so,  their 
authority  is  peremptory.  Are  they  modes  of  thinking 
and  feeling  naturally  caused  in  men  by  experience  of 
these  conditions  ?  If  so,  their  authority  is  no  less  per- 
emptory. Not  only,  then,  does  Bentham  fail  to  infer 
that  certain  principles  of  guidance  must  by  this  time 
have  been  ascertained,  but  he  refuses  to  recognize  these 
principles  as  actually  reached  and  present  to  him. 

And  then  after  all,  he  tacitly  admits  that  which  he 
overtly  denies,  by  saying  that — "  Be  the  meaning  of  the 
word  justice  what  it  will,  what  regard  is  it  entitled  to 
otherwise  than  as  a  means  of  happiness?  For  if  justice 
means  having  happiness  as  its  end,  then  justice 
musl  take  precedence  of  happiness,  as  every  other  means 
ace  of  every  other  end.  Bentham's  own 
elaborate  polity  is  a  means  having  happiness  as  its  end, 
as  jn  '  n  admission,  a  means  having  hap- 

L  If.  then,  we  may  properly  skip  jus- 
.  and  go  directly  to  the  end  happiness,  we  may  prop- 
erly fckip  Bentham's  polity,  and  go  directly  to  the  end 


fXTICISMB  A.XD  EXPLANATIONS.  205 

happiness  '  In  short,  we  are  led  to  the  remarkable  con- 
clusion i!  X  in  all  cases  we  must  contemplate  exclusively 
the  end  and  must  disregard  the  means. 

§  CI.  This  relation  of  ends  to  means,  underlying  all 
ethical  speculation,  will  be  further  elucidated  if  we  join 
with  some  of  the  above  conclusions,  certain  conclusions 
drawn  in  the  last  chapter.  We  shall  see  that  while 
greatest  happiness  may  vary  widely  in  societies  which, 
though  idly  constituted,  are  subject  to  unlike  physical 
circumstances,  certain  fundamental  conditions  to  the 
achievement  of  this  greatest  happiness,  are  common  to 
all  such  societies. 

Given  a  people  inhabiting  a  tract  which  makes  no- 
madic habits  necessary,  and  the  happiness  of  each  indi- 
vidual will  be  greatest  when  his  nature  is  so  molded 
to  the  requirements  of  his  life,  that  all  his  faculties  find 
their  due  activities  in  daily  driving  and  tending  cattle, 
milking,  migrating  and  so  forth.  The  members  of  a 
community  otherwise  similar,  which  is  permanently 
settled,  will  severally  achieve  their  greatest  happiness 
when  their  natures  have  become  such  that  a  fixed  hab- 
itat, and  the  occupations  necessitated  by  it,  supply  the 
spheres  in  which  each  instinct  and  emotion  is  exercised 
and  brings  the  concomitant  pleasure.  The  citizens  of  a 
large  nation,  industrially  organized,  have  reached  their 
possible  ideal  of  happiness,  when  the  producing,  dis- 
tributing, and  other  activities,  are  such  in  their  kinds 
and  amounts,  that  each  citizen  finds  in  them  a  place  for 
all  his  energies  and  aptitudes,  while  he  obtains  the 
means  of  satisfying  all  his  desires.  Once  more  we  may 
recognize  as  not  only  possible  but  probable,  the  eventual 
existence  of  a  community,  also  industrial,  the  members 


206  TI1E  DATA  Of-  ETHICS. 

of  which,  having  natures  similarly  respond^  •  to  these 
requirements,  are  also  characterized  by  dominant 
aesthetic  faculties,  and  achieve  complete  happiness  only 
when  a  large  part  of  life  is  rilled  with  aesthetic  activities. 
Evidently  these  different  types  of  men,  with  their  dif- 
ferent standards  of  happiness,  each  rinding  the  possibil- 
ity of  that  happiness  in  his  own  society,  would  not  find 
it  if  transferred  to  any  of  the  other  societies.  Evidently, 
though,  they  might  have  in  common  such  kinds  of 
happiness  as  accompany  the  satisfaction  of  vital  needs, 
they  would  not  have  in  common  sundry  other  kinds  of 
happiness. 

But  now  mark  that  while,  to  achieve  greatest  happi- 
ness in  each  of  such  societies,  the  special  conditions  to 
be  fulfilled  must  differ  from  those  to  be  fulfilled  in  the 
other  societies,  certain  general  conditions  must  be  ful- 
filled in  all  the  societies.  Harmonious  co-operation,  by 
which  alone  in  any  of  them  the  greatest  happiness  can 
be  attained,  is,  as  we  saw,  made  possible  only  by  re- 
spect for  one  another's  claims  :  there  must  be  neither 
those  direct  aggressions  which  we  class  as  crimes  against 
in  and  property,  nor  must  there  be  those  indirect 
aggressions  constituted  by  breaches  of  contracts.  So 
that  maintenance  of  equitable  relations  between  men  is 
the  condition  to  attainment  of  greatest  happiness  in  all 
.  however  much  the  greatest  happiness  attain- 
able iu  each  may  differ  in  nature,  or  amount,  or  both. 

And   here   a  physical   analogy  may  fitly  be  used  to 
give  the  greatest  definiteness  to  this  cardinal  truth.     A 

of  matter,  of  whatever  kind,  maintains  its  state  of 
internal  equilibrium,  so  long  as  its  component  particles 

illy  stand  toward  their  neighbors   in    equidistant 
positions.     Accepting  the  conclusions  of  modern  phys- 


CRITICISMS  AND  EXPLANATIONS.  207 

icists,  vJich  imply  that  each  molecule  moves  rhyth- 
mically, fi*.en  a  balanced  state  implies  that  each  performs 
its  movements  within  a  space  bounded  by  the  like  spaces 
required  for  the  movements  of  those  around.  If  the 
b'  '  3S  have  been  so  aggregated  that  the  oscillations 
aome  are  more  restrained  than  the  oscillations  of 
others,  there  is  a  proportionate  instability.  If  the 
number  of  them  thus  unduly  restrained  is  considerable, 
the  instability  is  such  that  the  cohesion  in  some  parts  is 
liable  to  fail,  and  a  crack  results.  If  the  excesses  of 
restraint  are  great  and  multitudinous,  a  trifling  disturb- 
ance causes  the  mass  to  break  up  into  small  fragments. 
To  which  add  that  the  recognized  remedy  for  this  un- 
stable state  is  an  exposure  to  such  physical  condition 
(ordinarily  high  temperature)  as  enables  the  molecules 
so  to  change  their  relative  positions  that  their  mutual 
restraints  become  equal  on  all  sides.  And  now  observe 
that  this  holds  whatever  be  the  natures  of  the  molecules. 
They  may  be  simple  ;  they  may  be  compound ;  they 
may  be  composed  of  this  or  that  matter  in  this  or  that 
way.  In  other  words,  the  special  activities  of  each  mole- 
cule, constituted  by  the  relative  movements  of  its  units, 
may  be  various  in  their  kinds  and  degrees  ;  and  yet,  be 
they  what  they  may,  it  remains  true  that  to  preserve  in- 
ternal equilibrium  throughout  the  mass  of  molecules, 
the  mutual  limitations  of  their  activities  must  be  every- 
where alike. 

And  this  is  the  above-described  prerequisite  to  social 
equilibrium,  whatever  the  special  natures  of  the  asso- 
ciated persons.  Assuming  that  within  each  society  such 
persons  are  of  the  same  type,  needing  for  the  fulfillment 
of  their  several  lives  kindred  activities,  and  though  these 
activities  may  be  of  one  kind  in  one  society  and  of  an- 
other kind  in  another,  so  admitting  of  indefinite  varia- 


208  TEE  DATA   OF  ETHICS. 

tion,  this  condition  to  social  equilibrium  doesl.-ot  admit 
of  variation.  It  must  be  fulfilled  before  cojnplete  life, 
that  is  greatest  happiness,  can  be  attained  in  any  society; 
be  thf  particular  quality  of  that  life,  or  that  happiness, 

what  it  may.* 

§  <')2.  After  thus  observing  how  means  and  ends  in 
conduct  stand  to  one  another,  and  how  there  emerge 
certain  conclusions  respecting  their  relative  claims,  we 
may  sec  a  way  to  reconcile  sundry  conflicting  ethical 
theories.  These  severally  embody  portions  of  the  truth ; 
and  simply  require  combining  in  proper  order  to  embody 
the  whole  truth. 

Tin:  theological  theory  contains  a  part.  If  for  the 
divine  will,  supposed  to  be  suj)ernaturally  revealed,  we 
substitute  the  naturally  revealed  end  toward  which  the 
Power  manifested  throughout  Evolution  works  ;  then, 
since  Evolution  lias  been,  and  is  still,  working  toward 
thf  highesl  life,  it  follows  that  conforming  to  those 
principles  by  which  the  highest  life  is  achieved,  is  fur- 
thering that  end.  The  doctrine  that  perfection  or  ex- 
cellence of  nature  should  be  the  object  of  pursuit,  is  in 
one  sense  true  :  fin-  it  tacitly  recognizes  that  ideal  form 
of  being  which  the  highest  life  implies,  and  to  which 
EvolutioD  tends.  There  is  a  truth,  also,  in  the  doctrine 
that,  virtue  must  he  the  aim  ;  for  this  is  another  form  of 
the  doctrine  that  the  aim  must  be  to  fulfill  the  condi- 
tion- 1.)  achievement  of  the  highest  life.  That  the  in- 
1  nit  ions  of  a  moral  faculty  should  guide  or  conduct,  is  a 
proposition  in  which  a  truth  is  contained;  for  these  in- 
tuitions are  the  slowly  organized  results  of  experiences 

*This  universal  requirement  it  was  which  I  had  in  view  when 
chixwing  for  my  first  work,  published  in  1850,  the  title  Social 
Static*. 


CRITICISMS  AND  EX  I'LANATIO  200 

receive'^,  by  the  race  while  living  in  presence  of  these 
condit'ons.  And  that  happiness  is  the  supreme  end  is 
beyond  question  true  ;  for  this  is  the  concomitant  of 
that  highest  life  which  every  theory  of  moral  guidance 
has  distinctly  or  vaguely  in  view. 

So  understanding  their  relative  positions,  those  ethical 
systems  which  make  virtue,  right,  obligation,  the  car- 
dinal aims,  arc  seen  to  he  complementary  to  those  ethical 
systems  which  make  welfare,  pleasure,  happiness,  the 
cardinal  aims.  Though  the  moral  sentiments  generated 
in  civilized  men  by  daily  contact  with  social  conditions 
and  gradual  adaptation  to  them,  are  indispensable  as 
incentives  and  deterrents  ;  and  though  the  intuitions 
corresponding  to  these  sentiments  have,  in  virtue  of 
their  origin,  a  general  authority  to  be  reverently  recog- 
nized ;  yet  the  sympathies  and  antipathies  hence  origi- 
nating, together  with  the  intellectual  expressions  of  them, 
are,  in  their  primitive  forms,  necessarily  vague.  To 
make  guidance  by  them  adequate  to  all  requirements, 
their  dictates  have  to  he  interpreted  and  made  definite 
by  science  ;  to  which  end  there  must  be  analysis  of  those 
conditions  to  complete  living  which  they  respond  to, 
and  from  converse  with  which  they  have  arisen.  And 
such  analysis  necessitates  the  recognition  of  happiness 
for  each  and  all,  as  the  end  to  be  achieved  by  fulfillment 
of  these  conditions. 

Hence,  recognizing  in  due  degrees  all  the  various 
ethical  theories,  conduct  in  its  highest  form  will  take  as 
guides  innate  perceptions  of  right  duly  enlightened  and 
made  precise  by  an  analytic  intelligence,  while  conscious 
that  these  guides  are  proximately  supreme  solely  because 
they  lead  to  the  ultimate  supreme  eud,  happiness  spe- 
cial and  general. 
14 


lilO  THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


CHAPTER  X. 

THE  RELATIVITY   OF  PAINS  AND  PLEASURES. 

§  63.  A  truth  of  cardinal  importance  as  a  datum  of 
Ethics,  which  was  incidentally  referred  to  in  the  last 
chapter,  must  here  be  set  forth  at  full  length.  I  mean 
the  truth  that  not  only  men  of  different  races,  but  also 
different  men  of  the  same  race,  and  even  the  same  men 
at  different  periods  of  life,  have  different  standards  of 
happiness.  Though  there  is  some  recognition  of  this  by 
moralists,  the  recognition  is  inadequate,  and  the  far- 
reaching  conclusions  to  be  drawn  when  the  relativity  of 
happiness  is  fully  recognized,  are  scarcely  suspected. 

It  is  a  belief  universal  in  early  life — a  belief  which  in 
most  people  is  but  partially  corrected  in  later  life,  and  in 
vi'i y  few  wholly  dissipated — that  there  is  something  in- 
trinsic in  the  pleasantness  of  certain  things,  while  other 
things  are  intrinsically  unpleasant.  The  error  is  analo- 
to,  and  closely  allied  with,  the  error  crude  realism 
makes.  Just  as  to  the  uncultured  mind  it  appears  self' 
evident  that  the  sweetness  of  sugar  is  inherent  i»  sugar, 
that  sound  as  we  perceive  it  is  sound  as  it  exists  in  the 
externa]  world,  and  that  the  warmth  from  a  fire  is  in 
itself  what  it  seems;  so  does  it  appear  self-evident  that 
the  sweetness  of  sugar  is  necessarily  grateful,  that  there 
is  in  a  beautiful  sound  something  that  must  be  beautiful 
to  all  creatures,  and  that  the  agreeable  feeling  produced 


2ELATIVITY  OF  PAINS  AND  PLEASURES.       211 

by  warmth  is  a  feeling  which  every  other  consciousness 
must  find  agreeahle. 

But  as  criticism  proves  the  one  set  of  conclusions  to 
be  wrong,  so  does  it  prove  to  be  wrong  the  other  set. 
Not  only  are  the  qualities  of  external  things  as  intel- 
lectually apprehended  by  us,  relative  to  our  own  organ- 
isms ;  but  the  pleasurableness  or  painfulness  of  the 
ie<  lings  which  we  associate  with  such  qualities,  are  also 
re?  itive  to  our  own  organisms.  They  are  so  in  a 
d<.  ible  sense — they  are  relative  to  its  structures,  and 
+)j  y  are  relative  to  the  states  of  its  structures. 

f  hat  we  may  not  rest  in  a  mere  nominal  acceptance 
fl  these  general  truths,  but  may  so  appreciate  them  as 
do  see  their  full  bearings  on  ethical  theory,  we  must 
here  glance  at  them  as  exemplified  by  animate  creatures 
at  large.  For  after  contemplating  the  wide  divergences 
of  sentiency  accompanying  the  wide  divergences  of 
organization  which  evolution  in  general  has  brought 
about,  we  shall  be  enabled  the  better  to  see  the  diver- 
gences of  sentiency  to  be  expected  from  the  further 
evolution  of  humanity. 

§  64.  Because  they  can  be  most  quickly  disposed  of, 
let  us  first  deal  with  pains :  a  further  reason  for  first 
dealing  with  pains  being  that  we  may  thus  forthwith 
recognize,  and  then  leave  out  of  consideration,  those 
sentient  states  the  qualities  of  which  may  be  regarded 
as  absolute  rather  than  relative. 

The  painfulness  of  the  feelings  produced  by  forces 
which  tend  to  destroy  organic  structures,  wholly  or  in 
part,  is  of  course  common  to  all  creatures  capable  of 
feeling.  We  saw  it  to  be  inevitable  that  during  evolu- 
tion there  must  everywhere  be  established  such  connec* 


2  !  2  THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 

turns  l),t  ween  external  actions  and  the  modes  of  con- 
Bciousness  they  cause,  that  the  injurious  ones  are  accom- 
panied by  disagreeable  feelings  and  the  beneficial  ones 
by  agreeable  feelings.  Consequently,  pressures  or 
strains  which  tear  or  bruise,  and  heats  which  burn  or 
scald,  being  in  all  cases  partially  or  wholly  destructive, 
are  in  all  cases  painful. 

lint  even  here  the  relativity  of  the  feelings  may  in 
one  sense  be  asserted.  For  the  effect  of  a  force  of 
given  quantity  or  intensity  varies  partly  with  the  size 
and  partly  with  the  structure  of  the  creature  exposed  to 
it.  The  weight  which  is  scarcely  felt  by  a  large  animal 
crushes  a  small  one  ;  the  blow  which  breaks  the  limb  of 
a  mouse  produces  little  effect  on  a  horse  :  the  weapon 
which  lacerates  a  horse  leaves  a  rhinoceros  uninjured. 
And  with  these  differences  of  injuriousness  doubtless 
go  differences  of  feeling.  Merely  glancing  at  the  illus- 
trations of  this  truth  furnished  by  sentient  beings  in 
general,  let  us  consider  the  illustrations  mankind  fur- 
nish. 

Comparisons  of  robust  laboring  men  with  women  or 
children  show  us  that  degrees  of  mechanical  stress  which 
the  first  bear  with  impunity,  produce  on  the  others 
Injuries  and  accompanying  pains.  The  blistering  of  a 
tender  skin  by  an  amount  of  friction  which  does  not 
even  redden  ;i  coarse  one,  or  tin;  bursting  of  superficial 
blood  .  and  consequent  discoloration,  caused  in  a 

person  of  lax  tissues  by  a  blow  which  leaves  in  well- 
toned  tissues  no  trace,  will  sufficiently  exemplify  this 
conti 

Not  only,  however,  are  the  pains  due  to  violent  in- 
.    relative'    to  the    characters    or   constitu- 
tional qualities  of  the  parts  directly  affected,  but  they 


JiELA TIVITY  OF  I'M  V 8  AND  PI. EA  8 ERE*.        -J  1  3 

are  relative  in  equally  marked  ways,  or  even  in  more 
marked  ways,  to  the  characters  of  the  nervous  struct- 
ures. The  common  assumption  is  that  equal  bodily  in- 
juries excite  equal  pains.  But  this  is  a  mistake.  Pull- 
ing out  a  tooth  or  cutting  off  a  limb,  gives  to  different 
persons  widely  different  amounts  of  suffering  :  not  the 
endurance  only,  hut  the  feeling  to  he  endured,  varies 
greatly;  and  the  variation  largely  depends  on  the  de- 
gree of  nervous  development.  This  is  well  shown  by 
the  great  insensibility  of  idiots — blows,  cuts,  and  ex- 
tremes of  heat  and  cold,  being  borne  by  them  with  in- 
difference.* The  relation  thus  shown  in  the  most 
marked  manner  where  the  development  of  the  central 
nervous  system  is  abnormally  low,  is  shown  in  a  less 
marked  manner  where  the  development  of  the  central 
m  is  abnormally  low  ;  namely,  among  in- 
ferior races  of  men.  Many  travelers  have  commented 
on  the  strange  callousness  shown  by  savages  who  have 
been  mangled  in  battle  or  by  accident ;  and  surgeons  in 
India  say  that  wounds  and  operations  are  better  borne 
by  natives  than  by  Europeans.  Further,  there  comes 
the  converse  fact  that  among  the  higher  types  of  men, 
larger  brained  and  more  sensitive  to  pain  than  the 
lower,  the  most  sensitive  are  those  whose  nervous  de- 
velopments, as  shown  by  their  mental  powers,  are  the 
highest  :  part  of  the  evidence  being  the  relative  intoler- 
ance of  disagreeable  sensations  common  among  men  of 
genius,f  and  the  general  irritability  characteristic  of 
them. 

*  On  Idiocy  and  Imbecility,  by  William  W.  Ireland,  M.  D.,  pp. 

t  For  instances  see  Fortnightly  Review,  Vol.  XXIV.  {New  SeriesX 
p.  712. 


2U  TBE  DATA   OF  ETHICS. 

That  j viin  is  relative  not  to  structures  only,  but  to 
their  states  as  well,  is  also  manifest — more  manifest 
indeed.  The  sensibility  of  an  external  part  depends  on 
its  temperature.  Cool  it  below  a  certain  point  and  it 
becomes,  as  we  say,  numb  ;  and  if  by  ether  spray  it  is 
made  very  cold,  it  may  be  cut  without  any  feeling  being 
produced.  Conversely,  heat  the  part  so  that  its  blood- 
vessels dilate,  and  the  pain  which  any  injury  or  irrita- 
tion causes  is  greater  than  usual.  How  largely  the 
production  of  pain  depends  on  the  condition  of  the  part 
affected,  we  see  in  the  extreme  tenderness  of  an  inflamed 
sin  face — a  tenderness  such  that  a  slight  touch  causes 
shrinking,  and  such  that  rays  from  the  fire  which  ordi- 
narily would  be  indifferent  become  intolerable. 

Similarly  with  the  special  senses.  A  light  which 
eyes  that  are  in  good  order  bear  without  disagreeable 
feeling,  cannot  be  borne  by  inflamed  eyes.  And  be- 
yond the  local  state,  the  state  of  the  system  as  a  whole, 
and  the  state  of  the  nervous  centres,  are  both  factors. 
Those  enfeebled  by  illness  are  distressed  by  noises 
which  those  in  health  bear  with  equanimity;  and  men 
with  overwrought  brains  are  irritated  in  unusual  de- 
li v  annoyances,  both  physical  and  moral. 

Further,  the  temporary  condition  known  as  exhaus- 
tion enters  into  the  relation.  Limbs  overworn  by 
prolonged  exertion,  cannot,  without  aching  perform  acts 
which  would  at  oilier  times  cause  no  appreciable  feeling. 
After  reading  continuously  for  very  many  hours,  even 
stron  begin  to  smart.      And   noises  that  can   be 

ted  to  for  a  short  time  with  indifference,  become,  if 
there  is  no  ce   nation,  causes  of  suffering. 

So  that  though  there  is  absoluteness  in  the  relation 
between  positive   pains  and  actions  that  are  positively 


BEL  A  TIT  IT  Y  OF  PAINS  AND  PLEA  S  URES.        2 1  5 

injurious,  in  so  far  that  wherever  there  is  sentiency  it 
exists  ;  yet  even  here  partial  relativity  may  be  asserted. 
For  there  is  no  fixed  relation  between  the  acting  force 
and  the  produced  feeling.  The  amount  of  feeling  varies 
with  the  size  of  the  organism,  with  the  character  of  its 
outer  structures,  with  the  character  of  its  nervous 
system  ;  and  also  with  the  temporary  states  of  the  part 
affected,  of  the  body  at  large,  and  of  the  nervous  centres. 

§  65.  The  relativity  of  pleasures  is  far  more  con- 
spicuous ;  and  the  illustrations  of  it  furnished  by  the 
sentient  world  at  large  are  innumerable. 

It  needs  but  to  glance  round  at  the  various  things 
which  different  creatures  are  prompted  by  their  desires 
to  eat  and  are  gratified  in  eating — flesh  for  predaceous 
animals,  grass  for  the  herbivora,  worms  for  the  mole, 
flies  for  the  swallow,  seeds  for  the  finch,  honey  for  the 
bee,  a  decaying  carcass  for  the  maggot — to  be  reminded 
that  the  tastes  for  foods  are  relative  to  the  structures  of 
the  creatures.  And  this  truth,  made  conspicuous  by  a 
survey  of  animals  in  general,  is  forced  on  our  attention 
even  by  a  survey  of  different  races  of  men.  Here  human 
flesh  is  abhorred,  and  there  regarded  as  the  greatest  del- 
icacy ;  in  this  country  roots  are  allowed  to  putrefy  before 
they  are  eaten,  and  in  that  the  taint  of  decay  produces 
disgust :  the  whale's  blubber  which  one  race  devours  with 
avidity,  will  in  another  by  its  very  odor  produce  nausea. 
Nay,  without  looking  abroad  we  may,  in  the  common 
saying  that  "one  man's  meat  is  another  man's  poison."' 
see  the  general  admission  that  members  of  the  same 
socity  so  far  differ,  that  a  taste  which  is  to  these  pleasur- 
able is  to  those  displeasurable.  So  is  it  with  the  other 
senses.     Assafoetida,   which   by   us   is   singled   out  as 


■2 1  6  TI1E  DA  TA  OF  ETHICS. 

typical  of  the  disgusting  in  odor,  ranks  among  the 
Esthonians  as  a  favorite  perfume,  and  even  those  around 
us  vary  so  Ear  in  their  likings  that  the  scents  of  flowers 
grateful  to  some  are  repugnant  to  others.  Analogous 
differences,  in  the  preferences  for  colors,  we  daily  hear 
expressed.  And  in  a  greater  or  less  degree  the  like  holds 
with  all  sensations  down  even  to  those  of  touch:  the 
feeling  yielded  by  velvet,  which  is  to  most  agreeable, 
setting  the  teeth  on  edire  in  some. 

It  needs  but  to  name  appetite  and  satiety  to  suggest 
multitudinous  facts  showing  that  pleasures  are  relative 
not  only  to  the  organic  structures  but  also  to  their  states. 
The  food  which  yields  keen  gratification  when  there  is 
great  hunger  ceases  \<>  be  grateful  when  hunger  is  satis- 
fied,  and   if  then  forced  on  the  eater  is  rejected    with 

ion.     So,  too,  a  particular  kind  of  food,  seeming 
when  firs!  tasted  so  delicious  that  daily  repetition  would 

source  of  endless  enjoyment,  becomes,  in  a  few  days, 
not  only  unenjoyable  but  repugnant.  Brilliant  colors 
which,  falling  on  unaccustomed  e}res  give-  delight,  pall 
on  the  sense  if  long  looked  at,  and  there  is  relief  in  get- 
ting away  from  the  impressions  they  yield.  Sounds 
in  themselves  and  sweet  in  their  combinations 
which  yield  to  unfatigued  ears  intense  pleasure,  become, 
at  the  end  of  a  long  concert,  not  only  wearisome  hut,  if 
from  them,  causes  of  irritation.  The 
like  bolds  down  even  to  such  simple  sensations  as  those 
of   heat  and  cold.      The  file  so  delightful   on   a   winter's 

is,  in  hot  weather,  oppressive  ;  and  pleasure  is  then 

i    in  the  cold  water  from   which,  in  winter,  there 
would  be  shrinking.     Indeed,  experiences  lasting  over 

out  a  few  moments  suffice  to  show  how  relative  to  the 
:    the  structures   are    pleasurable  sensations   of 


RELATIVITY  OF  I'AI.XS  A  .V l>  PLEASURES.        217 

these  kinds  ;  for  it  is  observable  that  on  dipping  the  cold 
hand  into  hot  water,  tin:  agreeable  feeling  gradually 
diminishes  as  the  hand  warms. 

These  few  instances  will  cany  home  the  truth,  mani- 
fest enough  to  all  who  observe,  that  the  receipt  of  each 
agreeable  sensation  depends  primarily  on  the  existence 
of  a  strnetnre  which  is  called  into  play;  and,  second- 
arily, on  the  condition  of  that  structure,  as  fitting  it  or 
unfitting  it  for  activity. 

§  6G.  The  truth  that  emotional  pleasures  are  made 
possihle,  partly  by  the  existence  of  correlative  structures, 
and  partly  by  the  states  of  those  structures,  is  equally 
undeniable. 

Observe  the  animal  which,  leading  a  life  demanding 
solitary  habits,  has  an  adapted  organization,  and  it 
gives  no  sign  of  need  for  the  presence  of  its  hind. 
<  observe,  conversely,  a  gregarious  animal  separated  from 
the  herd,  and  you  see  marks  of  unhappiness  while  the 
separation  continues,  and  equally  distinct  marks  of  joy 
on  joining  its  companions.  In  the  one  case  there  is  no 
nervous  structure  which  finds  its  sphere  of  action  in 
i lie  gregarious  state,  and  in  the  other  case  such  a 
structure  exists.  As  was  implied  by  instances  cited  in 
the  last  chapter  for  another  purpose,  animals  leading- 
lives  involving  particular  kinds  of  activities,  have  he- 
come  so  constituted  that  pursuance  of  those  activities, 
exercising  the  correlative  structures,  \  ields  the  associated 
pleasures.  Beasts  of  prey  confined  in  dens,  show  us  by 
their  pacings  from  side  to  side  the  endeavor  to  obtain, 
as  well  as  they  can.  the  satisfactions  that  accompany 
roaming  about  in  their  natural  habitats,  and  that  grati- 
fication in  the  expenditure  of  their  locomotive  enerj 


213  TUE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 

shown  us  by  porpoises  playing  round  a  vessel,  is  shown 
us  by  the  similarly  unceasing  excursions  from  end  to 
end  of  its  cell  which  a  captured  porpoise  makes.  The 
perpetual  hoppings  of  the  canary  from  bar  to  bar  of  its 
cage,  and  the  ceaseless  use  of  claws  and  bill  in  climbing 
about  its  perch  by  the  parrot,  are  other  activities  which, 
severally  related  to  the  needs  of  the  species,  have  sever- 
ally themselves  become  sources  of  agreeable  feelings. 
Still  more  clearly  are  we  shown  by  the  efforts  which  a 
caged  beaver  makes  to  build  with  such  sticks  and  pieces 
of  wood  as  are  at  hand,  how  dominant  in  its  nature  has 
become  the  building  instinct,  and  how,  apart  from  any 
advantage  gained,  it  gets  gratification  by  repeating,  as 
well  as  it  can,  the  processes  of  construction  it  is  organ- 
ized to  cany  on.  The  cat  which,  lacking  something  to 
tear  with  her  claws,  pulls  at  the  mat  with  them,  the 
confined  giraffe  which,  in  default  of  branches  to  lay 
hold  of  wears  out  the  upper  angles  of  the  doors  to  its 
house  by  continually  grasping  them  with  its  prehensile 
tongue,  the  rhinoceros  which,  having  no  enemy  to  fight, 
plows  ii])  the  ground  with  his  horn — all  yield  us  analo- 
gous evidence  ( llearly,  these  various  actions  performed 
by  these  various  creatures  are  not  intrinsically  pleasur- 
able, for  they  differ  more  or  less  in  each  species  and  are 
often  utterly  unlike.  The  pleasurableness  is  simply  in 
the  exercise  of  nervo-muscular  structures  adapted  to 
the  performance  of  the  actions. 

Though  races  of  men  are  contrasted  with  one  an- 
other so  much  less  than  genera  and  orders  of  animals 
as  we  saw  in  the  last  chapter,  along  with 
visible  differences  there  go  invisible  differences,  with 
accompanying  likings  for  different  modes  of  life. 
Among  some,  as  the  Mantras,  the  love  of  unrestrained 


RELATIVITY  OF  PAINS  AND  PLEASURES.        219 

action  and  the  disregard  of  companionship  are  such 
that  they  separate  if  they  quarrel,  and  hence  live  scat- 
tered ;  while  among  others,  as  the  Damaras,  there  is 
little  tendency  to  resist,  but  instead,  an  admiration  for 
any  one  who  assumes  power  over  them.  Already  when 
exemplifying  the  indefiniteness  of  happiness  as  an  end 
of  action,  I  have  referred  to  the  unlike  ideals  of  life 
pursued  by  the  nomadic  and  the  settled,  the  warlike 
and  the  peaceful — unlike  ideals  which  imply  unlike- 
nesses  of  nervous  structures  caused  by  the  inherited 
effects  of  unlike  habits  accumulating  through  genera- 
tions. These  contrasts,  various  in  their  kinds  and 
degrees  among  the  various  types  of  mankind,  every  one 
can  supplement  by  analogous  contrasts  observable 
among  those  around.  The  occupations  some  delight  in 
are  to  those  otherwise  constituted  intolerable;  and 
men's  hobbies,  severally  appearing  to  themselves  quite 
natural,  often  appear  to  their  friends  ludicrous  and 
almost  insane :  facts  which  alone  might  make  us  see 
that  the  pleasurableness  of  actions  of  this  or  that  kind 
is  due  not  to  anything  in  the  natures  of  the  actions  but 
to  the  existence  of  faculties  which  find  exercise  in 
them. 

It  must  be  added  that  each  pleasurable  emotion,  like 
each  pleasurable  sensation,  is  relative  not  only  to  a 
certain  structure  but  also  to  the  state  of  that  structure. 
The  parts  called  into  action  must  have  had  proper 
rest — must  be  in  a  condition  fit  for  action  ;  not  in  the 
condition  which  prolonged  action  produces.  Be  the 
order  of  emotion  what  it  may,  an  unbroken  continuity 
in  the  receipt  of  it  eventually  brings  satiety.  The 
pleasurable  consciousness  becomes  less  and  less  vivid,  and 
there  arises  the  need  for  a  temporary  cessation  during 


220  THE  DATA   OF  ETHICS. 

which  the  purls  that  have  been  active  may  recover 
their  fitness  for  activity,  and  during  which  also  the 
activities  of  other  parts  and  receipt  of  the  accompanying 
emotions    may   find  due  place. 

^  67.  1  have  insisted  on  these  general  truths  with 
perhaps  needless  iteration,  to  prepare  the  reader  for 
more  fully  recognizing  a  corollary  that  is  practically 
ignored.  Abundant  and  clear  as  is  the  evidence,  and 
forced  though  it  is  daily  on  every  one's  attention,  the 
conclusions  respecting  life  and  conduct  which  should 
be  drawn  are  not  drawn,  and  so  much  at  variance  are 
these  conclusions  with  current  beliefs,  that  enunciation 
of  them  causes  a  stare  of  incredulity.  Pervaded  as  all 
pasl  thinking  has  been,  and  as  most  present  thinking 
is,  by  the  assumption  that  the  nature  of  every  creature 
has  been  specially  created  for  it,  and  that  human 
nature,  also  specially  created,  is,  like  other  natures, 
fixed — pervaded  too  as  this  thinking  has  been,  and  is, 
by  the  allied  assumption  that  the  agreeableness  of  cer- 
tain actions  depends  on  their  essential  qualities,  while 
other  actions  are  by  their  essential  qualities  made  dis- 

able;  it  is  difficult  to  obtain  a  hearing  for  the 
doctrine  that  the  kinds  of  action  which  are  now  pleas- 
urable will,    under    conditions    requiring  the   change, 

to  be  pleasurable,  while  other  kinds  of  action  will 
become  pleasurable.  Even  those  who  accept  the  doc- 
trine of   Evolution    mostly  hear  with  skepticism,  or  at 

with    Dominal   Eaith,    the   inferences   to  be  drawn 

from  it   !•  g   the  humanity  of  the  fut  ure. 

And  yet  as  shown  in   myriads  of  instances  indicated 

by  the  few  above  given,  those   natural  processes   which 

produced    multitudinous    forms     of      structure 


RELATIVITY  OF  PAIXS  AXD  PLEASURES. 

adapted  to  multitudinous  forms  of  activity,  have  simul- 
taneously made  these  forms  of  activity  pleasurable. 
And  the  inevitable  implication  is  that  within  the 
limits  imposed  by  physical  laws,  there  will  be  evolved; 
in  adaptation  to  any  new  sets  of  conditions  that  may 
be  established,  appropriate  structures  of  which  the 
functions  will  yield  their  respective  gratifications. 

When  we  have  got  rid  of  the  tendency  to  think  that 
certain  modes  of  activity  are  necessarily  pleasurable 
because  they  give  us  pleasure,  and  that  other  modes 
which  do  not  please  us  arc  necessarily  unpleasing  ;  we 
shall  see  that  the  remolding  of  human  nature  into 
fitness  for  the  requirements  of  social  life,  must  event- 
ually make  all  needful  activities  pleasurable,  while  it 
makes  displeasurable  all  activities  at  variance  with 
these  requirements.  When  we  have  come  fully  to  rec- 
ognize the  truth  that  there  is  nothing  intrinsically 
more  gratifying  in  the  efforts  by  which  wild  animals 
are  caught,  than  in  the  efforts  expended  in  rearing 
plants,  and  that  the  combined  action  of  muscles  and 
senses  in  rowing  a  boat  are  not  by  their  essential 
natures  more  productive  of  agreeable  feeling  than 
those  gone  through  in  reaping  corn,  but  that  every- 
thing depends  on  the  co-operating  emotions,  which  at 
present  are  more  in  accordance  with  the  one  than  with 
the  other  ;  we  shall  infer  that  along  with  decrease  of 
emotions  for  which  the  social  state  affords  little 
or  no  scope,  and  increase  of  those  which  it  persist- 
ently exercises,  the  things  now  done  with  dislike  from 
a  sense  of  obligation  will  be  done  with  immediate 
liking,  and  the  things  desisted  from  as  a  matter  of 
duty  will  be  desisted  from  because  they  are  repugnant. 

This    conclusion,    alien    to   popular    beliefs    and   in 


222  THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 

ethical  speculation  habitually  ignored,  or  at  most  rec- 
ognized but  partially  and  occasionally,  will  be  thought 
by  the  majority  so  improbable  that  I  must  give 
further  justification  of  it;  enforcing  the  a  priori  ar- 
gument by  an  a  posteriori  one.  Small  as  is  the  atten- 
tion given  to  the  fact,  yet  is  the  fact  conspicuous  that 
the  corollary  above  drawn  from  the  doctrine  of  Evolu- 
tion at  large,  coincides  with  the  corollary  which  past 
and  present  changes  in  human  nature  force  upon  us. 
The  leading  contrasts  of  character  between  savage 
and  civilized  are  just  those  contrasts  to  be  expected 
from  the  process  of  adaptation. 

The  life  of  the  primitive  man  is  passed  mainly  in 
the  pursuit  of  beasts,  birds  and  fish,  which  yields  him 
a  gratifying  excitement ;  but  though  to  the  civilized 
man  the  chase  gives  gratification,  this  is  neither  so 
persistent  nor  so  general.  There  are  among  us  keen 
sportsmen,  but  there  are  many  to  whom  shooting  and 
fishing  soon  become  wearisome,  and  there  are  not  a 
few  to  whom  they  are  altogether  indifferent  or  even 
distasteful. 

Conversely,  the  power  of  continued  application, 
which  in  the  primitive  man  is  very  small,  has  among 
ourselves  become  considerable.  It  is  true  that  most 
are  coerced  into  industry  by  necessity  ;  but  there  are 
sprinkled  throughout  society  men  to  whom  active 
occupation  is  a  need — men  who  are  restless  when  away 
from  business  and  miserable  when  they  eventually 
give  it  up;  men  to  whom  this  or  that  line  of  investi- 
gation is  so  attractive  that  they  devote  themselves  to 
it  day  after  day,  year  after  year;  men  who  are  so 
deeply  interested  in  public  affairs  that  they  pass  lives 
of  labor  in    achieving  political  ends  they  think  advan- 


RELATIVITY  OF  I'Al.XS  AND  I'LKASURES.        223 

tageous,  hardly  giving  themselves  the  rest  necessary 
for  lical th. 

Yet  again,  and  still  more  strikingly,  does  the  change 
become  manifest  when  we  compare  undeveloped  with 
developed  humanity  in  respect  of  the  conduct  prompted 
by  fellow  feeling.  Cruelty  rather  than  kindness  is 
characteristic  of  the  savage,  and  is  in  many  cases  a 
source  of  marked  gratification  to  him ;  but  though 
among  the  eivilized  are  some  in  whom  this  trait  of  the 
savage  survives,  yet  a  love  of  inflicting  pain  is  not 
general,  and  besides  numbers  who  show  benevolence, 
there  are  those  who  devote  their  whole  time  and  much 
of  their  money  to  philanthropic  ends,  without  thought 
of  reward  either  here  or  hereafter. 

Clearly  these  major,  along  with  many  minor,  changes 
of  nature  conform  to  the  law  set  forth.  Activities 
appropriate  to  their  needs  which  give  pleasures  to 
savages  have  ceased  to  be  pleasurable  to  many  of  the 
civilized ;  while  the  civilized  have  acquired  capacities 
for  other  appropriate  activities  and  accompanying 
pleasures  which  savages  had  no  capacities  for. 

Now,  not  only  is  it  rational  to  infer  that  changes 
like  those  which  have  been  going  on  during  civiliza- 
tion, will  continue  to  go  on,  but  it  is  irrational  to  do 
otherwise.  Not  he  who  believes  that  adaptation  will 
increase  is  absurd,  but  he  who  doubts  that  it  will  in- 
crease is  absurd.  Lack  of  faith  in  such  further  evolu- 
tion of  humanity  as  shall  harmonize  its  nature  with  its 
conditions,  adds  but  another  to  the  countless  illustrations 
of  inadequate  consciousness  of  causation.  One  who, 
leaving  behind  both  primitive  dogmas  and  primitive 
ways  of  looking  at  things,  has,  while  accepting  scientific 
conclusions,  acquired    those    habits  of   thought    which 


224  TTIE  DATA  OF  ETIUCS. 

Bcience  generates,  will  regard  the  conclusion  a1>ove 
drawn  as  inevitable.  He  will  find  it  impossible  to  be- 
that  the  processes  which  have  heretofore  so  molded 
all  beings  to  the  requirements  of  their  lives  that  they 
satisfactions  in  fulfilling  them,  will  not  hereafter 
continue  so  molding  them,  lie  Mill  infer  that  the  type 
of  nature  to  which  the  highest  social  life  affords  a  spin- re 
such  that  every  faculty  has  its  due  amount,  and  no  more 
than  the  due  amount,  of  function  and  accompanying 
gratification,  is  the  type  of  nature  toward  which  progress 
cannot  cease  till  it  is  reached.  Pleasure  being  pro- 
ducible by  the  exercise  of  any  structure  which  is  ad- 
justed to  its  special  end,  he  will  see  the  necessary  im- 
plication to  be  that,  supposing  it  consistent  with 
maintenance  of  life,  there  is  no  kind  of  activity  which 
will  not  become  a  source  of  pleasure  if  continued  ;  and 
that  therefore  pleasure  will  eventually  accompany  every 
mode  of  action  demanded  by  social  conditions. 

This  corollary  I  here  emphasize  because  it  will  pres 
ently  play  an  important  part  in  the  argument. 


EGOISM  VERSUS  ALTRUISM.  225 


CHAPTER  XI. 

EGOISM   VERSUS   ALTRUISM. 

§  08.  If  insistence  on  them  tends  to  unsettle  estab- 
lish.•<!  systems  of  belief,  self-evident  truths  are  by  most 
people  silently  passed  over;  or  else  there  is  a  tacit  re- 
fusal to  draw  from  them  the  most  obvious  inferences. 

Of  self-evident  truths  so  dealt  with,  the  one  which 
hnc  concerns  us  is  that  a  creature  must  live  before  it 
can  act.  From  this  it  is  a  corollary  that  the  acts  by 
which  each  maintains  his  own  life  must,  speaking  gen- 
erally, precede  in  imperativeness  all  other  acts  of 
which  he  is  capable.  For  if  it  be  asserted  that  these 
other  acts  must  precede  in  imperativeness  the  acts 
which  maintain  life  ;  and  if  this,  accepted  as  a  general 
law  of  conduct,  is  conformed  to  by  all,  then  by  post- 
poning the  acts  which  maintain  life  to  the  other  acts 
which  make  life  possible,  all  must  lose  their  lives. 
That  is  to  say.  Ethics  has  to  recognize  the  truth,  rec- 
ognized in  unethical  thought,  that  egoism  comes  before 
altruism.  The  acts  required  for  continued  self-preserva- 
tion, including  the  enjoyment  of  benefits  achieved  by 
such  acts,  are  the  first  requisites  to  universal  welfare. 
Unless  each  duly  cares  for  himself,  his  care  for  all 
others  is  ended  by  death  ;  and  if  each  thus  dies,  there 
remain  no  others  to  be  cared  for. 
15 


223  7BE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 

This  permanent  supremacy  of  egoism  over  altruism, 
made  manifest  by  contemplating  existing  life,  is  further 
made  manifest  by  contemplating  life  in  course  of  evolu- 
tion. 

§  *  10.  Those  who  have  followed  with  assent  the 
recent  course  of  thought,  do  not  need  telling  that 
throughout  past  eras,  the  life,  vast  in  amount  and 
varied  in  kind,  which  has  overspread  the  earth,  has 
progressed  in  subordination  to  the  law  that  every  indi- 
vidual shall  gain  by  whatever  aptitude  it  has  for  ful- 
filling the  conditions  to  its  existence.  The  uniform 
principle  lias  been  that  better  adaptation  shall  bring 
greater  benefit ;  which  greater  benefit,  while  increasing 
the  prosperity  of  the  better  adapted,  shall  increase  also 
its  ability  to  leave  offspring  inheriting  more  or  less  its 
better  adaptation.  And,  by  implication,  the  uniform  prin- 
ciple lias  been  that  the  ill-adapted,  disadvantaged  in  the 
struggle  for  existence,  shall  bear  the  consequent  evils  : 
either  disappearing  when  its  imperfections  are  extreme, 
or  else  rearing  fewer  offspring,  which,  inheriting  its 
imperfections,  tend  to  dwindle  away  in  posterity. 

Tt  has    been    thus   with    innate    superiorities;  it  has 

been  thus  also  with  acquired  ones.     All  along  the  law 

has     been    that   increased     function    brings    increased 

::  and  that  therefore  such   extra  activities  as  aid 

welfare  in  any  member  of  a  race,  produce  in    its  struct- 

iter  ability  to  cany  on  such  extra  activities :  the 

derived  advantages  being  enjoyed  by  it  to  the  heighten- 

of  its  life.     Conversely,  as  lessened 

function   ends  in   Lessened  structure,  the  dwindling  of 

unused    faculties   lias   ever   entailed   loss  of  power  to 

achieve  the  correlative  ends :  the  result  of  inadequate 


EGOISM   VERSU8  ALTRUISM.  227 

fulfillment  of  the  cuds  being  diminished  ability  to  main- 
tain life.  And  by  inheritance,  such  functionally  pro- 
duced modifications  have  respectively  furthered  or 
hindered  survival   in  posterity. 

As  already  said,  the  law  that  each  creature  shall  take 
the  benefits  and  the  evils  of  its  nature,  be  they1  those 
derived  from  ancestry  or  those  due  to  self-produced 
modifications,  has  been  the  law  under  which  life  has 
evolved  thus  far  ;  and  it  must  continue  to  be  the  law 
however  much  further  life  may  evolve.  Whatever 
qualifications  this  natural  course  of  action  may  now  or 
hereafter  undergo,  are  qualifications  that  cannot,  with- 
out fatal  results,  essentially  change  it.  Any  arrange- 
ments which  in  a  considerable  degree  prevent  supe- 
riority from  profiting  !)}•  the  rewards  of  superiority,  or 
shield  inferiority  from  the  evils  it  entails — any  arrange- 
ments which  tend  to  make  it  as  well  to  be  inferior  as  to 
he  superior,  are  arrangements  diametrically  opposed  to 
the  progress  of  organization  and  the  reaching  of  a  higher 
life. 

But  to  say  that  each  individual  shall  reap  the  bene- 
fits brought  to  him  by  his  own  powers,  inherited  and 
acquired,  is  to  enunciate  egoism  as  an  ultimate  prin- 
ciple of  conduct.  It  is  to  say  that  egoistic  claims  must 
take  precedence  of  altruistic  claims. 

§  70.  Under  its  biological  aspect  tins  proposition 
cannot  be  contested  by  those  who  agree  in  the  doctrine 
of  Evolution  ;  but  probably  they  will  not  at  once  allow 
that  admission  of  it  under  its  ethical  aspect  is  equally 
unavoidable.  "While,  as  respects  development  of  life, 
the  well-working  of  the  universal  principle  described 
is  sufficiently  manifest;    the  well-working  of  it  as  re- 


228  THE  DATA  OF  ETI7ICS. 

spects  increase  of  happiness  may  not  be  seen  at  once. 
But  the  two  cannot  be  disjoined. 

Incapacity  of  every  kind  and  of  whatever  degree 
causes  unhappiness  directly  and  indirectly — directly 
by  the  pain  consequent  on  the  overtaxing  of  inadequate 
faculty,  and  indirectly  by  the  non-fulfillment,  or  imper- 
fect fulfillment,  of  certain  conditions  to  welfare.  Con- 
versely, capacity  of  every  kind  sufficient  for  the  require- 
ment conduces  to  happiness  immediately  and  remotely 
— immediately  by  the  pleasure  accompanying  the  normal 
exercise  of  each  power  that  is  up  to  its  work,  and 
remotely  by  the  pleasures  which  are  furthered  by  the 
ends  achieved.  A  creature  that  is  weak  or  slow  of  foot, 
and  so  gets  food  only  by  exhausting  efforts,  or  escapes 
enemies  with  difficulty,  suffers  the  pains  of  overstrained 
powers,  of  unsatisfied  appetites,  of  distressed  emotions; 
while  the  strong  and  swift  creature  of  the  same  species 
delights  in  its  efficient  activities,  gains  more  fully  the 
satisfactions  yielded  by  food  as  well  as  the  renewed 
vivacity  this  gives,  and  has  to  hear  fewer  and  smaller 
pains  in  defending  itself  against  foes  or  escaping  from 
them.  Similarly  with  duller  and  keener  sense-,  or 
r  and  Lower  degrees  of  sagacity.  The  mentally- 
inferior  individual  of  any  race  suffers  negative  and 
positive  miseries  ;  while  the  mentally-superior  Lndivi  lual 
es  uegal  ive  and  positive  gratifications.  Inevitably, 
then,  ihis  law  in  conformity  with  which  each  memberof 
a  species  takes  the  consequences  of  its  own  nature  ;  and 
in  virtue  of  which  the  progeny  of  each  member,  par- 
ticipating in  its  nature,  also  takes  such  consequences  ; 
•  •  thai  tends  ever  to  raise  the  ite  happiness 

of  the  ,  by  furthering  the  multiplication   of  the 

happier  and  hindering  that  of  the  less  happy. 


EGOISM  VXSBU8   ALTRUISM.  229 

All  this  is  true  of  human  beings  as  of  other  beings. 
The  conclusion  forced  on  us  is  that  the  pursuit  of  indi- 
vidual happiness  within  those  limits  prescribed  by  social 
conditions,  is  the  first  requisite  to  the  attainment  of  the 
greatest  general  happiness.  To  see-  this  it  needs  but  to 
contrast  one  whose  self-regard  has  maintained  bodily 
well-being,  with  one  whose  regardlessness  of  self  has 
brought  its  natural  results  ;  and  then  to  ask  what  must 
be  the  contrast  between  two  societies  formed  of  two 
such  kinds  of  individuals. 

Bounding  out  of  bed  after  an  unbroken  sleep,  singing 
or  whistling  as  he  dresses,  coming  down  with  beaming 
face  ready  to  laugh  on  the  smallest  provocation,  the 
healthy  man  of  high  j towers,  conscious  of  past  successes 
and  by  his  energy,  quickness,  resource,  made  confident 
of  the  future,  enters  on  the  day's  business  not  with 
repugnance,  but  with  gladness  ;  and  from  hour  to  hour 
experiencing  satisfactions  from  work  effectually  done, 
comes  home  with  an  abundant  surplus  of  energy  remain- 
ing for  hours  of  relaxation.  Far  otherwise  is  it  with 
one  who  is  enfeebled  by  great  neglect  of  self.  Already 
deficient,  his  energies  are  made  more  deficient  by  constant 
endeavors  to  execute  tasks  that  prove  beyond  his 
strength,  and  by  the  resulting  discouragement.  Besides 
the  depressing  consciousness  of  the  immediate  future, 
there  is  the  depressing  consciousness  of  the  remoter 
future,  with  its  probability  of  accumulated  difficulties  and 
diminished  ability  to  meet  them.  Hours  of  leisure  which, 
rightly  passed,' bring  pleasures  that  raise  the  tide  of  life 
and  renew  the  powers  of  work,  cannot  be  utilized:  there  is 
not  vigor  enough  for  enjoyments  involving  action,  and 
lack  of  spirits  prevents  passive  enjoyments  from  being 
entered  upon  with  zest.     In  brief,  life  becomes  a  burden. 


230  THE  DA  7 A  OF  ETHICS. 

X.>w  if.  as  must  be  admitted,  in  a  community  composed 
of  individuals  like  the  first,  the  happiness  will  be  rela- 
tively great,  while  in  one  composed  of  individuals  like 
the  last,  there  will  be  relatively  little  happiness,  or 
rather  much  misery;  it  must  be  admitted  that  conduct 
causing  the  one  result  is  good,  and  conduct  causing  the 
other  is  bad 

But  diminutions  of  general  happiness  are  produced  by 
inadequate  egoism  in  several  other  ways.  These  we 
will  successively  glance  at. 

§  71.  If  there  were  no  proofs  of  heredity — if  it  were 
the  rule  that  the  strong  are  usually  begotten  by  the 
weak,  while  the  weak  usually  descend  from  the  strong, 
that  vivacious  children  form  the  families  of  melancholy 
parents,  while  fathers  and  mothers  with  overflowing 
spirits  mostly  have  dull  progeny,  that  from  stolid  peas- 
ants there  ordinarily  come  sons  of  high  intelligence, 
while  the  sons  of  ih<-  cultured  are  commonly  fit  for 
nothing  but  following  the  plow — if  there  were  no  trans- 
mission of  gout,  scrofula,  insanity,  and  did  the  diseased 
habitually  give  birth  to  the  healthy  and  the  healthy  to 
the  diseased,  writers  on  Ethics  might  be  justified  in 
ignoring  those  effects  of  conduct  which  are  felt  by  pos- 
terity through  the  natures  they  inherit. 

A  it  i-;.  however,  the  current  ideas  concerning  the 
relative  claims  of  egoism  and  altruism  are  vitiated  by 
the  omission  of  this  all-important  factor.  For  if 
health,  strength  ami  capacity  are  usually  transmitted ; 
and  if  disease,  feebleness,  stupidity,  generally  reappear 
in  descendants ;  then  a  rational  altruism  requires  in- 
sistence on  thai  egoism  which  is  shown  by  receipt  of  the 
satisfactions    accompanying   preservation    of    body   and 


EGOISM  VER8TJ8  ALTRUISM.  231 

mind  in  the  best  state.  The  necessary  implication  is 
that  blessings  are  provided  for  offspring  by  due  self- 
regard,  while  disregard  of  self  carried  too  far  provides 
curses.  When,  indeed,  we  remember  how  commonly  it 
is  remarked  that  high  health  and  overflowing  spirits 
render  any  lot  in  life  tolerable,  while  chronic  ailments 
make  gloomy  a  life  most  favorable  circumstanced,  it 
becomes  amazing  that  both  the  world  at  large  and  writ- 
ers who  make  conduct  their  study,  should  ignore  the 
terrible  evils  which  disregard  of  personal  well-being  in- 
tra the  unborn,  and  the  incalculable  good  laid  up 
for  the  unborn  by  attention  to  personal  well-being.  Of 
all  bequests  of  parents  to  children  the  most  valuable  is 
a  sound  constitution.  Though  a  man's  body  is  not  a 
property  that  can  be  inherited,  yet  his  constitution  may 
fitly  be  compared  to  an  entailed  estate  ;  and  if  he  rightly 
understands  his  duty  to  posterity,  lie  will  see  that  he  is 
bound  to  pass  on  that  estate  uninjured  if  not  improved. 
To  say  this  is  to  say  that  he  must  be  egoistic  to  the  ex- 
tent of  satisfying  all  those  desires  associated  with  the 
due  performance  of  functions.  Nay.  it  is  to  say  more. 
It  is  to  say  that  he  must  seek  in  due  amounts  the  vari- 
ous pleasures  which  life  offers.  For  beyond  the  effect 
these  have  in  raising  the  tide  of  life  and  maintaining 
constitutional  vigor,  there  is  the  effect  they  have  in  pre- 
serving and  increasing  a  capacity  for  receiving  enjoy- 
ment. Endowed  with  abundant  energies  and  various 
tastes,  some  can  get  gratifications  of  many  kinds  on  op- 
portunities hourly  occurring;  while  others  are  so  inert, 
and  so  uninterested  in  things  around,  that  they  cannot 
even  take  the  trouble  to  amuse  themselves.  And  unless 
heredity  be  denied,  the  inference  must  be  that  due  ac- 
ceptance of  the  miscellaneous  pleasures  life   offers,  con- 


•2:1  -2  THE  DATA  OF  ETIIICS. 

duces  to  the  capacity  for  enjoyment  in  posterity ;  and 
that  persistence  in  dull,  monotonous  lives  by  parents. 
diminishes  the  ability  of  their  descendants  to  make  the 
best  of  what  gratifications  fall  to  them. 

§  72.  Beyond  the  decrease  of  general  happiness  which 
results  in  this  indirect  way,  if  egoism  is  unduly  subordi- 
nated, there  is  a  decrease  of  general  happiness  which  re- 
sults in  a  direct  way.  He  who  carries  self-regard  far 
enough  to  keep  himself  in  good  health  and  high  spirits, 
in  the  first  place,  thereby  becomes  an  immediate  source 
of  happiness  to  those  around,  and,  in  the  second  place, 
maintains  the  ability  to  increase  their  happiness  by  al- 
truistic actions.  But  one  whose  bodily  vigor  and  men- 
tal health  are  undermined  by  self-sacrifice  carried  too 
far,  in  the  first  place  becomes  to  those  around  a  cause  of 
sssion,  and,  in  the  second  place,  renders  himself 
incapable,  or  less  capable,  of  actively  furthering  their 
welfare. 

In  estimating  conduct  we  must  remember  that  there 
are  those  who  by  their  joyousness  beget  joy  in  others, 
and  that  there  are  those  who  by  their  melancholy  east  a 
-loom  on  every  circle  they  enter.  And  we  must  remem- 
hat  by  display  of  overflowing  happiness  a  man  of 
the  one  kind  may  add  to  the  happiness  of  others  more 
than  by  positive  efforts  to  benefit  them,  and  that  a  man 
of  tlm  other  kind  may  decrease  their  happiness  more  by 
his  presence  than  he  increases  it  byhis  actions.  Full  of 
vivacity  the  one  is  ever  welcome.  For  his  wife  he  has 
smiles  and  jocose  speeches  ;  for  his  children  stores  of 
fun  and  play  ;  for  his  friends  pleasant  talk  interspersed 
with  the  sallies  of  wit  that  come  Erom  buoyancy.  Con- 
trariwise, the  other  is  shunned.     The  irritability  result- 


EGOISM  VERSUS  ALTRUI-M.  233 

Ing  now  from  ailments,  now  from  failures  caused  by 
feebleness,  his  family  has  daily  to  bear.  Lacking  ade- 
quate energy  for  joining  in  them,  lie  has  at  best  but  a 
tepid  interest  in  the  amusements  of  his  children,  ana  he 
is  called  a  wet  blanket  by  his  friends.  Little  account 
as  our  ethical  reasonings  take  note  of  it,  yet  is  the  fact 
obvious  that  since  happiness  and  misery  are  infectious, 
such  regard  for  self  as  conduces  to  health  and  high 
spirits  is  a  benefaction  to  others,  and  such  disregard  of 
self  as  brings  on  suffering,  bodily  or  mental,  is  a  male- 
faction to  others. 

The  duty  of  making  one's  self  agreeable  by  seeming 
to  be  pleased,  is  indeed,  often  urged,  and  thus  to  gratify 
friends  is  applauded  so  long  as  self-sacrificing  effort  is 
implied.  But  though  display  of  real  happiness  gratifies 
friends  far  more  than  display  of  sham  happiness,  and 
has  no  drawback  in  the  shape  either  of  hypocrisy  or 
strain,  yet  it  is  not  thought  a  duty  to  fulfill  the  con- 
ditions which  favor  the  display  of  real  happiness. 
Nevertheless,  if  quantity  of  happiness  produced  is  to  be 
the  measure,  the  last  is  more  imperative  than  the  first. 

And  then,  as  above  indicated,  beyond  this  primary 
series  of  effects  produced  on  others  there  is  a  secondary 
series  of  effects.  The  adequately  egoistic  individual 
retains  those  powers  which  make  altruistic  activities 
possible.  The  individual  who  is  inadequately  egoistic 
loses  more  or  less  of  his  ability  to  be  altruistic.  The 
truth  of  the  one  proposition  is  self-evident,  and  the 
truth  of  the  other  is  daily  forced  on  us  by  examples. 
Note  a  few  of  them. 

Here  is  a  mother  who,  brought  up  in  the  insane 
fashion  usual  among  the  cultivated,  has  a  physique  not 
strong  enough   for  suckling  her  infant,  but  who,  know- 


234  THE  DATA  OF  ETIIICS. 

ing  that  its  natural  Eood  is  the  best,  and  anxious  for  its 
welfare, continues  to  give  it  milk  fora  longer  time  than 
her  system  will  bear.  Eventually  the  accumulating  re- 
action  tells.  There  comes  exhaustion  running,  it  may 
be,  into  illness  caused  by  depletion;  occasionally  ending 
in  death,  and  often  entailing  chronic  weakness.  She 
becomes,  perhaps  for  a  time,  perhaps  permanently,  in- 
capable of  carrying  on  household  affairs;  her  other 
children  suffer  from  the  loss  of  maternal  attention; 
and  where  the  income  is  small,  payments  for  nurse  and 
doctor  tell  injuriously  on  the  whole  family. 

Instance,  again,  what  not  unfrequently  happens  with 
the  father.  Similarly  prompted  by  a  high  sense  of 
obligation,  and  misled  by  current  moral  theories  into 
the  notion  that  self-denial  may  rightly  be  carried  to  any 
extent,  he  daily  continues  his  office  work  for  long  hours 
regardless  of  hot  head  and  cold  feet;  and  debars  him- 
self from  social  pleasures,  for  which  he  thinks  he  can 
afford  neither  time  nor  money.  What  comes  of  this  en- 
tirely unegoistic  course?  Eventually  a  sudden  col- 
iapse,  sleeplessness,  inability  to  work.  That  rest  which 
he  would  not  give  himself  when  his  sensations  prompt- 
ed, he  has  now  to  take  in  long  measure.  The  extra 
earnings  Laid  by  for  the  benefit  of  his  family  are  quickly 
swept  away  by  costly  journeys  in  aid  of  recovery,  and 

by  the  many  expenses  which  illness  entails.  Instead  of 
increased  ability  to  do  his  duty  by  his  offspring,  there 
comes  now  inability.     Life-long  evils  on  them  replace 

hoped-for  L>oods. 

And  so  is  it,  too,  with  the  social  effects  of  inadequate 

mi.     All  grades  furnish  examples  of  the  mischiefs, 

positive  and    negative,  inflicted  on  society  by  excessive 

»f  self,     Now  the  case  is  that  of  a  laborer  who, 


EGOISM  VERSUS  ALTRUISM.  2?,r, 

conscientiously  continuing  his  work  under  a  broiling 
sun,  spite  of  violent  protest  from  his  feelings,  dies  of 
sunstroke  ;  and  Leaves  his  family  a  burden  to  the  parish. 
Now  the  case  is  that  of  a  clerk  whose  eyes  permanently 
fail  from  overstraining,  or  who,  daily  writing  for  hours 
after  his  lingers  are  painfully  cramped,  is  attacked  with 
"scrivener's  palsy,"  and,  unable  to  write  at  all,  sinks 
with  aged  parents  into  poverty  which  friends  are  called 
on  to  mitigate.  And  now  the  case  is  that  of  a  man  de- 
voted to  public  ends  who,  shattering  his  health  by  cease- 
less application,  fails  to  achieve  all  he  might  have 
achieved  by  a  more  reasonable  apportionment  of  his  time 
between  labor  on  behalf  of  others  and  ministration  to 
his  own  needs. 

§  73.  In  one  further  way  is  the  undue  subordination  of 
egoism  to  altruism  injurious.  Both  directly  and  indirect- 
ly unselfishness  pushed  to  excess  generates  selfishness. 

Consider  first  the  immediate  effects.  That  one  man 
may  yield  up  to  another  a  gratification,  it  is  needful 
that  the  other  shall  accept  it ;  and  where  the  gratifica- 
tion is  of  a  kind  to  which  their  respective  claims  are 
equal,  or  which  is  no  more  required  by  the  one  than  by 
the  other,  acceptance  implies  a  readiness  to  get  gratifi- 
cation at  another's  cost.  The  circumstances  and  needs 
of  the  two  being  alike,  the  transaction  involves  as  much 
culture  of  egoism  in  the  last  as  it  involves  culture  of 
altruism  in  the  first.  It  is  true  that  not  unfrequentlv, 
difference  between  their  means  or  difference  between 
their  appetites  for  a  pleasure  which  the  one  has  had 
often  and  the  other  rarely,  divests  the  acceptance  of  this 
character;  and  it  is  true  that  in  other  cases  the  bene* 
factor  manifestly  takes  so  much  pleasure  in  giving  picas- 


236  THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 

urc  thai  the  .sacrifice  is  partial,  and  the  reception  of  it 
not  wholly  selfish.  But  to  see  the  effect  above  indi- 
cated we  must  exclude  such  inequalities,  and  consider 
what  happens  where  wants  arc  approximately  alike,  and 
where  the  sacrifices,  not  reciprocated  at  intervals,  are 
perpetually  on  one  side.  So  restricting  the  inquiry  all 
can  name  instances  verifying  the  alleged  result.  Every 
one  can  remember  circles  in  which  the  daily  surrender 
of  benefits  by  the  generous  to  the  greedy  has  caused 
increase  of  greediness,  until  there  has  been  produced  an 
unscrupulous  egoism  intolerable  to  all  around.  There 
are  obvious  social  effects  of  kindred  nature.  Most  think- 
ing people  now  recognize  the  demoralization  caused  by 
indiscriminate  charity.  They  see  how  in  the  mendicant 
is,  besides  destruction  of  the  normal  relation  be- 
tween Labor  expended  and  benefit  obtained,  agenesis  of 
the  expectation  that  others  shall  minister  to  his  needs; 
showing  itself  sometimes  in  the  venting  of  curses  on 
those  who 

st  consider  the  remote  results.     When  the  egois- 
tic claims  are  so  much  subordinated  to  the  altruistic  as 
to  produce   physical   mischief,  the   tendency  is  toward 
itive  decrease  in  the  number  of  the  altruistic,  and 
Eore   an   increased   predominance   of   the  egoistic. 
Pushed  to  extremes,  sacrifice  of  self  for  the  benefit  of 
>  leads  occasionally  to  death   before  the  ordinary 
!    of    m;  leads    sometimes    to    abstention 

in  i  isters  of  charity  ;  leads  sometimes 
i  ill-health  or  a  loss  of  attractiveness  which  prevents 
marriage;  leads  sometimes   to  non-acquirement  of  the 
pecuniary  m  ded  for  marriage;  and  in  all  these 

ore,  ill",  unusually  altruistic  leave  no  de- 
scendants.   "Where  the  postponement  of  personal  welfare 


EGOISM  VERSUS  ALTRUISM.  237 

to  the  welfare  of  others  has  not  been  carried  so  far  as  t<> 
prevent  marriage,  it  yet  not  unfrequently  occurs  that 
the  physical  degradation  resulting  from  years  of  self- 
neglect  causes  infertility ;  so  that  again  the  most 
altruistically  natured  leave  no  like  natured  posterity. 
And  then  in  less  marked  and  more  numerous  cases,  the 
resulting  enfeeblement  shows  itself  by  the  production 
of  relatively  weak  offspring ;  of  whom  some  die  early, 
while  the  rest  are  less  likely  than  usual  to  transmit  the 
parental  type  to  future  generations.  Inevitably,  then, 
by  this  dying  out  of  the  especially  unegoistic,  there  is 
prevented  that  desirable  mitigation  of  egoism  in  the 
average  nature  which  would  else  have  taken  place. 
Such  disregard  of  self  as  brings  down  bodily  vigor  below 
the  normal  level,  eventually  produces  in  the  society  a 
counterbalancing  excess  of  regard  for  self. 

§  74.  That  egoism  precedes  altruism  in  order  of  im- 
perativeness, is  thus  clearly  shown.  The  acts  which 
make  continued  life  possible,  must,  on  the  average,  be 
more  peremptory  than  all  those  other  acts  which  life 
makes  possible,  including  the  acts  which  benefit  otliers. 
Turning  from  life  as  existing  to  life  as  evolving,  we  are 
equally  shown  this.  Sentient  beings  have  progressed 
from  low  to  high  types,  under  the  law  that  the  superior 
shall  profit  by  their  superiority  and  the  inferior  shall 
suffer  from  their  inferiority.  Conformity  to  this  law 
has  been,  and  is  still,  needful,  not  only  for  the  con- 
tinuance of  life  but  for  the  increase  of  happiness  :  since 
the  superior  are  those  having  faculties  better  adjusted 
to  the  requirements — faculties,  therefore,  which  bring 
in  their  exercise  greater  pleasure  and  less  pain. 

More  special  considerations  join  these  more  general 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 

ones  in  showing  us  this  truth.  Such  egoism  as  pre- 
serves a  vivacious  mind  in  a  vigorous  body  furthers  the 
happiness  of  descendants,  whose  inherited  constitutions 
make  the  labors  of  life  easy  and  its  pleasures  keen  ; 
while,  conversely,  unhappiness  is  entailed  on  posterity 
by  those  who  bequeath  them  constitutions  injured  by 
self-neglect.  Again,  the  individual  whose  well-con- 
1  Life  shows  itself  in  overflowing  spirits,  becomes, 
by  his  mere  existence,  a  source  of  pleasure  to  all  around  ; 
while  the  depression  which  commonly  accompanies  ill- 
health  diffuses  itself  through  family  and  among  friends. 
A  farther  contrast  is  that  whereas  one  who  has  been 
duly  regardful  of  self  retains  the  power  of  being  helpful 
to  others,  there  results  from  self-abnegation  in  excess, 
not  only  an  inability  to  helj}  others  but  the  infliction  of 
positive  burdens  od  them.  Lastly,  we  come  upon  the 
truth  that  undue  altruism  increases  egoism,  both  directly 
in  contemporaries  and  indirectly  in  posterity. 

And  now  observe  that  though  the  general  conclusion 
enforced  by  these  special  conclusions  is  at  variance  Avith 
nominally  accepted  beliefs,  it  is  not  at  variance  with 
actually  accepted  beliefs.  While  opposed  to  the  doctrine 
which  men  are  taught  should  be  acted  upon,  it  is  in 
harmony  with  the  doctrine  which  they  do  act  upon  and 
dimly  see  must  be  acted  upon.  For  omitting  such 
abnormalities  of  conduct  as  are  instanced  above,  every 
one,  alike  by  deed  and  word,  implies  that  in  1  lie  business 
of  life  personal  welfare  is  the  primary  consideration. 
The  laborer  looking  for  wages  in  return  for  work  done, 
no  less  than  the  merchant  who  sells  goods  at  a  profit, 
the  doctor  who  expects  fees  for  advice,  the  priest  who 
calls  the  scene  of  his  ministrations  "a  living,"  assumes 
as  beyond  question  the  truth  that  selfishness,   carried  to 


EGOISM  VERSUS  ALTRUISM.  239 

the  extent  of  enforcing  his  claims  and  enjoying  the  re- 
turns his  efforts  bring,  is  not  only  legitimate  but  essen- 
tial. Even  persons  who  avow  a  contrary  conviction 
prove  by  their  acts  that  it  is  inoperative.  Those  who 
repeat  with  emphasis  the  maxim,  *'  Love  your  neighbor 
as  yourself,"  do  not  render  up  what  they  possess  so  as 
to  satisfy  the  desires  of  all  as  much  as  they  satisfy  their 
own  desires.  Nor  do  those  whose  extreme  maxim  is, 
"Live  for  others,"  differ  appreciably  from  people  around 
in  their  regards  for  personal  welfare,  or  fail  to  appro- 
priate their  shares  of  life's  pleasures.  In  short,  that 
which  is  above  set  forth  as  the  belief  to  which  scientific 
ethics  leads  us,  is  that  which  men  do  really  believe,  as 
distinguished  from  that  which  they  believe  they  believe. 
Finally,  it  may  be  remarked  that  a  rational  egoism,  so 
far  from  implying  a  more  egoistic  human  nature,  is  con- 
sistent with  a  human  nature  that  is  less  egoistic.  For 
excesses  in  one  direction  do  not  prevent  excesses  in  the 
opposite  direction ;  but  rather,  extreme  deviations  from 
the  mean  on  one  side  lead  to  extreme  deviations  on  the 
other  side.  A  society  in  which  the  most  exalted  prin- 
ciples of  self-sacrifice  for  the  benefit  of  neighbors  are 
enunciated,  may  be  a  society  in  which  unscrupulous  sac- 
rifice of  alien  fellow-creatures  is  not  only  tolerated  but 
applauded.  Along  with  professed  anxiety  to  spread 
these  exalted  principles  among  heathens,  there  may  go 
the  deliberate  fastening  of  a  quarrel  upon  them  with  a 
view  to  annexing  their  territory.  Men  who  every  Sun- 
day have  listened  approvingly  to  injunctions  carrying 
the  regard  for  other  men  to  an  impracticable  extent, 
may  }-et  hire  themselves  out  to  slay,  at  the  word  of  com- 
mand, any  people,  in  any  part  of  the  world,  utterly  in- 
different to  the  right  or  wrong  of  the  matter  fought 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS*. 

about.  And  as  in  these  cases  transcendent  altruism  in 
theory  co-exists  with  brutal  egoism  in  practice,  so  con- 
v.  a  more  qualified  altruism  may  have  for  its  con- 
comitant  a  greatly  moderated  egoism.  For  asserting  the 
due  claims  <>i'  self,  is,  by  implication,  drawing  a  limit 
beyond  which  tin;  claims  are  undue;  and  is,  by  conse- 
quence, bringing  into  greater  clearness  the  claims  of 
others. 


ALTRUISM   VERSUS  EGOISM.  241 


CHAPTER  XII. 

ALTRUISM  VERSUS   EGOISM. 

§  75.  If  we  define  altruism  as  being  all  action  which, 
in  the  normal  course  of  things,  benefits  others  instead  of 
benefiting  self,  then,  from  the  dawn  of  life,  altruism  has 
been  no  less  essential  than  egoism.  Though,  primarily, 
it  is  dependent  on  egoism,  yet,  secondarily,  egoism  is 
dependent  on  it. 

Under  altruism,  in  this  comprehensive  sense,  I  take 
in  the  acts  by  which  offspring  are  preserved  and  the 
species  maintained.  Moreover,  among  these  acts  must 
be  included  not  such  only  as  are  accompanied  by  con- 
sciousness but  also  such  as  conduce  to  the  welfare  of 
offspring  without  mental  representation  of  the  welfare — 
acts  of  automatic  altruism  as  we  may  call  them.  Nor 
must  there  be  left  out  those  lowest  altruistic  acts  which 
subserve  race-maintenance  without  implying  even  auto- 
matic nervous  processes — acts  not  in  the  remotest  sense 
psychical,  but  in  a  literal  sense  physical.  Whatever 
action,  conscious  or  unconscious,  involves  expenditure 
of  individual  life  to  the  end  of  increasing  life  in  other 
individuals,  is  unquestionably  altruistic  in  a  sense,  if  not 
in  the  usual  sense,  and  it  is  here  needful  to  understand 
it  in  this  sense  that  we  may  see  how  conscious  altruism 
grows  out  of  unconscious  altruism. 

The  simplest  beings  habitually  multiply  by  sponta- 
neous fission.  Physical  altruism  of  the  lowest  kind,  dif- 
16 


2  I J  THE  LATA  OF  ETHICS. 

ferentiating  from  physical  egoism,  may,  in  this  case,  be 
considered  as  not  yet  independent  of  it.  For  since  the 
two  halves  which,  before  fission,  constituted  the  individ- 
ual, do  not  on  dividing  disappear,  we  must  say  that 
though  the  individuality  of  the  parent  infusorium  or 
other  protozoon  is  lost  in  ceasing  to  be  single,  yet  the 
old  individual  continues  to  exist  in  each  of  the  new  in- 
dividuals. When,  however,  as  happens  generally  with 
smallest  animals,  an  interval  of  quiescence  ends  in 
tin-  breaking  up  of  the  whole  body  into  minute  parts, 
each  of  wliich  is  the  germ  of  a  young  one,  we  see  the 
parent  entirely  sacrificed  in  forming  progeny. 

Here  might  be  described  how  among  creatures  of 
higher  grades,  by  fission  or  gemmation,  parents  bequeath 
parts  of  their  bodies,  more  or  less  organized,  to  form 
offspring  at  the  cost  of  their  own  individualities.  Numer- 
ous examples  might  also  be  given  of  the  ways  in  which 
the  development  of  ova  is  carried  to  the  extent  of  mak- 
ing the  parental  body  little  more  than  a  receptacle  for 
them  :  the  implication  being  that  the  accumulations  of 
nutriment  which  parental  activities  have  laid  up  are 
disposed  of  for  the  benefit  of  posterity.  And  then  might 
be  dwell  on  the  multitudinous  cases  where,  as  generally 
throughout  the  insect-world,  maturity  having  been 
reached  and  a  new  generation  provided  for,  life  ends : 
death  follows  the  sacrifices  made  for  progeny. 

But  leaving  these  lower  types  in  which  the  altruism 
is  physical  only,  or  in  which  it  is  physical  and  automati- 
cally psychical  only,  Let  us  ascend  to  those  in  which  it  is 
also,  to  a  considerable  degree,  conscious.  Though,  in 
birds  and  mammals,  such  parental  activities,  as  are 
guided  by  instinct,  are  accompanied  by  either  no  repre- 
sentations or  but  vague  representations  of  the  benefits 


ALTRUISM  VER8U8  EGOISM.  243 

which  the  young  receive,  yet  then"  are  also  in  them  ac- 
tions which  we  may  class  as  altruistic  in  the  higher 
sense.  The  agitation  which  creatures  of  these  cl: 
show  when  their  young  are  in  danger,  joined  often  with 
efforts  on  their  behalf,  as  well  as  grief  displayed  after 
loss  of  their  young,  make  it  manifest  that  in  them  pa- 
rental altruism  has  a  concomitant  of  emotion. 

Those  who  understand  by  altruism  only  the  conscious 
sacrifice  of  self  to  others  among  human  beings,  will 
think  it  strange,  or  even  absurd,  to  extend  its  meaning 
so  widely.  But  the  justification  for  doing  this  is 
greater  than  has  thus  far  appeared.  I  do  not  mean 
merely  that  in  the  course  of  evolution  there  has  been 
a  progress  through  infinitesimal  gradations  from  purely 
physical  and  unconscious  sacrifices  of  the  individual  for 
the  welfare  of  the  species,  up  to  sacrifices  consciously 
made.  I  mean  that  from  first  to  last  the  sacrifices  are, 
when  reduced  to  their  lowest  terms,  of  the  same  essen- 
tial nature  :  to  the  last,  as  at  first,  there  is  involved  a 
loss  of  bodily  substance.  When  a  part  of  the  parental 
body  is  detached  in  the  shape  of  gemmule,  or  egg,  or 
foetus,  the  material  sacrifice  is  conspicuous :  and  when 
the  mother  yields  milk  by  absorbing  which  the  young 
one  grows,  it  cannot  be  questioned  that  there  is  also  a 
material  sacrifice.  But  though  a  material  sacrifice  is 
not  manifest  when  the  young  are  benefited  by  activities 
on  their  behalf ;  yet,  as  no  effort  can  be  made  without 
an  equivalent  waste  of  tissue,  and  as  the  bodily  loss  is 
proportionate  to  the  expenditure  that  takes  place  with- 
out reimbursement  in  food  consumed,  it  follows  that 
efforts  made  in  fostering  offspring  do  really  represent  a 
part  of  the  parental  substance;  which  is  now  giren 
indirectly  instead  of  directly 


'J  [  1  THE  DA  TA   OF  ETHICS. 

Self-sacrifice,  them,  is  no  less  primordial  than  self- 
preservation.  Being  in  its  simple  physical  form  abso- 
lutely necessary  for  the  continuance  of  life  from  the 
aning;  and  being  extended  under  its  automatic 
form,  ;is  indispensable  to  maintenance  of  race  in  t}7pes 
considerably  advanced;  and  being  developed  to  its 
semi-conscious  and  conscious  forms,  along  with  the  con- 
tinued and  complicated  attendance  by  which  the  off- 
spring of  superior  creatures  are  brought  to  maturity, 
altruism  has  been  evolving  simultaneously  with  egoism. 
As  was  pointed  out  in  an  early  chapter,  the  same  supe- 
riorities which  have  enabled  the  individual  to  preserve 
better,  have  enabled  it  better  to  preserve  the  indi- 
viduals derived  from  it;  and  each  higher  species,  using 
its  improved  faculties  primarily  for  egoistic  benefit, 
has  spread  in  proportion  as  it  has  used  them  second- 
arily for  altruistic  benefit. 

The  imperativeness  of  altruism  as  thus  understood 
is,  indeed,  no  less  than  the  imperativeness  of  egoism 
was  shown  to  be  in  the  last  chapter.  For  while,  on  the 
one  hand,  a  falling  short  of  normal  egoistic  acts  entails 
enfeeblemenl  or  loss  of  Life,  and  therefore  loss  of  ability 
to  perform  altruistic  acts,  on  the  other  hand,  such  de- 
l'.-ei  of  altruistic  acts  as  causes  death  of  offspring  or  in- 
adequate development  of  them,  involves  disappearance 
from  future  generations  of  the  nature  that  is  not  altru- 
ist i.-  enough — so  decreasing  the  average  egoism.  In 
short,  every  species  is  continually  purifying  itself  from 
the  unduly  egoistic  individuals,  while  there  are  being 
i  it  the  unduly  altruistic  individuals. 

§  76.  As  there  has  been  an  advance  by  degrees  from 
Unconscious    parental    altruism    to    conscious    parental 


ALTRUISM   VERSU8  EQ0I8M.  245 

altruism  of  the  highest  kind,  so  Las  there  been  an 
advance  by  degrees  from  the  altruism  of  the  family  to 
social  altruism. 

A  fact  to  be  first  noted  is  that  only  where  altruistic 
relations  in  the  domestic  group  have  reached  highly- 
developed  forms,  do  there  arise  conditions  making-  pos- 
sible full  development  of  altruistic  relations  in  the 
political  group.  Tribes  in  which  promiscuity  prevails, 
or  in  which  the  marital  relations  are  transitory,  and 
tribes  in  which  polyandry  entails  in  another  way  in- 
definite relationships,  are  incapable  of  much  organiza- 
tion. Nor  do  peoples  who  are  habitually  polygamous 
show  themselves  able  to  take  on  those  high  forms  of 
social  co-operation  which  demand  due  subordination  of 
self  to  others.  Only  where  monogamic  marriage  has 
become  general  and  eventually  universal — only  where 
there  have  consequently  been  established  the  closest 
ties  of  blood — only  where  family  altruism  has  been 
most  fostered,  has  social  altruism  become  conspicuous. 
It  needs  but  to  recall  the  compound  forms  of  the  Aryan 
family,  as  described  by  Sir  Henry  Maine  and  others,  to 
see  that  family  feeling,  first  extending  itself  to  the  gens 
and  the  tribe,  and  afterward  to  the  society  formed  of 
related  tribes,  prepared  the  way  for  fellow  feeling  among 
citizens  not  of  the  same  stock. 

Recognizing  this  natural  transition,  we  are  here 
chiefly  concerned  to  observe  that  throughout  the  latter 
stages  of  the  progress,  as  throughout  the  former, 
increase  of  egoistic  satisfactions  has  depended  on  growth 
of  regard  for  the  satisfactions  of  others.  On  contem- 
plating a  line  of  successive  parents  and  offspring,  we 
see  that  each,  enabled  while  young  to  live  by  the  sacri- 


246  THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 

| predecessors  make  for  it,  itself  makes,  when  adult, 
equivalent  sacrifices  for  successors,  and  that,  in  default 
of  this  general  balancing  of  benefits  received  by  benefits 
given,  the  line  dies  out.  Similarly,  it  is  manifest  that 
in  a  society  each  generation  of  members,  indebted  for 
such  benefits  as  social  organization  yields  them  to  pre- 
ceding generations,  who  have  by  their  sacrifices  elabo- 
rated this  organization,  are  called  on  to  make  for  succeed- 
ing generations  such  kindred  sacrifices  as  shall  at  least 
maintain  this  organization,  if  they  do  not  improve  it  : 
the  alternative  being  decay  and  eventual  dissolution  of 
the  society,  implying  gradual  decrease  in  the  egoistic 
satisfactions  of  its  members. 

And  now  we  are  prepared  to  consider  the  several 
ways  in  which,  under  social  conditions,  personal  welfare 
depends  on  due  regard  for  the  welfare  of  others.  Already 
the  conclusions  to  be  drawn  have  been  foreshadowed. 
As  in  the  chapter  on  the  biological  view  were  implied 
the  inferences  definitely  set  forth  in  the  last  chapter,  so 
in  the  chapter  on  the  sociological  view  were  implied  the 
inferences  to  be  definitely  set  forth  here.  Sundry  of 
these  are  trite  enough,  but  they  must,  nevertheless,  be 
specified,  since  the  statement  would  be  incomplete 
without  them. 

§  77.  First  to  be  dealt  with  comes  that  negative 
altruism  implied  by  such  curbing  of  the  egoistic  im- 
pulses as  prevents  direct  aggression. 

As  before  shown,  if  men  instead  of  living  separately 

0   unite  for    defense  or  for   other   purposes,    they 

must  severally  reap  more  good  than  evil  from  the  union. 

On  the  average,  each  must  lose  less  from  the  antagonisms 

of  those  with  whom  he  is  associated  than  he  gains  by  the 


ALTRUISM  VERSUS  EGOISM.  247 

association.     At  the  outset,  therefore,  that  increas 
egoistic  satisfactions  which  the  social  state  brings,  can 
be  purchased  only  by  altruism  sufficient  to  cause  some 
recognition  of  others'  claims  :  if  not  a  voluntary  rec- 
ognition, still,  a  compulsory  recognition. 

While  the  recognition  is  but  of  that  lowest  kind  due 
to  dread  of  retaliation,  or  of  prescribed  punishment, 
the  egoistic  gain  from  association  is  small,  ami  it 
becomes  considerable  only  as  the  recognition  becomes 
voluntary — that  is,  more  altruistic.  Where,  as  among 
some  of  the  wild  Australians,  there  exists  no  limit  to 
the  right  of  the  strongest,  and  the  men  fight  to  get 
possession  of  women  while  the  wives  of  one  man  fight 
among  themselves  about  him,  the  pursuit  of  egoistic 
satisfactions  is  greatly  impeded.  Besides  the  bodily 
pain  occasionally  given  to  each  by  conflict,  and  the 
more  or  less  of  subsequent  inability  to  achieve  per- 
sonal ends,  there  is  the  waste  of  energy  entailed  in 
maintaining  readiness  for  self-defense,  and  there  is  the 
accompanying  occupation  of  consciousness  by  emotions 
that  are  on  the  average  of  cases  disagreeable.  More- 
over, the  primary  end  of  safety,  in  presence  of  external 
foes,  is  ill-attained  in  proportion  as  there  are  internal 
animosities,  such  furtherance  of  satisfactions  as  indus- 
trial co-operation  brings  cannot  be  had,  and  there  is 
little  motive  to  labor  for  extra  benefits  when  the 
products  of  labor  are  insecure.  And  from  this  early 
stage  to  comparatively  late  stages  we  may  trace  in  the 
wearing  of  arms,  in  the  carrying  on  of  family  feuds, 
and  in  the  taking  of  daily  precautions  for  safety,  the 
ways  in  which  the  egoistic  satisfactions  of  each  are 
diminished  by  deficiency  of  that  altruism  which  checks 
overt  injury  of  others. 


248  THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 

The  private  interests  of  the  individual  are  on  the 
average  better  subserved,  not  only  in  proportion  as  he 
himself  refrains  from  direct  aggression,  but  also,  on  the 
average,  in  proportion  as  he  succeeds  in  diminishing  the 
aggressions  of  his  fellows  on  one  another.  The  prev- 
alence of  antagonism  among  those  around  impedes  the 
activities  carried  on  by  each  in  pursuit  of  satisfactions  ; 
and  by  causing  disorder  makes  the  beneficial  results  of 
activities  more  doubtful.  Hence,  each  profits  egoisti- 
cally  from  the  growth  of  an  altruism  which  leads  each 
to  aid  in  preventing  or  diminishing  others'  violence. 

The  like  holds  when  we  pass  to  that  altruism  which 
restrains  the  undue  egoism  displayed  in  breaches  of 
contract.  General  acceptance  of  the  maxim  that  hon- 
esty is  the  best  policy,  implies  general  experience  that 
gratification  of  the  self-regarding  feelings  is  eventually 
furthered  by  such  checking  of  them  as  maintains 
equitable  dealings.  And  here,  as  before,  each  is  per- 
sonally interested  in  securing  good  treatment  of  his 
fellows  by  one  another.  For  in  countless  ways  evils 
are  entailed  on  each  by  the  prevalence  of  fraudulent 
transactions.  As  every  one  knows,  the  larger  the 
number  of  a  shop-keeper's  hills  left  unpaid  by  some 
customers,  the  higher  must  be  the  prices  which  other 
customers  pay.  The  more  manufacturers  lose  by  de- 
e  law  materials  or  by  carelessness  of  workmen, 
the  more  must,  they  charge  for  their  fabrics  to  buyers. 
The  Less  trustworthy  people  are,  the  higher  rises  the 
of  interest,  the  Larger  becomes  the  amount  of 
capital  hoarded,  the  greater  are  the  impediments  to 
industry.  The  further  traders  and  people  in  general 
go  beyond  their  means,  and  hypothecate  the  property  of 
others  in  speculation,  the   more  serious  are  those  com- 


ALTRUISM  VERSUS  EGOISM.  240 

mercial  panics  which  bring  disasters  on  multitudes  and 
injuriously  affect  all. 

This  introduces  us  to  yet  a  third  way  in  which  such 
personal  welfare  as  results  from  the  proportioning  of 
benefits  gained  to  labors  given,  depends  on  the  making 
of  certain  sacrifices  for  social  welfare.  The  man  who, 
expending  his  energies  wholly  on  private  affairs,  refuses 
to  take  trouble  about  public  affairs,  pluming  himself  on 
his  wisdom  in  minding  his  own  business,  is  blind  to  the 
fact  that  his  own  business  is  made  possible  only  by 
maintenance  of  a  healthy  social  state,  and  that  he  loses 
all  round  by  defective  governmental  arrangements. 
Where  there  are  many  like-minded  with  himself — where, 
as  a  consequence,  offices  come  to  be  filled  by  political 
adventurers  and  opinion  is  swayed  by  demagogues — 
where  bribery  vitiates  the  administration  of  the  law  and 
makes  fraudulent  slate  transactions  habitual,  heavy 
penalties  fall  on  the  community  at  large,  and,  among 
others,  on  those  who  have  thus  done  everything  for  self 
and  nothing  for  societ}-.  Their  investments  are  insecure ; 
recovery  of  their  debts  is  difficult,  and  even  their  lives 
are  less  safe  than  they  would  otherwise  have  been. 

So  that  on  such  altruistic  actions  as  are  implied,  firstly 
in  being  just,  secondly  in  seeing  justice  done  between 
others,  and  thirdly  in  upholding  and  improving  the 
agencies  by  which  justice  is  administered,  depend,  in 
large  measure,  the  egoistic  satisfactions  of  each. 

§  78.  But  the   identification   of  personal   advantage 

with  the  advantage  of  fellow-eiti/.ens  is  much  wider  than 
this.  In  various  other  ways  the  well-being  of  each  rises 
and  falls  with  the  well-being  of  all. 

A  weak  man  left  to  provide  for  his  own  wants,  suffers 


12T.0  THE  DATA   OF  ETHIC8. 

t  ting  smaller  amounts  of  food  and  othemecessaries 
than  he  might  get  were  he  stronger.  In  a  community 
formed  of  weak  men,  who  divide  their  labors  and  ex- 
change the  products,  all  suffer  evils  from  the  weakness 
of  their  fellows.  The  quantity  of  each  kind  of  product 
is  made  deficient  by  the  deficiency  of  laboring  power; 
and  tin-  share  each  gets  for  such  share  of  his  own  product 
as  he  can  afford  to  give,  is  relatively  small.  Just  as  the 
maintenance  of  paupers,  hospital  patients,  inmates  of 
asylums,  and  others  who  consume  but  do  not  produce, 
leaves  to  be  divided  among  producers  a  smaller  stock  of 
commodities  than  would  exist  were  there  no  incapables  ; 
so  must  there  be  left  a  smaller  stock  of  commodities  to 
be  divided,  the  greater  the  number  of  inefficient  produ- 
or  the  greater  the  average  deficiency  of  producing 
power.  Hence,  whatever  decreases  the  strength  of  men 
in  general  restricts  the  gratifications  of  each  by  making 
the  means  to  them  dearer. 

More  directly,  and  more  obviously,  does  the  bodily 
well-being  of  his  fellows  concern  him  ;  for  their  bodily 
ill-being,  when  it  takes  certain  shapes,  is  apt  to  bring 
similar  bodily  ill-being  on  him.  If  he  is  not  himself 
attacked  by  cholera,  or  small-pox,  or  typhus,  when  it 
invades  his  neighborhood,  he  often  suffers  a  penalty 
through  his  belongings.  Under  conditions  spreading 
it.  his  wife  catches  diphtheria,  or  his  servant  is  laid  up 
with  scarlet  fever,  or  his  children  take  now  this  and  now 
that  infectious  disorder.  Add  together  the  immediate 
and  remote  evils  brought  on  him  year  after  year  by 
epidemics,  and  it  becomes  manifest  that  his  egoistic 
satis!  ire    greatly  furthered   by   such    altruistic 

render  disease  less  prevalent. 

With  the  mental,  as  well  as  with  the  bodily,  states  of 


AlT&UISM  V&R8VB  XQOlBlt.  251 

fellow-citizens,  his  enjoyments  are  in  multitudinous 
ways  bound  up.  Stupidity  like  weakness  raises  the  cost 
of  commodities.  Where  farming  is  unimproved,  the 
prices  of  food  are  higher  than  they  would  else  be ;  where 

antiquated  routine  maintains  itself  in  trade,  the  needless 
expense  of  distribution  weighs  on  all;  where  there  is  no 
inventiveness,  every  one  loses  the  benefits  which  im- 
proved appliances  diffuse.  Other  than  economic  evils 
come  from  the  average  unintelligence — periodically 
through  the  manias  and  panics  that  arise  because  traders 
rush  in  herds  all  to  buy  or  all  to  sell ;  and  habitually 
through  the  mal-adnhnistration  of  justice,  which  people 
and  rulers  alike  disregard  while  pursuing  this  or  that 
legislative  will-o'-the-wisp.  Closer  and  clearer  is  the 
dependence  of  his  personal  satisfactions  on  others' 
mental  states,  which  each  experiences  in  his  household. 
Unpunctuality  and  want  of  system  are  perpetual  sources 
of  annoyance.  The  unskillfulness  of  the  cook  causes 
frequent  vexation  and  occasional  indigestion.  Lack  of 
forethought  in  the  housemaid  leads  to  a  fall  over  a 
bucket  in  a  dark  passage.  And  inattention  to  a  message 
or  forgetfulness  in  delivering  it,  entails  failure  in  an  im- 
portant engagement.  Each,  therefore,  benefits  egois- 
tically  by  such  altruisism  as  aids  in  raising  the  average 
intelligence.  I  do  not  mean  such  altruism  as  taxes  rate- 
payers that  children's  minds  may  be  filled  with  dates, 
and  names,  and  gossip  about  kings,  and  narratives  of 
battles,  and  other  useless  information,  no  amount  of 
which  will  make  them  capable  workers  or  good  citizens  ; 
but  I  mean  such  altruism  as  helps  to  spread  a  knowl- 
edge of  the  nature  of  things  and  to  cultivate  the  power 
of  applying    that  knowledge. 

Yet  again,  each  has  a  private  interest  in  public  morals 


252  THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 

and  profits  by  improving  them.  Not  in  large  ways  only, 
by  aggressions  and  breaches  of  contract,  by  adulterations 
and  short  measures,  does  each  suffer  from  the  genera] 
unconscientiousness  ;  but  in  more  numerous  small  ways. 
Now  it  is  through  the  untruthfulness  of  one  who  gives 
a  good  character  to  a  bad  servant ;  now  it  is  by  the 
recklessness  of  a  laundress  who,  using  bleaching  agents 
to  save  trouble  in  washing,  destroys  his  linen  ;  now  it 
is  by  the  acted  falsehood  of  railway  passengers  who,  by 
dispersed  coats,  make  him  believe  that  all  the  seats  in  a 
compartment  are  taken  when  they  are  not.  Yesterday 
the  illness  of  his  child  due  to  foul  gases  led  to  the  dis- 
covery of  a  drain  that  had  become  choked  because  it 
was  ill-made  by  a  dishonest  builder  under  supervision  of 
a  careless  or  bribed  surveyor.  To-day  workmen  em- 
ployed to  rectify  it  bring  on  him  cost  and  inconvenience 
by  dawdling;  and  their  low  standard  of  work,  deter- 
mined by  the  unionist  principle  that  the  better  workers 
must  not  discredit  the  worse  by  exceeding  them  in 
efficiency,  be  may  trace  to  the  immoral  belief  that  the 
unworthy  should  fare  as  well  as  the  worthy.  To-morrow 
it  turns  out  that  business  for  the  plumber  has  been 
provided  by  damage  which  the  bricklayers  have  done. 
Thus  the  improvement  of  others,  physically,  intel- 
lectually and  morally,  personally  concerns  each;  since 
their  imperfections  tell  in  raising  the  cost  of  all  the 
commodities  he  buys,  in  increasing  the  taxes  and  rates 
he  pays,  and  in  the  losses  of  time,  trouble  and  money, 
daily  brought  on  by  others'  carelessness,  stupidity,  or 
unconscientiousness. 

§  70.  Very  obvious  are  certain  more  immediate  con- 
nections between  personal  welfare  and  ministration  to 


ALTRUISM  VERSUS  EGOISM.  253 

tlie  welfare  of  those  around.  The  evils  suffered  by 
those  whose  behavior  is  unsympathetic,  and  the  benefits 
to  self  which  unselfish  conduct  brings,,show  these. 

That  any  one  should  have  formulated  his  experience 
by  saying  that  the  conditions  to  success  are  a  hard 
heart  and  a  sound  digestion,  is  marvelous  considering 
the  man}-  proofs  that  success,  even  of  a  material  kind, 
greatly  depending  as  it  does  on  the  good  offices  of 
others,  is  furthered  by  whatever  creates  good  will  in 
others.  The  contrast  between  the  prosperity  of  those 
who,  to  but  moderate  abilities  join  natures  which  beget 
friendships  by  their  kindliness,  and  the  adversity  of 
those  who,  though  possessed  of  superior  faculties  and 
greater  acquirements,  arouse  dislikes  by  their  hardness 
or  indifference,  si  ion  Id  force  upon  all  the  truth  that 
egoistic  enjoyments  are  aided  by  altruistic  actions. 

This  increase  of  personal  benefit  achieved  by  bene- 
fiting others  is  but  partially  achieved  where  a  selfish 
motive  prompts  the  seemingly  unselfish  act:  it  is  fully 
achieved  only  where  the  act  is  really  unselfish.  Though 
services  rendered  with  the  view  of  some  time  profiting 
by  reciprocated  services,  answer  to  a  certain  extent; 
yet,  ordinarily,  they  answer  only  to  the  extent  of  bring- 
ing equivalents  of  reciprocated  services.  Those  which 
bring  more  than  equivalents  arc  those  not  prompted  by 
an}'-  thoughts  of  equivalents.  For  obviously  it  is  the 
spontaneous  outflow  of  good  nature,  not  in  the  larger 
acts  of  life  only  but  in  all  its  details,  which  generates 
in  those  around  the  attachments  prompting  unstinted 
benevolence. 

Besides  furthering  prosperity,  other  regarding  ac- 
tions conduce  to  self-regarding  gratifications  by  gener- 
ating a  genial   environment.      With   the   sympathetic 


254  7727?  DA  TA   OF  ETITICS. 

being  every  one  feels  more  sympathy  than  with  others. 
All  conduct  themselves  with  more  than  usual  amiability 
to  a  person  who  hourly  discloses  a  lovable  nature. 
Such  a  one  is  practically  surrounded  by  a  world  of  bet- 
ter people  than  one  who  is  less  attractive.  If  we  con- 
trast the  state  of  a  man  possessing-  all  the  material 
means  to  happiness,  but  isolated  by  his  absolute  egoism, 
with  the  state  of  an  altruistic  man  relatively  poor  in 
means  but  rich  in  friends,  we  may  see  that  various 
gratifications,  not  to  be  purchased  by  money,  come  in 
abundance  to  the  last  and  are  inaccessible  to  the  first. 

While,  then,  there  is  one  kind  of  other  reerardino'  ac- 
tion,  furthering  (lie  prosperity  of  fellow-citizens  at  large, 
which  admits  of  being  deliberately  pursued  from  mo- 
tives that  are  remotely  self-regarding — the  conviction 
being  that  personal  well-being  depends  in  large  meas- 
ure on  the  well-being  of  society — there  is  an  additional 
kind  of  other  regarding  action  having  in  it  no  element 
of  conscious  self-regard,  which  nevertheless  conduces 
greatly  to  egoistic  satisfactions. 

§  80.  Yet  other  modes  exist  in  which  egoism  un- 
qualified  by  altruism  habitually  fails.  It  diminishes 
tin- totality  of  egoistic  pleasure  by  diminishing  in  sev- 
eral directions  the  capacity  for  pleasure. 

Self-gratifications,    considered   separately,   or   in   the 
regate,  lose  their  intensities  by  that  too  great  per- 
sistence in  them  which  results  If  they  are  made  the  ex- 
clusive  objects  of  pursuit,     The  law  that  function  en- 
tails waste,  and  that  faculties  yielding  pleasure  by  their 
>n   cannot  act  incessantly  without  exhaustion  and 
•mpanying  Batiety,  has  the  implication  that  intervals 
fluring  istic  activities  absorb  the  energies. 


ALTRUISM  VERSUS  EGOISM.  2&S 

are  intervals  during  which  the  capacity  for  egoistic 
pleasure  is  recovering  its  full  degree.  The  sensitive- 
ness to  purely  personal  enjoyments  is  maintained  at  a 
higher  pitch  by  those  who  minister  to  the  enjoyments 
of  others  than  it  is  by  those  who  devote  then. selves 
wholly  to  personal  enjoyments. 

This  which  is  manifest  even  while  the  tide  of  life  is 
high,  becomes  still  more  manifest  as  life  ebbs.  It  is  in 
maturity  and  old  age  that  we  especially  see  how,  as 
egoistic  pleasures  grow  faint,  altruistic  actions  come  in 
to  revive  them  in  new  forms.  The  contrast  between 
the  child's  delight  in  the  novelties  daily  revealed,  and 
the  indifference  which  comes  as  the  world  around  grows 
familiar,  until,  in  adult  life,  there  remain  comparatively 
few  things  that  are  greatly  enjoyed,  draws  from  all  the 
reflection  that  as  years  go  by  pleasures  pall.  And  to 
those  who  think  it  becomes  clear  that  only  through 
sympathy  can  pleasures  be  indirectly  gained  from  things 
that  have  ceased  to  yield  pleasures  directly.  In  the 
gratifications  derived  by  parents  from  the  gratifications 
of  their  offspring,  this  is  conspicuously  shown.  Trite 
as  is  the  remark  that  men  live  afresh  in  their  children, 
it  is  needful  here  to  set  it  down  as  reminding  us  of  the 
way  in  which,  as  the  egoistic  satisfactions  in  life  fade, 
altruism  renews  them  while  it  transfigures  them. 

We  are  thus  introduced  to  a  more  general  considera- 
tion— the  egoistic  aspect  of  altruistic  pleasure.  Not, 
indeed,  that  this  is  the  place  for  discussing  the  question 
whether  the  egoistic  element  can  be  excluded  from 
altruism,  nor  is  it  the  place  for  distinguishing  between 
the  altruism  which  is  pursued  with  a  foresight  of  the 
pleasurable  feeling  to  be  achieved  through  it,  and  the 
altruism  which,  though  it  achieves  this  pleasurable  feel* 


266  THE  J) ATA  OF  ETHICS. 

ing,  does  not  make  pursuit  of  it  a  motive.  Here  we 
are  concerned  with  the  fact  that,  whether  knowingly  or 
unknowingly  gained,  the  state  of  mind  accompanying 
altruistic  action,  being  a  pleasurable  state,  is  to  be 
counted  in  the?  sum  of  pleasures  which  the  individual 
can  receive,  and  in  this  sense  cannot  be  other  than 
egoistic.  That  we  must  so  regard  it  is  proved  on  ob- 
serving that  this  pleasure,  like  pleasures  in  general,  con- 
duces to  the  physical  prosperity  of  the  ego.  As  every 
other  agreeable  emotion  raises  the  tide  of  life,  so  does 
the  agreeable  emotion  which  accompanies  a  benevolent 
deed.  As  it  cannot  be  denied  that  the  pain  caused  by 
the  sight  of  suffering  depresses  the  vital  functions — 
sometimes  even  to  the  extent  of  arresting  the  heart's 
action,  as  in  one  who  faints  on  seeing  a  surgical  opera- 
tion, so  neither  can  it  be  denied  that  the  joy  felt  in 
witnessing  others'  joy  exalts  the  vital  functions. 
Hence,  however  much  we  may  hesitate  to  class  altruistic 
pleasure  as  a  higher  kind  of  egoistic  pleasure,  we  are 
obliged  to  recognize  the  fact  that  its  immediate  effects, 
in  augmenting  life  and  so  furthering  personal  well-be- 
ing, are  like  those  of  pleasures  that  are  directly  egoistic. 
And  the  corollary  drawn  must  be  that  pure  egoism  is, 
even  in  its  immediate  results,  less  successfully  egoistic 
than  is  the  egoism  duly  qualified  by  altruism,  which, 
besides  achieving  additional  pleasures,  achieves  also, 
through  raised  vitality,  a  greater  capacity  for  pleasures 
in  general. 

Thai  the  range  of  aesthetic  gratifications  is  wider  for 
the  altruistic  nature  than  for  the  egoistic  nature  is  also 
a  truth  not  to  be  overlooked.  The  joys  and  sorrows  of 
human  beings  form  a  chief  element  in  the  subject- 
matter  of  art,  and,  evidently,  the  pleasures  which  art 


ALTRUISM  VERSUS  EQ0I8M.  25? 

gives  increase  as  the  fellow-feeling  with  these  joys  and 
sorrows  strengthens.  If  we  contrast  early  poetry 
occupied  mainly  with  war  and  gratifying  the  savage 
instincts  by  descriptions  of  bloody  victories,  with  the 
poetry  of  modern  times,  in  which  the  sanguinary  forms 
but  a  small  part,  while  a  large  part,  dealing  with  the 
gentler  affections,  enlists  the  feelings  of  readers  on 
behalf  of  the  weak ;  we  are  shown  that  with  the 
development  of  a  more  altruistic  nature  there  has  been 
opened  a  sphere  of  enjoyment  inaccessible  to  the  callous 
egoism  of  barbarous  times.  So,  too,  between  the  fiction 
of  the  past  and  the  fiction  of  the  present,  there  is  the 
difference  that  while  the  one  was  almost  exclusively 
occupied  with  the  doings  of  the  ruling  classes,  and 
found  its  plots  in  their  antagonisms  and  deeds  of 
violence,  the  other,  chiefly  taking  stories  of  peaceful 
life  for  its  subjects,  and  to  a  considerable  extent  the 
life  of  the  humbler  classes,  discloses  a  new  world  of 
interest  in  the  every-day  pleasures  and  pains  of  ordinary 
people.  A  like  contrast  exists  between  early  and  late 
forms  of  plastic  art.  When  not  representing  acts  of 
worship,  the  wall-sculptures  and  wall-paintings  of  the 
Assyrians  and  Egyptians,  or  the  decorations  of  temples 
among  the  Greeks,  represented  deeds  of  conquest  ; 
whereas  in  modern  times,  while  the  works  which  glorify 
destructive  activities  are  less  numerous,  there  are  an 
increasing  number  of  works  gratifying  to  the  kindlier 
sentiments  of  spectators.  To  see  that  those  who  care 
nothing  about  the  feelings  of  other  beings  are,  by 
implication,  shut  out  from  a  wide  range  of  resthetic 
pleasures,  it  needs  but  \<»  ask  whether  men  who  delight 
in  dog-fights  may  be  expected  to  appreciate  Beethoven's 
17 


•258  TEE  DATA  OF  ETUICS. 

Adelaida,  or  whether  Tennyson's  In  Memoriam  would 
greatly  move  a  gang  of  convicts. 

§  81.  From  the  dawn  of  life,  then,  egoism  has  been 
dependent  upon  altruism  as  altruism  has  been  depend- 
ent upon  egoism,  and  in  the  course  of  evolution  the 
reciprocal  services  of  the  two  have  heen  increasing. 

The  physical  and  unconscious  self-sacrifice  of  parents 
to  form  offspring,  which  the  lowest  living  things  dis- 
play from  hour  to  hour,  shows  us  in  its  primitive  form 
the  altruism  which  makes  possible  the  egoism  of  indi- 
vidual life  and  growth.  As  we  ascend  to  higher  grades 
of  creatures,  this  parental  altruism  becomes  a  direct 
yielding  up  of  only  part  of  the  body,  joined  with  an 
increasing  contribution  from  the  remainder  in  the 
shape  of  tissue  wasted  in  efforts  made  on  behalf  of 
progeny.  This  indirect  sacrifice  of  substance,  replac- 
ing more  and  more  the  direct  sacrifice  as  parental 
altruism  becomes  higher,  continues  to  the  last  to  repre- 
sent also  altruism  which  is  oilier  than  parental  ;  since 
this,  too,  implies  loss  of  substance  in  making  efforts  that 
do  not  bring  their  return  in  personal  aggrandizement. 

Ain-r  noting  how  among  mankind  parental  altruism 
and  family  altruism  pass  into  social  altruism,  we 
observed  that  a  society,  like  a  species,  survives  only  on 
condition  that  each  generation  of  its  members  shall 
yield  to  ib<-  next,  benefits  equivalent  to  those  it  has 
received  from  the  last.  And  this  implies  that  care  for 
the  family  must  be  supplemented  by  care  for  thesociety. 

Fullness  of   egoistic  satisfactions   in    the    associated 

depending    primarily    on   maintenance    of    the 

norma]  relation  between  efforts  expended  and  benefits 

obtained,  which  underlies  all  life,   implies  an  altruism 


ALTRUISM  VERSUS  EG0I8M.  259 

which  both  prompts  equitable  conduct  and  prompts 
the  enforcing  of  equity.  The  well-being  of  each  is 
involved  with  the  well-being  of  all  in  sundry  other 
ways.  Whatever  conduces  to  their  vigor  concerns 
Mm,  for  it  diminishes  the  cost  of  everything  he  buys. 
Whatever  conduces  to  their  freedom  from  disease  con- 
cerns him,  for  it  diminishes  his  own  liability  to  dis- 
ease. Whatever  raises  their  intelligence  concerns  him, 
for  inconveniences  are  daily  entailed  on  him  by  others' 
ignorance  or  folly.  Whatever  raises  their  moral  char- 
acter concerns  him,  for  at  every  turn  he  suffers  from 
the  average  unconscientiousness. 

Much  more  directly  do  his  egoistic  satisfactions 
depend  on  those  altruistic  activities  which  enlist  the 
sympathies  of  others.  By  alienating  those  around,  self- 
ishness loses  the  unbought  aid  they  can  render,  shuts  out 
a  wide  range  of  social  enjoyments,  and  tails  to  receive  those 
exaltations  of  pleasure  and  mitigations  of  pain  which 
come  from  men's  fellow-feeling  with  those  they  like. 

Lastly,  undue  egoism  defeats  itself  by  bringing  on 
an  incapacity  for  happiness.  Purely  egoistic  gratifi- 
cations are  rendered  less  keen  by  satiety,  even  in  the 
earlier  part  of  life,  and  almost  disappear  in  the  later  ; 
the  less  satiating  gratifications  of  altruism  are  missed 
throughout  life,  and  especially  in  that  latter  part  when 
they  largely  replace  egoistic  gratifications;  and  there 
is  a  lack  of  susceptibility  to  aesthetic  pleasures  of  the 
higher  orders. 

An  indication  must  be  added  of  the  truth,  scarcely 
at  all  recognized,  that  this  dependence  of  egoism  upon 
altruism  ranges  beyond  the  limits  of  each  society, 
and  tends  ever  toward  universality.  That  within  each 
society  it   becomes  greater  as   social  evolution,    imply- 


260  THE  DATA   OF  ETI1ICS. 

ing  increase  of  mutual  dependence,  progresses,  needs 
not  be  shown ;  and  it  is  a  corollary  thai  as  fast  as  de- 
pendence of  societies  on  one  another  is  increased  by 
common  ial  intercourse,  the  eternal  welfare  of  each 
becomes  a  matter  of  concern  to  the  others.  That  the 
impoverishment  of  any  country,  diminishing  both  its 
producing  and  consuming  powers,  tells  detrimentally 
on  the  people  of  countries  trading  with  it,  is  a  com- 
monplace  of  political  economy.  Moreover,  we  have 
had  of  late  years,  abundant  experience  of  the  indus- 
trial derangements  through  which  distress  is  brought 
on  nations  not  immediately  concerned  by  wars  be- 
tween other  nations.  And  if  each  community  lias  the 
egoistic  satisfactions  of  its  members  diminished  by 
aggressions  of  neighboring  communities  on  one  an- 
other, still  more  does  it  have  them  diminished  by  its 
own  aggressions.  One  who  marks  how,  in  various 
parts  of  the  world,  the  unscrupulous  greed  of  conquest, 
cloaked  by  pretenses  of  spreading  the  blessings  of 
British  rule  and  British  religion,  is  now  reacting  to 
the  immense  detriment  of  the  industrial  classes  at 
home,  alike-  by  increasing  expenditure  and  paralyzing 
trade,  may  see  that  these  industrial  classes,  absorbed 
in  questions  about  capital  and  labor,  and  thinking 
themselves  unconcerned  in  our  doings  abroad,  are 
suffering  from  lack  of  that  wide-reaching  altruism 
which  should  insist  on  just  dealings  with  other  peo- 
sivilized  or  savage.  And  he  may  also  see  that 
id  these  immediate  evils,  they  will  for  a  genera- 
tion to  come  suffer  the  evils  that  must  flow  from 
citating    the  type  of    social    organization    which 

produce,    and     from    ihe     lowered 

•       -  ■.■  cQmpaniment 


TRIAL  AND  COMPROMISE.  2G1 


CHAPTER  XIII. 


TRIAL    AND    COMPROMISE. 


§  82.  In  the  foregoing  two  chapters  the  case  on 
behalf  of  Egoism  and  the  case  on  behalf  of  Altruism 
have  been  slated.  The  two  conflict ;  and  we  have  now 
to  consider  what  verdict  ought  to  be  given. 

If  the  opposed  statements  are  severally  valid,  or 
even  if  each  of  them  is  valid  in  part,  the  inference 
must  be  that  pure  egoism  and  pure  altruism  are  both 
illegitimate.  If  the  maxim,  kk  Live  for  self,"  is  wrong, 
so  also  is  the  maxim,  "Live  for  others."  Hence,  a 
compromise  is  the  only  possibility. 

This  conclusion,  though  already  seeming  unavoidable, 
I  do  not  here  set  down  as  proved.  The  purpose  of 
this  chapter  is  to  justify  it  in  full,  and  I  enunciate  it 
at  the  outset  because  the  arguments  used  will  be  better 
understood,  if  the  conclusion  to  which  they  converge  is 
in  the  reader's  view. 

How  shall  we  so  conduct  the  discussion  as  most 
clearly  to  bring  out  this  necessity  for  a  compromise  ? 
Perhaps  the  best  way  will  be  that  of  stating  one  of 
the  two  claims  in  its  extreme  form,  and  observing  the 
implied  absurdities.  To  deal  thus  with  the  principle 
of  pure  selfishness  would  be  to  waste  space.  Every 
one  sees  that  an  unchecked  satisfaction  of  personal 
desires  from  moment  to  moment,  in  absolute  disregard 


262  TEE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 

of  all  other  beings,  would  cause  universal  oonflict  and 
social  dissolution.  The  principle  of  pure  unselfishness, 
less  obviously  mischievous,  may  therefore  better  be 
chosen. 

There  are  two  aspects  under  which  the  doctrine  that 
others'  happiness  is  the  true  ethical  aim  presents  itself. 
The  "  others "  may  be  conceived  personally,  as  indi- 
viduals with  whom  we  stand  in  direct  relations,  or 
they  may  be  conceived  impersonally,  as  constituting 
the  community.  In  so  far  as  the  self-abnegation 
implied  by  pure  altruism  is  concerned,  it  matters  not 
in  which  sense  "  others  "  is  used.  But  criticism  will 
be  facilitated  by  distinguishing  between  these  two 
forms  of  it.      We  will  take  the  last  form  first. 

§  83.  This  commits  us  to  an  examination  of  "  the 
greatest  happiness  principle,"  as  enunciated  by  Ben- 
tham  and  his  followers.  The  doctrine  that  "the 
general  happiness  "  ought  to  be  the  object  of  pursuit, 
is  not,  indeed,  overtly  identified  with  pure  altruism. 
But  as,  if  general  happiness  is  the  proper  end  of 
action,  the  individual  actor  must  regard  his  own  share 
of  it  simply  as  a  unit  in  the  aggregate,  no  more  to  be 
valued  by  him  than  any  other  unit,  it  results  that 
since  this  unit  is  almost  infinitesimal  in  comparison 
with  the  aggregate,  his  action,  if  directed  exclusively 
to  achievement  of  general  happiness,  is,  if  not  abso- 
lutely altruistic,  as  nearly  so  as  may  be.  Hence  the 
theory  which  makes  general  happiness  the  immediate 
object  of  pursuit  may  rightly  be  taken  as  one  form  of 
the  pure  altruism  to  be  here  criticised. 

Both  as  justifying  this  interpretation  and  as  furnish- 
ing a  definite  proposition  with   which   to  deal,  let  me 


TRIAL  AND  COMPROMISE.  2G3 

set     out    by    <|  noting    a    passage     from     Mr.     Mill's 
Utilitarian  is  in  : 

"The  Greatest  I  [appiness  Principle,"  he  says,  "is  a  mere  form  of 
words  witliout  rational  signification,  unless  one  person's  happiness,  - 
Bupposed  equal  in  degree  (with  the  proper  allowance  made  for 
kind),  is  counted  for  exactly  as  much  as  another's.  Those  condi- 
tions being  supplied,  Bentham's  dictum,  'everybody  to  count  for 
one,  nobody  for  more  than  one,'  might  be  written  under  the  prin- 
ciple of  utility  as  an  explanatory  commentary  "  (p.  91). 

Now,  though  the  meaning  of  "  greatest  happiness,"  as 
an  end,  is  here  to  a  certain  degree  defined,  the  need 
for  farther  definition  is  felt  the  moment  we  attempt  to 
decide  on  ways  of  regulating  conduct  so  as  to  attain 
the  end.  The  first  question  which  arises  is,  must  we 
regard  this  "  greatest  happiness  principle  "  as  a  princi- 
ple of  guidance  for  the  community  in  its  corporate 
capacity,  or  as  a  principle  of  guidance  for  its  members 
separately  considered,  or  both  ?  If  the  reply  is  that 
the  principle  must  be  taken  as  a  guide  for  governmental 
action  rather  than  for  individual  action,  we  are  at  once 
met  by  the  inquiry,  what  is  to  be  the  guide  for  indi- 
vidual action  ?  If  individual  action  is  not  to  be  regu- 
lated solely  for  the  purpose  of  achieving  "  the  greatest 
happiness  of  the  greatest  number,"  some  other  princi- 
ple of  regulation  for  individual  action  is  required,  and 
"  the  greatest  happiness  principle"  fails  to  furnish  the 
needful  ethical  standard.  Should  it  be  rejoined  that 
the  individual  in  his  capacity  of  political  unit  is  to  take 
furtherance  of  general  happiness  as  his  end,  giving  his 
vote  or  otherwise  acting  on  the  legislature  with  a  view 
to  this  end,  and  that  in  so  far  guidance  is  supplied  to 
him,  there  comes  the  further  inquiry,  whence  is  to 
come  guidance  for  the  remainder  of  individual  eon- 
duct,  constituting  by  far    the  greater  part   of   it?     If 


2G4  THE  DATA    OF  ETHICS. 

this  private  part  of  individual  conduct  is  not  to  have 
general  happiness  as  its  direct  aim,  then  an  ethical 
standard  other  than  that  offered  has  still  to  be  found. 
I  fence,  unless  pure  altruism  as  thus  formulated  con- 
3  its  inadequacy,  it  must  justify  itself  as  a  sufficient 
rule  for  all  conduct,  individual  and  social.  We  will 
firsl  deal  with  it  as  the  alleged  right  principle  of  public 
policy ;  and  then  as  the  alleged  right  principle  of  pri- 
vate action. 

§  84.  On  trying  to  understand  precisely  the  state- 
ment that  when  taking  general  happiness  as  an  end, 
the  rule  must  be — "  everybody  to  count  for  one,  nobody 
for  more  than  one,"  there  arises  the  idea  of  distribu- 
tion. We  can  form  no  idea  of  distribution  without 
thinking  of  something  distributed  and  recipients  of  this 
something.  That  we  may  clearly  conceive  the  proposi- 
tion we  must  clearly  conceive  both  these  elements  of 
it.     Let  us  take  first  the  recipients. 

"  Everybody  to  count  for  one,  nobody  for  more  than 
one."  Does  this  mean  that,  in  respect  of  whatever  is 
proportioned  out,  each  is  to  have  the  same  share  what- 
ever his  character,  whatever  his  conduct?  Shall  he  if 
passive  have  as  much  as  if  active?  Shall  he  if  useless 
have  as  much  as  if  useful?  Shall  he  if  criminal  have 
as  much  as  if  virtuous?  If  the  distribution  is  to  be 
made  withoul  reference  to  the  natures  and  deeds  of  the 
recipients,  then  it  must  be  shown  that  a  system  which 
equalizes,  as  far  as  it  can,  the  treatment  of  good  and 
had.  will  be  beneficial.  If  the  distribution  is  not  to  be 
indiscriminate,  then  the  formula  disappears.  The  some- 
thing distributed  must  he  apportioned  otherwise  than 
by    equal    division.     There    must    be    adjustment  of 


TRIAL  AM)  COMPROMISE.  265 

amounts  to  deserts ;  and  we  are  left  in  the  dark  as  to 
the  mode  of  adjustment — we  have  to  find  other  guid- 
ance. 

Let  us  next  ask  what  is  the  something  to  be  dis- 
tributed? The  first  idea  which  occurs  is  that  happi- 
ness itself  must  be  divided  out  among  all.  Taken 
literally,  the  notions  that  the  greatest  happiness  should 
be  the  end  sought,  and  that  in  apportioning  it  every- 
body should  count  for  one  and  nobody  for  more  than 
one,  imply  that  happiness  is  something  that  can  be  cut 
up  into  parts  and  handed  round.  This,  however,  is  an 
impossible  interpretation.  But  after  recognizing  the 
impossibility  of  it,  there  returns  the  question — What 
is  it  in  respect  of  which  everybody  is  to  count  for  one 
and  nobody  for  more  than  one  ? 

Shall  the  interpretation  be  that  the  concrete  means 
to  happiness  are  to  be  equally  divided?  Is  it  intended 
that  there  shall  be  distributed  to  all  in  equal  portions 
the  necessaries  of  life,  the  appliances  to  comfort,  the 
facilities  for  amusement?  As  a  conception  simply,  this 
is  more  defensible.  But  passing  over  the  question  of 
policy — passing  over  the  question  whether  greatest 
happiness  would  ultimately  be  secured  by  such  a  pro- 
cess (  which  it  obviously  would  not)  it  turns  out  on 
examination  that  greatest  happiness  could  not  even 
proximately  be  so  secured.  Differences  of  age,  of 
growth,  of  constitutional  need,  differences  of  activity 
and  consequent  expenditure,, differences  of  desires  and 
tastes,  would  entail  the  inevitable  result  that  the  ma- 
terial aids  to  happiness  which  eaeli  received  would  be 
more  or  less  unadapted  to  his  requirements.  Even  if 
purchasing  power  were  equally  divided,  the  greatest 
happiness  would  not  be  achieved  if  everybody  counted 


266  THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 

for  one  and  nobody  for  more  than  one  ;  since,  as  the 
capacities  for  utilizing  the  purchased  means  to  happi- 
ness would  vary  both  with  the  constitution  and  the 
stage  of  life,  the  means  which  would  approximately 
suflice  to  satisfy  the  wants  of  one  would  be  extremely 
insufficient  to  satisfy  the  wants  of  another,  and  so  the 
greatest  total  of  happiness  would  not  be  obtained  :  means 
might  be  unequally  apportioned  in  a  way  that  would 
produce  a  greater  total. 

But  now  if  happiness  itself  cannot  be  cut  up  and 
distributed  equally,  and  if  equal  division  of  the  mate- 
rial aids  to  happiness  would  not  produce  greatest  happi- 
ness, what  is  the  thing  to  be  thus  apportioned  ?  What 
is  it  in  respect  of  which  everybody  is  to  count  for  one 
and  nobody  for  more  than  one  ?  There  seems  but  a 
single  possibility.  There  remain  to  be  equally  dis- 
tributed nothing  but  the  conditions  under  which  each 
may  pursue  happiness.  The  limitations  to  action — 
the  degrees  of  freedom  and  restraint,  shall  be  alike 
for  all.  Each  shall  have  as  much  liberty  to  pursue  his 
ends  as  consists  with  maintaining  like  liberties  to 
pursue  their  ends  by  others  ;  and  one  as  much  as  an- 
other shall  have  the  enjoyment  of  that  which  his  efforts, 
carried  on  within  these  limits,  obtain.  But  to  say  that 
in  respect  of  these  conditions  everybody  shall  count  for 
(in.;  and  nobody  for  more  than  one,  is  simply  to  say  that 
equity  shall  be  enforced. 

Thus,  considered  as  a  principle  of  public  policy, 
Bentham's  principle,  when  analyzed,  transforms  itself 
into  the  principle  he  slights.  Not  general  happiness 
becomes  the  ethical  standard  by  which  legislative 
action  is  to  be  guided,  but  universal  justice.  And  so 
the  altrustic  theory  under  this  form  collapses. 


TRIAL  AND  COMPROMISE.  267 

§  85.  From  examining  the  doctrine  that  general 
happiness  should  be  the  end  of  public  action,  we  pass 
now  to  examine  the  doctrine  that  it  should  be  the  end 
of  private  action. 

It  is  contended  that  from  the  standpoint  of  pure 
reason,  the  happiness  of  others  has  no  less  a  claim  as 
an  object  of  pursuit  for  each  than  personal  happiness. 
Considered  as  parts  of  a  total,  happiness  felt  by  self 
and  like  happiness  felt  by  another  are  of  equal  values ; 
and  hence  it  is  inferred  that,  rationally  estimated,  the 
obligation  to  expend  effort  for  others'  benefit  is  as 
great  as  the  obligation  to  expend  effort  for  one's  own 
benefit.  Holding  that  the  utilitarian  system  of  morals, 
rightly  understood,  harmonizes  with  the  Christian 
maxim,  "  Love  your  neighbor  as  yourself,"  Mr.  Mill 
says  that  "  as  between  his  own  happiness  and  that  of 
others,  utilitarianism  requires  him  to  be  as  strictly 
impartial  as  a  disinterested  and  benevolent  spectator  n 
(p.  24).  Let  us  consider  the  alternative  interpretations 
which  may  be  given  to  this  statement. 

Suppose,  first,  that  a  certain  quantum  of  happiness 
has  in  some  way  become  available,  without  the  special 
instrumentality  of  A,  B,  C,  or  D,  constituting  the 
group  concerned.  Then  the  proposition  is  that  each 
shall  be  ready  to  have  this  quantum  of  happiness  as 
much  enjoyed  by  one  or  more  of  the  others  as  by  him- 
self. The  disinterested  and  benevolent  spectator 
would  clearly,  in  such  a  case,  rule  that  no  one  ought 
to  have  more  of  the  happiness  than  another.  But  here, 
assuming  as  we  do  that  the  quantum  of  happiness  has 
become  available  without  the  agency  of  any  among  the 
group,  simple  equity  dictates  as  much.  No  one  having 
in  any  way  established  a  claim  different  from  the  claim* 


TI1K  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 

of  others,  their  claims  are  equal;  and  due  regard  for 
justice  by  each  will  not  permit  him  to  monopolize  the 
happiness. 

Now  suppose  a  different  case.  Suppose  that  the 
quantum  of  happiness  lias  been  made  available  by  the 
efforts  of  one  member  of  the  group.  Suppose  that  A 
Las  acquired  by  labor  some  material  aid  to  happiness. 
lie  decides  to  act  as  the  disinterested  and  benevolent 
spectator  would  direct.  What  will  he  decide  ? — what 
would  the  spectator  direct?  Let  us  consider  the  pos- 
sible suppositions,  taking  first  the  least  reasonable. 

The  spectator  may  be  conceived  as  deciding  that  the 
labor  expended  b}-  A  in  acquiring  this  material  aid  to 
happiness,  originates  no  claim  to  special  use  of  it ;  but 
that  it  ought  to  be  given  to  B,  C,  or  D,  or  that  it  ought 
to  be  divided  equally  among  B,  C,  and  1),  or  that  it 
ought  to  be  divided  equally  among  all  members  of  the 
group,  including  A,  who  has  labored  for  it.  And  if  the 
spectator  is  conceived  as  deciding  thus  to-day, he  must 
be  conceived  as  deciding  thus  day  after  day;  with  the 
result  that  one  of  the  group  expends  all  the  effort,  get- 
ting either  none  of  the  benefit  or  only  his  numerical 
share,  while  the  others  get  their  shares  of  the  benefit 
without  expending  any  efforts.  That  A  might  con- 
ceive the  disinterested  and  benevolent  spectator  to 
decide  in  this  way,  and  might  feel  bound  to  act  in  con- 
formity with  the  imagined  decision,  is  a  strong  supposi- 
tion; and  probably  it  will  be  admitted  that  such  kind 

of  impartiality,  so  tar  Prom  being  conducive  to  the  gen- 
eral happiness,  would  quickly  be  fatal  to  every  one. 
But  this  is  not  all.  Action  in  pursuance  of  such  a  decis- 
ion would  in  reality  be  negatived  by  the  very  principle 
enunciated.       Tor  not  only  A,  but  also  B,  C,  and  D, 


TRIAL  AND  COMPROMISE.  269 

have  to  act  on  this  principle.  Each  of  them  must 
behave  as  he  conceives  an  impartial  spectator  would 
decide.  Docs  P>  conceive  the  impartial  .spectator  as 
awarding  to  him,  B,  the  product  of  A's  labor?  Then 
the  assumption  is  that  B  conceives  the  impartial  spec- 
tator as  favoring  himself,  B,  more  than  A  conceives  him 
as  favoring  himself,  A  ;  which  is  inconsistent  with  the 
hypothesis.  Does  B,  in  conceiving  the  impartial  spec- 
tator, exclude  his  own  interests  as  completely  as  A 
does?  Then  how  can  he  decide  so  much  to  his  own 
advantage,  so  partially,  as  to  allow  him  to  take  from  A 
an  equal  share  of  the  benefit  gaind  by  A's  labor,  toward 
which  he  and  the  rest  have  done  nothing? 

Passing  from  this  conceivable,  though  not  credible, 
decision  of  the  spectator,  here  noted  for  the  purpose  of 
observing  that  habitual  conformity  to  it  would  be  im- 
possible, there  remains  to  be  considered  the  decision 
which  a  spectator  really  impartial  would  give.  He 
would  say  that  the  happiness,  or  material  aid  to  hap- 
piness, which  had  been  purchased  by  A's  labor,  was  to 
be  taken  by  A.  He  would  say  that  B,  C,  and  D  had  no 
claims  to  it,  but  only  to  such  happiness,  or  aids  to  hap- 
piness, as  their  respective  labors  had  purchased.  Con- 
sequently, A,  acting  as  the  imaginary  impartial  specta- 
tor would  direct,  is,  by  this  test,  justified  in  appropria- 
ting such  happiness  or  aid  to  happiness  as  his  own 
efforts  have  achieved. 

And  so  under  its  special  form  as  under  its  general 
form,  the  principle  is  true  only  in  so  far  as  it  embodies 
a  disguised  justice.  Analysis  again  brings  out  the 
result  that  making  %*  general  happiness"  the  end  of 
action,  really  means  maintaining  what  we  call  equit- 
able relations  among  individuals.     Decline  to  accept  in 


270  TUE  DATA  OF  ETUICS. 

its  vague  form  "  the  greatest-happiness  principle,"  and 
insist  on  knowing  what  is  the  implied  conduct,  public, 
or  private,  and  it  turns  out  that  the  principle  is  mean- 
ingless save  as  indirectly  asserting  that  the  claims  of 
each  should  be  duly  regarded  by  all.  The  utilitarian 
altruism  becomes  a  duly  qualified  egoism. 

§  86.  Another  point  of  view  from  which  to  judge 
the  altruistic  theory  may  now  be  taken.  If,  assuming 
the  proper  object  of  pursuit  to  be  general  happiness, 
we  proceed  rationally,  we  must  ask  in  what  different 
way  the  aggregate,  general  happiness,  may  be  com- 
posed  ;  and  must  then  ask  what  composition  of  it  will 
yield  the  largest  sum. 

Suppose  that  each  citizen  pursues  his  own  happiness 
independently,  not  to  the  detriment  of  others,  but  with- 
out active  concern  for  others  ,  then  their  united  happi- 
nesses constitute  a  certain  sum — a  certain  general  happi- 
ness. Now  suppose  that  each,  instead  of  making  his 
own  happiness  the  object  of  pursuit,  makes  the  happi- 
ness of  others  the  object  of  pursuit;  then,  again,  there 
results  a  certain  sum  of  happiness.  This  sum  must  be 
less  than,  or  equal  to,  or  greater  than,  the  first.  If  it 
is  admitted  that  this  sum  is  either  less  than  the  first, 
or  only  equal  to  it,  the  altruistic  course  of  action  is 
confessedly  either  worse  than,  or  no  better  than,  the 
tic.  The  assumption  must  be  that  the  sum  of 
happiness  obtained  is  greater.  Let  us  observe  what  is 
involved  in  this  assumption. 

If  each  pursues  exclusively  the  happiness  of  others  ; 
and  if  each  is  also  a  recipient  of  happiness  (which  he 
must  be,  for  otherwise  no  aggregate  happiness  can  be 
formed  out  of  their  individual  happinesses) ;  then  the 


TRIAL  AND  COMPROMISE.  271 

implication  is  that  each  gains  the  happiness  due  to  altru- 
istic action  exclusively ;  and  that  in  each  this  is  greater 
in  amount  than  the  egoistic  happiness  obtainable  by 
him,  if  he  devoted  himself  to  pursuit  of  it.  Leaving 
out  of  consideration  for  a  moment  these  relative 
amounts  of  the  two,  let  us  note  the  conditions  to  the 
receipt  of  altruistic  happiness  by  each.  The  sympa- 
thetic nature  gets  pleasure  by  giving  pleasure  ;  and  the 
proposition  is  that  if  the  general  happiness  is  the  object 
of  pursuit,  each  will  be  made  happy  by  witnessing 
others'  happiness.  But  what  in  such  case  constitutes 
the  happiness  of  others  ?  These  others  are  also,  by  the 
hypothesis,  pursuers  and  receivers  of  altruistic  pleasure. 
The  genesis  of  altruistic  pleasure  in  each  is  to  depend 
on  the  display  of  pleasures  by  others ;  which  is  again 
to  depend  on  the  display  of  pleasures  by  others ;  and 
so  on  perpetually.  Where,  then,  is  the  pleasure  to 
begin  ?  Obviously  there  must  be  egoistic  pleasure 
somewhere  before  there  can  be  the  altruistic  pleasure 
caused  by  sympathy  with  it.  Obviously,  therefore,  each 
must  be  egoistic  in  due  amount,  even  if  only  with  the 
view  of  giving  others  the  possibility  of  being  altruistic. 
So  far  from  the  sum  of  happiness  being  made  greater  if 
all  make  greatest  happiness  the  exclusive  end,  the  sum 
disappears  entirely. 

How  absurd  is  the  supposition  that  the  happiness  of 
all  can  be  achieved  without  each  pursuing  his  own  hap- 
piness, will  be  best  shown  by  a  physical  simile.  Sup- 
pose a  cluster  of  bodies,  eacli  of  which  generates  heat, 
and  each  of  which  is,  therefore,  while  a  radiator  of 
heat  to  those  around,  also  a  receiver  of  heat  from 
them.  Manifestly  each  will  have  a  certain  proper  heat 
irrespective  of  that  which  it  gains  from  the  rest ;  and. 


272  Tin;  data  of  ethics. 

each  will  have  a  certain  heat  gained  from  the  rest 
irrespective  of  its  proper  heat.  What  will  happen? 
So  loii^  as  each  of  the  bodies  continues  to  be  a  gener- 
ator of  heat,  each  continues  to  maintain  a  temperature 
partly  derived  from  itself  and  partly  derived  from 
others.  Bu1  if  each  ceases  to  generate  heat  for  itself 
and  depends  on  the  heat  radiated  to  it  by  the  rest,  the 
entire  cluster  becomes  cold.  Well,  the  self-generated 
heat  stands  for  egoistic  pleasure;  the  heat  radiated  and 
received  stands  for  sympathetic  pleasure;  and  the  dis- 
appearance of  all  heat  if  each  ceases  to  be  an  originator 
of  it,  corresponds  to  the  disappearance  of  all  pleasure  if 
each  ceases  to  originate  it  egoistically. 

A  further  conclusion  may  be  drawn.  Besides  the 
implication  that  before  altruistic  pleasure  can  exist, 
egoistic  pleasure  must  exist,  and  that  if  the  rule  of 
conduct  is  to  be  the  same  for  all,  each  must  be  egoistic 
in  due  degree;  there  is  the  implication  that,  to  achieve 
the   greatest   sum   of  happiness,   each   must   be   more 

tic  than  altruistic.  For,  speaking  generally,  sym- 
pathetic pleasures  must  eve]'  continue  less  intense  than 
the  pleasures  with  which  there  is  sympathy.  Other 
things  equal,  ideal  feelings  cannot  be  as  vivid  as  real 
feelings.  It  is  true  that  those  having  strong  imagina- 
tions may,  especially  in  cases  where  the  affections  are 

fed,  feel  the  moral  pain  if  not  the  physical  pain 
of  another,  as   keenly  as  the  actual  sufferer  of  it,  and 

participate  with  like  intensity  in  another's  pleas- 
ure; sometimes  even  mentally  representing  the  received 
pleasure  a  greater  than  it  really  is,  and  so  getting  re- 
are  greater  than  the  recipients' direct  pleasure. 
Such  cases,  however,  and  cases  in  which  even  apart 
from  exultation   of  sympathy  caused  by  attachment, 


TRIAL  AND  COMPROMISE.  27S 

there  is  a  body  of  feeling  sympathetically  aroused  equal 
in  amount  to  the  original  feeling,  if  not  greater,  are 
jsarily  exceptional.  For  in  such  cases  the  total 
consciousness  inclndes  many  other  elements  besides  the 
mentally-represented  pleasure  or  pain — notably  the 
luxury  of  pity  and  the  luxury  of  goodness  ;  and  genesis  of 
these  can  occur  but  occasionally;  they  could  not  be 
habitual  concomitants  of  sympathetic  pleasures  if  all 
pursued  these  from  moment  to  moment.  In  estimating 
the  possible  totality  of  sympathetic  pleasures,  we  must 
include  nothing  beyond  the  representations  of  the 
pleasures  others  experience.  And  unless  it  be  asserted 
that  we  can  have  others'  states  of  consciousness  per- 
petually reproduced  in  us  more  vividly  than  the  kindred 
slates  of  consciousness  are  aroused  in  ourselves  by  their 
proper  personal  causes,  it  must  be  admitted  that  the 
totality  of  altruistic  pleasures  cannot  become  equal  to 
the  totality  of  egoistic  pleasures.  Hence,  beyond  the 
truth  that  before  there  can  be  altruistic  pleasures  there 
must  be  the  egoistic  pleasures  from  sympathy  with 
which  they  arise,  there  is  the  truth  that  to  obtain  the 
greatest  sum  of  altruistic  pleasures,  there  must  be  a 
greater  sum  of  egoistic  pleasures.. 

§  87.  That  pure  altruism  is  suicidal  may  be  yet  other- 
wise demonstrated.  A  perfectly  moral  law  must  be  one 
which  becomes  perfectly  practicable  as  human  nature 
becomes  perfect.  If  its  practicableness  decreases  as 
human  nature  improves  ;  and  if  an  ideal  human  nature 
necessitates  its  impracticability,  it  cannot  be  the  moral 
law  sought. 

Now  opportunities  for  practicing  altruism  are  numer- 
ous and  great  in  proportion  as  there  is  weakness,  or 
IS 


27  J  THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 

incapacity,  or  imperfection.  If  we  passed  beyond  the 
limits  of  the  family,  in  which  a  sphere  for  self-sacrificing 
activities  must  be  preserved  as  long  as  offspring  have  to 
ixed  ;  and  if  we  ask  how  there  can  continue  a  social 
sphere  for  self-sacrificing  activities,  it  becomes  obvious 
that  the  continued  existence  of  serious  evils,  caused  by 
prevalent  defects  of  nature,  is  implied.  As  fast  as  men 
adapt  themselves  to  the  requirements  of  social  life,  so 
fast  will  the  demands  for  efforts  on  their  behalf  dimin- 
ish. And  with  arrival  at  finished  adaptation,  when  all 
persons  are  at  once  completely  self-conserved  and  com* 
pletely  able  to  fulfill  the  obligations  which  society  im- 
poses on  them,  those  occasions  for  postponement  of  self 
to  others,  which  pure  altruism  contemplates,  disappear. 
Such  self-sacrifices  become,  indeed,  doubly  impracti- 
cable. Carrying  on  successfully  their  several  lives, 
men  not  only  cannot  yield  to  those  around  the  oppor- 
tunities for  giving  aid,  but  aid  cannot  ordinarily  be 
given  them  without  interfering  with  their  normal  ac- 
tivities, and  so  diminishing  their  pleasures.  Like  every 
inferior  creature,  led  by  its  innate  desires  spontaneously 
to  do  all  that  its  life  requires,  man,  when  completely 
molded  to  the  social  state,  must  have  desires  so  adjusted 
to  his  needs  that  lie  fulfills  the  needs  in  gratifying 
the  desires.  And  if  his  desires  are  severally  gratified 
by  the  performance  of  required  acts,  none  of  these  can 
be  performed  for  him  without  balking  his  desires.  Ac- 
ceptancefrom  others  of  the  results  of  their  activities  can 
take  plaee  only  on  condition  of  relinquishing  the  pleas- 
lerived  from  his  own  activities.  Diminution  rather 
than  increase  of  happiness  would  result,  could  altruistio 
action  in  such  ease  be  enforced. 


TRIAL  AND  COMPROMISE.  275 

And  here,  indeed,  we  are  introduced  to  another  base- 
less assumption  which  the  theory  makes. 

§  88.  The  postulate  of  utilitarianism  as  formulated  in 
the  statements  above  quoted,  and  of  pure  altruism  as 
Otherwise  expressed,  involves  the  belief  that  his  possible 
for  happiness,  or  the  means  to  happiness,  or  the  con- 
ditions to  happiness,  to  be  transferred.  Without  any 
specified  limitation  the  proposition  taken  for  granted  is, 
that  happiness  in  general  admits  of  detachment  from 
one  and  attachment  to  another — that  surrender  to  any 
extent  is  possible  by  one  and  appropriation  to  any  extent 
is  possible  by  another.  But  a  moment's  thought  shows 
this  to  be  far  from  the  truth.  On  the  one  hand,  sur- 
render carried  to  a  certain  point  is  extremely  mischiev- 
ous and  to  a  further  point  fatal  ;  and  on  the  other  hand, 
much  of  the  happiness  each  enjoys  is  self-generated  and 
can  neither  be  given  nor  received. 

To  assume  that  egoistic  pleasures  may  be  relinquished 
to  any  extent,  is  to  fall  into  one  of  those  many  errors 
of  ethical  speculation  which  result  from  ignoring  the 
truths  of  biology.  When  taking  the  biological  view 
of  ethics  we  saw  that  pleasures  accompany  normal 
amounts  of  functions,  while  pains  accompany  defects  or 
excesses  of  functions  ;  further,  that  complete  life  de- 
pends on  complete  discharge  of  functions,  and  therefore 
on  receipt  of  the  correlative  pleasures.  Hence,  to  yield 
up  normal  pleasures  is  to  yield  up  so  much  life ;  and 
there  arises  the  question — To  what  extent  may  this  be 
done?  If  he  is  to  continue  living,  the  individual  must 
take  certain  amounts  of  those  pleasures  which  go  along 
with  fulfillment  of  the  bodily  functions,  and  must  avoid 
the  pains  winch  entire  non-fulfillment  of   them  entail* 


276  TIIE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 

Complete  abnegation  means  death  ;  excessive  abnega- 
tion moans  illness  ;  abnegation  less  excessive  means 
physical  degradation  and  consequent  loss  of  power  to 
fultill  obligations,  personal  and  other.  When,  therefore, 
we  attempt  to  specialize  the  proposal  to  live  not  for  self- 
satisfaction  but  for  the  satisfaction  of  others,  we  meet 
with  the  difficulty  that  beyond  a  certain  limit  this  can- 
not be  done.  And  when  we  have  decided  what  decrease 
of  bodily  welfare,  caused  by  sacrifice  of  pleasures  and  ac- 
ceptance of  pains,  it  is  proper  for  the  individual  to  make, 
there  is  forced  on  us  the  fact  that  the  portion  of  hap- 
piness,  or  means  to  happiness,  which  it  is  possible  for 
him  tn  yield  up  for  redistribution,  is  a  limited  portion. 
Even  more  rigorous  on  another  side  is  the  restriction 
put  upon  the  transfer  of  happiness,  or  the  means  to  hap- 
piness. The  pleasures  gained  by  efficient  action — by 
successful  pursuit  of  ends,  cannot  by  any  process  be 
parted  with,  and  cannot  in  any  way  be  appropriated  by 
another.  The  habit  of  arguing  about  general  happiness 
sometimes  as  though  it  were  a  concrete  product  to  be 
portioned  out,  and  sometimes  as  though  it  were  co- 
extensive with  the  use  of  those  material  aids  to  pleasure 
which  may  be  givenand  received,  has  caused  inattention 
to  the  truth  that  the  pleasures  of  achievement  are  not 
transferable.  Alike  in  the  boy  who  has  won  a  game  of 
marbles,  the  athlete  who  has  performed  a  feat,  the 
::ian  who  has  gained  a  party  triumph,  the  inventor 
who  has  devised  a  new  machine,  the  man  of  science  who 
ed  a  truth,  the  novelist  who  has  well  de- 
lineated a  character,  the  poet  who  has  finely  rendered  an 
emotion,  we  see  pleasures  which  must,  in  the  nature  of 
things,  be  enjoyed  exclusively  by  those  to  whom  they 
And  if  we  look  at  all  such  occupations  as  men  are 


TRIAL  AM)  COMPROMISE.  '217 

not  impelled  to  by  their  necessities — if  we  contemplate 
the  various  ambitions  which  play  so  large  a  part  in  life  ; 
■we  are  reminded  that  so  long  as  the  consciousness  of 
efficiency  remains  a  dominant  pleasure,  there  will  re- 
main a  dominant  pleasure  which  cannot  be  pursued 
altruistically  hut  must  be  pursued  egoistically. 

Cutting  off.  then,  at  the  one  end,  those  pleasures 
which  arc  inseparable  from  maintenance  of  the  physique 
in  an  uninjured  state;  and  cutting  off  at  the  other  end 
the  pleasures  of  successful  action  ;  the  amount  that  re- 
mains is  so  greatly  diminished  as  to  make  untenable  the 
assumption  that  happiness  at  large  admits  of  distribution 
after  the  manner  which  utilitarianism  assumes. 

§  80.  In  yet  one  more  way  may  he  shown  the  incon- 
sistency of  this  transfigured  utilitarianism  which  regards 
its  doctrine  as  embodying  the  Christian  maxim — "  Love 
your  neighbor  as  yourself,"  and  of  that  altruism  which, 
going  still  further,  enunciates  the  maxim — "Live  for 
others. " 

A  right  rule  of  conduct  must  be  one  which  may  with 
advantage  be  adopted  by  all.  "Act  according  to  that 
maxim  only,  which  you  can  wish,  at  the  same  time,  to 
become  a  universal  law,"  says  Kant.  And  clearly, 
passing  over  needful  qualifications  of  this  maxim,  we 
may  accept  it,  to  the  extent  of  admitting  that  a  mode  of 
action  which  becomes  impracticable  as  it  approaches 
universality,  must  be  wrong.  Hence,  if  the  theory  oi 
pure  altruism,  implying  that  effort  should  be  expended 
for  the  benefit  of  others  and  not  for  personal  benefit,  is 
defensible,  it  must  be  shown  that  it  will  produce  good 
results  when  acted  141011  by  all.  Mark  the  consequences 
if  all  are  purely  altruistic. 


278  THE  DATA  OF ETR1CB. 

First,  an  impossible  combination  of  moral  attributes 
is  implied.  Each  is  supposed  by  the  hypothesis  to  re- 
gard self  so  little  and  others  so  much,  that  he  willingly 
sacrifices  his  own  pleasures  to  give  pleasures  to  them. 
But  if  this  is  a  universal  trait,  and  if  action  is  univer- 
sally congruous  with  it,  we  have  to  conceive  each  as 
being  not  only  a  sacrificer  but  also  one  who  accepts 
sacrifices.  While  he  is  so  unselfish  as  willingly  to  yield 
up  the  benefit  for  which  he  has  labored,  he  is  so  selfish 
as  willingly  to  let  others  yield  up  to  him  the  benefits 
they  have  labored  for.  To  make  pure  altruism  possible 
for  all,  each  must  be  at  once  extremely  unegoistic  and 
extremely  egoistic.  As  a  giver,  he  must  have  no 
thought  for  self ;  as  a  receiver,  no  thought  for  others. 
Evidently,  this  implies  an  inconceivable  mental  consti- 
tution. The  sympathy  which  is  so  solicitous  for  others 
as  willingly  to  injure  self  in  benefiting  them,  cannot  at 
the  same  time  be  so  regardless  of  others  as  to  accept  ben- 
efits which  they  injure  themselves  in  giving. 

The  incongruities  that  emerge  if  we  assume  pure  al- 
truism to  be  universally  practiced,  may  be  otherwise  ex- 
hibited thus.  Suppose  that  each,  instead  of  enjoying 
such  pleasures  as  come  to  him,  or  such  consumable  appli- 
isure  as  he  has  worked  for,  or  such  occasions 
for  pleasure  as  reward  his  efforts,  relinquishes  these  to 
j !••  other,  or  adds  them  to  a  common  stock  from 
which  others  benefit,  what  will  result?  Different  an- 
-  may  be  given  according  as  we  assume  that  there 
;■  are  not,  additional  influences  brought  into  play. 

Suppose  there  are  no  additional   influences.     Then, 

h  transfers  to  another  his  happiness,  or  means  to 

happine  -.  or  occasions    for  happiness,  while  some  one 

else  does  the  like  to  him,  the  distribution  of  happiness 


TRIAL  AXD  COMPROMISE.  279 

is,  on  the  average,  unchanged ;  or  if  eacli  adds  to  a 
common  stock  his  happiness,  or  means  to  happiness,  or 
occasions  for  happiness,  from  which  common  stock  each 
appropriates  his  portion,  the  average  state  is  still,  as  be- 
fore, unchanged.  The  only  obvious  effect  is  that  trans- 
actions must  be  gone  through  in  the  redistribution;  and 
loss  of  time  and  labor  must  result. 

Now  suppose  some  additional  influence  which  makes 
the  process  beneficial ;  what  must  it  be  ?  The  totality 
can  be  increased  only  if  the  acts  of  transfer  increase  the 
quantity  of  that  which  is  transferred.  The  happiness, 
or  that  which  brings  it,  must  be  greater  to  one  who  de- 
rives it  from  another's  efforts  than  it  would  have  been 
had  his  own  efforts  procured  it ;  or  otherwise,  supposing 
a  fund  of  happiness,  or  of  that  which  brings  it,  has  been 
formed  by  contributions  from  each,  then  each,  in  appro- 
priating his  share,  must  find  it  larger  than  it  would  have 
been  had  no  such  aggregation  and  dispersion  taken 
place.  To  justify  belief  in  such  increase  two  conceivable 
assumptions  may  be  made.  One  is  that  though  the  sum 
of  pleasures,  or  of  pleasure-yielding  things,  remains  the 
same  yet  the  kind  of  pleasure,  or  of  pleasure-yielding 
things,  which  each  receives  in  exchange  from  another, 
or  from  the  aggregate  of  others,  is  one  which  lie  appre- 
ciates more  than  that  for  which  he  labored.  But  to 
assume  this  is  to  assume  that  each  labors  directly  for  the 
thing  which  he  enjoys  less,  rather  than  for  the  thing 
which  he  enjoys  more,  which  is  absurd.  The  other 
assumption  is  that  while  the  exchanged,  or  redistributed 
pleasure  of  the  egoistic  kind,  remains  the  same  in  amount 
for  each,  there  is  added  to  it  the  altruistic  pleasure 
accompanying  the  exchange.  But  this  assumption  is 
clearly  inadmissible  if,  as  is  implied,  the   transaction  is 


280  TIIE  DATA  OF  ETUICS. 

Universal  —is  one  through  winch  each  becomes  giver  and 
receiver  to  equal  extents.  For  if  the  transfer  of  pleas- 
ures, or  of  pleasure-yielding  things,  from  one  to  another 
or  others,  is  always  accompanied  by  the  consciousness 
that  there  will  be  received  from  him  or  them  an  equiv- 
alent ;  there  results  merely  a  tacit  exchange,  either 
direct  or  roundabout.  Each  becomes  altruistic  in  no 
greater  degree  than  is  implied  by  being  equitable  ;  and 
each,  having  nothing  to  exalt  his  happiness,  sympathet- 
ically «>r  otherwise,  cannot  be  a  source  of  sympathetic 
happiness  to  others. 

§  90.  Thus,  when  the  meanings  of  its  words  are 
inquired  into,  or  when  the  necessary  implications  of 
its  theory  are  examined,  pure  altruism,  in  whatever 
form  expressed,  commits  its  adherents  to  various  ab- 
surdities. 

If  "  the  greatest  happiness  of  the  greatest  number," 
or  in  other  words,  "  the  general  happiness,"  is  the 
proper  end  of  action,  then  not  only  for  all  public  action 
1ml  for  all  private  action,  it  must  be  the  end;  because, 
otherwise,  the  greater  part  of  action  remains  unguided. 
Consider  its  fitness  I'm' each.  Jf  corporate  action  is  to 
be  guided  by  the  principle,  with  its  interpreting  com- 
ment, "everybody  to  count  for  one,  nobody  for  more 
than  one,"  there  must  bean  ignoring  of  all  differences 
of  character  and  conduct,  merits  and  demerits,  among 
citizens,  since  no  discrimination  is  provided  for,  and, 
moreover,  since  thai  in  respect  of  which  all  are  to  count 
alike  cannot  be  happiness  itself,  which  is  indistributable, 
and  since  equal  sharing  of  the  concrete  means  to  hap- 
.  besides  failing  ultimately  would  fail  proximately 
to  produce  the  greatest  happiness;  it  results  that  equal 


TRIAL  AND  COMPROMISE.  281 

distribution  of  the  conditions  under  which  happiness 
may  be  pursued  is  theonly  tenable  meaning:  a\u  discov- 
er in  tlic  principle  nothing  but  a  roundabout  insistence 
on  equity.  If,  taking  happiness  ;it  large  as  the  aim  of 
private  action,  the  individual  is  required  to  judge  be- 
tween his  own  happiness  and  that  of  others  as  an  im- 
partial spectator  would  do,  we  sec  that  no  supposition 
concerning  the  spectator  save  one  which  suicidally 
ascribes  partiality  to  him,  can  bring  out  any  other  re- 
sult than  that  each  shall  enjoy  such  happiness,  or  ap- 
propriate such  means  to  happiness,  as  his  own  efforts 
gain  :  equity  is  again  the  sole  content.  When,  adopting 
another  method,  we  consider  how  the  greatest  sum  of 
happiness  may  be  composed,  and,  recognizing  the  fact 
that  equitable  egoism  will  produce  a  certain  sum,  ask 
how  pure  altruism  is  to  produce  a  greater  sum  ;  we  are 
shown  that  if  all,  exclusively  pursuing  altruistic  pleas- 
ures, are  so  to  produce  a  greater  sum  of  pleasures,  the 
implication  is  that  altruistic  pleasures,  which  arise  from 
sympathy,  can  exist  in  the  absence  of  egoistic  pleasures 
with  which  there  may  be  sympathy — an  impossibility  , 
and  another  implication  is  that  if,  the  necessity  for 
egoistic  pleasures  being  admitted,  it  is  said  that  the 
greatest  sum  of  happiness  will  be  attained  if  all  indi- 
viduals are  more  altruistic  than  egoistic,  it  is  indirectly 
said  that  as  a  general  truth,  representative  feelings  are 
stronger  tnan  presentative  feelings— another  impossibil- 
ity. Again,  the  doctrine  of  pure  altruism  assumes  that 
happiness  may  be  to  any  extent  transferred  or  redis- 
tributed; whereas  the  fact  is  that  pleasures  of  one  older 
cannot  be  transferred  in  large  measure  without  results 
which  arc  fatal  or  extremely  injurious,  and  that  pleasures 
of  another  order  cannot  be  transferred  in  any  degree. 


282  TTIE  DATA  OF  ETIIICS. 

Further,  pure  altruism  presents  this  fatal  anomaly,  that 
while  a  right  principle  of  action  must  be  more  and  more 
practiced  as  men  improve,  the  altruistic  principle  be- 
comes less  and  less  practicable  as  men  approach  an  ideal 
form,  because  the  sphere  for  practicing  it  continually 
decreases.  Finally  its  self-destructiveness  is  made  mani- 
fest on  observing  that  for  all  to  adopt  it  as  a  principle  of 
action,  which  they  must  do  if  it  is  a  sound  principle, 
implies  that  all  are  at  once  extremely  unegoistic  and 
extremely  egoistic — ready  to  injure  self  for  others'  ben- 
efit, and  ready  to  accept  benefit  at  the  cost  of  injury  to 
others  ;  trails  which  cannot  co-exist. 

The  need  for  a  compromise  between  egoism  and 
altruism  is  thus  made  conspicuous.  We  are  forced  to 
recognize  the  claims  which  his  own  well-being  has  on 
the  attention  of  each  by  noting  how,  in  some  directions 
we  come  to  a  deadlock,  in  others  to  contradictions,  and 
in  others  to  disastrous  results,  if  they  are  ignored. 
Conversely,  it  is  undeniable  that  disregard  of  others  by 
each,  carried  to  a  great  extent,  is  fatal  to  society,  and 
carried  to  a  still  greater  extent  is  fatal  to  the  family, 
and  eventually  to  the  race.  Egoism  and  altruism  are 
I  herefore  co-essential. 

§  91.  What  form  is  the  compromise  between  egoism 
and  altruism  to  assume  ?  how  are  their  respective  claims 
to  be  satisfied  in  due  degrees  ? 

It  is  a  truth  insisted  on  by  moralists  and  recognized 
in  common  life,  that  the  achievement  of  individual  hap- 
piness  is  not  proportionate  to  the  degree  in  which  indi- 
vidual happiness  is  made  the  object  of  direct  pursuit; 
but  there  has  not  yet  become  current  the  belief  that, 
in  like  manner,  the    achievement  of  general  happiness 


TRIAL  AND  COMPROMISE.  283 

is  not  proportionate  to  the  degree  in  which  general 
happiness  is  made  the  object  of  direct  pursuit.  Yet 
failure  of  direct  pursuit  in  the  last  case  is  more  reason- 
ably to  be  expected  than  in  the  first. 

When  discussing  the  relations  of  means  and  ends,  we 
saw  that  as  individual  conduct  evolves,  its  principle  be- 
comes more  and  more  that  of  making  fulfillment  of 
means  the  proximate  end,  and  leaving  the  ultimate  end, 
welfare  or  happiness,  to  come  as  a  result.  And  we  saw 
that  when  general  welfare  or  happiness  is  the  ulti- 
mate end,  the  same  principle  holds  even  more  rigor- 
ously ;  since  the  ultimate  end  under  its  impersonal  form 
is  less  determinate  than  under  its  personal  form,  and 
the  difficulties  in  the  way  of  achieving  it  by  direct 
pursuit  still  greater.  Recognizing,  then,  the  fact  that 
corporate  happiness  still  more  than  individual  happi- 
ness, must  be  pursued  not  directly,  but  indirectly,  the 
first  question  for  us  is — What  must  be  the  general 
nature  of  the  means  through  which  it  is  to  be  achieved. 

It  is  admitted  that  self-happiness  is,  in  a  measure,  to 
be  obtained  by  furthering  the  happiness  of  others.  May 
it  not  be  true  that,  conversely,  general  happiness  is  to 
be  obtained  by  furthering  self-happiness  ?  If  the  well- 
being  of  each  unit  is  to  be  reached  partly  through  his 
care  for  the  well-being  of  the  aggregate,  is  not  the 
well-being  of  the  aggregate  to  be  reached  partly  through 
the  care  of  each  unit  for  himself  ?  Clearly,  our  con- 
clusion must  be  that  general  happiness  is  to  be  achieved 
mainly  through  the  adequate  pursuit  of  their  own  hap- 
piness by  individuals  ;  while,  reciprocally,  the  happiness 
of  individuals  is  to  be  achieved  in  part  by  their  pur- 
suit of  the  general  happiness. 

And  this  is  the  conclusion  embodied  in  the  progress- 


28  l  THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 

Lng  ideas  and  usages  of  mankind.  This  compromise 
between  egoism  and  altruism  has  been  slowly  establish- 
ingitself;  and  toward  recognition  of  its  propriety; 
men's  actual  beliefs,  as  distinguished  from  their  nominal 
beliefs,  have  been  gradually  approaching.  Social  evo- 
lution has  been  bringing  about  a  statein  which  the 
claims  of  the  individual  to  the  proceeds  of  his  activi- 
ties, and  to  such  satisfactions  as  they  bring,  are  more 
and  more  positively  asserted;  at  the  same  time  that 
insistence  on  others'  claims,  and  habitual  respect  for 
them  have  been  increasing.  Among  the  rudest  savages 
personal  interests  are  very  vaguely  distinguished  from 
the  interests  of  others.  In  early  stages  of  civilization 
the  proportioning  of  benefits  to  efforts  is  extremely 
rude:  slaves  and  serfs  get  for  work  arbitrary  amounts 
of  food  and  shelter :  exchange  being  infrequent,  there 
is  little  to  develop  the  idea  of  equivalence.  But  as 
civilization  advances  and  status  passes  into  contract 
there  comes  daily  experience  of  the  relation  between 
advantages  enjoyed  and  labor  given  :  the  industrial 
system  maintaining,  through  supply  and  demand,  a 
due  adjustment  of  the  one  to  the  other.  And  this 
growth  of  voluntary  co-operation,  this  exchange  of 
services  under  agreement,  lias  been  necessarily  accom- 
panied by  decrease  of  aggressions  one  upon  another, 
and  increase  of  sympathy  :  leading  to  exchange  of 
services  beyond  agreement.  That  is  to  say,  the  more 
distinct  assertions  of  individual  claims,  and  more  rig- 
orous apportioning  of  personal  enjoyments  to  efforts 
expended,  has  gone  hand  in  hand  with  growth  of  that 
altruism  shown  in  equitable  conductand  that 
positive  altruism  shown  in  gratuitous  aid. 

A  higher  phase  of  this  double  change  has  in  our  own 


TRIAL  AM)  COMPROMISE.  2s."> 

times  become  conspicuous.  If,  on  the  one  hand,  we 
note  the  struggles  for  political  freedom,  the  contests 
between  labor  and  capital,  the  judicial  reforms  made 
to  facilitate  enforcement  of  rights,  we  see  that  the 
tendency  still  is  toward  complete  appropriation  by 
each  of  whatever  benefits  are  due  to  him,  and  conse- 
quent exclusion  of  his  fellows  from  such  benefits.  On 
the  other  hand,  if  we  consider  what  is  meant  by  the 
surrender  of  power  to  the  masses,  the  abolition  of 
class-privileges,  the  efforts  to  diffuse  knowledge,  the 
agitations  to  spread  temperance,  the  multitudinous 
philanthrophic  societies;  it  becomes  clear  that  regard 
for  the  well  being  of  others  is  increasing  pari  passic 
with  the  taking  of  means  to  secure  personal  well 
being. 

What  holds  of  the  relations  within  each  society 
holds  to  souk;  extent,  if  to  a  less  extent,  of  the  rela- 
tions between  societies.  Though,  to  maintain  national 
claims,  real  or  imaginary,  often  of  a  trivial  kind,  the 
civilized  still  make  war  on  one  another;  yet  their 
several  nationalities  are  more  respected  than  in  past 
ages.  Though  by  victors  portions  of  territory  are 
taken  and  money  compensations  exacted ;  yet  conquest 
is  not  now,  as  of  old,  habitually  followed  by  entire 
appropriation  of  erritories  and  enslavement  of  peoples. 
The  individu aliti  d  of  societies  are  in  a  larger  measure 
preserved.  Meanwhile  the  altruistic  intercourse  is 
greater:  aid  is  rendered  on  occasions  of  disaster  by 
flood,  by  fire,  by  famine,  or  otherwise.  And  in  inter- 
national arbitration  as  lately  exemplified,  implying  the 
recognition  of  claims  by  one  nation  upon  another,  we 
see  a  further  progress  in  this  wider  altruism.  Doubtless 
there  is  much  to  bo  said  by  way  of  set-off;  for  in  the 


286  THE  BAT  A  OF  ETHICS. 

dealings  of  the  civilized  with  the  uncivilized  little  of 
this  progress  can  be  traced.  It  may  be  urged  that  the 
primitive  rule,  "  Life  for  life,"  has  been  developed  by  us 
into  the  rule,  "  For  one  life  many  lives,"  as  in  the  cases 
of  Bishop  Patterson  and  Mr.  Birch,  but  then  there  is  the 
qualifying  fact  that  we  do  not  torture  our  prisoners  or 
mutilate  them.  If  it  be  said  that  as  the  Hebrews 
thought  themselves  warranted  in  seizing  the  lands  God 
promised  to  them,  and  in  some  cases  exterminating  the 
inhabitants,  so  we,  to  fulfill  the  "manifest  intention  of 
Providence,"  dispossess  inferior  races  whenever  we  want 
their  territories ;  it  may  be  replied  that  we  do  not  kill 
many  more  than  seems  needful,  and  tolerate  the  exist- 
ence of  those  who  submit.  And  should  any  one  point 
out  that  as  Attila,  while  conquering  or  destroying 
peoples  and  nations,  regarded  himself  as  "  the  scourge 
of  God,"  punishing  men  for  their  sins,  so  we,  as  repre- 
sented by  a  High  Commissioner  and  a  priest  he  quotes, 
think  ourselves  called  on  to  chastise  with  rifles  and 
cannon,  heathens  who  practice  polygamy ;  there  is  the 
rejoinder  that  not  even  the  most  ferocious  disciple  of 
the  teacher  of  mercy  would  carry  his  vengeance  so  far 
as  to  depopulate  whole  territories  and  erase  scores  of 
cities.  And  when,  on  the  other  hand,  wc  remember 
that  there  is  an  Aborigines  Protection  Society,  that 
there  are  commissioners  in  certain  colonies  appointed  to 
protect  native  interests,  and  that  in  some  cases  the  lands 
of  natives  have  been  purchased  in  ways  which,  however 
unfair,  have  implied  some  recognition  of  their  claims ; 
we  may  say  that  little  as  the  compromise  between 
egoism  and  altruism  has  progressed  in  international 
affairs,  it  has  still  progressed  somewhat  in  the  direction 
indicated. 


kV02i' CILlATlOxW  2*7 


CHAPTEU  XIV. 

CONCILIATION. 

$  02.  As  exhibited  in  the  last  chapter,  the  com- 
promise between  the  claims  of  self  and  the  claims  of 
others  seems  to  imply  permanent  antagonism  between 
the  two.  The  pursuit  by  each  of  his  own  happiness 
while  paying  due  regard  to  the  happiness  of  his  fellows, 
apparently  necessitates  the  ever-recurring  question — 
How  far  must  the  one  end  be  sought  and  how  far  the 
other  :  suggesting,  if  not  discord  in  the  life  of  each,  still, 
an  absence  of  complete  harmony.  This  is  not  the  inevit- 
able inference  however. 

When,  in  the  Principles  of  Sociology,  Part  III,  the 
phenomena  of  race-maintenance  among  living  things 
at  large  were  discussed,  that  the  development  of  the 
domestic  relations  might  be  the  better  understood,  it 
was  shown  that  during  evolution  there  has  been  going 
on  a  conciliation  between  the  interests  of  the  species, 
the  interests  of  the  parents,  and  the  interests  of  the 
offspring.  Proof  was  given  that  as  we  ascend  from  the 
lowest  forms  of  life  to  the  highest,  race-maintenance  is 
achieved  with  a  decreasing  sacrifice  of  life,  alike  of 
young  Individuals  and  of  adult  individuals,  and  also 
with  a  decreasing  sacrifice  of  parental  lives  to  the  lives 
of  offspring.  We  saw  that,  with  the  progress  of  civiliza- 
tion, like  changes  go  on  among  human  beings  ;  and  that 


THE  DATA   OF  ETHICS. 

the  highest  domestic  relations  are  those  in  which  the 
conciliation  of  welfares  within  the  family  becomes 
greatest,  while  the  welfare  of  the  society  is  best  sub- 
served. Here  it  remains  to  be  shown  that  a  kindred 
conciliation  has  been,  and  is,  taking  place  between  the 
interests  of  each  citizen  and  the  interests  of  citizens  at 
large  ;  tending  ever  toward  a  state  in  which  the  two 
become  merged  in  one,  and  in  which  the  feelings 
answering  to  them  respectively,  fall  into  complete 
concord. 

In  the  family  group,  even  as  we  observe  it  among 
many  inferior  vertebrates,  we  see  that  the  parental 
sacrifice,  now  become  so  moderate  in  amount  as  to  con- 
sist with  long-continued  parental  life,  is  not  accompanied 
by  consciousness  of  sacrifice  ;  but  contrariwise,  is  made 
from  a  direct  desire  to  make  it :  the  altruistic  labors  on 
behalf  of  young  are  carried  on  in  satisfaction  of  parental 
instincts.  If  we  trace  these  relations  up  through  the 
grades  of  mankind,  and  observe  how  largely  love  rather 
than  obligation  prompts  the  care  of  children,  we  see  the 
conciliation  of  interest  to  be  such  that  achievement  of 
parental  happiness  coincides  with  securing  the  hap- 
3  of  offspring:  the  wish  for  children  among  the 
childless,  and  the  occasional  adoption  of  children,  show- 
ing how  needful  for  attainment  of  certain  egoistic  satis- 
ms  are  these  altruistic  activities.  And  further 
evolution,  causing  along  with  higher  oature  diminished 
fertility,  and  therefore  smaller  burdens  on  parents,  may 
ted  to  bring  a  state  in  which,  far  more  than 
now,  the  pleasures  of  adult  life  will  consist  in  raising 
offspring  to  perfection  while  simultaneously  furthering 
the  immediate  happiness  of  offspring. 

Now  though  altruism  of  a  social  kind,  lacking  cer* 


CONCILIATION.  289 

tain  elements  of  parental  altruism,  can  never  attain  the 
same  level,  yet  it  may  be  expected  to  attain  a  level  at 
which  it  will  be  like  parental  altruism  in  spontaneity — - 
a  level  such  that  ministration  to  others'  happiness  will 
become  a  daily  need — a  level  such  that  the  lower  egoistic 
satisfactions  will  be  continually  subordinated  to  this 
higher  egoistic  satisfaction,  not  by  any  effort  to  subor- 
dinate them,  but  by  the  preference  for  this  higher  ego- 
istic satisfaction  whenever  it  can  be  obtained. 

Let  us  consider  how  the  development  of  sympathy, 
which  must  advance  as  fast  as  conditions  permit,  will 
bring  about  this  state. 

§  93.  We  have  seen  that  during  the  evolution  of  life, 
pleasures  and  pains  have  necessarily  been  the  incen- 
tives to,  and  deterrents  from,  actions  which  the  condi- 
tions of  existence  demanded  and  negatived.  An  implied 
truth  to  be  here  noted  is,  that  faculties  which,  under 
given  conditions,  yield  partly  pain  and  partly  pleasure, 
cannot  develop  beyond  the  limit  at  which  they  yield  a 
surplus  of  pleasure  :  if  beyond  that  limit  more  pain 
than  pleasure  results  from  exercise  of  them,  their  growth 
must  be  arrested. 

Through  sympathy  both  these  forms  of  feeling  are 
excited.  Now  a  pleasurable  consciousness  is  aroused 
on  witnessing  pleasure  ;  now  a  painful  consciousness  is 
aroused  on  witnessing  pain.  Hence,  if  beings  around 
him  habitually  manifest  pleasure  and  but  rarely  pain, 
sympathy  yields  to  its  possessor  a  surplus  of  pleasure  ; 
while,  contrariwise,  if  little  pleasure  is  ordinarily  wit- 
nessed and  much  pain,  sympathy  yields  a  surplus  of 
pain  to  its  possessor.  The  average  development  of 
sympathy  must,  therefore,  be  regulated  by  the  average 

id 


200  THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 

manifestations  of  pleasure  and  pain  in  others.  If  the 
life  usually  led  under  given  social  conditions  is  such  that 
suffering  is  daily  inflicted,  or  is  daily  displayed  by 
associates,  sympathy  cannot  grow:  to  assume  growth 
of  it  is  to  assume  that  the  constitution  will  modify 
itself  in  such  way  as  to  increase  its  pains  and  therefore 
depress  its  energies  ;  and  is  to  ignore  the  truth  that 
bearing  any  kind  of  pain  gradually  produces  insensi- 
bility in  that  pain,  or  callousness.  On  the  other  hand, 
if  the  social  state  is  such  that  manifestations  of  pleasure 
predominate,  sympathy  will  increase;  since  sympathetic 
pleasures,  adding  to  the  totality  of  pleasures  enhancing 
vitality,  conduce  to  the  physical  prosperity  of  the  most 
sympathetic,  and  since  the  pleasures  of  sympathy  exceed- 
ing its  pains  in  all,  lead  to  an  exercise  of  it  which 
strengthens  it. 

Tin,'  first  implication  is  one  already  more  than  once 
indicated.  We  have  seen  that  along  with  habitual 
militancy  and  under  the  adapted  type  of  social  organ- 
ization, sympathy  cannot  develop  to  any  considerable 
height.  The  destructive  activities  carried  on  against 
external  enemies  scar  it;  the  state  of  feeling  maintained 
causes  within  the  society  itself  frequent  acts  of  aggres- 
sion  or  cruelty;  and  further,  the  compulsory  co-opera- 
tion characterizing  the  militant  rSgirne  necessarily 
repre  apathy — exists  only  on  condition  of  an  un- 

sympathetic  treatment  of  some  by  others. 

But  even  could  the  militant  rSgime  forthwith  end, 
the  hinderance  to  development  of  sympathy  would  still 
be  great.  Though  cessation  of  war  would  imply  in- 
d  adaptation  of  man  to  social  life,  and  decrease  of 
sundry  evils,  yet  there  would  remain  much  non-adapta- 
tion aud  much  consequent  unhappiness.     In  the  first 


CONCIL I A  TION.  201 

place,  that  form  of  nature  which  has  generated  and  still 
generates  wars,  though  by  implication  raised  to  a 
higher  form,  would  not  at  once  be  raised  to  so  high  a 
form  that  there  would  cease  all  injustices  and  the  pains 
they  cause.  For  a  considerable  period  after  predatory 
activities  had  ended,  the  defects  of  the  predatory  nature 
would  continue:  entailing  their  slowly  diminishing 
evils.  In  the  second  place,  the  ill-adjustment  of  the 
human  constitution  to  the  pursuits  of  industrial  life, 
must  long  persist,  and  may  be  expected  to  survive  in  a 
measure  the  cessation  of  wars :  the  required  modes  of 
activity  must  remain  for  innumerable  generations  in 
some  degree  displeasurable.  And  in  the  third  place, 
deficiencies  of  self-control  such  as  the  improvident 
show  us,  as  well  as  those  many  failures  of  conduct  due 
to  inadequate  foresight  of  consequences,  though  less 
marked  than  now,  could  not  fail  still  to  produce  suffer- 
ing. 

Nor  would  even  complete  adaptation,  if  limited  to 
disappearance  of  the  non-adaptations  just  indicated, 
remove  all  sources  of  those  miseries  whioh,  to  the  ex- 
tent of  their  manifestation,  check  the  growth  of  sym- 
pathy. For  while  the  rate  of  multiplication  continues 
so  to  exceed  the  rate  of  mortality  as  to  cause  pressure 
on  the  means  of  subsistence,  there  must  continue  to 
result  much  unhappiness;  either  from  balked  affections 
or  from  overwork  and  stinted  means.  Only  as  fast  as 
fertility  diminishes,  which  we  have  seen  it  must  do 
along  with  further  mental  development  {Principles  of 
Biology,  §§  367-377),  can  there  go  on  such  diminution 
of  the  labors  required  for  efficiently  supporting  self  and 
family,  that  they  will  not  constitute  a  displeasurable 
t.ix  on  the  energies. 


2 !  1 2  THE  DA  TA  OF  ETHICS. 

Gradually  then,  and  only  gradually,  as  these  various 
causes  of  unhappiness  become  less  can  sympathy  be- 
come greater.  Life  would  be  intolerable  if,  while  the 
causes  of  misery  remained  as  they  now  are,  all  men 
were  not  only  in  a  high  degree  sensitive  to  the  pains, 
bodily  and  mental,  felt  by  those  around  and  expressed 
in  the  faces  of  those  they  met,  but  were  unceasingly 
conscious  of  the  miseries  everywhere  being  suffered  as 
consequences  of  war,  crime,  misconduct,  misfortune, 
improvidence,  incapacity.  But,  as  the  molding  and 
re-molding  of  man  and  society  into  mutual  fitness 
progresses,  and  as  the  pains  caused  by  unfitness  de- 
crease, sympathy  can  increase  in  presence  of  the  pleas- 
ures that  come  from  fitness.  The  two  changes  are  in- 
deed so  related  that  each  furthers  the  other.  Such 
growth  of  sympathy  as  conditions  permit,  itself  aids 
in  lessening  pain  and  augmenting  pleasure  :  and  the 
greater  surplus  of  pleasure  that  results  makes  possible 
further  growth  of  sympathy. 

§  94.  The  extent  to  which  sympathy  may  develop 
when  the  hinderances  are  removed,  will  be  better  con- 
ceived after  observing  the  agencies  through  which  it  is 
excited,  and  setting  down  the  reasons  for  expecting 
those  agencies  to  become  more  sufficient.  Two  factors 
have  to  be  considered — the  natural  language  of  feeling 
in  tin;  being  sympathized  with,  and  the  power  of  inter- 
preting that  language  in  the  being  who  sympathizes. 
We  may  anticipate  development  of  both. 

Movements  of  the  body  and  facial  changes  are  visible 
effects  of  feeling  which,  when  the  feeling  is  strong,  are 
uncontrollable.  When  the  feeling  is  less  strong,  how- 
ever, be  it  sensational  or  emotional,  they  may  be  wholly 


CONCILIATION.  293 

or  partially  repressed  ;  and  there  is  a  habit,  more  or  less 
constant,  of  repressing  them  ;  this  habit  being  the 
concomitant  of  a  nature  suchthat  it  is  often  undesirable 
that  others  should  see  what  is  felt.  So  necessary  with 
our  existing  characters  and  conditions  are  concealments 
thus  prompted,  that  they  have  come  to  form  a  part  of 
moral  duty  ;  and  concealment  for  its  own  sake  is  often 
insisted  upon  as  an  element  in  good  manners.  All  this 
is  caused  by  the  prevalence  of  feelings  at  variance  with 
social  good — feelings  which  cannot  be  shown  without 
producing  discords  or  estrangements.  But  in  proportion 
as  the  egoistic  desires  fall  more  under  control  of  the 
altruistic,  and  there  come  fewer  and  slighter  impulses 
of  a  kind  to  be  reprobated,  the  need  for  keeping  guard 
over  facial  expression  and  bodily  movement  will  de- 
crease, and  these  will  with  increasing  clearness  convey 
to  spectators  the  mental  state.  Nor  is  this  all.  Re- 
strained as  its  use  is,  this  language  of  the  emotions  is  at 
present  prevented  from  growing.  But  as  fast  as  the 
emotions  become  such  that  they  may  be  more  candidly 
displayed,  there  will  go,  along  with  the  habit  of  dis- 
play, development  of  the  means  of  display ;  so  that 
besides  the  stronger  emotions,  the  more  delicate  shades 
and  smaller  degrees  of  emotion  will  visibly  exhibit 
themselves  ;  the  emotional  language  will  become  at  once 
more  copious,  more  varied,  more  definite.  And  obviously 
sympathy  will  be  proportionately  facilitated. 

An  equally  important,  if  not  a  more  important, 
advance  of  kindred  nature,  is  to  be  anticipated.  The 
vocal  signs  of  sentient  states  will  simultaneously  evolve 
further.  Loudness  of  tone,  pitch  of  tone,  quality  of 
tone,  and  change  of  tone,  are  severally  marks  of  feeling ; 
and,  combined  in  different  ways  and  proportions,  serve 


294  THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 

to  express  different  amounts  and  kinds  of  feelings. 
As  elsewhere  pointed  out,  cadences  are  the  comments 
of  the  emotions  on  the  propositions  of  the  intellect.* 
Not  in  excited  speech  only,  but  in  ordinary  speech,  we 
show  by  ascending  and  descending  intervals,  by  degrees 
of  deviation  from  the  medium  tone,  as  well  as  by  plac& 
and  strength  of  emphasis,  the  kind  of  sentiency  which 
accompanies  the  thought  expressed.  Now  the  manifesta- 
tion of  feeling  by  cadence,  like  its  manifestation  by 
visible  changes,  is  at  present  under  restraint;  the 
motives  for  repression  act  in  the  one  case  as  they  act  in 
the  other.  A  double  effect  is  produced.  This  audible 
language  of  feeling  is  not  used  up  to  the  limit  of  its 
existing  capacity;  and  it  is  to  a  considerable  degree 
misused,  so  as  to  convey  other  feelings  than  those 
which  are  felt.  The  result  of  this  disuse  and  misuse  is 
to  check  that  evolution  which  normal  use  would  cause. 
We  must  infer,  then,  that  as  moral  adaptation  pro- 
gresses, and  there  is  decreasing  need  for  concealment 
of  the  feelings,  their  vocal  signs  will  develop  much 
further.  Though  it  is  not  to  be  supposed  that  cadences 
will  ever  convey  emotions  as  exactly  as  words  convey 
thoughts,  yet  it  is  quite  possible  that  the  emotional 
language  of  the  future  may  rise  as  much  above  our  pres- 
ent emotional  language,  as  our  intellectual  language 
lias  already  risen  above  the  intellectual  language  of  the 
st  races. 
A  simultaneous  increase  in  the  power  of  interpreting 
Loth  visible  and  audible  signs  of  feeling  must  be  taken 
into  account.  Among  those  around  we  see  differences 
both  of  ability  to  perceive  such  signs   and   of  ability  to 

•See  Essay  on  "  The  Origin  and  Function  of  Music.'' 


CO  XCIL I  A  TIOX.  295 

conceive  the  implied  mental  states  and  their  causes ; 
here,  a  stolidity  unimpressed  by  a  slight  facial  change 
or  altered  tone  of  voice,  or  else  unable  to  imagine  what 
is  felt ;  and  there,  a  quick  observation  and  a  penetrat- 
ing intuition,  making  instantly  comprehensible  the  state 
of  mind  and  its  origin.  If  we  suppose  both  these 
faculties  exalted — both  a  more  delicate  perception  of 
the  signs  and  a  strengthened  constructive  imagination — 
we  shall  get  some  idea  of  the  deeper  and  wider  sympathy 
that  will  hereafter  arise1.  More  vivid  representations  of 
the  feelings  of  others,  implying  ideal  excitements  of 
feelings  approaching  to  real  excitements,  must  imply  a 
greater  likeness  between  the  feelings  of  the  sympathizer 
and  those  of  the  sympathized  with  ;  coming  near  to 
identity. 

By  simultaneous  increase  of  its  subjective  and  objec- 
tive factors,  sympathy  may  thus,  as  the  hinderances 
diminish,  rise  above  that  now  shown  by  the  sympathetic 
as  much  as  in  them  it  has  risen  above  that  which  the 
callous  show. 

§  Oo.  What  must  be  the  accompanying  evolution  of 
conduct?  What  must  the  relations  between  egoism 
and  altruism  become  as  this  form  of  nature  is  neared? 

A  conclusion  drawn  in  the  chapter  on  the  relativity 
of  pleasures  and  pains,  and  there  emphasized  as  one  to 
be  borne  in  mind,  must  now  be  recalled.  It  was 
pointed  out  that,  supposing  thern  to  be  consistent  with 
continuance  of  life,  there  are  no  activities  which  may 
not  become  sources  of  pleasure,  if  surrounding  condi- 
tions require  persistence  in  them.  And  here  it  is  to 
be  added,  as  a  corollary,  that  if  the  conditions  require 
any  class  of  activities  to  be   relatively  great,  there   will 


296  THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 

arise  a  relatively  great  pleasure  accompanying  that  class 
of  activities.  What  bearing  have  these  general  in- 
ferences on  the  special  question  before  us  ? 

That  alike  for  public  welfare  and  private  welfare 
sympathy  is  essential  we  have  seen.  We  have  seen 
that  co-operation  and  the  benefits  which  it  brings  to 
each  and  all,  become  high  in  proportion  as  the  altruistic, 
that  is  the  sympathetic,  interests  extend.  The  actions 
prompted  by  fellow-feeling  are  thus  to  be  counted  among 
those  .demanded  by  social  conditions.  They  are  actions 
which  maintenance  and  further  development  of  social 
organization  tend  ever  to  increase,  and,  therefore,  actions 
with  which  there  will  be  joined  an  increasing  pleasure. 
From  the  laws  of  life  it  must  be  concluded  that  unceas- 
ing social  discipline  will  so  mold  human  nature  that 
eventually  sympathetic  pleasures  will  be  spontaneously 
pursued  to  the  fullest  extent  advantageous  to  each  and 
all.  The  scope  for  altruistic  activities  will  not  exceed 
the  desire  for  altruistic  satisfactions. 

In  natures  thus  constituted,  though  the  altruistic 
gratifications  must  remain  in  a  transfigured  sense 
egoistic,  yet  they  will  not  be  egoistically  pursued — will 
not  be  pursued  from  egoistic  motives.  Though  pleasure 
will  be  gained  by  giving  pleasure,  yet  the  thought  of 
the  sympathetic  pleasure  to  be  gained  will  not  occupy 
consciousness,  but  only  the  thought  of  the  pleasure 
given.  To  a  great  extent  this  is  so  now.  In  the  truly 
sympathetic,  attention  is  so  absorbed  with  the  proximate 
end,  others'  happiness,  that  there  is  none  given  to  the 
prospective  self-happiness  which  may  ultimately  result. 
An  analogy  will  make  the  relation  clear. 

A  miser  accumulates  money,  not  deliberately  saying 
to  himself,  "  I  shall  by  doing  this  get  the  delight  which 


CONCILIATION.  297 

possession  gives."  lie  thinks  only  of  the  money  and 
the  means  of  getting  it,  and  he  experiences  incidentally 
the  pleasure  that  comes  from  possession.  Owning 
properly  is  that  which  he  revels  in  imagining,  and  not 
the  feeling  which  owning  property  will  cause.  Simi- 
larly, one  who  is  sympathetic  in  the  highest  sense,  is 
mentally  engaged  solely  in  representing  pleasure  as  ex- 
perienced by  another,  and  pursues  it  for  the  benefit  of 
that  other,  forgetting  any  participation  he  will  have  in 
it.  Subjectively  considered,  then,  the  conciliation  of 
egoism  and  altruism  will  eventually  become  such  that 
though  the  altruistic  pleasure,  as  being  a  part  of  the 
consciousness  of  one  who  experiences  it,  can  never  be 
other  than  egoistic,  it  will  not  be  consciously  egoistic. 

Let  us  now  ask  what  must  happen  in  a  society  com- 
posed of  persons  constituted  in  this  manner. 

§  9(5.  The  opportunities  for  that  postponement  of  self 
to  others  which  constitutes  altruism  as  ordinarily  con- 
ceived, must,  in  several  ways,  be  more  and  more  limited 
as  the  highest  state  is  approached. 

Extensive  demands  on  the  benevolent  presuppose 
much  unhappiness.  Before  there  can  be  many  and 
large  calls  on  some  for  efforts  on  behalf  of  others,  there 
must  be  many  others  in  conditions  needing  help — in 
conditions  of  comparative  misery.  But,  as  we  have 
seen  above,  the  development  of  fellow-feeling  can  go  on 
only  as  fast  as  misery  decreases.  Sympathy  can  reach 
its  full  height  only  when  there  have  ceased  to  be  fre- 
quent occasions  for  anything  like   serious  self-sacrifice. 

Change  the  point  of  view,  and  this  truth  presents 
itself  under  another  aspect.  We  have  already  seen  that 
with  the  progress  of  adaptation  each  becomes  so  eon- 


298  THE  DATA  OF  ETUICS. 

stitutcd  that  he  cannot  be  helped  without  in  some  way 
arresting  a  pleasurable  activity.  There  cannot  be  a 
beneficial  interference  between  faculty  and  function 
when  the  two  are  adjusted.  Consequently,  in  propor- 
tion as  mankind  approach  complete  adjustment  of  their 
natures  to  social  needs,  there  must  be  fewer  and  smaller 
opportunities  for  giving  aid. 

Yei  again,  as  was  pointed  out  in  the  last  chapter,  the 
sympathy  which  prompts  efforts  for  others'  welfare  must 
be  pained  by  self-injury  on  the  part  of  others  ;  and  must, 
therefore,  cause  aversion  to  accept  benefits  derived  from 
their  self-injuries.  What  is  to  be  inferred  ?  While 
each,  when  occasion  offers,  is  ready,  anxious  even, 
to  surrender  egoistic  satisfactions ;  others,  similarly 
natured,  cannot  but  resist  the  surrender.  If  any  one, 
proposing  to  treat  himself  more  hardly  than  a  disin- 
terested spectator  would  direct,  refrains  from  appro- 
priating that  which  is  due  ;  others,  caring  for  him  if  he 
will  not  care  for  himself,  must  necessarily  insist  that  lie 
shall  appropriate  it.  General  altruism  then,  in  its  de- 
veloped  form,  must  inevitably  resist  individual  excesses 
of  altruism.  The  relation  at  present  familiar  to  us  will 
be  inverted,  and  instead  of  each  maintaining  his  own 
claims,  others  will  maintain  his  claims  for  him:  not, in- 
deed, by  active  efforts,  which  will  be  needless,  hut   by 

-.-fly  resisting  any  undue  yielding  up  of  them. 
There  is  nothing  in  such   behavior  which  is  not  even 

to  be  traced  in  our  daily  experiences  as  beginning. 
In  business  transactions  among  honorable  men  there  is 
usually  a  desire  on  either  side  that  the  other  shall  treat 
himself  fairly.  Not  unfrequently  there  is  a  refusal  to 
take  something  regarded  as  the  other's  due,  but  which 
the  other  offers  to  give  up.     In  social  intercourse,  too, 


CONCILIATION.  299 

the  cases  are  common  in  which  those  who  would  surren- 
der their  shares  of  pleasure  are  not  permitted  hy  the 
rest  to  do  so.  Further  development  of  sympathy  cannot 
but  make  this  mode  of  behaving  increasingly  general 
and  increasingly  genuine. 

Certain  complex  restraints  on  excesses  of  altruism 
exist,  which,  in  another  way,  force  back  the  individual 
upon  a  normal  egoism.     Two  may  here  be  noted. 

In  the  first  place,  self-abnegations  often  repeated  im- 
ply on  the  part  of  the  actor  a  tacit  ascription  of  relative 
selfishness  to  others  who  profit  by  the  self-abnegations. 
Even  with  men  as  they  are  there  occasionally  arises  a 
feeling  among  those  for  whom  sacrifices  are  frequently 
made,  that  they  are  being  insulted  by  the  assumption 
that  they  are  ready  to  receive  them,  and  in  the  mind  of 
the  actor  also,  there  sometimes  grows  up  a  recognition 
of  this  feeling  on  their  part,  and  a  consequent  check  on 
his  too  great  or  too  frequent  surrenders  of  pleasure. 
Obviously,  in  more  developed  natures,  tins  kind  of 
check  must  act  still  more  promptly. 

In  the  second  place,  when,  as  the  hypothesis  implies, 
altruistic  pleasures  have  reached  a  greater  intensity  than 
they  now  possess,  each  person  will  be  debarred  from  un- 
due pursuit  of  them  by  the  consciousness  that  other 
persons,  too,  desire  them,  and  that  scope  for  others'  en- 
joyment of  them  must  be  left.  Even  now  may  be  ob- 
served among  groups  of  friends,  where  some  competition 
in  amiability  is  going  on,  relinquishments  of  opportuni- 
ties for  self-abnegation  that  others  may  have  them. 
"  Let  her  give  up  the  gratification,  she  will  like  to  do 
so;'"  "Let  him  undertake  the  trouble,  it  will  please 
him  ;"  are  suggestions  which,  from  time  to  time,  illus- 
trate this  consciousness.     The  most  developed  sympathy 


300  THE  DATA   OF  ETHICS. 

will  care  for  the  sympathetic  satisfactions  of  others  as 
well  as  for  their  selfish  satisfactions.  What  may  be 
called  a  higher  equity  will  refrain  from  trespassing  on 
the  spheres  of  others'  altruistic  activities,  as  a  lower 
equity  refrains  from  trespassing  on  the  spheres  of  their 
egoistic  activities.  And  by  this  checking  of  what  may 
be  called  an  egoistic  altruism,  undue  sacrifices  on  the 
part  of  each  must  be  prevented. 

What  spheres,  then,  will  eventually  remain  for  altru- 
ism as  it  is  commonly  conceived  ?  There  are  three. 
One  of  them  must  to  the  last  continue  large  in  extent; 
ami  the  others  must  progressively  diminish,  though  they 
do  not  disappear. 

The  first  is  that  which  family  life  affords.  Always 
there  must  be  a  need  for  subordination  of  self-regard- 
ing feelings  to  other-regarding  feelings  in  the  rearing  of 
children.  Though  this  will  diminish  with  diminution 
in  the  number  to  be  reared,  yet  it  will  increase  with  the 
greater  elaboration  and  prolongation  of  the  activities  on 
their  behalf.  But  as  shown  above,  there  is  even  now 
partially  effected  a  conciliation  such  that  those  egoistic 
satisfactions  which  parenthood  yields  are  achieved 
through  altruistic  activities — a  conciliation  tending  ever 
toward  completeness.  An  important  development  of 
family  altruism  must  be  added:  the  reciprocal  care  of 
parents  by  children  during  old  age — a  care  becoming 
lighter  and  better  fulfilled,  in  which  a  kindred  concilia- 
tion  may  be  Looked  for. 

Pursuit  of  social  welfare  :il  large  must  afford  here- 
after, ;is  it  (hies  now,  scope  for  the  postponement  of 
»  unselfish  interests,  but  a  continually 
ipe  ;  because  as  adaptation  to  the  social 
state  progresses  the  needs  for  those  regulative  actions 


CO  N  CILIA  TION.  30 1 

by  which  social  life  is  made  harmonious  become  less. 
And  here  the  amount  of  altruistic  action  which  each 
undertakes  must  inevitably  be  kept  within  moderate 
bounds  by  others;  for  if  they  are  similarly  altruistic, 
they  will  not  allow  some  to  pursue  public  ends  to  their 
own  considerable  detriment  that  the  rest  may  profit. 

In  the  private  relations  of  men,  opportunies  for 
self-sacrifice  prompted  by  sympathy,  must  ever  in  some 
degree,  though  eventually  in  a  small  degree,  be  af- 
forded by  accidents,  diseases,  and  misfortunes  in 
genera] ;  since,  however  near  to  completeness  the  adap- 
tation of  human  nature  to  the  conditions  of  existence 
at  large,  physical  and  social,  may  become,  it  can  never 
reach  completeness.  Flood,  fire,  and  wreck  must  to  the 
last  yield  at  intervals  opportunities  for  heroic  acts  ;  and 
in  the  motives  to  such  acts,  anxiety  for  others  will  be 
less  alloyed  with  love  of  admiration  than  now.  Ex- 
treme, however,  as  may  be  the  eagerness  for  altruistic 
action  on  the  rare  occasions  hence  arising,  the  amount 
falling  to  the  share  of  each  must,  for  the  reasons  given, 
be  narrowly  limited. 

But  though  in  the  incidents  of  ordinary  life,  post- 
ponements of  self  to  others  in  large  ways  must  become 
very  infrequent,  daily  intercourse  will  still  furnish  mul- 
titudinous small  occasions  for  the  activity  of  fellow 
feeling.  Always  each  may  continue  to  further  the  wel- 
fare of  others  by  warding  off  from  them  evils  they  can- 
not see,  and  by  aiding  their  actions  in  ways  unknown 
to  them;  or,  conversely  putting  it,  each  may  have,  as 
it  were,  supplementary  eyes  and  ears  in  other  persons, 
which  perceive  for  him  things  he  cannot  perceive  him- 
self: so  perfecting  his  life  in  numerous  details,  by 
making  its  adjustment  to  environing  actions  complete. 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 

$  97.  AT ust  it  then  follow  that  eventually,  with  this 
diminution  of  the  spheres  for  it,  altruism  must  diminish 
in  total  amount?  By  no  means.  Such  a  conclusion 
implies  a  misconception. 

Naturally,  under  existing  conditions,  with  suffering 
widely  diffused  and  so  much  of  effort  demanded  from 
the  more  fortunate  in  succoring  the  less  fortunate,  al- 
truism is  understood  to  mean  only  self-sacrifice ;  or,  at 
any  rate,  a  mode  of  action  which,  while  it  brings  some 
pleasure,  has  an  accompaniment  of  self-surrender  that 
is  not  pleasurable.  But  the  sympathy  which  prompts 
denial  of  self  to  please  others  is  a  sympathy  which  also 
receives  pleasure  from  their  pleasures  when  they  are 
otherwise  originated.  The  stronger  the  fellow-feeling 
which  excites  efforts  to  make  others  happy,  the  stronger 
is  the  fellow-feeling  with  their  happiness  however  caused. 

In  its  ultimate  form,  then,  altruism  will  be  the 
achievement  of  gratification  through  sympathy  with 
those  gratifications  of  others  which  are  mainly  pro- 
duced  by  their  activities  of  all  kinds  successfully  carried 
on — sympathetic  gratification  which  costs  the  receiver 
nothing,  but  is  a  gratis  addition  to  his  egoistic  gratifi- 
cations. This  power  of  representing  in  idea  the  mental 
Btates  of  others,  which,  during  the  process  of  adapta- 
tion has  had  the  function  of  mitigating  suffering,  must, 
as  tin'  Buffering  falls  to  a  minimum,  come  to  have 
almost  wholly  the  function  of  mutually  exalting  men's 
enjoyments  by  giving  every  one  a  vivid  intuition  of  his 
ijoyments.  While  pain  prevails  widely, 
it  is  undesirable  that  each  should  participate  much  in 
the  consciousness  of  others;  but  with  an  increasing 
predominance  of  pleasure,  participation  in  others'  con' 
m  irjusiK- -.,« is  becomes,  a  gain  of  pleasure  to  all. 


CONCILIATION.  303 

And  so  there  will  disappear  that  apparently  perma- 
nent opposition  between  egoism  and  altruism,  implied 
by  the  compromise  reached  in  the  last  chapter.  Sub- 
jectively looked  at,  the  conciliation  will  be  such  that  the 
individual  will  not  have  to  balance  between  self-regard- 
ing impulses  and  other-regarding  impulses ;  but,  instead, 
those  satisfactions  of  other-regarding  impulses  which 
involve  self-sacrifice,  becoming  rare  and  much  prized, 
will  be  so  unhesitatingly  preferred  that  the  competition 
of  self-regarding  impulses  with  them  will  scarcely  be 
felt.  And  the  subjective  conciliation  will  also  be  such 
that  though  altruistic  pleasure  will  be  attained,  yet 
the  motive  of  action  will  not  consciously  be  the  attain- 
ment of  altruistic  pleasure  ;  but  the  idea  present  will  be 
the  securing  of  others'  pleasures.  Meanwhile,  the  con- 
ciliation objectively  considered  will  be  equally  complete. 
Though  each,  no  longer  needing  to  maintain  his  egoistic 
claims,  will  tend  rather  when  occasion  offers  to  sur- 
render them,  yet  others,  similarly  natured,  will  not  per- 
mit him  in  any  Luge  measure  to  do  this,  and  that  ful- 
fillment of  personal  desires  required  for  completion  of 
his  life  will  thus  be  secured  to  him  ;  though  not  now 
egoistic  in  the  ordinary  sense,  }ret  the  effects  of  due 
egoism  will  be  achieved.  Nor  is  this  all.  As,  at  an 
early  stage,  egoistic  competition,  first  reaching  a  compro- 
mise such  that  each  claims  no  more  than  his  equitable 
share,  afterward  rises  to  a  conciliation  such  that  each 
insists  on  the  taking  of  equitable  shares  by  others;  so, 
at  the  latest  stage,  altruistic  competition,  first  reaching 
a  compromise  under  which  each  restrains  himself  from 
taking  an  undue  share  of  altruistic  satisfactions,  event- 
ually rises  to  a  conciliation  under  which  each  takes  care 
that  others  shall  have  their  opportunities   for  altruistic 


THE  LATA  OF  ETHICS. 

satisfactions:  the  highest  altruism  being  that  which 
ministers  not  to  the  egoistic  satisfactions  of  others  only, 
but  also  to  their  altruistic  satisfactions. 

Far  off  as  seems  such  a  state,  yet  every  one  of  the 
factors  counted  on  to  produce  it  may  already  be  traced 
in  operation  among  those  of  highest  natures.  What 
now  in  them  is  occasional  and  feeble,  may  be  expected 
with  further  evolution  to  become  habitual  and  strong; 
and  what  now  characterizes  the  exceptionally  high  may 
be  expected  eventually  to  characterize  all.  For  that 
which  the  best  human  nature  is  capable  of,  is  within  the 
reach  of  human  nature  at  large. 

§  98.  That  these  conclusions  will  meet  with  any  con- 
siderable acceptance  is  improbable.  Neither  with  cur- 
rent ideas  nor  with  current  sentiments  are  they  suffi- 
ciently congruous. 

Such  a  view  will  not  be  agreeable  to  those  who  lament 
the  spreading  disbelief  in  eternal  damnation  ;  nor  to 
those  who  follow  the  apostle  of  brute  force  in  thinking 
that  because  the  rule  of  the  strong  hand  was  once  good 
good  for  all  time  ;  nor  to  those  whose  reverence  for 
one  who  told  them  to  put  up  the  sword,  is  shown  by 
using  the  sword  to  spread  his  doctrine  among  heathens. 
From  the  ten  thousand  priests  of  the  religion  of  love, 
who  are  silent  when  the  nation  is  moved  by  the  religion 
of  hate-,  will  come  no  sign  of  assent;  nor  from  their 
bishops  who,  far  from  urging  the  extreme  precept  of  the 
r  they  pretend  to  follow,  to  turn  the  other  cheek 
when  one  is  smitten,  vote  for  acting  on  the  principle — 
strike  lest  ye  be  struck.  Nor  will  any  approval  be  felt 
by  legislators  who,  after  praying  to  be  forgiven  their 
tsses  as  they  forgive  the  trespasses  of  others,  forth* 


CONCILIATION  305 

with  decide  to  attack  those  who  have  not  trespassed 
against  them,  and  who,  after  a  Queen's  Speech  has  in- 
voked -i  the  blessing  of  Almighty  God"  on  their  coun- 
cils, immediately  provide  means  for  committing  political 
burglary. 

P>ut,  though  men  who  profess  Christianity  and  prac- 
tice Paganism  can  feel  no  sympathy  with  such  a  view, 
there  are  some,  classed  us  antagonists  to  the  current 
creed,  who  may  not  think  it  absurd  to  believe  that  a 
rationalized  version  of  its  ethical  principles  will  event- 
ually be  acted  upon. 
20 


THE  DATA  OF  ETU1CS. 


CHAPTER  XV. 

ABSOLUTE  AND   RELATIVE  ETHICS. 

§  90.  As  applied  to  Ethics,  the  word  "absolute  "  will 
by  many  be  supposed  to  imply  principles  of  right  con- 
duct that  exist  out  of  relation  to  life  as  conditioned  on 
the  Earth,  out  of  relation  to  time  and  place,  and  inde- 
pendent of  the  Universe  as  now  visible  to  us,  "  eternal " 
principles  as  they  are  called.  Those,  however,  who 
recall  the  doctrine  set  forth  in  First  Principles,  will 
hesitate  to  put  this  interpretation  on  the  word.  Right, 
us  we  can  think  it,  necessitates  the  thought  of  not  right, 
or  WTong,  for  its  correlative,  and  hence,  to  ascribe  right- 
to  the  acts  of  the  Power  manifested  through  phenom- 
ena, is  to  assume  the  possibility  that  wrong  acts  may 
be  committed  by  this  Power.  But  how  come  there  to 
.  apart  from  this  Power,  conditions  of  such  kind 
thai  subordination  of  its  acts  to  them  makes  them  right 
and  insubordination  wrong.  How  can  Unconditioned 
Being  be  subject  to  conditions  beyond  itself? 

If,  for  example,  any  one  should  assert  that  the  Cause 
of  Things,  conceived  in  respect  of  fundamental  moral 
attributes  as  like  ourselves,  did  right  in  producing  a 
Universe  which,  in  the  course  of  immeasurable  time, 
ivin  origen  to  beings  capable  of  pleasure,  and 
would  have  done  wrong  in  abstaining  from  the  produc- 
tion of  such  a  Universe  ;  then,  the  comment  to  be  made 


ABSOLUTE  AND  RELAT1     /:  ETHICS.  307 

is  that,  imposing  the  moral  ideas  generated  in  his  finite 
consciousness,  upon  the  Infinite  Existence  which  tran« 
scends  consciousness,  lie  goes  behind  that  Infinite  Exist- 
ence and  prescribes  for  it  principles  of  action. 

As  implied  in  foregoing  chapters,  right  and  wrong 
as  conceived  by  us  can  exist  only  in  relation  to  the 
actions  of  creatures  capable  of  pleasures  and  pains ; 
seeing  that  analysis  carries  us  back  to  pleasures  and 
pains  as  the  elements  out  of  which  the  conceptions  are 
framed. 

But  if  the  word  "  absolute,"  as  used  above  does  not 
refer  to  the  Unconditioned  Being — if  the  principles  of 
action  distinguished  as  absolute  and  relative  concern 
the  conduct  of  conditioned  beings,  in  what  way  are  the 
words  to  be  understood?  An  explanation  of  their 
meanings  will  be  best  conveyed  by  a  criticism  on  the 
current  conceptions  of  right  and  wrong, 

§  100.  Conversations  about  the  affairs  of  life  habitu- 
ally imply  the  belief  that  every  deed  named  may  be 
placed  under  the  one  head  or  the  other.  In  discussing 
a  political  question,  both  sides  take  it  for  granted  that 
some  line  of  action  may  be  chosen  which  is  right,  while 
all  other  lines  of  action  are  wrong.  So,  too,  is  it  with 
judgments  on  the  doings  of  individuals  ;  each  of  these 
is  approved  or  disapproved  on  the  assumption  that  it  is 
definitely  classable  as  good  or  bad.  Even  where  quali- 
fications are  admitted,  they  are  admitted  with  an  im- 
plied idea  that  some  such  positive  characterization  is  to 
be  made. 

Nor  is  it  in  popular  thought  and  speech  only  that  we 
see  this.  If  not  wholly  and  definitely,  yet  partiall)' 
Slid  by  implication,  the  belief  is  expressed  by  moralists. 


30 S  THE  DATA  OF  ETUICS. 

In  his  Methods  ofMhics  (1st  Ed.,  p.  6)  Mr.  Sidgwick 
says  :  "  That  there  is  in  any  given  circumstances  some 
one  thing  which  ought  to  be  done  and  that  this  can  be 
known,  is  a  fundamental  assumption,  made  not  by  phil- 
osophers only,  but  by  all  who  perform  any  processes  of 
moral  reasoning.''*  In  this  sentence  there  is  specifically 
asserted  only  the  last  of  the  above  propositions  ;  namely, 
that,  in  every  case,  what  "  ought  to  be  done  "  "  can  be 
known."  But  though  that  "which  ought  to  be  done" 
is  not  distinctly  identified  with  "the  right,"  it  may  be 
inferred,  in  the  absence  of  any  indication  to  the  con- 
trary, that  Mr.  Sidgwick  regards  the  two  as  identical; 
and  doubtless,  in  so  conceiving  the  postulates  of  moral 
science,  he  is  at  one  with  most,  if  not  all,  who  have 
made  it  a  subject  of  study.  At  first  sight,  indeed,  noth- 
ing seems  more  obvious  than  that  if  actions  are  to  be 
judged  at  all,  these  postulates  must  be  accepted.  Never- 
theless they  may  both  be  called  in  question,  and  I  think 
it  may  be  shown  that  neither  of  them  is  tenable.  In- 
stead of  admitting  (hat  there  is  in  every  case  a  right 
and  a  wrong,  it  maybe  contended  that  in  multitudi- 
nous cases  no  right,  properly  so-called,  can  be  alleged, 
but  only  a  least  wrong  ;  and  further,  it  may  be  con- 
tended that  in  many  of  these  cases  where  there  can  be 
alleged  only  a  least  wrong,  it  is  not  possible  to  ascer- 
tain with  any  precision  which  is  the  least  wrong. 

A  gfeal  part  of  the  perplexities  in  ethical  speculation 

from  neglect  of  this  distinction  between  right  and 

least  wrong — between  the  absolutely  right  and  the  rel- 

*  I  do  not  find  this  passage  in  the  second  edition  ;  but  the  omis« 
son  of  it  appears  to  have  arisen  not  from  any  change  of  view,  but 
lid  not  naturally  come  into  the  recast  form  of  the  argu» 
merit  wlhch  the  section  contains. 


ABSOLUTE  AND  RELATIVE  ETHTCS.  '.',  >D 

atively  right.  And  many  further  perplexities  are  due  to 
the  assumption  that  it  cfin,  in  some  way,  be  decided  iu 
every  case  which  of  two  courses  is  morally  obligatory. 

§  101.  The  law  of  absolute  right  can  take  no  cogni- 
zance of  pain,  save  the  cognizance  implied  by  negation. 
Pain  is  the  correlative  of  some  species  of  wrong — some 
kind  of  divergence  from  that  course  of  action  which 
perfectly  fulfills  all  requirements.  If,  as  was  shown  in 
an  early  chapter,  the  conception  of  good  conduct  always 
proves,  when  analyzed,  to  be  the  conception  of  a  conduct 
which  produces  a  surplus  of  pleasure  somewhere  ;  while, 
conversely,  the  conduct  conceived  as  bad  proves  always 
to  be  that  which  inflicts  somewhere  a  surplus  of  either 
positive  or  negative  pain  ;  then  the  absolutely  good,  the 
absolutely  right,  in  conduct,  can  be  that  only  which 
produces  pure  pleasure — pleasure  unalloyed  with  pain 
anywhere.  By  implication,  conduct  which  has  any  con- 
comitant of  pain,  or  any  painful  consequence,  is  par- 
tially wrong;  and  the  highest  claim  to  be  made  for 
such  conduct  is  that  it  is  the  least  wrong  which,  under 
the  conditions,  is  possible — the  relatively  right. 

The  contents  of  preceding  chapters  imply  throughout 
that,  considered  from  the  evolution  point  of  view,  the 
aets  of  men  during  the  transition  which  has  been,  is 
still,  and  long  will  be,  in  progress,  must,  in  most  cases, 
be  of  the  kind  here  classed  as  least  wrong.  In  propor- 
tion to  the  incongruity  between  the  natures  men  inherit 
from  the  pre-social  state,  and  the  requirements  of  social 
life,  must  be  the  amount  of  pain  entailed  by  their 
actions,  either  on  themselves  or  on  others.  In  so  far  as 
pain  is  suffered,  evil  is  inflicted;  and  conduct  which 
inflicts  any  evil  cannot  be  absolutely  good. 


810  TIIE  LATA  OF  ETHICS. 

To  make  clear  tlie  distinction  here  insisted  upon 
between  that  perfect  conduct  which  is  the  subject* 
matter  of  Absolute  Ethics,  and  that  imperfect  conduct 
which  is  the  subject-matter  of  Relative  Ethics,  some 
illustrations  must  be  given. 

§  102.  Among  the  best  examples  of  absolutely  right 
actions  to  be  named  are  those  arising  where  the  nature 
and  the  requirements  have  been  molded  to  one  another 
before  social  evolution  began.     Two  will  here  suffice. 

Consider  the  relation  of  a  healthy  mother  to  a  healthy 
infant.  Between  the  two  there  exists  a  mutual  depend- 
ence which  is  a  source  of  pleasure  to  both.  In  yielding 
its  natural  food  to  the  child,  the  mother  receives  grat- 
ification ;  and  to  the  child  there  comes  the  satisfaction 
of  appetite — a  satisfaction  which  accompanies  further- 
ance of  life,  growth  and  increasing  enjoyment.  Let 
the  relation  be  suspended,  and  on  both  sides  there  is 
Buffering.  The  mother  experiences  both  bodily  pain 
and  mental  pain,  and  the  painful  sensation  borne  by 
the  child  brings  as  its  result  physical  mischief  and  some 
damage  to  the  emotional  nature.  Thus  the  act  is  one 
that  is  to  both  exclusively  pleasurable,  while  abstention 
entails  pain  on  both  ;  and  it  is  consequently  of  the  kind 
avc  here  call  absolutely  right. 

hi  the  parental  relations  of  the  father  we  are  fur- 
nished with  a  kindred  example.  If  lie  is  well  consti- 
tuted in  body  and  mind,  his  boy,  eager  for  play,  finds 
in  him  a  sympathetic  response,  and  their  frolics,  giving 
mutual  pleasure,  not  only  further  the  child's  physical 
welfare,  but  strengthen  that  bond  of  good  feeling 
between  the  two  which  makes  subsequent  guidance 
easier.     And    then    if,    repudiating   the   stupidities   of 


ABSOLUTE  AND  RELATIVE  ETHICS.  311 

early  education  as  at  present  conceived  and  unhappily 
State-enacted,  lie  has  rational  ideas  of  mental  develop- 
ment, and  sees  that  the  second-hand  knowledge  gained 
through  books  should  begin  to  supplement  the  first-hand 
knowledge  gained  by  direct  observation,  only  when  a 
good  stock  of  this  has  been  acquired,  he  will,  with 
active  sympathy,  aid  in  the  exploration  of  the  surround- 
ing world  which  his  boy  pursues  with  delight;  giving 
and  receiving  gratification  from  moment  to  moment 
while  furthering  ultimate  welfare.  Here,  again,  are 
actions  of  a  kind  purely  pleasurable  alike  in  their 
immediate  and  remote  effects — actions  absolutely  right. 
The  intercourse  of  adults  yields,  for  the  reason  as- 
signed, relatively  few  cases  that  fall  completely  within 
the  same  category.  In  their  transactions  from  hour 
to  hour,  more  or  less  of  deduction  from  pure  gratifica* 
tion  is  caused  on  one  or  other  side  by  imperfect  fitness 
to  the  requirements.  The  pleasures  men  gain  by  labor- 
ing in  their  vocations  and  receiving  in  one  form  or 
other  returns  for  their  services  usually  have  the  draw- 
back that  the  laborers  are  in  a  considerable  decree 
displeasurable.  Cases,  however,  do  occur  where  the 
energies  are  so  abundant  that  inaction  is  irksome  ;  and 
where  the  daily  work,  not  too  great  in  duration,  is  of 
a  kind  appropriate  to  the  nature ;  and  where,  as  a  con- 
sequence, pleasure  rather  than  pain  is  a  concomitant. 
When  services  yielded  by  such  a  one  are  paid  for  by  an- 
other similarly  adapted  to  his  occupation,  the  entire 
transaction  is  of  the  kind  we  are  here  considering1  :  ex- 
change  under  agreement  between  two  so  constituted 
becomes  a  means  of  pleasure  to  both,  with  no  set-off 
of  pain.  Bearing  in  mind  the  form  of  nature  which 
social  discipline  is  producing,  as  shown  in  the  contrast 


812  THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 

1)tt  ween  savage  and  civilized,  the  implication  is  that 
ultimately  men's  activities  at  large  will  assume  this 
character.  Remembering  that  in  the  course  of  organic 
evolution,  the  means  to  enjoyment  themselves  event- 
ually become  sources  of  enjoyment  ;  and  that  there  is 
no  form  of  action  which  may  not  through  the  devel- 
opment of  appropriate  structures  become  pleasurable; 
the  inference  must  be  that  industrial  activities,  carried 
on  through  voluntary  co-operation,  will  in  time  acquire 
the  character  of  absolute  lightness  as  here  conceived. 
Already,  indeed,  something  like  such  a  state  has  been 
reached  among  certain  of  those  who  minister  to  our 
aesthetic  gratifications.  The  artist  of  genius — poet, 
painter,  or  musician — is  one  who  obtains  the  means  of 
living  by  acts  that  are  directly  pleasurable  to  him,  while 
they  yield,  immediately  or  remotely,  pleasures  to  others. 
Once  more,  among  absolutely  right  acts  may  be 
named  certain  of  those  which  we  class  as  benevolent. 
I  say  certain  of  them,  because  such  benevolent  acts  as 
entail  submission  to  pain,  positive  or  negative,  that 
others  may  receive  pleasure,  are,  by  the  definition,  ex- 
cluded. But  there  are  benevolent  acts  of  a  kind  yield- 
ing pleasure  solely.  Some  one  who  has  slipped  is 
saved  from  falling  by  a  by-stander  :  a  hurt  is  pre- 
vented  and  satisfaction  is  felt  by  both.  A  pedestrian 
is  choosing  a  dangerous  route,  or  a  fellow-passenger  is 
about  to  alight  at  the  wrong  station,  and,  warned 
against  doing  so,  is  saved  from  evil :  each  being,  as  a 
.  gratified.  There  is  a  misunderstanding 
sen  friends,  and  one  who  sees  how  it  has  arisen 
explains,  the  result  being  agreeable  to  all.  Services  to 
those  around  in  the  small  affairs  of  life,  may  be,  and 
often   are,  of  a  kind  which  there   is   equal  pleasure  in 


A BSOL  l '  IK  .  1  -Y D  R EL , I  Tl  I ' E  El  HICS.  3 1 3 

giving  and  receiving.  Indeed,  as  was  urged  in  the  last 
chapter,  the  actions  of  developed  altruism  must  habit- 
ually have  this  character.  And  so,  in  countless  ways 
suggested  by  these  few,  men  may  add  to  one  another's 
happiness  without  anywhere  producing  unhappiness— 
ways  which  arc  therefore  absolutely  right. 

In  contrast  with  these  consider  the  many  actions 
which  from  hour  to  hour  are  gone  through,  now  with  an 
accompaniment  of  some  pain  to  the  actor  and  now  bring- 
ing results  that  are  partially  painful  to  others,  but  which 
nevertheless  are  imperative.  As  implied  by  antithesis 
with  cases  above  referred  to,  the  wearisomeness  of  pro- 
ductive labor  as  ordinarily  pursued,  renders  it  in  so  far 
wrong;  but  then  far  greater  suffering  would  result, 
both  to  the  laborer  and  his  family,  and  therefore  far 
greater  wrong  would  be  done,  were  this  wearisomeness 
not  borne.  Though  the  pains  which  the  care  of  many 
children  entail  on  a  mother  form  a  considerable  set-off 
from  the  pleasures  secured  by  them  to  her  children  and 
herself,  yet  the  miseries  immediate  and  remote,  which 
neglect  would  entail,  so  far  exceed  them  that  submission 
to  such  pains  up  to  the  limit  of  physical  ability  to  bear 
them  becomes  morally  imperative  as  being  the  least 
wrong.  A  servant  who  fails  to  fulfill  an  agreement  in 
respect  of  work,  or  who  is  perpetually  breaking  crockery, 
or  who  pilfers,  may  have  to  suffer  pain  from  being  dis- 
charged ;  but  since  the  evils  to  be  borne  by  all  concerned 
if  incapacity  or  misconduct  is  tolerated,  not  in  one  case 
only  but  habitually,  must  be  much  greater,  such  inflic- 
tion of  pain  is  warranted  as  a  means  to  preventing 
greater  pain.  Withdrawal  of  custom  from  a  tradesman 
whose  charges  are  too  high,  or  whose  commodities  are 
inferior,  or  who  gives  short  measure,  or  who  is  unpunc- 


314  THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 

tual,  decreases  his  welfare,  and  perhaps  injures  his 
belongings;  but  as  saving  him  from  these  evils  would 
imply  bearing  the  evils  his  conduct  causes,  and  as  such 

i  fur  his  well-being  would  imply  disregard  of  the 
well  being  of  some  more  worthy  or  more  efficient  trades- 
man to  whom  the  custom  would  else  go,  and  as,  chiefly, 
general  adoption  of  the  implied  course,  having  the  effect 
that  the  inferior  would  not  suffer  from  their  inferiority 
nor  the  superior  gain  by  their  superiority,  would  pro- 
duce universal  misery,  withdrawal  is  justified — the  act 
is  relatively  right. 

§  103.  I  pass  now  to  the  second  of  the  two  proposi- 
tions above  enunciated.  After  recognizing  the  truth 
that  a  large  part  of  human  conduct  is  not  absolutely 
right,  but  only  relatively  right,  we  have  to  recognize 
the  further  truth  that  in  many  cases  where  there  is  no 
absolutely  right  course,  but  only  courses  that  are  more 
or  less  wrong,  it  is  not  possible  to  say  which  is  the  least 
wrong.  Recurrence  to  the  instances  just  given  will 
show  this. 

There  is  a  point  up  to  which  it  is  relatively  right  for 
a  parent  to  cany  self-sacrifice  for  the  benefit  of  off- 
spring, and  there  is  a  point  beyond  which  self-sacrifice 
cannol  be  pushed  without  bringing,  not  only  on  himself 
or  herself,  but  also  on  the  family,  evils  greater  than 
those  to  be  prevented  by  the  self-sacrifice.  Who  shall 
say  where  this  point  is?  Depending  on  the  constitutions 
and  needs  of  those  concerned  it  is  in  no  two  cases  the 
same,  and  cannot  be  bjr  any  one  more  than  guessed. 
The  trail  as  or  short-comings  of  a  servant  vary 

from  the  trivial  to  the  grave,  and  the  evils  which  dis- 
charge may  bring  range  through  countless  degrees  from 


AH  SOLUTE  AND  RELATIVE  ETHICS.  315 

sliglit  to  serious.  The  penalty  may  be  inflicted  for  a 
very  small  offense,  and  then  there  is  wrong  done,  or, 
after  numerous  grave  offenses,  it  may  not  be  inflicted, 
and  again  there  is  wrong  done.  How  shall  be  deter- 
mined the  degree  of  transgression  beyond  which  to 
discharge  is  less  wrong  than  not  to  discharge?  In  like 
manner  with  the  shopkeeper's  misdemeanors.  No  one 
can  sum  up  either  the  amount  of  positive  and  negative 
pain  which  tolerating  them  involves,  nor  the  amount  of 
positive  and  negative  pain  involved  by  not  tolerating 
them,  and  in  medium  cases  no  one  can  say  where  the 
one  exceeds  the  other. 

In  men's  wider  relations  frequently  occur  circum- 
stances under  which  a  decision  one  or  other  way  is  im- 
perative, and  yet  under  which  not  even  the  most  sen- 
sitive conscience,  helped  by  the  clearest  judgment,  can 
decide  which  of  the  alternatives  is  relatively  right.  Two 
examples  will  suffice. 

Here  is  a  merchant  who  loses  by  the  failure  of  a  man 
indebted  to  him.  Unless  he  gets  help  he  himself  will 
fail,  and  if  he  fails  he  will  bring  disaster  not  only  on  his 
family  but  on  all  who  have  given  him  credit.  Even  if 
by  borrowing  he  is  enabled  to  meet  immediate  engage- 
ments, he  is  not  safe;  for  the  time  is  one  of  panic,  and 
others  of  his  debtors  by  going  to  the  wall  may  put  him 
in  further  difficulties.  Shall  he  ask  a  friend  for  a  loan? 
On  the  one  hand,  is  it  not  wrong  forthwith  to  bring  on 
himself,  his  family,  and  those  who  have  business  relations 
with  him,  the  evils  of  his  failure  ?  On  the  other  hand, 
is  it  not  wrong  to  hypothecate  the  property  of  his 
friend,  and  lead  him  too,  with  his  belongings  and 
dependants,  into  similar  risks  ?  The  loan  would  prob- 
ably tide  him  over  his  difficulty,  in  which  case  would 


316  THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 

it  not  be  unjust  to  his  creditors  did  lie  refrain  from 
asking  it?  Contrariwise,  the  loan  would  very  possibly 
fail  to  stave  off  his  bankruptcy,  in  which  case  is  not  his 
action  in  frying  to  obtain  it  practically  fraudulent? 
Though,  in  extreme  cases,  it  may  be  easy  to  say  which 
course  is  the  least  wrong,  how  is  it  possible  in  all  those 
medium  cases  where  even  by  the  keenest  man  of 
business  the  contingencies  cannot  be  calculated  ? 

Take,  again,  the  difficulties  that  not  unfrequently 
arise  from  antagonism  between  family  duties  and  social 
duties.  Here  is  a  tenant  farmer  whose  political  prin- 
ciples prompt  him  to  vote  in  opposition  to  his  landlord. 
If,  being  a  liberal,  he  votes  for  a  conservative,  not  only 
does  he  by  his  act  say  that  he  thinks  what  lie  does  not 
think,  but  he  may  perhaps  assist  what  he  regards  as  bad 
legislation  :  his  vote  may  by  chance  turn  the  election, 
and  on  a  parliamentary  division  a  single  member  may 
decide  the  fate  of  a  measure.  Even  neglecting,  as  too 
improbable,  such  serious  consequenees,  there  is  the 
manifest  truth  that  if  all  who  hold  like  views  with  him- 
self are  similarly  deterred  from  electoral  expression  of 
them,  there  must  result  a  different  balance  of  power  and 
a  different  national  policy  ;  making  it  clear  that  only  by 
adherence  of  all  to  their  political  principles  can  the 
policy  he  thinks  right  be  maintained.  But  now,  on  the 
other  hand,  how  can  he  absolve  himself  from  responsi- 
bility for  the  evils  which  those  dependingon  him  may 
Buffer  if  he  fulfills  what  appears  to  bea  peremptory  public 
duty?  Is  not  his  duty  to  his  children  even  more 
peremptory?  Does  not  the  family  precede  the  State; 
and  does  not  the  welfare  of  the  State  depend  on  the 
welfare  of  the  family?  May  he,  then,  take  a  course 
which,  if  the  threats  uttered  are  carried  out,  will  eject 


A  P.  sol.  UTE  .  1  YD  RELA  Tl  VE  ETHICS.  317 

him  from  his  farm;  and  so  cause  inability,  perhaps 
temporary,  perhaps  prolonged,  to  feed  his  children. 
The  contingent  evils  are  infinitely  varied  in  their  ratios. 
In  one  ease  the  imperativeness  of  the  public  duty  is 
great  and  the  evil  that  may  come  on  dependants  small ; 
in  another  case  the  political  issue  is  of  trivial  moment 
and  the  possible  injury  which  the  family  may  suffer  is 
great ;  and  between  these  extremes  there  are  all  grada- 
tions. Further,  the  degreesof  probability  of  each  result, 
public  and  private,  range  from  the  nearly  certain  to  the 
almost  impossible.  Admitting,  then,  that  it  is  wrong  to 
act  in  a  way  likely  to  injure  the  State;  and  admitting 
that  it  is  wrong  to  act  in  a  way  likely  to  injure  the 
family,  we  have  to  recognize  the  fact  that  in  countless 
cases  no  one  can  decide  by  which  of  the  alternative 
courses  the  least  wrong  is  likely  to  be  done. 

These  instances  will  sufficiently  show  that  in  conduct 
at  large',  including  men's  dealings  with  themselves,  with 
their  families,  with  their  friends,  with  their  debtors  and 
creditors,  and  with  the  public,  it  usually  happens  that 
whatever  course  is  taken  entails  some  pain  somewhere  ; 
forming  a  deduction  from  the  pleasure  achieved,  and 
making  the  course  in  so  far  not  absolutely  right.  Further, 
they  will  show  that  throughout  a  considerable  part  of 
conduct,  no  guiding  principle,  no  method  of  estimation, 
enables  us  to  say  whether  a  proposed  course  is  even 
relatively  right;  as  causing,  proximately  and  remotely, 
specially  and  generally,  the  greatest  surplus  of  good 
over  evil. 

§  104.  And  now  we  are  prepared  for  dealing  in  a 
systematic  way  with  the  distinction  between  Absolute 
Ethics  and  Relative  Ethics. 


313  THE  DATA  OF  ETUICS. 

Scientific  truths,  of  whatever  order,  are  reached  by 
eliminating  perturbing  or  conflicting  factors,  and  rec- 
ognizing only  fundamental  factors.  When,  by  dealing 
with  fundamental  factors  in  the  abstract,  not  as  pre- 
sented in  actual  phenomena,  but  as  presented  in  ideal 
separation,  general  laws  have  been  ascertained,  it  be- 
comes possible  to  draw  inferences  in  concrete  cases  by 
taking  into  account  incidental  factors.  But  it  is  only 
by  first  ignoring  these  and  recognizing  the  essential 
elements  alone  that  we  can  discover  the  essential  truths 
sought.  Take,  in  illustration,  the  progress  of  mechanics 
from  its  empirical  form  to  its  rational  form. 

All  have  occasional  experience  of  the  fact  that  a 
person  pushed  on  one  side  beyond  a  certain  degree 
loses  his  balance  and  falls.  It  is  observed  that  a  stone 
ih ing,  or  an  arrow  shot,  does  not  proceed  in  a  straight 
line,  but  comes  to  the  earth  after  pursuing  a  course 
which  deviates  more  and  more  from  its  original  course. 
When  trying  to  break  a  stick  across  the  knee,  it  is 
found  that  success  is  easier  if  the  stick  is  seized  at 
considerable  distances  from  the  knee  on  each  side  than 
if  seized  close  to  the  knee.  Daily  use  of  a  spear  draws 
attention  to  the  truth  that  by  thrusting  its  point  under 
;i  stone  and  depressing  the  shaft,  the  stone  may  be 
raised  the  more  readily  the  further  away  the  hand  is 
toward  the  end.  Here,  then,  are  sundry  experiences, 
eventually  grouped  int..  empirical  generalizations,  which 
to  guide  conduct  in  certain  simple  eases.  How 
mechanical  science  evolve  from  these  experiences? 
To  reach  a  formula  expressing  the  powers  of  the  lever, 
it  -iij.j)!.  er  which  does  not;,  like  the  stick,  admit 

(.f  being  bent,  but  is  absolutely  rigid,  and  it  supposes  a 
rum  not  having  a  broad   surface,  like  that  of  on« 


ABSOLUTE  AND  RELATIVE  ETHIC8.  319 

Ordinarily  used,  but  a  fulcrum  without  breadth,  and  it 
supposes  that  the  weight  to  be  raised  bears  on  a  definite 
point,  instead  of  bearing  over  a  considerable  portion 
of  the  lever.  Similarly  with  the  leaning  body,  which, 
passing  a  certain  inclination,  overbalances.  Before  the 
truth  respecting  the  relations  of  centre  of  gravity  and  base 
can  be  formulated,  it  must  be  assumed  that  the  surface 
on  which  the  body  stands  is  unyielding,  that  the  edge 
of  the  body  itself  is  unyielding,  and  that  its  mass,  while 
made  to  lean  more  and  more,  does  not  change  its  form — 
conditions  not  fulfilled  in  the  cases  commonly  observed. 
And  so,  too,  is  it  with  the  projectile  :  determination  of 
its  course  by  deduction  from  mechanical  laws,  primarily 
ignores  all  deviations  caused  by  its  shape  and  by  the 
resistance  of  the  air.  The  science  of  rational  mechanics 
is  a  science  which  consists  of  such  ideal  truths,  and  can 
come  into  existence  only  by  thus  dealing  with  ideal 
cases.  It  remains  impossible  so  long  as  attention  is  re- 
stricted to  concrete  cases  presenting  all  the  complica- 
tions of  friction,  plasticity  and  so  forth. 

But  now,  after  disentangling  certain  fundamental 
mechanical  truths,  it  becomes  possible  by  their  help  to 
guide  actions  better,  and  it  becomes  possible  to  guide 
them  still  better  when,  as  presently  happens,  the  com- 
plicating elements  from  which  they  have  been  disen- 
tangled are  themselves  taken  into  account.  At  an  ad- 
vanced stage  the  modifying  effects  of  friction  are  allowed 
for,  and  the  inferences  are  qualified  to  the  requisite  ex- 
tent. The  theory  of  the  pulley  is  corrected  in  its 
application  to  actual  cases  by  recognizing  the  rigidity  of 
cordage ;  the  effects  of  which  are  formulated.  The 
stabilities  of  masses,  determinable  in  the  abstract  by 
reference  to  the  centres  of  gravity  of  the  masses  in  re- 


320  THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 

lation  to  the  bases,  come  to  be  determined  in  the  concrete 
by  including  also  their  characters  inrespect  of  cohesion. 
The  courses  of  projectiles,  having  been  theoretically- 
settled  as  though  they  moved  through  a  vacuum,  are 
afterward  settled  in  more  exact  correspondence  with 
fact  by  taking  into  account  atmospheric  resistance. 

And  thus  we  see  illustrated  the  relation  between 
certain  absolute  truths  of  mechanical  science,  and  cer- 
tain relative  truths  which  involve  them.  We  are  shown 
that  no  scientific  establishment  of  relative  truths  is 
possible  until  the  absolute  truths  have  been  formulated 
independently.  AVe  see  that  mechanical  science,  fitted 
for  dealing  with  the  real,  can  arise  only  after  ideal 
mechanical  science  has  arisen. 

All  this  holds  of  moral  science.  As  by  early  and 
rude  experiences  there  were  inductively  reached,  vague 
but  partially  true  notions  respecting  the  overbalancing 
of  bodies,  the  motions  of  missiles,  the  actions  of  levers ; 
so  by  early  and  rude  experiences  there  were  in- 
ductively reached,  vague  but  partially  true  notions 
respecting  the  effects  of  men's  behavior  on  themselves, 
on  one  another,  and  on  society :  to  a  certain  extent 
serving  in  the  last  i ;ase,  as  in  the  first,  for  the  guidance 
of  conduct.  Moreover,  as  this  rudimentary  mechani- 
cal knowledge,  though  still  remaining  empirical,  be- 
comes  during  early  stages  of  civilization  at  once  more 
definite  and  more  extensive;  so  during  early  stages 
of  civilization  these  ethical  ideas,  still  retaining  their 
empirical  character,  increase  in  precision  and  multiplic- 
ity. But  just  as  we  have  seen  that  mechanical  knowl- 
edge of  the  empirical  sort  can  evolve  into  mechanical 
science  only  by  first  omitting  all  qualifying  circum- 
stances, and  generalizing   in  absolute   ways  the   funda- 


A^SOijl  fE  A  Xl>  RELATIVE  ETHICS.  321 

mental  laws  of  forces;  so  here  we  have  to  see  that 
empirical  ethics  can  evolve  into  rational  ethics  only  by 
first  neglecting  all  complicating  incidents,  and  formulat- 
ing the  laws  of  right  action  apart  from  the  obscuring 
effects  of  special  conditions.  And  the  final  implication 
is  that  just  as  the  system  of  mechanical  truths,  conceived 
in  ideal  separation  as  absolute,  becomes  applicable  to 
real  mechanical  problems  in  such  way  that  making 
allowance  for  all  incidental  circumstances  there  can  be 
reached  conclusions  far  nearer  to  the  truth  than  could 
otherwise  be  reached  ;  so  a  system  of  ideal  ethical  truths, 
expressing  the  absolutely  right,  will  be  applicable  to  the 
questions  of  our  transitional  state  in  such  ways  that, 
allowing  for  the  friction  of  an  incomplete  life  and  the 
imperfection  of  existing  natures,  we  may  ascertain  with 
approximate  correctness  what  is  the  relatively  right. 

§  105.  In  a  chapter  entitled  "  Definition  of  Morality  " 
in  facial  Statics,  1  contended  that  the  moral  law,  prop- 
erly so-called,  is  the  law  of  the  perfect  man — is  the 
formula  of  ideal  conduct — is  the  statement  in  all  cases  of 
that  which  should  be,  and  cannot  recognize  in  its  prop- 
ositions any  elements  implying  existence  of  that  which 
should  not  be.  Instancing  questions  concerning  the 
right  course  to  be  taken  in  cases  where  wrong  has 
already  been  done,  I  alleged  that  the  answers  to  such 
questions  cannot  be  given  "  on  purely  ethical  principles." 
I  argued  that : 

'  No  conclusions  can  lay  claim  to  absolute  truth,  but  such  as 
depend  upon  truths  that  are  themselves  absolute.  Before  there 
can  be  exactness  in  an  inference,  there  must  be  exactness  in  the 
antecedent  propositions.  A  geometrician  requires  that  the  straight 
lines  with  which  he  deals  shall  be  veritably  straight ;  and  that  his 
circles,  and  ellipses,  and  parabolas  shall  agree  with  precise  deftni  • 

til 


322  THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 

ticns — shall  perfectly  ami  invariably  answer  to  specified  equations. 
If  you  put  to  him  a  question  in  which  these  conditions  are  not  com- 
plied  with,  he  tells  you  that  it  cannot  be  answered.  So  likewise 
is  it  with  the  philosophical  moralist.  He  treats  solely  of ,  the  straight 
man.  lie  determines  the  properties  of  the  straight  man  :  describes 
how  the  straight  man  comports  himself  ;  shows  in  what  relation- 
ship he  stands  to  other  straight  men  ;  shows  how  a  community  of 
straight  men  is  constituted.  Any  deviation  from  strict  rectitude 
he  is  obliged  wholly  to  ignore.  It  cannot  be  admitted  into  his  prem- 
ises without  vitiating  all  his  conclusions.  A  problem  in  which  a 
crooked  man  forms  one  of  the  elements  is  insoluble  to  him." 

Referring  to  this  view,  specifically  in  the  first  edition 
of  the  Methods  of  Mhies,  but  more  generally  in  the 
second  edition,  Mr.  Sidgwick  says  : 

"  Those  who  take  this  view  adduce  the  analogy  of  Geometry  to 
show  that  Ethics  ought  to  deal  with  ideally  perfect  human  rela- 
tions, just  as  Geometry  treats  of  ideally  perfect  lines  and  circles. 
But  the  most  irregular  line  has  definite  spatial  relations  with  which 
Geometry  does  not  refuse  to  deal :  though  of  course  they  are  more 
complex  than  those  of  a  straight  line.  So  in  Astronomy,  it  would 
be  more  convenient  for  purposes  of  study  if  the  stars  moved  in 
circles,  as  was  once  believed  ;  but  the  fact  that  they  move  not  in 
circles  but  in  ellipses,  and  even  in  imperfect  and  perturbed  ellipses, 
ot  take  them  out  of  the  sphere  of  scientific  investigation:  by 
patience  and  industry  we  have  learned  how  to  reduce  to  principles 
and  calculate  even  these  more  complicated  motions.  It  is,  no 
doubt,  a  convenient  artifice  for  purposes  of  instruction  to  assume 
thai  the  planets  move  in  perfect  ellipses  (or  even— at  an  earlier 
Btage  of  study— in  circles):  we  thus  allow  the  individual's  knowl- 
edge to  ],: ass  through  the  same  graftal  ions  in  accuracy  as  that  of 

the  race  has  done.  But  what  we  want,  as  astronomers,  toknowis 
the  actual  motion  of  the  stars  and  its  causes:  and  similarly  as 
moralists  we  naturally  inquire  what  ought  to  be  done  in  the  actual 
world  in  which  we  live."     (P.  19,  2d.  ed.) 

Beginning  with  the  first  of  these  two  statements, 
winch  concerns  Geometry,  I  must  confess  myself  sur- 
|         1.  to  find  my  propositions  called  into  question;  and 


AliSOL UTE  AND  U EL ATIVE  ETHICS.  323 

after  full  consideration  I  remain  at  a  loss  to  under- 
stand Mr.  Sidgwick's  mode  of  viewing  the  matter. 
When,  in  a  sentence  preceding  those  quoted  above,  I 
remarked  on  the  impossibility  of  solving  "mathemati- 
cally a  scries  of  problems  respecting  crooked  lines  and 
broken-back  curves,"  it  never  occurred  to  me  that  I 
should  be  met  by  the  direct  assertion  that  "  Geometry 
does  not  refuse  to  deal  "  with  "  the  most  irregular 
line."  Mr.  Sidgwick  states  that  an  irregular  line,  say 
such  as  a  child  makes  in  scribbling,  has  "  definite 
spatial  relations."  What  meaning  does  he  here  give 
to  the  word  "  definite  ? "  If  he  means  that  its  rela- 
tions to  spaee  at  large  are  definite  in  the  sense  that  by 
an  infinite  intelligence  they  would  be  definable,  the 
reply  is  that  to  an  infinite  intelligence  all  spatial  rela- 
tions would  be  definable ;  there  could  be  no  indefinite 
spatial  relations — the  word  "definite"  thus  ceasing  to 
mark  any  distinction.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  when 
saying  that  an  irregular  line  has  "definite  spatial  rela- 
tions," he  means  relations  knowable  definitely  by  human 
intelligence,  there  still  comes  the  question,  how  is  the 
word  "  definite  "  to  be  understood  ?  Surely  anything 
distinguished  as  definite  admits  of  being  defined  ;  but 
how  can  we  define  an  irregular  line?  And  if  we  cannot 
define  the  irregular  line  itself,  how  can  we  know  its 
"•spatial  relations"  definite?  And  how,  in  the  absence 
of  definition,  can  Geometry  deal  with  it?  If  Mr. 
Sidgwick  means  that  it  can  be  dealt  with  by  the 
"  method  of  limits,"  then  the  reply  is  that  in  such  case, 
not  the  line  itself  is  dealt  with  geometrically,  hut  certain 
definite  lines  artificially  put  in  quasi-definite  relations 
to  it,  the  indefinite  becomes  cognizable  only  through  the 
medium  of  the  hypothetically  definite. 


324  THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 

Turning  to  the  second  illustration,  the  rejoinder  to 
be  made  is  that  in  so  far  as  it  concerns  the  relations 
between  the  ideal  and  the  real,  the  analog}'-  drawn 
does  not  shake  but  strengthens  my  argument.  For 
whether  considered  under  its  geometrical  or  under  its 
dynamical  aspect,  and  whether  considered  in  the  nec- 
essary order  of  its  development  or  in  the  order  histor- 
ically displayed,  Astronomy  shows  us  throughout  that 
truths  respecting  simple,  theoretically-exact  relations, 
must  be  ascertained  before  truths  respecting  the  com- 
plex and  practically  inexact  relations  that  actually  exist 
can  be  ascertained.  As  applied  to  the  interpretation  of 
planetary  movements,  we  see  that  the  theory  of  cycles 
and  epicycles  was  based  on  pre-existing  knowledge  of 
the  circle :  the  properties  of  an  ideal  curve  having  been 
learned,  a  power  was  acquired  of  giving  some  expression 
to  the  celestial  motions.  We  see  that  the  Copernican 
interpretation  expressed  the  facts  in  terms  of  circular 
movements  otherwise  distributed  and  combined.  We 
see  that  Kepler's  advance  from  the  conception  of  circular 
movements  to  the  conception  of  elliptic  movements  was 
made  possible  by  comparing  the  facts  as  they  are  with 
the  facts  as  they  would  be  were  the  movements  circular. 
We  see  that  the  subsequently-learned  deviations  from 
elliptic  movements  were  learned  only  through  the  pre- 
supposition that  the  movements  are  elliptical.  And  we 
see,  lastly,  that  even  now  predictions  concerning  the 
exact  positions  of  planets,  after  taking  account  of  per- 
turbations, imply  constant  references  to  ellipses  that  are 
regarded  as  their  normal  or  average  orbits  for  the  time 
being.  Thus,  ascertainment  of  the  actual  truths  has  been 
made  possible  only  by  preascertainment  of  certain  ideal 
truths,     To  be  convinced  that  by  no  other  course  could 


ABSOLUTE  AND  RELATIVE  ETHICS.  325 

the  actual  truths  have  been  ascertained,  it  needs  only  to 
suppose  any  one  saying  that  it  did  not  concern  him,  as 
an  astronomer,  to  know  anything  about  the  properties 
of  circles  and  ellipses,  but  that  he  had  to  deal  with  the 
Solar  System  as  it  exists,  to  which  end  it  was  his  busi- 
ness to  observe  and  tabulate  positions  and  directions 
and  to  be  guided  by  the  facts  as  he  found  them. 

So,  too,  is  it  if  we  look  at  the  development  of  dynam- 
ical astronomy.  The  first  proposition  in  Newton's 
Principia  deals  with  the  movement  of  a  single  body 
round  a  single  centre  of  force ;  and  the  phenomena  of 
central  motion  are  first  formulated  in  a  case  which  is 
not  simply  ideal,  but  in  which  there  is  no  specification 
of  the  force  concerned:  detachment  from  the  real  is 
the  greatest  possible.  Again,  postulating  a  principle  of 
action  conforming  to  an  ideal  law,  the  theory  of  gravita- 
tion deals  with  the  several  problems  of  the  Solar  System  in 
fictitious  detachment  from  the  rest ;  and  it  makes  certain 
fictitious  assumptions,  such  as  that  the  mass  of  each 
body  concerned  is  concentrated  in  its  centre  of  gravity. 
Only  later,  after  establishing  the  leading  truths  by 
this  artifice  of  disentangling  the  major  factors  from  the 
minor  factors,  is  the  theory  applied  to  the  actual  prob- 
lems in  their  ascending  degrees  of  complexity ;  taking 
in  more  and  more  of  the  minor  factors.  And  if  we  ask 
whether  the  dynamics  of  the  Solar  System  could  have 
been  established  in  any  other  way,  we  see  that  here,  too, 
simple  truths  holding  under  ideal  conditions,  have  to  be 
ascertained  before  real  truths  existing  under  complex 
conditions  can  be  ascertained. 

The  alleged  necessary  precedence  of  Absolute  Ethics 
over  Relative  Ethics  is  thus,  I  think,  further  elucidated. 
One  who  has  followed  the  general  argument  thus  far, 


326  THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 

will  not  deny  that  an  ideal  social  being  may  be  con- 
ceived as  so  constituted  that  his  spontaneous  activities 
are  congruous  with  the  conditions  imposed  by  the 
social  environment  formed  by  other  such  beings.  In 
many  places,  and  in  various  ways,  I  have  argued  that 
conformably  with  the  laws  of  evolution  in  general,  and 
conformably  with  the  laws  of  organization  in  particular, 
there  has  been,  and  is,  in  progress,  an  adaptation  of 
humanity  to  the  social  state,  changing  it  in  the  direc- 
tion of  such  an  ideal  congruity.  And  the  corollary 
before  drawn  and  here  repeated,  is  that  the  ultimate 
man  is  one  in  whom  this  process  has  gone  so  far  as  to 
produce  a  correspondence  between  all  the  promptings 
of  his  nature  and  all  the  requirements  of  his  life  as 
carried  on  in  society.  If  so  it  is  a  necessary  implica- 
tion that  there  exists  an  ideal  code  of  conduct  formu- 
lating the  behavior  of  the  completely  adapted  man  in 
the  completely  evolved  society.  Such  a  code  is  that 
here  called  Absolute  Ethics  as  distinguished  from  Rela- 
tive Ethics — a  code  the  injunctions  of  which  are  alone 
to  be  considered  as  absolutely  right  in  contrast  with 
those  that  are  relatively  right  or  least  wrong;  and 
which,  as  a  system  of  ideal  conduct,  is  to  serve  as  a 
standard  for  our  guidance  in  solving,  as  well  as  we  can, 
the  problems  of  real  conduct. 

§  10.",.  A  clear  conception  of  this  matter  is  so  impor- 
tant thai  I  must  he  excused  for  bringing  in  aid  of  it  a 
further  illustration,  more  obviously  appropriate  as  being 
furnished  by  organic  science  instead  of  by  inorganic 
science.  The  relatioD  between  morality  proper  and 
morality,  as  commonly  conceived,  is  analogous  to  the 
relation  between   physiology  and  pathology ;  and  the 


ABSOLUTE  AND  RELATIVE  ETUTCS.  327 

course  usually  pursued  by  moralists  is  much  like  tbe 
course  of  one  who  studies  pathology  without  Tjrevious 
study  of  physiology, 

Physiology  describes  the  various  functions  which,  as 
combined,  constitute  and  maintain  life;  and  in  treating 
of  them  it  assumes  that  they  arc  severally  performed  in 
right  ways,  in  due  amounts,  and  in  proper  order  ;  it  rec- 
ognizes only  healthy  functions.  If  it  explains  diges- 
tion, it  supposes  that  the  heart  is  supplying  blood  and 
that  the  visceral  nervous  system  is  stimulating  the 
organs  immediately  concerned.  If  it  gives  a  theory  of 
the  circulation,  it  assumes  that  blood  has  been  produced 
by  the  combined  actions  of  the  structures  devoted  to  its 
production,  and  that  it  is  properly  aerated.  If  the  re- 
lations between  respiration  and  the  vital  processes  at 
large  are  interpreted,  it  is  on  the  presupposition  that 
the  heart  goes  on  sending  blood,  not  only  to  the  lungs 
and  to  certain  nervous  centres,  but  to  the  diaphragm 
and  intercostal  muscles.  Physiology  ignores  failures  in 
the  actions  of  these  several  organs.  It  takes  no  account 
of  imperfections,  it  neglects  derangements,  it  does  not 
recognize  pain,  it  knows  nothing  of  vital  wrong.  It 
simply  formulates  that  which  goes  on  as  a  result  of  com- 
plete adaptation  of  all  parts  to  all  needs.  That  is  to 
say,  in  relation  to  the  inner  actions  constituting  bodily 
life,  physiological  theory  has  a  position  like  that  which 
ethical  theory,  under  its  absolute  form  as  above  con- 
ceived, has  to  the  outer  actions  constituting  conduct. 
The  moment  cognizance  is  taken  of  excess  of  function, 
or  arrest  of  function,  or  defect  of  function,  with  the 
resulting  evil,  physiology  passes  into  pathology.  We 
begin  now  to  take  account  of  wrong  actions  in  the  inner 


328  THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 

life  analogous  to  the  wrong  actions  in  the  outer  life 
taken  account  of  by  ordinary  theories  of  morals. 

The  antithesis  thus  drawn,  however,  is  but  prelimi- 
nary. After  observing  the  fact  that  there  is  a  science 
of  vital  actions  normally  carried  on,  which  ignores 
abnormal  actions,  we  have  more  especially  to  observe 
that  the  science  of  abnormal  actions  can  reach  such 
defmiteness  as  is  possible  to  it  only  on  condition  that 
the  science  of  normal  actions  has  previously  become 
definite  ;  or  rather,  let  us  say  that  pathological  science 
depends  for  its  advances  on  previous  advances  made 
by  physiological  science.  The  very  conception  of  dis- 
ordered action  implies  a  preconception  of  well-ordered 
action.  Before  it  can  be  decided  that  the  heart  is 
beating  faster  or  slower  than  it  should,  its  healthy  rate 
of  beating  must  be  learned ;  before  the  pulse  can  be 
recognized  as  too  weak  or  too  strong,  its  proper 
strength  must  be  known,  and  so  throughout.  Even 
the  rudest  and  most  empirical  ideas  of  diseases  pre- 
suppose ideas  of  the  healthy  states  from  which  they 
are  deviations,  and,  obviously,  the  diagnosis  of  diseases 
can  become  scientific  only  as  fast  as  there  arises 
scientific  knowledge  of  organic  actions  that  are  un- 
diseased. 

Similarly,  then,  is  it  with  the  relation  between  abso- 
lute morality,  or  the  law  of  perfect  right  in  human 
conduct,  and  relative  morality  which,  recognizing 
wrong  in  human  conduct,  lias  to  decide  in  what  way 
the  wrong  deviates  from  the  right,  and  how  the  right  is 
to  be  most  nearly  approached.  When,  formulating 
normal  conduct  in  an  ideal  society,  we  have  reached  a 
■cience  of  absolute  ethics,  we  have  simultaneously 
reached  a  science   which,  when  used  to  interpret  the 


ABSOLUTE  AND  RELATIVE  ETHICS.  32f+ 

phenomena  of  real  societies  in  their  transitional  states, 
full  of  the  miseries  due  to  non-adaptation  (which  we 
may  call  pathological  states)  enables  us  to  form  approxi- 
mately true  conclusions  respecting  the  natures  of  the 
abnormalities,  and  the  courses  which  tend  most  in  the 
direction  of  the  normal. 

§  106.  And  now  let  it  be  observed  that  the  concep- 
tion of  ethics  thus  set  forth,  strange  as  many  wTill  think 
it,  is  one  which  really  lies  latent  in  the  beliefs  of  moral- 
ists at  large.  Though  not  definitely  acknowledged  it 
is  vaguely  implied  in  many  of  their  propositions. 

From  early  times  downward  we  find  in  ethical  specu- 
lations, references  to  the  ideal  man,  his  acts,  his  feelings, 
his  judgments.  Well-doing  is  conceived  by  Socrates 
as  the  doing  of  "  the  best  man,"  who,  "  as  a  husband- 
man, performs  well  the  duties  of  husbandry;  as  a 
surgeon,  the  duties  of  the  medical  art ;  in  political  life, 
his  duty  toward  the  commonwealth."  Plato,  in  Minos, 
as  a  standard  to  which  State  law  should  conform,  "  postu- 
lates the  decision  of  some  ideal  wise  man,"  and  in 
Laches  the  wise  man's  knowledge  of  good  and  evil  is 
supposed  to  furnish  the  standard:  disregarding  v- the 
maxims  of  the  existing  society  "as  unscientific,  Plato  re- 
gards as  the  proper  guide,  that  "  Idea  of  the  Good  which 
only  a  philosopher  can  ascend  to."  Aristotle  (EtJi.  Bk. 
iii.  ch.  4),  making  the  decisions  of  the  good  man  the 
standard,  says  :  "  For  the  good  man  judges  everything 
rightly,  and  in  every  case  the  truth  appears  so  to  him. 
.  .  .  And,  perhaps,  the  principal  difference  between 
the  good  and  the  bad  man  is  that  the  good  man  sees  the 
truth  in  every  case,  since  he  is,  as  it  were,  the  rule  and 
measure  of  it."     The  Stoics,  too,  conceived  of  "  coin- 


THE  DA  TA   OF  ETHICS. 

plete  rectitude  of  action"  as  that  "which  none  could 
achieve  except  the  wise  man" — the  ideal  man.  And 
Epicurus  had  an  ideal  standard.  He  held  the  virtuous 
to  1 a  tranquil,  undisturbed,  innocuous,  non- 
competitive fruition,  which  approached  most  nearly  to 
the  perfect  happiness  of  the  gods,"  who  "  neither  suffered 
vexation  in  themselves  nor  caused  vexation  to  others."  * 

If,  in  modern  times,  influenced  by  theological  dogmas 
concerning  the  fall  and  human  sinfulness,  and  by  a 
theory  of  obligation  derived  from  the  current  creed, 
moralists  have  less  frequently  referred  to  an  ideal,  yet 
references  are  traceable.  We  see  one  in  the  dictum  of 
Kant — "  Act  according  to  the  maxim  only,  which  you 
can  wish,  at  the  same  time,  to  become  a  universal  law." 
For  this  implies  the  thought  of  a  society  in  which  the 
maxim  is  acted  upon  by  all  and  universal  benefit  recog- 
nized as  the  effect:  there  is  a  conception  of  ideal  con- 
duet  under  ideal  conditions.  And  though  Mr.  Sidgwick, 
in  the  quotation  above  made  from  him,  implies  that 
Ethics  is  concerned  with  man  as  he  is,  rather  than  with 
man  as  lie  should  he:  yet,  in  elsewhere  speaking  of 
Ethics  as  dealing  with  conduct  as  it  should  he,  rather 
than  with  conduct  as  it  is,  he  postulates  ideal  conduct 
and  indirectly  the  ideal  man.  On  his  first  page,  speak- 
ing  of  Ethics  along  with  Jurisprudence  and  Polities,  he 
that  they  are  distinguished  "  by  the  characteristic 
that  they  attempt  to  determine  not  the  actual  but  the 
ideal  —  what  ought  to  exist,  not  what  does  exist." 

I'      i  only  that  these  various  conceptions  of  an 

ideal  conduct,  and  of  an  ideal  humanity,  should  be 
made  consistent  and  definite,  to  bring  them  into  agree- 

*  Most  of  these  quotations  I  make  from  Dr.  Bain's  Mental  and 
Moral  Science. 


ABSOLUTE  AND  RELATIVE  ETTIICS.  331 

ment  with  the  conception  above  set  forth.  At  pr< 
such  conceptions  are  habitually  vague.  The  ideal  man 
having  been  conceived  in  terms  of  the  current  morality, 
is  thereupon  erected  into  a  moral  standard  by  which  the 
goodness  of  actions  may  he  judged;  and  the  reasoning 
becomes  circular.  To  make  the  ideal  man  serve  as  ;i 
standard,  he  has  to  he  defined  in  terms  of  the  conditions 
which  his  nature  fulfills — in  terms  of  those  objective 
requirements  which  must  be  met  before  conduct  can  be 
right ;  and  the  common  defect  of  these  conceptions  of 
the  ideal  man  is  that  they  suppose  him  out  of  relation 
to  such  conditions. 

All  the  above  references  to  him,  direct  or  indirect, 
imply  that  the  ideal  man  is  supposed  to  live  and  act 
under  existing  social  conditions.  The  tacit  inquiry  is, 
not  what  his  actions  would  be  under  circumstances 
altogether  changed,  but  what  they  would  be  under  pres- 
ent circumstances.  And  this  inquiry  is  futile  for  two 
reasons.  The  co-existence  of  a  perfect  man  and  an  im- 
perfect society  is  impossible  ;  and  could  the  two  co-exist, 
the  resulting  conduct  would  not  furnish  the  ethical 
standard  sought. 

In  the  fust  place,  given  the  laws  of  life  as  they  are, 
and  a  man  of  ideal  nature  cannot  be  produced  in  a 
society  consisting  of  men  having  natures  remote  from 
the  ideal.  As  well  might  we  expect  a  child  of  English 
type  to  be  born  among  Negroes,  as  expeel  that  among 
the  organically  immoral,  one  who  is  organically  moral 
Avill  arise.  Unless  it  be  denied  that  character  results 
from  inherited  structure,  it  must  be  admitted  that  since, 
in  any  society,  each  individual  descends  from  a  stock 
which,  traced  back  a  few  generations,  ramifies  every- 
where through  the  society,  and  participates  in  its  aver* 


332  THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 

age  nature,  there  must,  notwithstanding  marked  in- 
dividual diversities,  be  preserved  such  community  as 
prevents  any  one  from  reaching  an  ideal  form  while  the 
rest  remain  far  below  it. 

In  the  second  place,  ideal  conduct  such  as  ethical 
theory  is  concerned  with,  is  not  possible  for  the  ideal 
man  in  the  midst  of  men  otherwise  constituted.  An 
absolutely  just  or  perfectly  sympathetic  person,  could 
not  live  and  act  according  to  his  nature  in  a  tribe  of 
cannibals.  Among  people  who  are  treacherous  and 
utterly  without  scruple,  entire  truthfulness  and  open- 
ness must  bring  ruin.  If  all  around  recognize  only  the 
law  of  the  strongest,  one  whose  nature  will  not  allow 
him  to  inflict  pain  on  others  must  go  to  the  wall.  There 
requires  a  certain  congruity  between  the  conduct  of  each 
member  of  a  society  and  other's  conduct.  A  mode  of 
action  entirely  alien  to  the  prevailing  modes  of  action 
cannot  be  successfully  persisted  in — must  eventuate  in 
death  of  self,  or  posterity,  or  both. 

Hence  it  is  manifest  that  we  must  consider  the  ideal 
man  as  existing  in  the  ideal  social  state.  On  the  evo- 
lution hypothesis,  the  two  presuppose  one  another; 
and  only  when  they  co-exist  can  there  exist  that  ideal 
conduct  which  Absolute  Ethics  has  to  formulate,  and 
which  Relative  Ethics  has  to  take  as  the  standard  by 
which  to  estimate  divergencies  from  right,  or  degreea 
of  wrong. 


THE  SCOPE  OF  ETIIICH.  333 


CHAPTER  XVI. 


THE   SCOPE   OF    ETHICS. 


§  107.  At  the  outset  it  was  shown  that  as  the  con- 
duct with  which  Ethics  deals  is  a  part  of  conduct  at 
large,  conduct  at  large  must  be  understood  before  this 
part  can  be  understood.  After  taking  a  general  view 
of  conduct,  not  human  only  but  sub-human,  and  not  only 
as  existing  but  as  evolving,  we  saw  that  Ethics  has  for 
its  subject-matter  the  most  highly-evolved  conduct  as 
displayed  by  the  most  highly-evolved  being,  Man — is  a 
specification  of  those  traits  which  his  conduct  assumes 
on  reaching  its  limit  of  evolution.  Conceived  thus  as 
comprehending  the  laws  of  right  living  at  large,  Ethics 
has  a  wider  field  than  is  commonly  assigned  to  it.  Be- 
yond the  conduct  commonly  approved  or  reprobated  as 
right  or  wrong,  it  includes  all  conduct  which  furthers 
or  hinders,  in  either  direct  or  indirect  ways,  the  welfare 
of  self  or  others. 

As  foregoing  chapters  in  various  places  imply,  the 
entire  field  of  Ethics  includes  the  two  great  divisions, 
personal  and  social.  There  is  a  class  of  actions  directed 
to  personal  ends,  which  are  to  be  judged  in  their  rela- 
tions to  personal  well-being,  considered  apart  from  the 
well-being  of  others:  though  they  secondarily  affect 
fellow-men  these  primarily  affect  the  agent  himself, 
an4  must  be   classed   as    intrinsically    right  or  wrong 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 

according  to  their  beneficial  or  detrimental  effects  on 
him.  There  are  actions  of  another  class  which  affect 
fellow-men  immediately  and  remotely,  and  which, 
though  their  results  to  self  are  not  to  be  ignored,  must 
be  judged  as  good  or  bad  mainly  by  their  results  to 
others.  Actions  of  this  last  class  fall  into  two  groups. 
Those  of  the  one  group  achieve  ends  in  ways  that  do  or 
do  not  unduly  interfere  with  the  pursuit  of  ends  by 
others — actions  which,  because  of  this  difference,  we 
call  respectively  unjust  or  just.  Those  forming  the 
oilier  group  are  of  a  kind  which  influence  the  states  of 
others  without  directly  interfering  with  the  relations 
between  their  labors  and  the  results,  in  one  way  or  the 
other — actions  which  we  speak  of  as  beneficent  or  mal- 
eficent. And  the  conduct  which  we  regard  as  beneficent 
is  itself  subdivisible  according  as  it  shows  us  a  self-re- 
lod  to  avoid  giving  pain,  or  an  expenditure  of  effort 
to  give  pleasure — negative  beneficence  and  positive 
beneficence. 

Bach  of  these  divisions  and  subdivisions  has  to  be 
considered  first  as  a  part  of  Absolute  Ethics  and  then 
as  a  part  of  Relative  Ethics-.  Having  seen  what  its  in- 
junctions must  be  for  the  ideal  man  under  the  implied 
ideal  conditions,  we  shall  be  prepared  to  see  how  such 
injunctions  are  to  be  most  nearly  fulfilled  by  actual  men 
under  existing  conditions. 

§  108.  For  reasons  already  pointed  out,  a  code  of 
perfect  personal  conduct  can  never  be  made  definite. 
Many  forms  of  life-,  diverging  from  one  another  in  con- 
siderable .  may  be  so  carried  on  in  society  as 
entirely  to  fulfill  the  conditions  to  harmonious  co-oper- 
ation.    Aiid  if  various  types  of  men,  adapted  to  various 


THE  SCOPE  OF  ETHICS.  335 

types  of  activities,  may  thus  lead  Lives  that  are  severally 
complete  after  their  kinds,  no  specific  statement  of  the 
activities  universally  required  for  personal  well-being  is 
possible. 

But,  though  the  particular  requirements  to  be  ful- 
filled for  perfect  individual  well-being  must  vary  along 
with  variations  in  the  material  conditions  of  each  society, 
certain  general  requirements  have  to  be  fulfilled  by  the 
individuals  of  all  societies.  An  average  balance  be- 
tween waste  and  nutrition  has  universally  to  be  pre- 
served. Normal  vitality  implies  a  relation  between 
activity  and  rest  falling  within  moderate  limits  of  vari- 
ation. Continuance  of  the  society  depends  on  satisfac- 
tion of  those  primarily  personal  needs  which  result  in 
marriage  and  parenthood.  Perfection  of  individual  life 
hence  implies  certain  modes  of  action  which  are  approxi- 
mately alike  in  all  eases,  and  which,  therefore,  become 
part  of  the  subject  matter  of  Ethics. 

That  it  is  possible  to  reduce  even  this  restricted  part  to 
scientific  definiteness,  can  scarcely  be  said.  But  ethical 
requirements  may  here  be  to  such  extent  affiliated  upon 
physical  necessities,  as  to  give  them  a  partially  scientific 
authority.  It  is  clear  that  between  the  expenditure  of 
bodily  substance  in  vital  activities,  and  the  taking  in  of 
materials  from  which  this  substance  may  be  renewed, 
there  is  a  direct  relation.  It  is  clear,  too,  that  there  is 
a  direct  relation  between  the  wasting  of  tissue  by 
effort,  and  the  need  for  those  cessations  of  effort 
during  which  repair  may  overtake  waste.  Nor  is  it  less 
clear  that  between  the  rate  of  mortality  and  the  rate  of 
multiplication  in  any  society,  there  is  a  relation  such 
that  the  last  must  reach  a  certain  level  before  it  can 
balance    the    first,    and    prevent   disappearance    of    the 


836  THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 

society.  And  it  may  be  inferred  that  pursuits  of  other 
leading  ends  are,  in  like  manner,  determined  by  certain 
natural  necessities,  and  from  these  derive  their  ethical 
sanctions.  That  it  will  ever  be  practicable  to  lay  down 
precise  rules  for  private  conduct  in  conformity  with 
such  requirements,  may  be  doubted.  But  the  function 
of  Absolute  Ethics  in  relation  to  private  conduct  will 
have  been  discharged  when  it  has  produced  the  warrant 
for  its  requirements  as  generally  expressed ;  when  it 
has  shown  the  imperativeness  of  obedience  to  them ; 
and  when  it  has  thus  taught  the  need  for  deliberately 
considering  whether  the  conduct  fulfills  them  as  well 
may  be. 

Under  the  ethics  of  personal  considered  in  relation  to 
existing  conditions,  have  to  come  all  questions  concern- 
ing the  degree  in  which  immediate  personal  welfare 
has  to  be  postponed,  either  to  ultimate  personal  welfare 
or  to  the  welfare  of  others.  As  now  carried  on,  life 
hourly  sets  the  claims  of  present  self  against  the  claims 
of  future  self,  and  hourly  brings  individual  interests 
face,  to  face  with  the  interests  of  other  individuals, 
taken  singly  or  as  associated.  In  many  of  such  cases 
the  decisions  can  be  nothing  more  than  compromises ; 
and  ethical  science,  here  necessarily  empirical,  can  do 
no  more  than  aid  in  making  compromises  that  are  the 
least  objectionable.  To  arrive  at  the  best  compromise 
in  any  case,  implies  correct  conceptions  of  the  alterna- 
tive results  of  this  or  that  course.  And,  consequently, 
in  so  f;ir  as  the  absolute  ethics  of  individual  conduct 
can  be  made  definite,  it  must  help  us  to  decide  between 
conflicting  personal  requirements,  and  also  between  the 
needs  for  asserting  self  and  the  needs  for  subordinating 
»elf. 


THE  SCOPE  OF  ETniCS.  337 

§  100.  From  that  division  of  Ethics  which  deals  with 
the  right  regulation  of  private  conduct,  considered 
apart  from  the  effects  directly  produced  on  others, 
we  pass  now  to  that  division  of  Ethics  which,  consider- 
ing exclusively  the  effects  of  conduct  on  others,  treats 
of  the  right  regulation  of  it  with  a  view  to  such  effects. 

The  first  set  of  regulations  coming  under  this  head 
are  those  concerning  what  we  distinguish  as  justice. 
Individual  life  is  possible  only  on  condition  that  each 
organ  is  paid  for  its  action  by  an  equivalent  of  blood, 
while  the  organism  as  a  whole  obtains  from  the  envi- 
ronment assimilable  matters  that  compensate  for  its 
efforts;  and  the  mutual  dependence  of  parts  in  the 
social  organism  necessitates  that,  alike  for  its  total  life 
and  the  lives  of  its  units,  there  similarly  shall  be  main- 
tained a  due  proportion  between  returns  and  labors: 
the  natural  relation  between  work  and  welfare  shall  be 
preserved  intact.  Justice,  which  formulates  the  range 
of  conduct  and  limitations  to  conduct  hence  arising,  is 
at  once  the  most  important  division  of  Ethics  and  the 
division  which  admits  of  the  greatest  defmiteness. 
That  principle  of  equivalence  which  meets  us  when 
we  seek  its  roots  in  the  laws  of  individual  life,  involves 
the  idea  of  measure;  and  on  passing  to  social  life,  the 
same  principle  introduces  us  to  the  conception  of 
equity  or  equalness,  in  the  relations  of  citizens  to  one 
another:  the  elements  of  the  questions  arising  are 
quantitative,  and  hence  the  solutions  assume  a  more 
scientific  form.  Though,  having  to  recognize  differ- 
ences among  individuals  due  to  age,  sex,  or  other 
cause,  we  cannot  regard  the  members  of  a  society  as 
absolutely    equal,   and     therefore    cannot    deal     with 

problems    growing  out    of    their    relations    with  that 
22 


33  8  THE  HA  TA  OF  ETHICS. 

precision  which  absolute  equality  might  make  possi- 
ble:  yet,  considering  them  as  approximately  equal  in 
virtue  of  their  common  human  nature,  and  dealing 
with  <[  nest  ions  of  equity  on  this  supposition,  we  may 
reach  conclusions  of  a  sufficiently  definite  kind. 

This  division  of  Ethics,  considered  under  its  absolute 
form,  has  to  define  the  equitable  relations  among 
perfect  individuals  who  limit  one  another's  spheres  of 
action  by  co-existing,  and  who  achieve  their  ends  by 
co-operation.  It  has  to  do  much  more  than  this.  Be- 
yond justice  between  man  and  man,  justice  between 
each  man  and  the  aggregate  of  men  has  to  be  dealt 
with  by  it.  The  relations  between  the  individual  and 
the  State,  considered  as  representing  all  individuals, 
have  to  be  deduced — an  important  and  a  relatively 
difficult  matter.  What  is  the  ethical  warrant  for  gov- 
ernmental authority  ?  To  what  ends  may  it  be  legiti- 
mately exercised  ?  How  far  may  it  rightly  be  carried  ? 
Up  to  what  point  is  the  citizen  bound  to  recognize  the 
collective  decisions  of  other  citizens,  and  beyond  what 
point  may  he  properly  refuse  to  obey  them  ? 

These  relations,  private  and  public,  considered  as 
maintained  under  ideal  conditions,  having  been  formu- 
lated, there  come  to  be  dealt  with  the  analogous  rela- 
tions under  real  conditions — absolute  justice  being  the 
standard,  relative  justice  has  to  be  determined  by  con- 
sidering how  near  an  approach  may,  under  present 
circumstances,  be  made  to  it.  As  already  implied  in 
various  places,  it  is  impossible  during  stages  of  transi- 
tion which  necessitate  ever  changing  compromises,  to 
fulfill  the  dictates  of  absolute  equity  ;  and  nothing 
beyond  empirical  judgments  can  be  formed  of  the 
extent  to  which   they  m;iy  be,  at  any  given   time,  ful- 


TIIE  SCOPE  OF  ETHICS.  339 

filled.  "While  war  continues  and  injustice  is  done 
between  societies,  there  cannot  be  anything  like  com- 
plete justice  within  each  society.  Militant  organization, 
no  less  than  militant  action,  is  irreconcilable  with  pure 
equity ;  and  the  inequity  implied  by  it  inevitably 
ramifies  throughout  all  social  relations.  But  there  is 
at  every  stage  in  social  evolution  a  certain  range  of 
variation  within  which  it  is  possible  to  approach 
nearer  to,  or  diverge  further  from,  the  requirements 
of  absolute  equity.  Hence  these  requirements  have 
ever  to  be  kept  in  view  that  relative  equity  may  be 
ascertained. 

§  110.  Of  the  two  subdivisions  into  which  benefi- 
cence falls,  the  negative  and  the  positive,  neither  can 
be  specialized.  Under  ideal  conditions  the  first  of 
them  has  but  a  nominal  existence;  and  the  second  of 
them  passes  largely  into  a  transfigured  form  admitting 
of  but  general  definition. 

In  the  conduct  of  the  ideal  man  among  ideal  men, 
that  self-regulation  which  lias  for  its  motive  to  avoid 
giving  pain,  practically  disappears.  No  one  having 
feelings  which  prompt  acts  that  disagreeably  affect 
others,  there  can  exist  no  code  of  restraints  referring  to 
this  division  of  conduct. 

But  though  negative  beneficence  is  only  a  nominal 
part  of  Absolute  Ethics,  it  is  an  actual  and  considerable 
part  of  Relative  Ethics.  For  while  men's  natures 
remain  imperfectly  adapted  to  social  life,  there  must 
continue  in  them  impulses  which,  causing  in  some 
cases  the  actions  we  name  unjust,  cause  in  other  cases 
the  actions  we  name  unkind — unkind  now  in  deed  and 
now   in   word;    and   in  respect   of  these  modes  of  be- 


340  THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 

havior  which,  though  not  aggressive,  give  pain,  there 
arise  numerous  and  complicated  problems.  Pain  is 
sometimes  given  to  others  simply  by  maintaining  an 
equitable  claim ;  pain  is  at  other  times  given  by  refus- 
ing a  request ;  and  again  at  other  times  by  maintain- 
ing an  opinion.  In  these  and  numerous  cases  sug- 
gested by  them,  there  have  to  be  answered  the 
questions  whether,  to  avoid  inflicting  pain,  personal 
feelings  should  be  sacrificed,  and  how  far  sacrificed. 
Again,  in  cases  of  another  class,  pain  is  given  not  by 
a  passive  course,  but  by  an  active  course.  How  far 
shall  a  person  who  has  misbehaved  be  grieved  by 
showing  aversion  to  him  ?  Shall  one  whose  action  is 
to  be  reprobated  have  the  reprobation  expressed  to 
him  or  shall  nothing  be  said  ?  Is  it  right  to  annoy  by 
condemning  a  prejudice  which  another  displays  ? 
These  and  kindred  queries  have  to  be  answered  after 
taking  into  account  the  immediate  pain  given,  the 
possible  benefit  caused  by  giving  it,  and  the  possible 
evil  caused  by  not  giving  it.  In  solving  problems  of 
this  class,  the  only  help  Absolute  Ethics  gives  is  by 
enforcing  the  consideration  that  inflicting  more  pain 
than  is  necessitated  by  proper  self-regard,  or  by  desire 
for  another's  benefit,  or  by  the  maintenance  of  a 
general  principle,  is  unwarranted. 

Of  positive  beneficence  under  its  absolute  form 
nothing  more  specific  can  be  said  than  that  it  must 
become  co-extensive  with  whatever  sphere  remains  for 
it  ;  aiding  to  complete  the  life  of  each  as  a  recipient 
of  services  and  to  exalt  the  life  of  each  as  a  Tenderer 
of  services.  As  with  a  developed  humanity  the  desire 
for  it  by  every  one  will  so  increase,  and  the  sphere  for 
exercise  of  it  so   decrease,  as  to  involve  an  altruistic 


THE  SCOPE  OF  ETHICS.  341 

competition,  analogous  to  the  existing  egoistic  competi- 
tion, it  may  be  that  Absolute  Ethics  will  eventually 
include  what  we  before  called  a  higher  equity,  prescrib- 
ing the  mutual  limitations  of  altruistic  activities. 

Under  its  relative  form,  positive  beneficence  presents 
numerous  problems,  alike  important  and  difficult, 
admitting  only  of  empirical  solutions.  How  far  is  self- 
sacrifice  for  another's  benefit  to  be  carried  in  each 
case  ? — a  question  which  must  be  answered  differently 
according  to  the  character  of  the  other,  the  needs  of  the 
other,  and  the  various  claims  of  self  and  belongings 
which  have  to  be  met.  To  what  extent  under  given 
circumstances  shall  private  welfare  be  subordinated  to 
public  welfare  ? — a  question  to  be  answered  after  con- 
sidering the  importance  of  the  end  and  the  seriousness 
of  the  sacrifice.  What  benefit  and  what  detriment  will 
result  from  gratuitous  aid  yielded  to  another  ? — a  ques- 
tion in  each  case  implying  an  estimate  of  probabilities. 
Is  there  any  unfair  treatment  of  sundry  others.,  involved 
by  more  than  fair  treatment  of  this  one  other  ?  Up  to 
what  limit  may  help  be  given  to  the  existing  generation 
of  the  inferior,  without  entailing  mischief  on  future 
generations  of  the  superior  ?  Evidently  to  these  and 
many  kindred  questions  included  in  this  division  of 
Relative  Ethics,  approximately  true  answers  only  can 
be  given. 

But  though  here  Absolute  Ethics,  by  the  standard  it 
supplies,  does  not  greatly  aid  Relative  Ethics,  yet,  as  in 
other  cases,  it  aids  somewhat  by  keeping  before  con- 
sciousness an  ideal  conciliation  of  the  various  claims  in- 
Tolved;  and  by  suggesting  the  search  for  such  com- 
promise among  them,  as  shall  not  disregard  any,  but 
shall  satisfy  all  to  the  greatest  extent  practicable. 


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ar.  Lion  of  the  North,  The:  A  Tale  of  Gustavus  Adolphus  and 
the  Wars  of  Religion. 
"  Pictures  the  great  deeds  of  the  Scotch  Brigade."— Athenccum. 

aa.  Lion  of  St.  Mark,  The :    A  Tale  of  Venice  in  the  Four- 
teenth Century. 

"Mr.  Henry  has  never  produced  a  story  more  delightful  whole- 
some  or  vivacious." — Saturday  Review. 

23.  Maori  and  Settler :  A  Story  of  the  New  Zealand  War, 

"  A  book  which  all  young  people,  especially  boys,  will  read  wicb 
avidity." — Alhenawii.  „ 


HENTY  SERIES. 

•4.  Orange  and  Green :  A  Tale  of  the  Boyne  and  the  Limerick. 
"  Should  be  in  the  hands  of  every  young  s'.udent  of  Irish  history.* 
—Belfast  Ac u & 


25.  One  of  the  28th:  A  Tale  of  Waterloo. 
"  Graphic,  picturesque  and  dramatically  t 
Henty  at  his  best  and  brightest." — Observer. 


"  Graphic,  picturesque  and  dramatically  effective.    Shows  us  Mr 
at  his  be 


26.  Out  On  the  Pampas  :  A  Tale  of  South  America. 

"Bright,  interesting  and  instructive." 

27.  St.  George  for  England:  A  Tale  of  Cressy  and  Poitiers. 

"  A  story  of  very  great  interest  for  boys."— Pall  Mall  Gazette. 

28.  Through  the  Fray :  A  Story  of  the  Luddite  Riots. 

"One  of  the  best  of  the  many  good  books  Mr.  Henty  has  pro- 
duced." 

29.  True  to  the  Old  Flag:  A  Tale  of  the  American  War  ot 

Independence. 
"Mr.   Henty  undoubtedly  possesses   the  secret  of  writing  sue 
cessful  historical  tales." — The  Times. 

30.  Under  Drake's  Flag:  A  Tale  of  the  Spanish  Main. 

"There  is  not  a  dull  chapter,  nor  indeed  a  dull  page,  in  the  book" 
— Observer. 

•£.,  With  Clive  in  India,  or  The  Beginning  of  an  Empire. 
"Among  writers  of  stories  of  adventure,  Mr.  Henty  stands  in  the 
very  front  rank." — Academy. 

32.  With  I,ee  in  Virginia:  A  Story  of  the  American  Civil 

War. 
"Capital  and  full  of  variety,  and  presents  us  with  many  scenes  ot 
Southern  life.'  —Times. 

33.  With  Wolfe  in  Canada,  or  The  Winning  of  a  Con- 

tinent. 
■  A  model  of  what  a  boy's  book  shoula  ^,e.* — School  Guardian 

34.  Young   Carthaginian,    The :    A   Story  of  the  Times  of 

Hannibal. 

"  From  first  tr  last  nothing  stays  the  interest  of  the  narrative'  — 
Saturday  Review. 

35.  Young  Buglers  :  A  Tale  of  the  reninsular  War. 

36.  Young  Franc-Tireurs  :    A  Tale  of  the  Franco  Prussian 

War. 

37.  Young  Colonists,  The. 


A  Glance  Tirol!  the  Bond  to  Win  Series  for  Boys. 

BOUND  TO  BE  AN  ELECTRICIAN;  or,  Franklin  Bell's  Suc- 
cess.    By  Edward  Stratka»ykr. 

Although  Mr.  Stratemeyer  has  penned  many  books  for 
boys,  he  has  turned  out  nothing  better  than  this  tale  of  the 
doings  of  a  manly  young  fellow  who  was  bound  to  become 
an  electrician.  Franklin  Bell  starts  out  under  many  diffi- 
culties. He  is  poor  and  has  no  friends  to  assist  him  in 
advancing  himself.  But  a  showing  of  what  pluck  can  do 
at  a  most  perilous  moment  gains  for  him  the  opening  he 
geeks,  and  from  that  time  ort  his  advancement  is  steady. 
From  the  east  he  is  sent  to  Chicago  by  his  employer,  where 
he  experiences  several  remarkable  adventures  on  Lake 
Michigan,  and  clears  up  a  business  complication  involving 
a  large  sum  of  money.  His  enemies  endeavor  to  capture 
him,  and  what  Franklin  does  when  confronted  makes  such 
reading  as  no  wide-awake  boy  would  care  to  miss. 

THE  SCHOOLDAYS  OF  FEED  HABLEY-  or   Blvals  for  A1K 

Honors.    By  Arthub  M.  ^Witivjvld. 

A  bright,  lively,  and  thoroughly  up-to-date  American 
school  story  :s  this  account  of  the  doings  of  Fred  Harley 
and  his  chums  at  the  Maplewood  school.  Never  was  there 
a  more  popular  fellow  than  Fred,  whether  on  the  ball  field, 
in  the  schoolroom  or  on  the  river,  and  the  manner  in  which 
he  turns  upon  his  enemies,  and  saves  them  from  grave 
perils,  teaches  a  lesson  not  easily  forgotten.  The  boye 
from  a  rivnl  school  are  also  introduced,  and  the  pranks  and 
plots  on  both  sides  are  both  comical  and  thrilling,  while 
the  boat-house  secret  is  one  which  is  sure  to  awaken  deep 
interest.  Every  youth  who  reads  this  book  will  wiafc  l& 
knew  Fred  Uarley  and  could  shake  iuaa  by  the  &sa& 


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